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Abstract 
his report tries to delineate the vulnerability of the income position of elderly people 
aged 55 years and over in the member states that have joined the European Union since 
2004, in relation to the demographic, socio-economic and institutional contexts of these 
countries. The main focus is on the degree of poverty. This has been assessed through a cross-
comparative analysis of all countries conducted in 2005, and through in-depth studies showing 
historical trends for Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
The overriding conclusion is that elderly people in these New Member States (NMS) currently 
do not have a very unfavourable income position, in the sense that they experience more relative 
or absolute poverty than their younger compatriots, or evaluate their income position more 
negatively. Of the six countries studied ‘in depth’ here, only in Slovenia are the elderly worse 
off. However, in terms of material deprivation the elderly in all NMS lag behind the EU-15 
members; the least in Slovenia, the most in Poland. 
In the future, however, the income position of the elderly can generally be expected to be in 
decline in most NMS. This is due to various factors: the implementation of new pension 
formulae recently agreed upon; the impact of ageing and external migration, which may make a 
further reduction of the adequacy of pensions necessary; the after-effects of the transition period 
(high unemployment, low accrual of pension rights) affecting certain future elderly cohorts; and 
the decreasing importance of extended families, leading to fewer economies of scale among the 
elderly. There is some variation in the manageability of these problems between countries: in 
the long run, the prospects for reconciling pension adequacy and financial sustainability seem 
better for Estonia than for Slovenia in a number of respects. 
The report suggests reconsidering the way in which the future income position of the elderly is 
monitored. Instead of the standard relative poverty line, a combination of poverty measured in a 
more 'absolute' sense (through a generalised budget approach) and a direct measurement of the 
main dimensions of social exclusion could be more suitable. Furthermore, specific attention 
should be paid to measuring the income risks of marginal elderly groups in the EU's new 
member states, especially the Roma minorities. 
More detailed conclusions can be found in the separate summaries to each chapter and in the 
general discussion in the final chapter. 
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1. Introduction 
Cok Vrooman
* 
t is a common notion that old people tend to be poor; and that this applies all the more so to 
elderly citizens of the countries that have accessed the European Union recently, due to the 
lower general level of wealth and the limited scope of social security and pension schemes 
in these countries. If recent pension system revisions take full effect over the coming decades, 
the income position of the elderly in these New Member States (NMS) may be expected to go 
from bad to worse.  
How plausible is this rather gloomy picture? To what extent is the financial position of the 
elderly in the NMS more vulnerable than that of the old member states (OMS, or EU-15), due to 
a rather unfavourable starting point and the possible impact of pension reforms? This is the 
main issue of the current research report. It tries to delineate the vulnerability of the income 
position of the elderly in the NMS, in relation to the demographic, socio-economic and 
institutional context of these countries. 
More specifically, the report focuses on: 
-  the current level of income of the elderly in the NMS, and the degree of relative poverty; 
-  the way this position is related to the educational and labour market status of the elderly in 
the NMS, their retirement behaviour, institutional arrangements (notably the pension 
system), and demographic developments; 
-  specific problems regarding the income position of possibly ‘marginal’ elderly groups in the 
NMS (such as single elderly female pensioners). 
Throughout the report the elderly have been defined as persons over 55 years of age. This is not 
meant to imply that all people in this age bracket are ‘old’, especially not in any pejorative 
sense. However, in the mid-fifties the likelihood of experiencing health problems increases, 
people are often regarded as less productive or flexible by their employers, and the balance 
between preferences for leisure time and earnings may shift – all of which may make an early 
exit from the labour market an attractive option. From that perspective, the threshold of 55 years 
has been chosen as a bottom line for demarcating the elderly. To do justice to the varied 
situation of the group, the report often makes a further distinction between the young elderly 
(55-64), people just above standard pensionable age (65-74), and the very aged (75+).  
The focus of the report is mainly descriptive, making use of existing survey data. Thus, no 
projections on future sustainability and adequacy of pensions are made here
1, although some 
effort will be made to contemplate the possible implications of our results for the future 
situation of the 55+ group in these countries. 
The report starts with an elaborate cross-comparative analysis of the income position of the 
elderly in all NMS that entered the EU in 2004. This is based on the data of the 2005-wave of 
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Chapter 2 
examines the situation in Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. A comparison of the income position of the 55+ group will be 
                                                      
* The Netherlands Institute for Social Research│SCP, P.O. Box 16164, 2500 BD The Hague, the 
Netherlands. Email: c.vrooman@scp.nl 
1 As mentioned in the proposal of the AIM-project (CEPS 2004), of which the current report is one of the 
outputs, such future projections are made in various other work packages. Several other publications have 
been devoted to this issue as well; cf.  EC 2006, EPC 2006, ISG 2006, OECD 2007. 
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made between these NMS, where about 19 million elderly people live (half of whom in Poland, 
and a further 15% in both Hungary and the Czech Republic); and vis-à-vis the old EU-15 
(containing about 110 million elderly on their territory). EU-SILC does not yet contain data on 
Malta or the two countries that joined the EU in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, so these had to be 
excluded from this chapter.  
The cross-comparative analysis is broad and has the advantage of being based on a standardised 
dataset, but it is rather general as well. A major drawback is that the EU-SILC data do not make 
it possible yet to identify any long-term trends in the income position of the elderly. In order to 
remedy this, the subsequent chapters contain a number of more ‘in-depth’ studies of a selected 
group of NMS: Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (chapters 3-8). This 
selection covers half of the countries that entered the EU in 2004 and 2007, and 77% of the 
current population (78.5 millions inhabitants) of all these recent NMS. 
Making use of country-specific data (mostly household budget surveys and information 
supplied by the National Statistical Offices), the focus in these chapters is more on the historical 
development of the income position of the elderly. These longitudinal data make it possible to 
show the links with the general demographic, economic and labour market trends. Each country 
chapter also contains a brief summary of the institutional context (pension schemes and recent 
reforms), which includes an assessment of the various actors aiming to influence national 
pension policy (such as pensioners’ political parties and affiliations). All of these ‘in-depth’ 
chapters have a similar format, and conclude with a section sketching the possible future 
prospects regarding the income and poverty position of the elderly.  
Each chapter starts with a short summary that outlines the main results. The annexes to the 
various chapters have been gathered at the end of the report. These contain much additional 
material, and are often referred to in the main text. Chapter 9 discusses some of the results at a 
more general level, based on both the cross-comparative and in-depth country analyses. 
This report is the result of collaboration between several partners. The project has been 
coordinated by The Netherlands Institute for Social Research│SCP, which also took care of 
editing the final report. The cross-comparative analysis on the EU-SILC data has been 
performed by the Institute for Economic Research (IER, Ljubljana), which provided the 
Slovenian case study as well. Further country analyses were delivered by the Center for Social 
and Economic Research (CASE, Warsaw; on Estonia and Poland); TARKI Social Research 
Institute in Budapest (the Hungarian and Romanian cases, the latter in collaboration with Mr. 
Lénart at the Corvinus University of Budapest); and the Bratislava Institute of Economic 
Research (the Slovakian case study). 
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2.  Income and poverty among the elderly in the 
new member states: a cross-comparative 
analysis 
Nada Stropnik & Nataša Kump
* 
Summary 
1. This chapter presents the results of an analysis of the absolute and relative income position of 
the elderly (persons aged 55 years and over), their (possible) material hardship, and their 
subjective evaluation of their own situation. It focussed on the situation of the relatively poor 
elderly in the new member states (NMS), is a cross-sectional analysis and is based on the EU-
SILC 2005 database. 
2. Income inequality is higher among the non-elderly than among the elderly in all NMS except 
Cyprus and Slovenia. Cyprus is the country with the highest income inequality among the 
elderly and the only NMS where it exceeds the average one for the population of the EU-15. 
3. By far the highest relative poverty among the elderly was registered in Cyprus (34.3%). Only 
in Cyprus, Latvia and Estonia are the elderly more exposed to poverty than the population of 
the EU-15 on average. In all NMS except Poland the poverty incidence is higher among elderly 
women than among elderly men. The likelihood of being relatively poor is higher for women in 
one-person households than for elderly men living in such households.  
4. Surprisingly, working full-time or part-time results in a higher likelihood of relative poverty 
among the elderly in the NMS than being retired. The reason could be found in formerly general 
retirement conditions and (still) favourable indexation of pensions. The likelihood of being 
relatively poor considerably decreases with: a) an increase in the number of years the person 
spent in paid work, b) attained educational level, and c) the household work intensity status. 
Poor health increases that likelihood. 
5. There is a high correlation between the incidence of relative poverty among the elderly and 
their subjective poverty (making ends meet with difficulty).  
6. Various financial constraints - arrears on mortgage, utility bills, hire purchase instalments or 
other loan payments, incapacity to face unexpected financial expenses, inability to keep the 
home adequately warm, inability to afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish (or vegetarian 
equivalent) every second day, and inability to afford paying for one week’s annual holiday away 
from home - are least frequently faced by the elderly poor in Slovenia and most frequently in 
Poland. The capacity of households in which the poor elderly live to face unexpected financial 
expenses is lower in all NMS than in any of the OMS.  
7. While almost 70% of the poor elderly in the EU-15 own their own housing, the proportions 
are even higher in six NMS, with Lithuania (94%) at the top. Generally, the quality of housing 
is the worst in the Baltic States.  
8. Not being relatively poor does not necessarily mean having enough income to make ends 
meet. It is evident that the average lowest monthly income to make ends meet exceeds the 
relative poverty threshold (60% of equivalised disposable median income) in all NMS and for 
both elderly and non-elderly. This is particularly true for the poor elderly in the Slovak 
Republic.  
                                                      
* Institute for Economic Research (IER), Kardeljeva ploščad 17, 1109 Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Due to an increasing life expectancy and a rising number of elderly people, the issue of the 
economic and material position of the population aged 55 years and over is becoming ever more 
important. This is further stressed by the reforms of pension systems that decrease pension 
entitlements and threaten to push more elderly below the poverty line.  
In this chapter we present the results of our research focused on the absolute and relative income 
position of the elderly, their (possible) material hardship, and their subjective evaluation of their 
own situation. The group of relatively poor elderly is of particular interest.  
Previous research (for instance: Russel and Whelan, 2004; European Commission, 2007a and 
2007b) has shown very interesting differences in various aspects of the economic/material 
position of people in the new and old member states (NMS and OMS). Our analysis 
complements this knowledge by focusing on the persons aged 55 years and over in the NMS. 
The analysis is performed by age groups of the elderly too. Reference is made to the situation of 
the non-elderly (population aged 16-54 years), as well as to the average of the EU-15 (in some 
relevant cases also to individual OMS).  
2.2  Data and methodological aspects 
Our general analysis of the income and poverty position of the elderly in the NMS is cross-
sectional and based on the EU-SILC 2005 database. The surveys were conducted in 2005; most 
of the data on income were collected from administrative bases and refer to 2004. 
Table 2.1 Number of cases, EU-SILC 2005 
Country      Age  (years)       
  16-55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  16 and over 
CY 422,810  43,001  32,692  54,440  37,138 167,270 590,080 
CZ 5,644,918  789,007  578,820  883,384  585,271 2,836,482 8,481,400 
EE 725,692  80,423  70,458  133,627 92,293  376,800  1,102,492 
HU 5,440,939  642,829  563,955  913,297  657,154 2,777,235 8,218,174 
LV 1,186,724  122,439  127,883  211,417 162,355  624,094  1,810,818 
LT 1,875,719  182,440  180,018  311,683 214,275  888,415  2,764,134 
PL 21,817,232  2,478,250  1,503,036  2,913,601 2,230,776  9,125,664  30,942,896 
SK 3,189,514  349,420  258,119  411,847  266,407 1,285,794 4,475,308 
SI 1,138,701  113,246  100,877  183,434 110,624  508,181  1,646,881 
NMS-9 41,442,249  4,801,055  3,415,858  6,016,730 4,356,293  18,589,935 60,032,183 
BE 5,415,858  658,251  495,916  934,709  747,678 2,836,554 8,252,412 
DK 2,726,548  381,428  337,529  445,150  382,167 1,546,273 4,272,821 
DE 42,863,713  4,738,442  5,637,531  10,356,488  4,913,190 25,645,652 68,509,364 
GR 5,751,308  651,355  551,115  1,173,890  838,479 3,214,839 8,966,147 
ES 24,306,185  2,443,668  2,055,905  3,844,902  3,464,326 11,808,800 36,114,985 
FR 30,669,504  3,895,948  3,124,147  5,123,101  4,836,424 16,979,620 47,649,123 
IE 2,357,169  230,488  180,351  254,203 193,825  858,867  3,216,036 
IT 30,359,044  3,916,396  3,593,107  5,753,389  5,663,902 18,926,794 49,285,838 
LU 248,109  26,339  21,333  37,670  24,518 109,860 357,969 
NL 8,811,936  1,106,943  818,866  1,239,936 916,866  4,082,611  12,894,547 
AT 4,422,902  495,839  454,699  715,204  630,651 2,296,393 6,719,295 
PT 5,725,400  633,725  553,977  1,020,794  832,497 3,040,992 8,766,392 
FI 2,674,771  412,897  274,592  451,316  369,157 1,507,962 4,182,733 
SE 4,602,745  621,121  592,263  744,160  793,512 2,751,056 7,353,801 
UK 26,772,222  3,398,360  2,731,430  4,547,162  3,766,566 14,443,517 41,215,739 
EU-15   197,707,413  23,611,198  21,422,761  36,642,072 28,373,759  110,049,790 307,757,203 
EU-24 239,149,662  28,412,253  24,838,619  42,658,802 32,730,052  128,639,725 367,789,386 INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 5 
 
The total sample size is about 400 hundred persons (about 370 million persons after weighting; 
see Table 2.1). It includes persons aged 16 years and over
1 in nine NMS (all except Malta; 
60,032,184 persons) and the EU-15 (307.757.202 persons). They are grouped in two large age 
groups: 16-54 years (for comparison) and 55 years and over (the group of our particular 
interest). We are using the term “non-elderly” for persons aged 16-54 years, and the term 
“elderly” for persons aged 55 years and over. For analytical purposes, the elderly are further 
grouped in four smaller age groups: 55-59, 60-64, 65-75, and 75 and over. 
In spite of the large sample, the problem of small numbers puts limitations on the depth of 
analytical analysis, particularly in the cases where the answers of selected groups of respondents 
were divided by age groups (for instance, when we tried to analyse the reasons for which the 
poor elderly, who needed dental examinations or treatment, had not met their need). 
The modified OECD equivalence scale, originally used in the EU-SILC database, was applied 
in order to allow comparisons across households of a different size and composition. The first 
adult in the household was assigned the weight 1, all other adults 0.5, and each child (below 14 
years of age) the weight 0.3. The sum of values for household members produced the number of 
equivalent adults.  
The disposable household income was calculated using the formula suggested by Eurostat. It 
includes employment income, self-employment income, factor incomes, old-age benefits, 
survivor/disability benefits, other social transfers, private transfers, and the value of own 
consumption. Taxes and interests paid are deducted. 
Subsequently, the disposable household income was equivalised (divided by the number of 
equivalent adults in the household) and attributed to all household members (thus neglecting 
within household differences). An effort was made to find out, by country, which income 
sources sum up to the equivalised disposable income reported in the database.
2 
Although the sample used for the analysis includes only persons aged 16 years and over, 
equivalised household income and indicators per household member also take younger children 
into account. 
A poverty threshold set at 60% of the median equivalised disposable income was used to define 
the relatively poor population. In some cases, however, the comparison with the results obtained 
using a poverty threshold at 50% of the median equivalised disposable income is provided.  
The stress is on the cross-sectional analyses that are not provided by Eurostat. The NMS are 
compared with the EU-15 average and sometimes also with individual old member states. Not 
only the situation of the population aged 55 years and over, but also the within-group 
differences are analysed. Where relevant, the differences in the situation of female elderly, as 
compared to that of elderly men, are pointed out. 
                                                      
1 We focus on the population aged 16 years and over for two reasons: 1) the AIM project is not interested 
in children but rather in the transition to retirement, 2) most personal data are not available for persons 
aged under 16. 
2 Eurostat is aware of the non-coherence between the total disposable income and the sum of its 
components that is probably due to individual non-response. Namely, the compensation for the individual 
non-response for the total income is only taken into account at household level through the implicit 
imputation of missing income records. The compensation for individual non-response for other variables 
is usually done by re-weighing strategy. This double strategy breaks up the consistency between the total 
income and its components at the aggregated level. 6 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
The methods applied in investigating and comparing the economic and material position of the 
elderly include standard poverty and income inequality measures, descriptive statistics, the 
Borda ranking
3 and logistic regression analysis.  
The Borda rankings were created in order to aggregate the indicators of three aspects of material 
deprivation in the twelve month prior to the survey.  
-  Financial constraints include seven indicators: arrears on mortgage, arrears on utility bills, 
arrears on hire purchase instalments or other loan payments, incapacity to face unexpected 
financial expenses, inability to keep home adequately warm, inability to afford a meal with 
meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day, and inability to afford 
paying for one week’s annual holiday away from home. 
-  Health care deprivation means unmet need for medical examination or treatment and unmet 
need for dental examination or treatment. 
-  Housing quality deprivation includes four indicators: average number of rooms per 
household member, absence of a bath or shower in their dwelling, absence of a flush toilet 
in the dwelling, and problems with leaking roofs, damp walls/floors/foundation, or rotting 
window frames or floors. 
Logistic regression was used to identify the factors influencing the probability for the elderly to 
be relatively poor. Our intention was to identify the characteristics of the elderly that determine 
(explain) their lower or higher likelihood of being relatively poor, as compared to the 
characteristics of the reference group. Our model uses demographic, economic and some other 
explanatory variables (covariates). Standard demographic variables related to life cycle include 
sex, age, and attained educational level of the respondent. Five-year age groups are observed 
and an infinite one (75 years or more), and three educational levels (lower secondary or less; 
upper secondary, and post-secondary). The demographic variable ‘household type’ captures the 
household size, differing between two-person households with respect to the age of household 
members (one-person household, two-person household of adults below 65 years of age, two-
person household with at least one adult aged 65 years or over, household with 3 or more 
members). As single female households tend to be one of the most vulnerable groups in many 
countries, an interaction term was included to control for gender in single households.  
Economic characteristics of the elderly and households they live in are brought into the model 
through the variables ‘self-defined economic status' (retired, working full time or part time, 
unemployed, and other inactive
4), number of years spent in paid work (up to 25, 26-34, and 35 
and more),
5 and household work intensity status
6 (no work intensity, low work intensity, and 
high work intensity).
7 Additional explanatory variables are tenure status (living in owned or free 
                                                      
3 The Borda ranking (or Borda count) is a synthetic rank. Countries are first ranked for each indicator; we 
opted for a variant where the lowest rank (1) is assigned to the country with the most favourable situation 
(for instance, the lowest proportion of persons unable to keep their homes adequately warm). Then the 
scores are added up to create a Borda ranking (for details and references see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count). 
4 The last group includes pupils, students, persons on military service, persons fulfilling domestic tasks, 
and other inactive persons. 
5 This variable was omitted from the models for four NMS with between 17% and 54% non-response rate 
(Cyprus, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia). It was retained in the models for other countries 
due to its high statistical significance in explaining the likelihood of being relatively poor.  
6 Household work intensity status is the ratio between ‘worked’ and ‘workable’ months of persons aged 
18-64 years. 
7 The border between low and high work intensity is at half of ‘workable’ months. INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 7 
 
accommodation, and tenant) and health status of the elderly (fair, good or very good; and bad or 
very bad). The models were tested for individual new member states. Since the first results 
indicated a high interference of age and/or living alone with the sex variable, an interaction 
between gender and single household had to be introduced into the model.
8  
There were some limitations to our analysis that do not allow it to be much more than an 
overview of the situation regarding the economic and material position of the elderly in the 
NMS. The data are cross-sectional and, since we can not see the trends, it may be that some 
issues remained hidden to us or are even wrongly interpreted if the data for 2005 differ from the 
general situation. The number of countries does not allow for a detailed and in-depth study of 
the economic position of the elderly. A detailed knowledge of the relevant background situation 
in all NMS would be needed for that.  
2.3  The absolute income position of the elderly 
Median income  
Not surprisingly, the median income of both non-elderly and elderly in all NMS is below the 
EU-15 average. It is by far the highest in Cyprus (about 85% of the EU-15 average), followed 
by Slovenia (56% of that average). In other NMS, the median incomes are between 13% and 
28% of the EU-15 average (almost the same for non-elderly and elderly). 
In all NMS (like in the EU-15 average) a decrease in the median income with the age of elderly 
is evident. This is, by far, most characteristic for Cyprus, particularly between the age groups 
60-64 and 65-74 years where the median income drops by one third. The median income of 
persons aged 75 years and over is lower in Cyprus than in Slovenia, which is surprising 
considering the fact that at the age of 55-59 the median income in Cyprus exceeds that in 
Slovenia by two thirds. People in Cyprus obviously suffer a considerable decrease in their 
disposable income after retirement, which is at about age 63. This is mostly due to two facts: the 
net replacement rate is 52%, and the average pension amounts to only 25% of the average 
earnings (ISG 2006: 62-66). Hungary and Poland show somewhat different patterns. The 
median income is almost the same for all elderly age-groups in Poland, while in Hungary the 
drop is insignificant and only occurs between the age groups 60-64 and 65-74 years. 
Income sources  
As expected, pensions account for the highest share of the elderly persons' income (Figure 2.1). 
This is to a great extent due to early retirement or retiring as soon as the conditions are fulfilled. 
Among other income sources, the share of income from (self-)employment is still considerable, 
particularly in Cyprus and the Baltic States where it accounts for 40 or more percent of the total 
income of the elderly.  
                                                      
8 Women have a higher life expectancy than men, so they more often live alone. Since elderly people and 
people living alone have a higher likelihood of being relatively poor, the effect of gender can disappear. 8 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
Figure 2.1 Income sources of the elderly; NMS and EU-15, 2005
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Source: EU-SILC 2005 database, in which income data are from 2004. 
 
2.4  Relative income position of the elderly 
Distribution across income deciles 
This part of the analysis investigates the shares of the elderly in the bottom and top income 
deciles of the distribution of equivalised disposable income, and compares them with the 
average share of the elderly in the total population of the EU-15. 
In the EU-15, the elderly are somewhat over-represented in the bottom income decile and 
somewhat under-represented in the top one (Figure 2.2). In Cyprus and Slovenia, the over-
representation of the elderly is considerable in the bottom income decile (particularly in Cyprus 
where it is twice the average for all elderly).
9 In the rest of the NMS, the elderly are under-
represented in both the bottom and top income deciles. The share of the elderly in the top 
income decile, as compared to the average share in the total population, is particularly low in the 
Baltic States and the Czech Republic.
10  
                                                      
9 It is still at 1.7 times the average in the second income decile. 
10 The non-elderly are over-represented in both the bottom and the top income decile in all NMS except 
Cyprus and Slovenia where they are under-represented in the bottom income decile (the latter applies to 
the EU-15 average too). INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 9 
 
Figure 2.2 Income distribution of the elderly (% in the bottom and top income deciles, and 
average share); NMS and EU-15, 2005 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
C YS I E U - 1 5 E EL VC ZL TH US KP L
%
 
 
o
f
 
e
l
d
e
r
l
y
 
i
n
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
d
e
c
i
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
 
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
bottom decile
top decile
average
 
In the NMS, elderly people represent up to 34% of the total population, which still lags behind 
the share of elderly in the total population of the EU-15. Elderly in EU-15 are over-represented 
in the bottom income deciles. On the contrary, as shown in Table 2.2, this is not the case in 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and the Slovak Republic. If we look at the separate age groups of 
elderly, we come to the conclusion, that in the NMS (except the Baltic States), the persons aged 
55-59 are under-represented in the bottom income deciles. For persons aged 65 years and over 
this is true for all countries except Cyprus and Slovenia. In these two countries, the over-
representation in the bottom income decile is considerable (particularly in Cyprus), which is the 
cause for the general over-representation of the elderly in the bottom income decile.  
Women account for more than half of the elderly in all EU Member States, up to 63% in Latvia 
and Estonia. Elderly women are under-represented in the top income decile, but in some NMS 
(Poland and the Baltic States) the same is true for their representation in the bottom income 
decile. It is evident from Table 2.3 that there are more elderly women in the bottom income 
decile than in the top one.
11 The opposite is the case with men in most of the NMS.   
Table 2.2 Elderly (men and women aged 55 and over) in the bottom and top deciles as a % of 
all persons, NMS and EU-15, 2005 
Country  55 and over 
  1 2  10  Total 
CY 59.9  49.1  26.7  28.3 
CZ 21.0  45.0  21.6  33.4 
EE 27.3  55.3  18.0  34.2 
HU 19.2  29.1  28.9  33.8 
LV 26.8  49.0  22.0  34.5 
LT 19.6  40.0  22.0  32.1 
PL 12.1  20.6  23.9  29.5 
SK 15.0  32.4  22.6  28.7 
SI 44.6  36.5  27.1  30.9 
EU-15   38.4  45.0  33.2  35.8 
                                                      
11 In the EU, Luxemburg is the only exception. 10 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
Table 2.3 Elderly women as a % of the total elderly population, in the bottom and top deciles, 
NMS and EU-15, 2005 
Country  55 and over 
  1 2  10  Total 
CY 63.0  54.9  42.9  52.9 
CZ 73.1  70.3  50.1  56.2 
EE 62.6  79.4  49.3  62.7 
HU 63.2  67.4  52.3  59.6 
LV 59.3  77.2  55.7  63.3 
LT 56.3  77.4  50.4  61.9 
PL 53.1  57.7  50.3  58.1 
SK 69.0  71.4  46.7  59.3 
SI 73.3  63.1  47.8  57.2 
EU-15   58.3  60.6  47.0  54.4 
Median disposable income of the elderly compared to that of the non-elderly 
The countries differ considerably regarding the ratio between the median income of the elderly 
and the non-elderly. The average ratio in the EU-15 is 0.90 (from 0.73 in Ireland to 1.01 in 
Luxembourg). Among the NMS, Cyprus is close to the lowest ratio in the EU-15 while in the 
Baltic States (particularly in Estonia and Latvia) the relative situation of the elderly is only 
slightly better (Figure 2.3). In two NMS the ratio is over one: 1.09 in Poland and 1.02 in 
Hungary. This is due to a low median income of the non-elderly rather than to a high median 
income of the elderly. High ratios also reflect the fact that the pension systems in these two 
countries were successful in safeguarding the standard of living of the elderly. In 2004, the net 
replacement rate was as much as 101.9% in Hungary and 77.7% in Poland (ISG, 2006: 81 and 
100). 
Figure 2.3 Median income of the elderly as a % of the median income of non-elderly, NMS and 
EU-15, 2005 
 
Only in Poland do all elderly age groups have a higher median income than the non-elderly on 
average (Figure 2.4). In the EU-15, Cyprus, and the Czech and the Slovak Republics, this is true 
only for the age group 55-59 when most people are still active (in the Baltic States not even at 
that age). INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 11 
 
Figure 2.4 Median income of the elderly as a % of the median income of non-elderly, by elderly 
age groups; NMS and EU-15, 2005
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a The countries are sorted according to the average share of the median income (in a decreasing order). 
Income inequality  
Income inequality is higher among the non-elderly than among the elderly in all NMS except 
Cyprus and Slovenia (Figure 2.5). In Cyprus, the difference is considerable: the Gini coefficient 
is 0.270 for non-elderly and 0.350 for the elderly. It is also the country with the highest income 
inequality among the elderly, and the only NMS where it exceeds the average for the population 
of the EU-15. The lowest Gini coefficients are characteristic for the Czech and the Slovak 
Republics; the values are lower than in any of the EU-15 countries. 
Figure 2.5 Gini coefficient; elderly and non-elderly; NMS and EU-15, 2005 
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From the age group 60-64 years and over, income inequality is lower for each older age group 
in all NMS except Slovenia where it is the highest among persons aged 75 years and over 
(though it does not differ much between the elderly age groups). 
2.5 Relative  poverty 
The poverty incidence
12 and the poverty gap
13 are based on a poverty threshold set at 60% of the 
median equivalised disposable income. In our comparison of objective (relative) and subjective 
poverty, we have used a lower threshold (50%) as well. 
Poverty incidence 
By far the highest relative poverty among the elderly was registered in Cyprus (34.3%) (Figure 
2.6). The extent of poverty increases rapidly after the age of 60: it is 20% in the age group 60-
64, 42% in the age group 65-74 and 63% among the population aged 75 years and over (Figure 
2.7).  
Apart from Cyprus, only in Latvia and Estonia are the elderly more exposed to poverty than the 
population of the EU-15 on average. In these two countries, the differences in poverty rates 
between the elderly age groups are relatively small: the rates are in the range between 20% and 
22% in Latvia, and between 18% and 20 % for the population aged 60-74 years in Estonia (it is 
24% for people aged 75 years and over).  
The Czech Republic is the NMS with the lowest poverty rate among the elderly (5.8%). The 
Slovak Republic and Hungary have relatively low rates too: 7.3% and 8.1% respectively. In five 
NMS (the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland
14 and Lithuania), the poverty 
rates are higher for the non-elderly than for the elderly (the same is true for the EU-15 average, 
and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Sweden). 
Both the average poverty among the elderly and the age-group pattern in Slovenia are very 
similar to the EU-15 average. In Slovenia and the EU-15 average, poverty rate increases with 
age while the opposite is true for Poland. There is a (considerably) higher poverty incidence 
among elderly women than among elderly men in all NMS except Poland (Figure 2.8). 
                                                      
12 The poverty incidence (or the poverty rate) is the % of persons living in households where the 
equivalised total net household income is below the threshold. 
13 The poverty gap is defined as the difference between the median income of persons below the poverty 
threshold and the poverty threshold itself, expressed as a % of the poverty threshold. It provides an insight 
into the severity of income poverty. 
14 There are case studies of the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland in this book. The other two case 
studies are of Slovenia and Estonia, where the poverty rates are higher for the elderly. There are no data 
on Romania in the EU-SILC 2005. INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 13 
 
Figure 2.6 Poverty incidence (at 60% median income); non-elderly and elderly; NMS and 
EU-15, 2005 
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Figure 2.7 Poverty incidence among elderly (at 60% median income), by age groups; NMS and 
EU-15, 2005 
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Figure 2.8 Poverty incidence among the elderly (at 60% median income), by sex; NMS and 
EU-15, 2005
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a Countries are sorted in a descending order according to the poverty incidence among elderly women. 
 
Of course, if a poverty threshold is set at 50% of the median equivalised disposable income, the 
poverty incidence is much lower (Figure 2.9). This means that a considerable share of the 
relatively poor have incomes amounting to 50%-60% of the median equivalised disposable 
income of their respective countries. Consequently, the poverty gaps should not be very large.  
Figure 2.9 Poverty incidence among the elderly in NMS and EU-15; poverty threshold at 60% 
and 50% of median income; 2005 
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The shares of poor non-elderly women in the total non-elderly poor population are around 50% 
in all NMS and the EU-15 average (Figure 2.10). For the age group 55-59 years, these shares 
are generally still relatively close to each other. At higher ages, the shares of poor women in the 
total poor population generally increase in most of the NMS. At the age of 65-74 years, women 
account for between 58% of all poor persons in Cyprus to 83% in the Czech Republic, while at 
a higher age they account for more than 80% of the poor in seven out of nine NMS. 
Figure 2.10 Share of poor women in the total poor population (at 60% median income), by age 
groups; NMS and EU-15, 2005 
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Characteristics of individuals and households influencing the relative poverty status 
In order to identify the characteristics of elderly individuals (and households they live in) that 
determine their lower or higher likelihood of being relatively poor, as compared to the 
characteristics of the reference group, we tested a logistic regression model. Parameters were 
estimated by a maximum likelihood technique. 
The dependent variable is the relative poverty status, that is, the probability that the equivalised 
disposable income of an elderly person is below 60% of the national median. It takes the value 
of 1 if the person is relatively poor, and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in terms of odds 
(ratio between the likelihood that particular outcome will occur and the likelihood that it will 
not).The estimated odds ratios smaller than 1.00 indicate that the likelihood of occurrence is 
smaller for this particular category than for the reference category (everything else being 
controlled for). The availability of data was a decisive constraint for our theoretical model; 
ideally, additional variables would have been included.  
Based on a large body of research, our presumption was that women are more likely to be poor 
than men. While persons older than 69 years were expected to have a higher likelihood of being 
relatively poor than those aged 65-69 years, the opposite was expected for persons aged 55-64 
years. We expected the likelihood of being relatively poor to decrease with an increase in 
attained education, number of years spent in paid employment, and the household work 
intensity status. We also assumed that it would be higher for tenants and people with poor 
health. A negative association between the household size and the likelihood of being relatively 
poor was expected. We also expected that likelihood to be higher for households with both 16 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
members aged 65 years or more. Retired persons were expected to have a higher likelihood of 
being relatively poor than those working, a lower likelihood than unemployed and other inactive 
persons. 
The models for all countries proved to be statistically significant. Most of the results are highly 
significant too (see Table 2.4). Nevertheless, some caution is needed when interpreting the 
results because, in some of the NMS, the share of poor elderly is relatively low (meaning that 
the population below 55 years of age is relatively worse off). Consequently, the absolute 
number of poor individuals is relatively low too. As could be expected, the sensitivity of 
prediction, i.e. the percentage of occurrences correctly predicted, is relatively low in these 
countries.
15  
In five out of nine NMS, the likelihood of being relatively poor is higher for persons aged 55-59 
years than for those aged 65-69 years, which is opposite to our assumption. This is most 
probably due to unemployment, early retirement or permanent disability, all resulting in a 
relatively low income.  
The impact of gender should be considered separately for women who live alone and those who 
live with other person(s). The likelihood of being relatively poor is higher for women in one-
person households than for elderly men living in such households, except in Estonia and Latvia 
where the interaction terms coefficients are statistically non-significant. Living in two- or more-
person households decreases the likelihood for elderly women of being relatively poor, as 
compared to elderly men in such households.
16 
 
                                                      
15 This is evident from the sensitivity of prediction (the % of occurrences of being ‘poor’ correctly 
predicted) and specificity of prediction (the % of non-occurrences ‘not being poor’ correctly predicted): 
  Sensitivity  Specificity  % of poor among the elderly 
CY 67.9  83.8  34.3 
CZ  17.2  99.7    5.8 
EE 34.2  96.2  20.0 
HU    4.2  99.8    8.1 
LV 33.7  95.3  20.8 
LT 22.5  98.1  17.2 
PL    7.4  99.5  11.0 
SK    6.7  99.9    7.3 
SI 47.6  95.0  17.5 
 
16 In Cyprus, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia the likelihood for women is even lower than for men. In 
Cyprus, for instance, the odds ratio is 0.75 for elderly women in more-person households and 1.52 
(0.75*2.03) for women in one-person households. This means that living in one-person households 
significantly increases the likelihood for elderly women of being relatively poor, as compared to elderly 
men, while the opposite is true for elderly women living in households with more persons. | 17 
Table 2.4 Logistic regression estimate of poverty, by country  
  CY   CZ   EE   HU   LV   LT   PL   SK   SI  
Male  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
Sex 
Female  0.75 ***  1.46 ***  1.47 *** 0.80 ***  1.09 ***  1.06 *** 0.99 *** 1.28 *** 0.70 *** 
55-59  0.69 ***  0.72 ***  1.23 *** 2.29 ***  1.13 ***  0.67 *** 1.12 *** 1.24 *** 0.62 *** 
60-64  0.73 ***  0.13 ***  0.46 *** 0.84 ***  0.49 ***  0.49 *** 0.77 *** 0.65 *** 0.58 *** 
65-69  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
70-74  1.32 ***  1.36 ***  1.17 *** 1.25 ***  1.08 ***  1.01   1.06 *** 1.16 *** 1.29 *** 
Age group 
75+  2.16 ***  1.17 ***  1.07 *** 1.25 ***  1.00   1.56 *** 0.63 *** 1.73 *** 1.27 *** 
Attained educational level 
 
Lower  secondary  or  less  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
  Upper  secondary  0.27 ***  0.55 ***  0.77 *** 0.40 ***  0.51 ***  0.59 *** 0.38 *** 0.40 *** 0.24 *** 
  Post  secondary  and  tertiary  0.16 ***  0.19 ***  0.40 *** 0.17 ***  0.33 ***  0.34 *** 0.14 *** 0.20 *** 0.04 *** 
Two-person household,  
at least one person > 65 
1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
One  person  household  1.39 *** 14.58 *** 15.70 *** 3.59 *** 14.90 *** 14.03 *** 5.33 *** 2.78 *** 5.49 *** 
Two person household,  
both persons <65 years 
0.53 ***  3.83 ***  2.99 *** 1.38 ***  3.58 ***  5.10 *** 1.60 *** 2.33 *** 0.86 *** 
Household type 
Household  with  3+  members 0.31 ***  1.63 ***  1.89 *** 1.32 ***  2.58 ***  2.58 *** 3.57 *** 1.61 *** 0.53 *** 
Interaction coefficient  Single female household  2.03 ***  1.24 ***  0.96   1.32 ***  1.01   0.63 *** 0.49 *** 1.24 *** 2.51 *** 18 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
Table 2.4 Logistic regression estimate of poverty, by country (continued) 
  CY   CZ   EE   HU   LV   LT   PL   SK   SI  
Retired  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
Unemployed  2.42 ***  0.89 ***  0.63 ***  0.82 ***  0.87 ***  0.82 ***  2.03 ***  2.81 ***  1.64 *** 
Working full or part time  0.26  ***  1.41  ***  0.49  ***  1.39  ***  0.70  ***  1.66  ***  2.67  ***  2.34  ***  2.42  ***  Self-defined economic status 
Other inactive (pupil, student,  
military, fulfilling domestic  
tasks, other inactive) 
0.93 **  24.35 ***  7.05 *** 10.01 ***  2.48 *** 11.33 ***  2.20 ***  5.69 ***  3.99 *** 
35  and  more     1.00   1.00      1.00   1.00   1.00        
from  26  to  34     1.24 ***  1.83 ***     1.68 ***  1.46 ***  1.08 ***       
Number of years  
spent in paid work 
up  to  25     2.02 ***  1.94 ***     1.99 ***  2.89 ***  1.59 ***       
No work intensity  (WI=0)  1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00   
Low  work  intensity  (WI<0.5)  0.86 ***  1.20 ***  0.59 ***  0.95 ***  0.33 ***  1.08 ***  0.51 ***  0.73 ***  0.61 *** 
Household 
work intensity  status 
High  work  intensity  (WI>0.5)  0.40 ***  0.12 ***  0.11 ***  0.35 ***  0.14 ***  0.22 ***  0.30 ***  0.34 ***  0.22 *** 
Owner or free accommodation  1.00    1.00    1.00   1.00    1.00   1.00    1.00   1.00   1.00   
Tenure status 
Tenant  0.95 *  1.29 ***  0.91 **  0.94 ***  1.34 ***  2.27 ***  0.96 ***  1.53 ***  1.30 *** 
Fair,  good  or  very  good  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
Health status 
Bad  health  1.60 ***  1.26 ***  1.08 ***  1.23 ***  1.01   1.44 ***  1.42 ***  1.23 ***  1.37 *** 
 
Number of cases included  2764   3276   3141   5449   2965   3387   10799   3516   6467  
Adjusted R
2 (Nagelkerke)  0.43   0.33   0.39   0.16   0.35   0.30   0.19   0.17   0.39  
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In contrast to what was expected, in more than half of the countries (the Baltic States, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic) the likelihood of being relatively poor is not higher for the elderly 
unemployed persons than for the retired. This obviously has to do with the fact that there was a 
separate variable for the household work intensity status and that the unemployment benefits are 
usually related to the number of years spent in paid work (also an independent variable in the 
model). 
Also surprising is that working full-time or part-time results in a higher likelihood of relative 
poverty for the elderly than being retired (in seven out of nine countries). This may be due to the 
generous conditions for retirement and the rather favourable benefit indexation experienced by 
the current group of retirees. It also may be an indication of the rather low earnings of many 
working elderly. 
Our assumptions that the number of years the person spent in paid work, his/her attained 
educational level and the household work intensity decrease the likelihood of being relatively 
poor, proved to be correct. The impact is considerable. It is also in line with our expectations 
that poor health, compared with fair, good or very good health, results in a higher likelihood of 
being relatively poor. The impact of tenure status is not consistent across countries. In four out 
of nine countries, the odds ratio of being relatively poor is slightly lower for tenants than for 
persons living in owned or free accommodation. 
Poverty gaps 
The poverty gaps for the elderly in the NMS generally do not exceed those in the EU-15 (only 
in Cyprus it does, but the difference is negligible; see Figure 2.11). Different from that, the 
poverty gaps for the non-elderly are higher in four NMS (the Baltic States and Poland) than in 
the EU-15 average. 
Figure 2.11 Poverty gap (at 60% median income); non-elderly and elderly; NMS and EU-15, 
2005 
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The poverty gaps by elderly age groups show that in Cyprus the depth of poverty almost does 
not differ across age groups (Figure 2.12). A similar situation can be observed in the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. In other NMS, the poverty gap decreases for each subsequent age group, 
which is particularly pronounced up to the age of 75. At age 65-74, the poverty gaps in all NMS 20 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
are below the EU-15 average. A particularly large poverty gap is characteristic for the 
population aged 55-59 years in Latvia and Lithuania: 41 and 34% respectively. Interestingly, it 
drops to 19% for the population aged 60-64 years in Latvia.  
Figure 2.12 Poverty gap (at 60% median income), by elderly age groups; NMS and EU-15, 
2005 
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Women account for 56-73% of all elderly poor, but the poverty gaps are lower for poor elderly 
women than for poor elderly men in all NMS except Cyprus and Slovenia (and in the EU-15 
average) (Figure 2.13).  
Figure 2.13 Poverty gap, by sex; NMS and EU-15, 2005 
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In Figure 2.14 we compare the poverty incidence among the elderly and the poverty gap in 24 
EU member states. Common characteristics are shared by the Czech and the Slovak Republics 
and Hungary, but also by the Netherlands, Sweden and Luxembourg. In these new and old 
member states, both the poverty incidence among the elderly and the poverty gap are relatively 
low (6-9% and 11-17% respectively. However, one can hardly speak of common characteristics 
– in terms of welfare regimes – of these two groups of countries. 
In the Baltic States and Slovenia, the poverty incidence among the elderly is much higher than 
in the former group, which is not that true for the poverty gaps. Similar characteristics are 
shared by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Finland.  
There is one more distinct group consisting of three Mediterranean countries (Greece, Portugal 
and Spain) and the UK. In these countries, both the poverty incidence among the elderly (about 
25%) and the poverty gaps (between 22% and 24%) are high. 
Figure 2.14 Poverty incidence and poverty gap among the elderly; EU member states, 2005 
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Self-defined economic status of the poor elderly 
The retirees account for the highest share of the poor elderly. In Poland, Hungary and Estonia, 
the permanently disabled or/and unfit to work account for 25%, 18% and 10% respectively. The 
proportions are higher for men than for women, particularly in Estonia and Hungary (Figure 
2.15). The highest shares of the unemployed are observed in the Czech Republic (17% on 
average and as much as 43% for men), Lithuania (11%), the Slovak Republic (10%) and Poland 
(9%).  
The shares of persons working full-time are the highest (9%) in Hungary, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic. In the last named country, a quarter of poor elderly men work full-time. Unlike the 
EU-15 (and particularly countries like Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg), in the NMS there are 
not many poor elderly persons fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities. The highest 
proportions are 13% (17% for women) in Cyprus and 5% (7% for women) in Slovenia. 
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Figure 2.15 Self-defined economic status of the poor elderly, by sex;
a NMS and EU-15, 2005
b 
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a W = women, M = men. 
b Countries are sorted according to a descending order of the percentages of the working poor elderly women. 
 
At the age of 55-59 years, there are considerable proportions of persons working full-time and 
part-time among the relatively poor, up to 34-44% in the Baltic States. The unemployed account 
for high proportions too: for instance, 38% in the Czech Republic, 33% in Lithuania, 30% in 
Latvia and 29% in the Slovak Republic. At that age, high proportions of the poor are already 
retired in Slovenia (44%), the Slovak Republic (38%) and the Czech Republic (34%). The 
highest shares of poor persons aged 55-59 years in Hungary, Poland and Estonia are accounted 
for by the permanently disabled or/and unfit to work (38%, 29% and 28% respectively). The 
proportion of persons fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities is only considerable in 
Cyprus (43%). 
Average number of years the elderly poor spent in paid work 
The average number of years that the elderly poor spent in paid work exceeds 30 in all 
observed
1 EU member states except Poland (29).
2 In the NMS it is the highest in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Cyprus: 35-36 years (Figure 2.16). In some OMS it is even 
higher: 38 years in Spain, 39 in Greece and 43 in Portugal. In all countries but Cyprus, the 
relatively poor elderly have spent fewer years (by up to 3.6 years) in paid employment than the 
non-poor ones.  
 
 
                                                      
1 There is no information for Denmark, Finland, Sweden or the UK. 
2 It is lower for Slovenia (17) and the Netherlands (26) too, but the non-response rate is very high in these 
two countries (53.9% and 61.8% respectively). In Slovenia, this is due to the fact that only household 
respondents were asked this question. INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 23 
 
Figure 2.16 Average number of years spent in paid work; NMS and EU-15, 2005
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a Countries are sorted in descending order according to the number of years that the poor elderly spent in paid work. 
In Figure 2.17, the poverty incidence among the elderly is related to the average number of 
years spent in paid work. It is evident that the two are negatively related (which would be 
normal) only in the group of Central European Countries. At the same number of years spent in 
paid work, the poverty incidence is much higher in the Baltic States. 
Figure 2.17 Poverty incidence among the elderly vs. average number of years that the poor 
elderly spent in paid work; NMS and EU-15, 2005 
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Household types in which the poor elderly live 
In all NMS and the EU-15 average, elderly living in one-person households are (much) more 
frequently affected by relative poverty than the elderly on average. The same applies for the 
elderly living in single parent households with dependent children, and in households of two 
adults and two or more dependent children. Lower-than-average poverty rates are characteristic 
for the elderly living in households of two adults and in ‘other’ households without dependent 
children as well as in households of three or more adults with dependent children. 
Generally, the greatest positive declines from the average poverty rates among the elderly in 
individual countries (i.e. the cases where poverty rates exceed the national averages by the 
highest number of percentage points) are observed for the elderly living in households of two 
adults and three or more dependent children (see Figure 2.18). The same is the case with those 
living in one-person households and in single parent households with dependent children. 
Figure 2.18 Deviation from the average poverty rate for the elderly, by country/region and 
household type; poverty threshold at 60% median income; NMA and EU-15, 2005 
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Legend:  1   One-person household 
  2  2 adults, no dependent children, both adults under 65 years 
  3  2 adults, no dependent children, at least one adult 65 years 
  4  Other households without dependent children 
  5  Single parent household, one or more dependent children 
  6  2 adults, one dependent child 
  7  2 adults, two dependent children 
  8  2 adults, three or more dependent children 
  9  Other households with dependent children 
 10  Other 
 
High relative poverty rates (over 20%) are most frequent among the elderly living in households 
of two adults and three or more dependent children, single parent households with dependent 
children, one-person households and households of two adults with two dependent children. INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 25 
 
Household work intensity status
3 
In three NMS (Poland, the Slovak Republic and Hungary) just over half of the poor elderly live 
in households where no member is active at all. In other NMS, these shares are 60-71%. It is 
interesting to note that the elderly aged 60-64, compared to other age elderly groups, most 
frequently live in households with no active member. The logical explanation would be that the 
younger non-active elderly more frequently live with an active partner while the older elderly 
more frequently live with active children. 
In Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary, 12%-17% of the poor elderly 
live in households where all persons are active full-time. In these countries and Poland as well, 
27-35% of the elderly live in households whose members, on average, are active at least half-
time. The share of poor elderly living in households where all persons are active full-time is 
relatively high in the EU-15 average too, with shares in individual countries as high as 30% in 
Sweden and 27% in the UK. This indicates that full-time activity does not provide people with 
sufficient income to escape relative poverty. 
Elderly poor women live in households with no active time more frequently than elderly men 
(Figure 2.19). This is partly due to women's higher life expectancy and consequent living in 
one-person households in their old age. Another reason a lower activity rate among elderly 
women as compared to elderly men (see Figure 2.15). Cyprus is an exemption with almost equal 
shares of women and men living in households with no active time. 
Figure 2.19 Household work intensity status; poor elderly, by sex; NMS and EU-15, 2005
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a Countries are sorted in a descending order according to the share of no active time for women. 
In Figure 2.20, the percentage of the poor elderly living in households with no active time is 
related to the poverty rate among the elderly. The NMS with lowest proportions of elderly living 
in households with no active time (Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic) also have the 
lowest poverty rates among the elderly. The exception is the Czech Republic with low poverty 
rates among the elderly in spite of a relatively high proportion of elderly living in households 
with no active time. 
                                                      
3 This variable is explained in Section 2.2. 26 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
Figure 2.20 % of the elderly poor living in households with no active time vs. poverty rate 
among the elderly (at 60% median income)  
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2.6  Relative poverty and material hardship 
2.6.1 Financial  constraints  for the relatively poor elderly 
Arrears on mortgage or rent payments 
Arrears on mortgage or rent payments are more frequent among poor non-elderly (i.e. 
households they live in) in the NMS than among poor elderly with such obligations. Lithuania, 
Poland and Hungary are exceptions. These are also the NMS with the highest shares of poor, 
particularly elderly, who live in households facing that problem: 58% of elderly poor in 
Lithuania, 49% in Poland and 47% in Poland. In all NMS, the shares of poor living in 
households with arrears on mortgage or rent payments are higher than in the EU-15 average 
(Figure 2.21). The problem is less widespread among each older age group of the elderly, and 
practically disappears at the age of 75 in all but three NMS (Poland, Latvia and Cyprus). INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 27 
 
Figure 2.21 Share of elderly poor living in households with arrears on payments (in the last 12 
months); poverty threshold at 60% median income; NMS and EU-15, 2005 
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Arrears on utility bills 
In the EU-15, arrears on utility bills are relatively rare among the poor elderly: only 6% live in 
households facing this problem, compared to as many as 33% in Poland and 23% in Lithuania 
(see Figure 2.21). Much higher proportions are observed among the poor non-elderly than 
among the poor elderly in almost all EU member states (up to 44% in Poland). There are only 
small differences between the genders and, generally, the problem decreases for each older age 
group of the elderly.  
Arrears on hire purchase instalments or other loan payments 
The proportion of those poor elderly in the EU-15 who live in households with arrears on hire 
purchase instalments or other loan payments is also low: less than 5% (see Figure 2.21). The 
differences between the NMS are great: from 2% of such cases among the poor elderly in the 
Slovak Republic and 5% in Estonia to as much as 47% in Cyprus, 39% in the Czech Republic, 
34% in Hungary
4 and 33% in Poland. In some NMS, the problem is more widespread among the 
elderly poor; while the opposite is the case in other countries (the latter is true for all OMS too). 
Cyprus stands out for the fact that the proportion of persons living in households with arrears on 
hire purchase instalments or other loan payments is higher rather than lower in older age groups 
of the poor elderly. 
The capacity to face unexpected financial expenses 
The capacity of households in which the poor elderly
5 live to face unexpected financial 
expenses is lower in all NMS than in any of the OMS. While 56% of the poor elderly in the EU-
                                                      
4 This is due to the high proportion (56%) of such cases in the age group 60-64 years (and 36% in the age 
group 55-59 years). There are no such cases among the population aged 75 years and over. 
5 The same is true for the non-elderly poor, with the exception of Finland and France. 28 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
15 live in households with sufficient capacity to accomplish this, the same is true for only 5% of 
poor elderly in Latvia and 11% in Lithuania, up to 24% in Slovenia and 30% in Estonia (see 
Figure in Annex A). For the comparison, the proportions of the non-elderly poor in the NMS 
living in households capable of facing unexpected financial expenses are below 31%. 
Ability to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day 
The share of the elderly poor living in households that are not able to afford a meal with meat, 
chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day is 13% in the EU-15 (see Figure in 
Annex A). It is over 20% only in Austria and Germany. The lowest shares registered in the 
NMS are 17% in Cyprus and 26% in Slovenia; the highest are 71% in Latvia and 65% in 
Poland. In Hungary and the Slovak Republic they are over 50% too. Except in the Czech 
Republic, the shares for the population aged 16-54 years are lower but not significantly in most 
of the countries studied.  
There is no common pattern as regards the age groups. The situation of households according to 
this indicator is by far the least favourable for poor persons aged 60-64 in the Czech Republic, 
persons aged 65-74 in the Slovak Republic, and persons aged 75 years and over in Latvia.  
Ability to keep the home adequately warm 
On the one hand, as many as 93% of the poor – both non-elderly and elderly – in Estonia and 
Slovenia live in households that are able to keep their homes adequately warm (see Figure in 
Annex A). This is more than in the EU-15 average or (for the poor elderly) in seven EU-15 
member states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, France and particularly Greece and Portugal).
6 
On the other hand, in four NMS (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Cyprus) just half or less of the 
poor elderly live in households that are able to keep their homes adequately warm. The 
proportions are slightly higher for the non-elderly poor. In most of the NMS the situation is 
somewhat better for the two older age groups of the elderly compared to the age group 60-64 
years. 
Ability to afford one week’s annual holiday away from home 
The shares of the poor elderly living in households that cannot afford one week’s annual holiday 
away from home range from 74% in Slovenia to 89% in Hungary; the EU-15 average is 53% (in 
Greece and Portugal the shares are 83% and 88% respectively) (see Figure in Annex A). The 
highest frequency of such answers is usually among the population aged 75 years and over, but 
as a rule the differences between age groups are not very pronounced. 
Only in Slovenia and the Slovak Republic is the situation of the non-elderly much better that it 
is worth mentioning (by 14 and 10% points respectively). However, at least in Slovenia, this 
might be due to the availability of (almost) free accommodation in relatives'/friends' (vacation) 
houses/flats.
7 It is interesting to note that in eleven of the EU-15 countries it is the non-elderly 
poor who report their households as not being able to afford one week’s annual holiday away 
from home (considerably) more often than the elderly poor. 
 
                                                      
6 In Portugal, only 30% of the elderly poor are able to keep their homes adequately warm.  
7 Namely, "paying for" is missing in the wording of the question in the Slovenian questionnaire. The issue 
of financial and social dimensions of holidays was discussed by an expert group, and the second 
dimension was opted for. Holidays with friends and relatives, subsidised holidays, second residence, etc. 
are to be considered in this item (European Commission, 2007a). INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 29 
 
Summary indicator of financial constraints for the relatively poor elderly 
In Table 2.5, the countries are ranked according to the financial constraints
8 faced by the elderly 
poor. These constraints are least frequent in Slovenia and most frequent in Poland. In the Slovak 
Republic and Latvia, the rank for poor elderly women is worse than that for poor elderly men. 
The opposite situation is characteristic for the Czech Republic, in particular. 
Table 2.5 Financial constraints for the relatively poor elderly (ranks) 
Country  All elderly persons  Elderly women  Elderly men 
SI 1  2  1 
EE 2  1  2 
CY 3  4  4 
SK 4  5  3 
CZ 5  3  5 
HU 6  6  6 
LV 7  9  7 
LT 8  7  8 
PL 9  8  9 
Note: The Borda ranking was applied. The lower the rank, the lower the constraint. 
In Figure 2.22, the ranks of poverty rates and financial constraints are compared for the NMS. 
Poverty rates are an objective and relative measure while financial constraints are an absolute 
and subjective measure. For Cyprus, Slovenia and Estonia, high poverty rate ranks show a 
relatively high unfavourable economic situation of the elderly population than do ranks of 
financial constraints faced by the poor elderly. There is a relatively high frequency of financial 
constraints among the elderly poor in Poland and Hungary, which are the countries with low 
ranks as regards the income poverty incidence. 
                                                      
8 For the definition see Section 2.2. 30 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
Figure 2.22 Relative poverty among the elderly and financial constraints faced by the poor 
elderly, by sex;
a,NMS, 2005 (ranks)
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a Shaded = poor elderly women; other = poor elderly men. 
b The Borda ranking was applied. The lower the rank, the lower the poverty rate and financial constraints. 
 
2.6.2  Meeting needs for medical/dental examination or treatment 
Meeting the needs for medical examination or treatment 
As regards meeting the needs for medical examination or treatment, Slovenia seems to be the 
best place in Europe for the poor non-elderly to live: only less than 1% of those who needed 
such services had the need unmet. The same is true for the poor elderly. No case of unmet need 
was reported by the poor elderly aged 55-64. The situation of the poor elderly is only better in 
Denmark where all their needs for medical examination or treatment were met. The EU-15 
averages are 13% for the non-elderly and 10% for the elderly. The situation is particularly 
unfavourable for the poor in Latvia where 44% of the poor elderly who needed medical 
examination or treatment reported unmet need, as well as in Poland and Hungary where the 
proportions are just below one quarter. In Hungary, the proportion of the poor elderly reporting 
unmet need decreases with age groups, while in Latvia the oldest age group is the most 
deprived. While the situation is better among the poor elderly than among the poor non-elderly 
in the EU-15 average, the opposite is true for most NMS. 
In all NMS except Hungary, the picture is worse if only a subgroup of the poor with bad and 
very bad general health is observed. In Latvia, the proportion of the elderly poor who have 
unmet needs for medical examination or treatment amounts to 53% (the proportion is 62% for 
the poor non-elderly). It is the highest in the age group 55-59 with 69% of persons having unmet 
needs. 
The main reason why the poor have unmet needs for medical examination or treatment is the 
cost of such services. In the EU-15 average, 54% of the poor elderly with unmet needs for 
medical examination or treatment cannot afford it. However, in some NMS and OMS this 
reason was not reported at all (in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Denmark and the Netherlands), INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 31 
 
or is below 3% (in Sweden and the UK). Services that are too expensive prevent poor elderly 
from using medical services particularly in Latvia (78%), Poland (70%), Cyprus (67%), the 
Slovak Republic (66%) and Lithuania (53%). The problem is also widespread among the non-
elderly in these countries, but also in Estonia. Waiting lists seem to be a relevant factor only in 
Estonia and Slovenia where it was reported as the main reason by 23% and 19%, respectively, 
of the poor elderly with unmet needs for medical examination or treatment. 
Meeting the needs for dental examination or treatment 
The proportion of the elderly poor who needed dental examination or treatment but did not meet 
that need is below the EU-15 average (12%) in four NMS: Slovenia (1%), the Czech Republic 
(5%), the Slovak Republic (8%) and Cyprus (11%). The most unfavourable situation is in Latvia 
where 37% of the elderly poor had such need unmet needs (50% of those aged 55-59 years). 
High proportions were also registered in some OMS, like 20% in Portugal and 18% in 
Germany. In most of the NMS and OMS the proportions are higher among the poor non-elderly 
who needed dental examination or treatment. Almost as a rule, the proportions of the poor 
elderly with unmet needs are lower in each older age group. In the NMS they are below 10% 
among poor persons aged 75 and over, except in Estonia (20%) and Latvia (35%).  
The main reason for unmet need for dental examination or treatment – in both NMS and OMS 
and both among non-elderly and elderly – are excessively high costs of services. As many as 
87-93% of the elderly poor in the Baltic States and 72% in Poland and the Slovak Republic 
cannot afford them. They are also too expensive for 65% of the elderly poor in the EU-15 (for 
instance, for 83% in Greece and Portugal, 75% in Finland, 74% in Italy and 73% in Germany). 
Waiting lists are a serious obstacle to meeting the needs for dental examination or treatment 
only for the Slovenian elderly poor. 
Health care deprivation of the relatively poor elderly 
Slovenia, Cyprus and the Slovak Republic are the NMS where it occurs least frequently that the 
poor elderly person - be it a man or a woman - does not meet his or her need for medical or 
dental examination or treatment (Table 2.6). Latvia, Hungary and Poland can be found on the 
other side of the spectrum. In Poland and Lithuania in particular, the rank for women is worse 
than that for men. 
Table 2.6 Health care deprivation of the relatively poor elderly who needed dental examination 
or treatment (ranks)
a 
Country  All elderly persons  Elderly women  Elderly men 
SI 1  1  1 
CY 2.5  2.5  2 
SK 2.5  2.5  3 
CZ 4  4  5 
LT 5  5.5  4 
EE 6  5.5  6,5 
PL 7  8  6,5 
HU 8  7  8 
LV 9  9  9 
a The Borda ranking was applied. The lower the rank, the lower the level of health care deprivation. 32 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
2.7 Housing  conditions  of the elderly poor 
Dwelling type 
In the EU-15, the elderly poor live in houses (rather than in the apartments) more frequently 
than the non-elderly poor. The same occurs in most NMS. In particular, more elderly poor 
people live in detached houses than in buildings with 10 or more dwellings. The frequency of 
the observed four dwelling types is much more balanced in the EU-15 than in the NMS (for 
both non-elderly and elderly poor) (see Figure 2.23). On the one hand, in Hungary and Slovenia 
more than 70% of the elderly poor live in detached houses (more than 60% in the Slovak 
Republic and Poland). On the other, living in an apartment/flat in a big building is more 
frequent in Estonia, Latvia and the Czech Republic. In the former two countries, this is related 
to the Soviet-type of communism that generally did not allow people to build houses but built 
huge apartment buildings for people to live in. 
Figure 2.23 Dwelling type; poor elderly in NMS and EU-15, 2005 
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Tenure status 
Just over 40% of the poor non-elderly in the EU-15 own their housing (Figure 2.24). In the 
NMS, this is the case of more than half of non-elderly (more than three quarters in Hungary, 
Estonia, the Slovak Republic and Lithuania). In contrast, almost 70% of the poor elderly in the 
EU-15 own their housing. The proportions are even higher in six NMS, with Lithuania (94%) at 
the top.  INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 33 
 
Figure 2.24 Poor elderly by tenure status; NMS and EU-15, 2005 
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The proportion of the poor elderly tenants or subtenants who pay rent at prevailing or market 
rate is quite high in the EU-15: 16%. The proportion is 7% in Cyprus and lower than that in 
other NMS. The proportions are higher for poor non-elderly: 34% in the EU-15 and 2%-24% in 
the NMS. 
In the EU-15, accommodation is provided free to 7% of the non-elderly poor and to 6% of the 
elderly poor. In most NMS too, the proportions are below 10%. For the non-elderly poor, they 
are between 4% in the Slovak Republic and 29% in Poland, while for the elderly poor, they are 
between 0.5% in the Slovak Republic and 43% in Cyprus. There is no free housing for the 
relatively poor people aged 55-74 years in the Slovak Republic. 
Only in Cyprus and the Slovak Republic, does housing ownership decrease with the age of the 
elderly, while in Poland and in the EU-15 average, it increases with age. In Cyprus, free 
accommodation is much more frequent among the poor aged 65 years and over than among 
younger elderly.  
Number of rooms per household member 
Except in Cyprus, the poor households in the NMS have fewer rooms per household member 
than the poor households in the EU-15 on average (1.1 rooms per non-elderly person and 2.0 
rooms per elderly person) (Figure 2.25). In eight other NMS, there are 0.7-0.8 rooms per poor 
non-elderly person and 0.8-1.5 rooms per poor elderly person. There is no common pattern as 
regards the elderly age groups (Figure 2.26). Only in Hungary and Slovenia the pattern is 
similar to that of the EU-15 where the number of rooms slightly increases with age. This 
indicates that the elderly tend not to leave their housing when they remain single. In Poland and 
the Slovak Republic the number of rooms per household member decreases. 
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Figure 2.25 Average number of rooms per member in poor households (poverty threshold at 
60% median income); elderly and non-elderly; NMS and EU-15 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
CY EU-15 EE LT CZ SI HU SK LV PL
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
r
o
o
m
s
55 and over
16-54
 
 
Figure 2.26 Average number of rooms per member in poor households (poverty threshold at 
60% median income); by elderly age groups; NMS and EU-15 
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Bath/shower and flush toilet 
Almost all relatively poor people in the EU-15 have a bath or shower in their dwelling. In the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and Cyprus, the proportions are between 89% 
and 93% for the elderly poor, but it is as low as 37% in Lithuania. 
The situation regarding flush toilets in the dwellings is very similar. Again, it is the worst in the 
Baltic States with only 38-66% of the poor elderly having such a toilet in their dwelling.  
In Latvia, the housing standard, as measured by these two indicators, is slightly worse for the 
non-elderly. Lithuania is the NMS with the most evident difference between the oldest age 
group (75 years and over) and the preceding one (65-74 years). Only a quarter of poor persons 
in the oldest age group have a bath/shower and a flush toilet in their dwelling.  INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 35 
 
Very low quality of housing 
Large proportions of the relatively poor in the NMS have problems with leaking roofs, damp 
walls/floors/foundation, or rotting window frames or floors. These proportions are much larger 
than in the EU-15 average where less than a quarter of the poor have such problems. In most of 
the NMS the proportions are over 40%, up to 62% for the poor elderly in Poland. The Slovak 
Republic is the only exception with the proportion of such cases below those in most old EU 
member states. It is important to note that in most of OMS and NMS, the elderly poor 
experience such problems less frequently than the non-elderly poor. 
Summary indicator of the housing quality deprivation of the relatively poor elderly 
Cyprus, Slovenia and the Czech Republic are the NMS with the relatively best housing 
conditions (Table 2.7).
9 The quality of housing is comparatively the worst in Latvia and Poland.  
Table 2.7 Housing deprivation of the relatively poor elderly (ranks)
a 
Country  All elderly persons  Elderly women  Elderly men 
CY 1 1 1 
SI  2 2 2 
CZ 3  3,5  3 
SK 4  3,5  4 
EE 5 5 5 
HU  6 6 6 
LT 7 7  7,5 
PL 8 8 9 
LV 9 9  7,5 
a Note: The Borda ranking was applied. The lower the rank, the lower the housing deprivation. 
From Figure 2.27 we can see that the ranks of the poverty incidence among the elderly and 
those of housing deprivation of the poor elderly are only weakly related. Elderly women in 
Slovenia and particularly the elderly in Cyprus have unfavourable ranks in terms of relative 
poverty, but the poor elderly enjoy a relatively decent housing standard. The opposite is true for 
the elderly poor population in the Poland and Hungary. 
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Figure 2.27 Relative poverty and housing quality deprivation, by sex
a; NMS, 2005 (ranks)
b 
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a Shaded = poor elderly women; other = poor elderly men. 
b The Borda ranking was applied. The lower the rank, the lower the poverty rate and housing quality deprivation. 
 
2.8 Housing  costs 
Absolute amount of housing costs 
The housing costs of the poor elderly in the NMS, per equivalent family member, exceed those 
of the poor non-elderly population (except in Hungary). This can partly be explained by a 
smaller average household size and a higher number of rooms per household member. Since a 
higher share of elderly poor own their housing, they may also face higher expenses on regular 
maintenance and repairs, particularly due to the fact that their housing is generally old and of a 
low quality. 
Such a situation is characteristic for some OMS as well: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and particularly Denmark where the total housing costs of the elderly 
poor, per equivalent family member, exceed those of the non-elderly poor by almost a half.  
Financial burden of housing costs 
The total housing cost is a heavy financial burden for more than half of the elderly poor in 
Cyprus (68%), Poland (58%) and Latvia (53%) (Figure 2.28). It is no burden at all for more than 
a tenth of the elderly poor in Estonia (13%), Lithuania and Latvia. However, these proportions 
are as much as 85% in Denmark and 54% in Sweden. INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 37 
 
Figure 2.28 Financial burden of the housing cost for the elderly poor; NMS and EU-15, 2005  
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Only in Spain, Latvia and Estonia are there relatively more elderly poor than non-elderly poor 
reporting a heavy burden of the total housing costs (the shares are equal in Latvia). In all other 
EU member states the shares are (considerably) higher among the non-elderly. 
In the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia and Portugal, the proportion of the poor 
population reporting no burden of housing costs is lower among the elderly than among the non-
elderly. The opposite is true for other NMS.  
Financial burden of the repayment of debts from hire purchase or loans 
The financial burden of the repayment of debts from hire purchase or loans is relatively high in 
all NMS. From 32% (in Estonia) to 75% and 76% (in the Czech Republic and Cyprus 
respectively) of the elderly poor who have debts consider them a heavy burden. In four out of 
nine NMS the proportions are even higher among the non-elderly poor with debts. The EU-15 
averages are 57% and 65% respectively. However, in some OMS the proportions are quite low 
among the elderly: 7% in Denmark and 10% in Sweden. 
2.9  Relative poverty and subjective indicators of the financial situation of 
the poor 
Figure 2.29 shows a high correlation between the relative poverty incidence among the elderly 
and the subjective poverty.
10 The persons are subjectively poor if evaluating that their 
households are making ends meet with difficulty. The UK is the most evident outlier with a 
relatively high relative poverty among the elderly on the one hand, and a relatively low 
proportion of the elderly reporting difficulties with making ends meet. 
 
                                                      
10 The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.806, significant at 0.01 level. 38 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
Figure 2.29 Relative vs. subjective poverty among the elderly (relative poverty threshold at 60% 
median income); EU member states, 2005 
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The ability to make ends meet 
Confronting relative and subjective poverty is an interesting exercise because the results show 
how the relatively poor experience their own situation. If they report having (great) difficulties 
with making ends meet, one tends to believe that a poverty threshold is not too high. If they 
have some difficulty or make ends meet fairly easily, one suspects that the relative poverty 
threshold may be too low. If, however, a non-negligible proportion of the relatively poor make 
ends meet (very) easily, the relative poverty threshold should be seriously reconsidered. 
With a poverty threshold set at 60% of the median equivalised income, relatively large 
proportions of both poor elderly (up to 39%) and poor non-elderly (up to 40%) in the NMS have 
only some difficulty with meeting ends meet (Figure 2.30). Additionally, there are those who 
make ends meet easily (from fairly to very easily). For instance, the proportion of the poor 
elderly in Estonia who make ends meet fairly easily amounts to as much as 32% (even 42% 
among the poor aged 75 years and over) (Figure 2.31). Part of the explanation may be found in 
the subjective nature of the judgement, i.e. different understandings of what it means to make 
ends meet. Undoubtedly, the differences exist both between the persons in the same country and 
between the countries. INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 39 
 
Figure 2.30 Share of the relatively poor (at 60% of median income) making ends meet with 
difficulty; NMS and EU-15 (%) 
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Figure 2.31 Elderly poor (at 60% median income) by ability to make ends meet; NMS and 
EU-15 (%) 
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Relative poverty threshold at 60% of median disposable income proved to be far too low for 
most of the OMS. For instance, one the one hand, only 8% of the relatively poor elderly in 
Denmark (13% in Sweden and 14% in Finland) make ends meet with (great) difficulty. On the 
other hand, as many as 56% of the relatively poor elderly in Denmark (37% in the Netherlands, 
26% in Luxemburg and 24% in Finland and Sweden) make ends meet (very) easily.  40 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
Due to such results, we checked the subjective evaluation of one's own economic situation 
taking into account only the elderly with the equivalised household income below 50% of the 
median income. Surprisingly, an increase in the share of the poor elderly making ends meet with 
difficulty (from some to great) did not exceed 2.5 percentage points in individual countries. In 
four out of nine countries, the proportion of the poor elderly making ends meet with difficulty 
was even lower than among the elderly with income below 60% of the median income (by up to 
6 percentage points). 
Lowest monthly income to make ends need 
It does not make much sense to compare the absolute amounts of the average lowest monthly 
income (per equivalent household member) to make ends meet across countries. We rather 
compare them between the non-elderly and the elderly, and between elderly age groups. The 
Slovak Republic is the only NMS where the elderly poor evaluate to need considerably (by 
37%) more income to make ends meet than the non-elderly. The amounts for the elderly poor 
are also higher than those for the non-elderly poor in the Czech Republic and Poland, and the 
same is the case in nine out of 15 OMS. 
The average lowest monthly income (per equivalent household member) to make ends meet is 
only slightly higher for the elderly who are poor at 60% of the median equivalent disposable 
income than for those who are poor at 50% of the median income. In the Czech Republic and 
the EU-15, it is even lower. In the EU-15 and Cyprus, the older the age group, the lower the 
evaluated amount of income needed to make ends meet. There is no clear pattern in other NMS. 
In the Slovak Republic, for instance, persons aged 75 years and over evaluated the income 
needed to make ends meet at 1.8 times the one evaluated by the non-elderly, and 1.5 times the 
one evaluated by persons aged 60-64 years.  
In Figure 2.32, the average lowest monthly income to make ends meet is presented as a 
percentage of the median income of elderly poor and non-elderly poor. It is evident that the 
average lowest monthly income to make ends meet exceeds the relative poverty threshold (60% 
of equivalised disposable median income) in all NMS and for both elderly and non-elderly. This 
means that not being relatively poor does not necessarily mean having enough income to make 
ends meet. This is particularly true for the elderly poor in the Slovak Republic, who estimate 
needing the equivalent of about 1.9 median income in order to make ends meet. That is more 
than three times the poverty threshold, which indicates that the poverty threshold may be far too 
low in that country. INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 41 
 
Figure 2.32 Average lowest monthly income to make ends meet as percentage of median 
income; poor elderly and poor non-elderly (poverty threshold at 60% median 
income); NMS and EU-15, 2005 
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2.10 Conclusion 
The absolute income position of the elderly 
The analysis has shown the median income of both non-elderly and elderly in all NMS to be 
below the EU-15 average. While the elderly in Cyprus suffer a considerable drop in their 
disposable income after retirement, the median income does not differ much between the elderly 
age groups in Poland and Hungary.  
There are considerable differences between the countries regarding the ratio between the median 
income of the elderly and the non-elderly. In Poland and Hungary the ratio is over one, which is 
due to a low median income of the non-elderly rather than to a high median income of the 
elderly. High ratios also indicate that the pension systems in these two countries were successful 
in safeguarding the standard of living of the elderly.  
Income inequality 
In almost all NMS, income inequality is higher among the non-elderly than among the elderly. 
The elderly are under-represented in both the bottom and the top income deciles. 
Relative poverty 
In three NMS (Cyprus, Latvia and Estonia) the elderly are more exposed to poverty than the 
population of the EU-15 on average. By far the highest relative poverty among the elderly was 
registered in Cyprus (34.3%). The Czech Republic is the NMS with the lowest poverty rate 
among the elderly (5.8% at a poverty threshold equal to 60% of the median equivalised 
disposable income). Considerable shares of the relatively poor in the NMS have incomes 
amounting to 50%-60% of the median equivalised disposable income of their respective 
countries. In five NMS (the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland and 42 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
Lithuania), the poverty rates are higher for the non-elderly than for the elderly. In all NMS and 
the EU-15 average, the elderly living in one-person households are (much) more frequently 
affected by relative poverty than the elderly on average.  
The logistic regression analysis has shown that in five out of nine NMS the likelihood of being 
relatively poor is higher for persons aged 55-59 than for those aged 65-69. This is most 
probably due to unemployment, early retirement or permanent disability, all resulting in a 
relatively low income. However, in contrast to what was expected, in more than half of the 
countries (the Baltic States, Hungary and the Czech Republic) the likelihood of being relatively 
poor is no higher for the elderly unemployed than for the retired persons. The number of years 
the person spent in paid work was proved to considerably decrease the likelihood of being 
relatively poor.  
Poverty among elderly women 
There is a higher poverty incidence among elderly women than among elderly men in all NMS 
except Poland. The likelihood of being relatively poor is higher for women in one-person 
households than for elderly men living in such households. Living in two- or more-person 
households decreases the likelihood for elderly women of being relatively poor, as compared to 
elderly men in such households. 
Poverty gap 
The poverty gaps for the elderly in the EU-15 exceed those in the NMS (except in Cyprus). In 
six NMS, the poverty gap decreases for each subsequent age group, which is particularly 
pronounced till age 75. Women account for 56-73% of all elderly poor NMS, but the poverty 
gaps are lower for poor elderly women than for poor elderly men, except in Cyprus and 
Slovenia. 
Economic status and the history of the poor elderly 
At the age of 55-59, there are considerable proportions of persons working full-time and part-
time among the relatively poor, up to 34-44% in the Baltic States. It was surprising to find out 
that working full-time or part-time result in a higher likelihood of relative poverty than being 
retired (in seven out of nine NMS). The reason could be found in formerly general retirement 
conditions and (still) favourable indexation of pensions. In Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, 
Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary, 12%-17% of the poor elderly live in households where all persons 
are active full-time. All this indicates that full-time activity does not provide people with 
sufficient income to escape relative poverty. 
In all countries but Cyprus, the relatively poor elderly have spent fewer years in paid 
employment than the non-poor ones. The poverty incidence among the elderly and the average 
number of years spent in paid work are negatively related (which would be normal) only in the 
Central European Countries. At the same number of years spent in paid work, the poverty 
incidence is much higher in the Baltic States.  
Subjective poverty 
There is a high correlation between the relative poverty incidence among the elderly and their 
subjective poverty, the latter being based on the elderly people's evaluation that their households 
are making ends meet with difficulty. The average lowest monthly income to make ends meet 
exceeds the relative poverty threshold (60% of equivalised disposable median income) in all 
NMS and for both elderly and non-elderly. This means that not being relatively poor does not 
necessarily mean having enough income to make ends meet. INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES | 43 
 
Material hardship of the elderly poor 
The capacity of households in which the elderly poor live to face unexpected financial expenses 
is lower in all NMS than in any of the OMS. In the Slovak Republic and Latvia, the financial 
constraints are somewhat higher for elderly poor women than for elderly poor men. The 
opposite situation is typical for the Czech Republic. 
Meeting the health care needs of the elderly poor 
In Slovenia, only less than one percent of the elderly poor who needed medical examination or 
treatment had that need unmet. The situation is particularly unfavourable in Latvia where 44% 
reported unmet need. 
Housing conditions of the elderly poor 
Large proportions of the elderly poor in most of the NMS own their housing, with Lithuania 
(94%) at the top. Cyprus, Slovenia and the Czech Republic are the NMS with relatively the best 
housing conditions of the elderly poor. Latvia, Poland and Lithuania are at the other end of the 
spectrum. The proportions of the relatively poor in the NMS who have problems with leaking 
roofs, damp walls/floors/foundation, or rotting window frames or floors, are mostly over 40%, 
up to 62% for the elderly poor in Poland. 
General conclusion 
The general conclusion regarding the elderly poor in the NMS would be that the elderly in 
Latvia and Lithuania are in the least favourable situation, followed by the elderly in Estonia and 
Cyprus. The Central European Countries provide pensioners with a relatively high and stabile 
income that prevents the high incidence of poverty and material deprivation among the elderly. 
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3. Estonia 
Katarzyna Piętka
* 
Summary 
1. Estonia has undertaken reforms of the pension system from the very beginning of the 
transition, which have been followed by institutional adjustments in more recent years. The 
effects of growing wealth and societal openness have occurred relatively quickly. Although in 
the early stages of the transition the elderly were considered better-off (due to their access to 
stable incomes and indexation of pensions), in the 1996-2004 period the elderly are in a 
relatively less favourable position when compared to younger generations. 
2. The income level of the elderly remains lower than of the rest of society. Both levels grew at a 
similar rate over the period analysed. The relative stability of the situation of elderly people 
was largely due to an increase in their employment rate. In particular the youngest elderly age 
groups (55-59 and 60-64) enjoy relatively high incomes, due to a greater share of labour 
income in the household budget.  
3. The impact of the minimum pension as well as the redistributive character of the pension 
formula to date have translated into relatively lower income inequality among the elderly than 
among people under 55. The incomes of the elderly are concentrated most in the 2
nd decile, then 
in the 1
st and the 3
rd.  
4. The phenomenon of extended families, where pensioners share their income with less wealthy 
younger family members, which causes them to fall into lower income levels, seems to be 
replaced gradually by an adverse direction of support: from increasingly wealthy children 
towards their older parents. 
5. The relative poverty rates of the various elderly groups are generally higher than for the 
younger generations. The poverty gap ratio is quite wide in Estonia, and it decreases with age, 
starting from the 60-64 group. According to two absolute poverty measures (the subsistence 
minimum and the absolute poverty line) the income situation of the elderly looks more 
favourable, especially in recent years. The subjective assessment of the income situation by the 
elderly is very much in line or even slightly more optimistic than relative poverty indices. The 
elderly in Estonia are characterised by greater material deprivation than the younger 
generations. 
6. The prospects for the income situation of the elderly are not very promising, although less 
gloomy than in some other transition economies. Pension reform will diminish the replacement 
rate in the public system, but the funded pillar is expected to compensate for this and the overall 
net replacement rate, which is currently low, will remain stable  until 2050 (around 43%). 
7. Income inequalities among the elderly are expected to grow over time, due to changes in the 
pension system and a rise in the share of minimum pensions. 
3.1  General background information 
Estonia is a relatively small country, with a population of about 1.3 million at the beginning of 
2007, which gives a very low density of 30.9 inhabitants per km². The country’s administrative 
structure is based on 15 counties, of which three have relatively high population concentration: 
Harju, in the north and along the Gulf of Finland coastline (39% of the total population, 
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including 30% in Tallinn, the capital city), Ida-Viru, in the north, above the Gulf of Finland and 
bordering Russia (13%), and Tartu county in the middle-eastern part of the country and next to 
Peipus Lake, also bordering Russia (11%, including 8% in the city of Tartu). 
In 1991, Estonia became an independent country after 51 years as a republic of the Soviet 
Union. The transition from a planned to a market economy was accompanied by a twin 
challenge: an increase in the prices of energy and raw materials (due to changes in price 
settlements between Estonia and Russia, as was the case for many other Soviet Bloc countries) 
and a disruption in trade with FSU (Former Soviet Union) countries (due to changes in the 
system of financial settlements). Falling production and restructuring of enterprises led to 
outcomes that are typical for transition economies: job cuts and rising unemployment. GDP fell 
by 33% between 1991 and 1993 [Trumm, p.20]. Stabilisation reforms were radical and efficient 
and this meant that the period of negative GDP growth was relatively short (1992-1994) and 
macroeconomic imbalances were quickly reduced (including the fiscal deficit, which imposed 
limits on the social safety net). Massive foreign direct investments (which saw growth from 
USD 58 mln in 1992 to USD 209 mln in 1995, averaging 8% of GDP during this period) and 
robust exports to Western countries (accounting for one third of GDP by the end of 1995) were 
important factors driving the fast recovery. Real wages started to grow as early as 1993 and 
unemployment peaked at only 8.9% also early, again in 1993. Growth in real wages did not 
harm the country's external competitiveness since it was backed by a rapid re-orientation of 
trade towards markets outside the FSU (e.g. Finland, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands – 
in 1993 these four countries accounted for 42% of Estonian commodity exports).  
In the following years, the Estonian economy experiences very dynamic growth (6.4% on 
average in 1995-1998), backed by the development of robust domestic demand. The global 
economic slowdown following the Asian crisis of 1997 and Russian financial crisis of 1998 put 
certain brakes on this strong GDP growth to just above zero percent in 1999. However, the 
economy recovered very quickly: 9.6% growth in GDP in 2000, which was continued in the 
following years (on average 8.7% during 2000-2007). Again, domestic demand – both 
household consumption and investments – were strong driving factors (during 2000-2007 on 
average at 9.5% and 14.3%, respectively). This led to deepening external imbalances (since 
2002 the current account deficit has stood at over 10% of GDP) and has necessitated policies 
designed to cool the economy. As a result, we saw an economic slow-down to 0.1% year-on-
year in the first quarter of 2008. From 1995 to 2007, GDP per capita (constant prices in 
Estonian Kroons) has grown by more than 150%
1 (in the analysed period 1996-2004 by 81%
2). 
According to PPP, Estonian GDP equals 72.5% of the EU-27 average (2007, Eurostat), which 
means it has almost doubled during last ten years (41.2% in 1997). 
Demographic changes since 1990 have been significant. Both the fertility rate and the crude 
birth rate have dropped significantly (the latter by 33% between 1990 and 1994, down to 9.5 
and further to 8.8 in 1998; after that a slow recovery to 11.8 in 2007). Most probably the 
removal of subsidies for child-related goods and services (e.g. day care) at the beginning of 
transition, as well as the need for greater involvement of women in the workplace and increased 
labour market flexibility for women were primary factors underpinning this unwanted change in 
reproductive behaviour. As a result, the share of children under 15 dropped between 1990 and 
2005 from 22.3% to 15.4%, while the total population fell by as much as 14.2%. The number of 
Estonians decreased in all the main age groups of the population under 65. Moreover, Estonian 
society, like other nations, is ageing – the share of those in the 65+ bracket increased by 4.9% 
during this 15-year period. 
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The sharp fall in GDP during the first years of the transition did not lead to a massive increase 
in unemployment. Instead we saw a substantial lowering of labour market participation (in 1989 
the total labour force was close to 843,000, and dropped to about 749,000 within 5 years (that is, 
by 11%). Particularly marked was the increase in the number of disability pensioners: it rose by 
more than half between 1990 and 2000, from 41,000 to 67,000. Since 1996 (the beginning of 
available Household Budget Survey data) the participation rate continued falling until 1999 and 
then stabilised at 62-63% (of the 15-74 population bracket); it then jumped to almost 66% in 
2006-2007. Estonian society is characterised by relatively high economic activity compared to 
other transition economies, as well as to EU targets. For women, who are traditionally less 
economically active, the rate was 57-58% during 1997-2004, then rose to 61% (2006-2007). For 
men the rate was on a downward trend from 73% in 1997 to 67.4% in 2005. In the last two 
years it returned to 71.3% in 2007. The fairly stable overall participation rate since 1997 has 
been characterised by important structural changes. The participation rate has dropped for 
people aged 15-24 by almost 10 percentage points (35.5% in 2006), while the activity of the 
elderly has grown: for those aged 55-64 by 12.2 percentage points and those aged 65-74 by 9.3 
percentage points. The increased activity of the elderly is almost exclusively related to increased 
employment (a growth in the employment rate of 12.6 percentage points to 58.2% and by 9.0 
percentage points to 19.1% for both age groups respectively), while the drop in the activity rates 
for younger generations, the 15-54 age brackets combined, was caused by falls in 
unemployment. The employment rate for those aged 55-64 was far above the Lisbon target 
(50% by 2010). Rising employment among the elderly has been influenced by continued 
economic growth (with a short-term slow down in 1999) and by policies motivating people to 
defer their retirement. In 2006, the overall employment rate was 61.6%, that is 3.1 percentage 
points higher than in 1997. The rate for women reached a level of 60.7%, which is above the 
Lisbon target (57% in 2005, 60% in 2010); the rate for men was 65.9%. During 1997-2007, the 
worst situation on the labour market was triggered by the global financial crisis in 1997-1998. In 
2000, the employment rate (for people aged 35+ and, eventually, also for the aggregate figure) 
was the lowest and the unemployment rate for practically all age groups was the highest (the 
overall rate stood at 13.6%). It has dropped by more than half since then (5.9% in 2007). The 
unemployment rate for the elderly remained the lowest throughout the entire period (4.1% for 
the 55-64 age group in 2006) – in cases of not working many use early retirement instead of 
relying on unemployment benefits. 
The transition from a planned to a market economy led to structural changes among the working 
population in all the countries in transition. In Estonia the share of people involved in 
agriculture has lowered by three quarters, from 19.3% in 1991 to just 4.9% in 2006. The share 
of employment in industry has shrunk as well (from 28.9% to 23.8%). The shift in the labour 
force from these two sectors has been towards services: to market services (from 27.6% to 
40.5%) and non-market services (from 16% to 20.8%); employment in construction remained 
fairly stable (7-8%). The rise in the service sector was partly driven by growing self-
employment, which increased its share of the working population from 3.2% to 8.1% during the 
period. 
The dependency ratio (the sum of the 0-14 and 65+ age brackets in relation to the 15-64 
population) in Estonia has improved slightly since the beginning of the transition: in 1989 it was 
50.8% and has dropped to 47% in 2007 (which corresponds with a ratio of 2.1 of all adults to 
every child (0-14) and elderly person (65+) taken together). As we know from the demographic 
analysis, this was caused by a big fall in the number of children. When we divide the 
dependency ratio into the ratio of children to the 15-64 population and the ratio of the elderly 
(65+) to the 15-64 group we see that gradually the burden of the elderly has kept on increasing. 
In 1989, the ratio for children was 33.6% and 17.2% for the 65+ group – then up to 2007 the 
proportions reversed: 21.9% for children and 25.1% for the elderly. Such a tendency puts ESTONIA | 47 
 
pressure on the sustainability of the future pension system and the adequacy of elderly incomes. 
According to the Eurostat baseline forecast, this pressure will grow further in the coming years: 
the dependency ratio is expected to increase by over 40% (to 67.9% in 2050), overwhelmingly 
due to an increase in the ratio of the 65+ group to the 15-64 population, which is forecast to 
reach 43.1% in 2050 (higher by three quarters compared with the current level).
3  
3.2 Pension  institutions  and actors in pension policy 
The Estonian pension system offers four major types of benefit: old-age pensions, survival 
pensions, disability pensions and state allowances.  
Old-age pension 
The pension system has undergone a series of changes since the early 1990s. At the beginning 
of the transition these modifications were concentrated on adjusting pensioners’ incomes to the 
inflationary environment. Budget concerns and hyperinflation forced the shelving of an 
earnings-related system, designed in 1991, before it was even implemented. From January 1992 
to April 1993 a system of flat-rate pensions was used, in which pensions only varied according 
to the type of pension. A move towards a pension system in which benefit levels were based 
partly on the length of employment was approved in April 1993. The basic pension (social 
assistance) for an old-age pensioner was linked to the minimum wage under this law. Also in 
1993, Parliament decided to raise the retirement age (at that time it was 55 for women and 60 
for men) by 6 months each year until it reached 60 for women and 65 for men. Then it was 
changed further by freezing the legal retirement age for men at 63 and gradually increasing it for 
women up to the same level by 2016. The actual retirement age can be deferred with no limits. 
The pension size calculated on the basis of the pension formula was increased by 0.9% for every 
month of deferred retirement. The eligibility for obtaining an old-age pension generally requires 
having worked for at least 15 years and having reached the retirement age.  
The current so-called three pillar pension system was formed at around the turn of the 
Millennium. It includes: 
(1) Compulsory funded DC (defined contribution) system, started in 2002 and partially 
replacing (in 1/5)
4 state DB (defined benefit) PAYG; 
(2) Funded pillar; participation in the funded system was mandatory for people born in 1983 and 
later, voluntary for people born between 1942 and 1982. By 2005, around 75% of the labour 
force had joined the new system. The first benefits of the new system should be paid in 2009.  
(3) Voluntary private pension schemes, launched in 1998. Despite some tax incentives 
(introduced with some delay) the participation is still low (around 13% of the labour force in 
2004). Therefore their contribution to older people's incomes is projected to be rather small. The 
payment of benefits will not commence in this system before 55 years of age, and the minimum 
period for participating in the pension scheme is 5 years. 
                                                      
3 The dependency ratio for the group considered “elderly” in this report (the 55+ group in relation to the 
15-54 group) is expected to grow even stronger: from 49% to 88.1%. 
4 “The total rate of social tax is 33% of taxable sums (comprised mainly of wages), paid by employers, 
self-employed persons and, on some occasions, by the state. 13% of social tax is ear-marked for health 
insurance and 20% for pension insurance. In the case of persons who have joined the second pillar, the 
20% pension insurance, which is part of social tax is further divided into state pension insurance of 16% 
and funded pension part of 4%” [National Strategy Reports, p. 9]. An employee pays to the second pillar 
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Having fulfilled the criterion of a minimum working period (15 years) one can get an early 
retirement pension up to 3 years before the legal retirement age (in a few cases up to 5 years). In 
the case of workers in occupations that are considered hard or hazardous, the early retirement 
age could be 5 or 10 years prior to the legal age; however, this requires 15-25 years of work, at 
least half of it in an occupation considered hard or hazardous. The amount of early pension 
calculated on the basis of the pension formula is permanently reduced by 0.4% for every month 
of early retirement. Some professional groups enjoy separate early retirement schemes (e.g. 
military and police officers). Moreover “some categories of civil servants (for example judges, 
prosecutors, officials of the State Audit Office, police officers, members of the Defence Forces, 
Chancellors of Justice have a right to favourable special pensions.” [National Strategy Reports, 
p. 9] 
Unlike many other transition economies around the middle of the 1990s the concentration 
indicator
5 for pensions in Estonia was zero (World Bank, 2006, p. 26). This reflected a very 
concentrated distribution of pensions. The formula consisted of a large flat rate element 
(equalling 85% of the minimum wage) and the non-flat rate portion dependent only on the 
length of service but not the previous salary level (1.7% to 2.5% for each year of service). The 
difference between the maximum and minimum pension was less than 2.  For this reason higher 
income groups received a smaller share of pension benefits in Estonia than in other transition 
economies.  
The pension reform has changed the factors determining the benefit level. Since 2000, the 
formula consists of 3 parts: (1) a base amount (flat rate element, subject to indexation), (2) an 
element calculated based on the number of years in service until 1998, (3) an element based on 
the insurance component since 1999; the insurance component is the sum of annual pension 
insurance coefficients during a full working career; the annual pension insurance coefficient is a 
ratio of individual contributions paid during a single year and the national average contributions 
in a given year. The number of years of service and/or the insurance component are multiplied 
by the so-called cash value (subject to indexation). The pension formula includes a gradual 
transition from the old rules to the new rules. For persons who withdraw from work before 
1999, the state pension depends only on the flat rate base amount and the length of service. For 
persons who entered the labour market in 1999 or later, the state pension also consists of two 
parts: the base amount and the insurance component. In essence, the three-part pension formula 
applies only to those generations that have acquired the record of employment both before and 
after 1999. From 1
st July 2005, the base amount was EEK 858 (ca 28% of the average old age 
pension) and the cash value of annual score was EEK 42.83. 
The non-contributory periods until 1998 are credited, and contributions for non-contributory 
periods after 1998 are paid by the state. 
Pensions are indexed annually on April 1
st. The index depends in equal shares on the increase in 
consumer prices and the increase in social tax revenues; however, additional ad hoc pension 
increases may also sometimes be used as a political instrument.  
Accumulating pensions with earnings from work is allowed, but only in the case of retiring and 
no earlier than at the legal retirement age. Individuals who retire before the legal age may 
                                                      
5 “Similar in concept to a Gini coefficient, the "concentration coefficient" summarises the correlation 
between income and benefits received. A highly negative coefficient indicates that lower income groups 
receive a disproportionately large share of benefits relative to their share in the population. A coefficient 
close to zero describes a distribution in which benefits are not linked to income. A highly positive 
coefficient signifies a regressive benefit distribution in which richer individuals receive the lion's share of 
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continue to work while receiving an old-age pension; however, if their wage exceeds the set 
amount, they only receive a partial pension. 
The number of old-age pensioners kept growing until 1994 (starting from 1970 – the beginning 
of the available data set), then we saw a gradual fall (between 1990 and 2000 by over 3% and a 
further fall by over 2% between 2001 and 2008
6). This was an outcome of the described 
changes in the pension system and of improvement in the labour market for the elderly. The 
share of old-age pensioners in the 55+ group started to lower gradually from 84.4% in 1994 to 
78.3% in 2000 and further from 82.3% in 2001 to 77.3% in 2007.  
The average level of the old age pension was around 35% of the net wage in the economy 
during 2001-2006.  
Survival pension  
Survival pensions are provided to family members unable to work (children, widows/widowers, 
parents) in the event of the death of the family’s main breadwinner. Persons who have not met 
the length of employment requirement stipulated for the old-age pension are eligible to receive a 
state allowance or a national pension.  
The number of pensioners receiving a survival pension in the 1990s continued the trend started 
in previous years and kept falling throughout the transition period (by over 5% between 1990 
and 2000; further decrease by 42% between 2001 and 2008 was mainly due to legal changes).  
Disability pension 
Disability pensions are provided to individuals unable to work due to physical or mental 
limitations. A commission for disabled people determines the eligibility and the level of 
inability (there are three categories of invalidity associated with three benefit levels). 
The disability pension entitlement was narrowed in 2002 (together with the pension reform). 
The incapacity to work is defined in increments of 10% of impairment: 10-90% of impairment 
means ‘partial incapacity,’ and 100% of impairment means ‘total incapacity’). The benefit is 
granted to people with a minimum of 40% incapacity. The formula for disability benefit is 
similar to the old-age pension (however, with the maximum number of years of working career 
taken into account set at 30) multiplied by the level of incapacity to work; the minimum value 
of the disability pension is defined, however. Indexation is the same as for old-age pensions. 
The process of assigning disability pensions has served as one of a number of instruments aimed 
at releasing pressure in the labour market during the transition. Due to the liberal and generous 
system the number of disability pensioners grew by 64% between 1990 and 2000, and by a 
further 56% between 2001 and 2008 (mainly on the account of an increase in the number of the 
least disabled – 40-70%). The average pension for work incapacity accounted for around 60% 
of the average old age pension. The ratio lowered from 68% in 2001 following an increase in 
the share of partial incapacity pensions. 
Social assistance 
The pension system and social protection also offer some guarantees of minimum income, in the 
form of a national pension (or a minimum old age pension) and social assistance subsistence 
benefit.  
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The national pension is for those who did not complete a sufficient number of years of pension 
insurance to be eligible for regular old-age, disability or survival pensions, on condition that the 
pension applicant has lived in Estonia for at least 5 years and has reached the age of 63. The law 
does not define the rate of the national pension, however different governments have followed 
the principle that the rate should be higher than the subsistence level
7 determined on the basis of 
the Social Welfare Act. In 2004, the average value of the national pension was EEK 990 
(around 50% of the average old-age benefit, similar to previous years). In 2005, around 2% of 
all pensioners were receiving this benefit.  
Since November 1997 the social assistance subsistence benefit for the first household member 
was EEK 500 and for each subsequent household member EEK 350 (EEK 400 since 2000). The 
average amount of benefit equalled EEK 440 in 2002, which was around 27% of the old-age 
pension. In 2002, 12.2% of households received the benefit, of whom 7.9% were households 
with a pensioner (a fall from 12.2% in 1998) (Ministry of Social Affairs (2003), p.70-71). 
According to the Synthesis report on adequate and sustainable pensions (p. 2), in 2005 around 
2.6% of pensioners were granted a social assistance subsistence benefit (mainly in the winter 
months to compensate for heating costs). 
According to Estonian legislation, the family has the primary responsibility to care for the 
elderly. Social welfare services for the elderly are organised by local municipalities. In 2001, 
1.5% of people over 65 lived in welfare institutions. 
Pensioners have at times sought to exert direct political influence in Estonia. In the early 1990s, 
for example, they formed their own party (the Estonian Party of Pensioners and Families), 
which at the parliamentary elections of 1995 won the biggest block of seats in a coalition with 
three other parties. In 2000, the party merged with the People's Union Party. We may say that 
the influence of the pensioners’ party did not translate into the creation of particularly 
favourable institutional arrangements for the elderly nor lead to a raising of the pension level 
compared with wages, as was the case in some other transition economies. 
3.3 Data 
For the purposes of analysis we used household budget surveys (HBS) for 9 years: 1996-2004, 
provided by the Estonian Statistical Office (ESO). These surveys are household-based (income 
streams and material status), with added individual information (including age, gender, status in 
the family, educational level and labour market position). The questionnaire was extended 
substantially after 1999, however both periods (1996-1999 and 2000-2004) are considered 
methodologically homogenous (ESO publishes calculations for the entire period 1996-2007 not 
adding any remark on the trend break). 
Statistics Estonia conducts the Household Income and Expenditure Survey regularly. The 
sampling includes 520 households per month and 6,240 households per year and is carried out 
by a stratified systematic sampling procedure. The data were collected from households by face-
to-face interviews and by the diary questionnaire method. The data are coded and entered 
centrally, making use of the Blaise system. To calculate the weights and sampling errors the 
software package SAS is used. 
Using the income side for analysis has its limits. The World Bank promoted the expenditure 
approach in the study on poverty level in 1995, indicating that incomes in transition economies 
tend to be under-reported, in particular in the area of income from the private and informal 
sectors (World Bank, p. 42). The role of the self-employed sector in Estonia is quite high (8-9% 
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of the working population). In addition, the seasonality of rural incomes means overall incomes 
are not spread evenly over the year and the share of people working in agriculture, fishing and 
forestry accounted for 9.7% in 1996, which was similar to the role of farming income in 
household budgets (8.9%, Table B4 in Annex B). The role of farming income dropped to just 
1.6% in 2004, while the share of agricultural employment lowered by that time to 5.9%. This 
could suggest either the stronger impact of month-to-month variability of farming revenues, a 
drop in labour productivity in this sector or an increase in income under-reporting. Another 
argument that points to the under-reporting of incomes in surveys is that the majority of 
Estonians have access to plots of land where they produce non-traded food for themselves – this 
provides additional resources to households that are not measured, however, in the monetary 
income stream. Also, incomes in the HBS do not include housing subsidies that go directly to 
the owner of the housing unit. In 1995, over 16% of Estonian households received this form of 
household subsidy (World Bank, p. 47). Not being able to account for them overestimates 
poverty indices among the elderly as well as among other groups of society (we have no access 
to information on the structure of the population receiving this benefit). These issues have to be 
kept in mind when formulating conclusions about poverty in Estonia. 
Income has been calculated based on household monetary income weighted with the OECD-
modified equivalence scale [1.0; 0.5; 0.3] with one difference: children are individuals under 18 
years old (against 15 in the standard version of the scale). Additionally, the weights of the 
Estonian Statistical Office were used to get representative income data. Income data have been 
presented in the average prices of a given year in order to eliminate the impact of inflation. In 
practice this implies May prices, as the observations for a given year included cases from 
December of the previous year as well. 
3.4  The income and labour market position of the elderly, 1996-2004 
The elderly, 55+ group, accounted for 27.1% of the total population in 2004, with a slight 
growing tendency during the last two years. A similar increase in the relative size of this group 
was noted during 1996-1999, but at slightly higher levels. The figure and the trend are similar 
compared to registered official numbers, especially for the second period (2000-2004). The 
shares of sub-groups of the elderly correspond with official figures as well. The growing weight 
of the 55+ population results in fact from a growing share of people aged 65+, and reflects a 
slowly ageing society.  
Labour market participation 
Estonians’ economic activity, including the elderly, is very high. Since the beginning of the 
transition until the economic slow down at the end of the 1990s the employment rate fell 
consistently (according to the LFS – Labour Force Survey, Table 3.1.a, from 73.2% in 1991 to 
57.6% in 2000 for the 15-69 population). Robust economic growth since then has stimulated an 
increase in the employment rate up to 65.8% in 2007 (or 62.6% for the 15-74 age brackets).  
The employment rate for the 55-59 group was as high as 74.2% in 2004. Since 2005 it has been 
higher than ever in history. The employment rate decreases gradually with age. It is lower by 
nearly half in the case of the 60-64 group (39.8% in 2004) and much lower for the 65-74 
population: 18.5% (however, very high when taking into account that these are people above the 
legal retirement age). The employment rate has been growing across all the age groups of the 
elderly, however most in the case of the 65-69 group: it has more than doubled during last ten 
years. It is quite astonishing that the 70-74 group registers an employment rate of more than 9%. 
The combined rate for the 65-74 group continued to grow after 1997 and almost doubled by 
2007. These tendencies are mostly reflected in the calculations based on the HBS. The growing 
employment rate of the 55-59 age group and 60-64 group can be observed for most of the 52 | KATARZYNA PIĘTKA 
 
period
8, although the scale of this growth is slightly smaller than according to the LFS. The 
difference between both surveys is much bigger in the case of the employment rate for the 65-74 
age brackets, which – according to the HBS – remained stable at 9-11% throughout the entire 
period (Table  3.1b). This explains why the income position of this group did not improve 
visibly despite the LFS suggesting a substantial increase in their economic activity.  
Table 3.1a Employment rate, official data based on LFS 
  1989 1990 1991 1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
15-74  na  na Na na na Na na na  58.5 57.7 55.3 54.7 55.2 55.9  56.7  56.8  57.9  61.6 62.6
15-69  76.4  75.0 73.2 69.5 65.5 64.6 61.7 61.2 61.3 60.6 58.2 57.6 58.1 58.8  59.7  59.7  60.9  64.7 65.8
15-54  82.2  80.9 79.7 77.3 74.2 73.5 70.7 69.6 69.6 68.4 65.1 64.2 64.2 63.8  64.6  64.7  65.6  69.6 70.9
55-59  67.8  68.1 66.4 59.4 55.2 55.5 55.1 56.5 58.8 59.5 57.1 56.6 57.9 63.7  63.8  65.0  68.2  71.7 74.2
60-64  52.3  52.3 47.3 37.2 30.6 29.5 27.9 29.0 30.0 32.6 32.6 32.5 35.1 41.2  41.9  40.9  43.2  41.1 39.8
65-74  na  na Na na na Na na na  10.2 10.2 11.8 12.7 13.5 15.2 16.1 16.8 16.0 19.1 18.5
65-69  39.8  35  32 27.8  20.7  18.6  12.3 14.2 11.9 12.8 16.0 17.7 17.7 20.1 21.9 22.1 21.6 27.0 25.9
70-74  na  na Na na na Na na na  7.7 6.9 6.7 6.9 8.8 10 9.9  11 9.5 9.1 9.1
Source: Estonian Statistical Office. 
Table 3.1b Employment rate, calculated based on HBS 
  1996
a  1997 1998 1999 2000
b
2001 2002 2003 2004 
15-54  50.2 50.5 51.7 49.3 46.8 48.3 47.5 50.3 50.2
55-59  61.2 60.3 61.6 64.2 57.1 64.1 62.1 61.2 63.3
60-64  32.7 34.1 35.3 36.9 30.8 32.6 32.1 32.7 38.4
65-74  10.5 9.9 11.1  10.0 9.6 10.9 9.3 8.6 10.8
75-79  1.0 2.3 0.8 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.9 1.8 1.8
80  +  3.0 1.3 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1
Total  43.8 43.2 44.4 42.3 41.2 41.7 41.7 42.5 43.0
a Sum of people working under 10 hours, more than 10 hours and having work but not working currently due to a seasonal break  
b Sum of people working full-time or part-time;  
Source: own calculations based on HBS 1996-2004 
From the very beginning of the transition, changes in the pension system have been aimed at 
deferring the age of retirement. Such a policy was launched through direct measures, such as 
gradually raising the legal age of retirement, as well as through introducing incentives granting 
an additional value to future pensions for each year of deferred retirement. However, 
instruments that would limit eligibility to early retirement for particular professional groups 
were not really used. These policies seemed to work. According to the HBS, the share of retired 
people among the age group of 55-59 and 60-64 dropped steadily during 1996-1999 (Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2 Retired persons by age group  
   Below 55 55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74  75 - 79  80 +  Total 
Social group           
  retired person           
  1996  1.6  32.1 66.1 89.1 98.8  96.8  20.5 
  1997  1.5  30.8 64.8 90.0 97.7  98.3  22.0 
  1998  1.8  30.3 62.7 88.9 99.1  99.7  21.7 
  1999  2.1  25.4 59.7 89.7 98.3  99.3  22.2 
Inactivity due to            
2000  Retirement and disability together  2.1  31.9 64.8 89.6 98.2  99.2  19.1 
  Retirement  0.1  21.9 58.3 86.1 94.8  95.3  16.2 
 disability  pension  1.9 10.0 6.5 3.5 3.4  3.9  2.8 
2001  Retirement and disability together  2.2  27.1 59.1 88.5 98.0  98.1  19.5 
  Retirement  0.1  17.3 53.8 85.3 95.4  95.0  16.7 
 disability  pension  2.1  9.7 5.4 3.2 2.6  3.1  2.8 
2003  Retirement and disability together  2.4  26.3 64.6 90.9 98.2  99.9  22.0 
  Retirement  0.1  14.8 59.0 87.0 96.2  97.2  18.8 
 disability  pension  2.3 11.5 5.6 3.9 1.9  2.7  3.1 
2004  Retirement and disability together  3.1  26.5 58.6 88.5 98.2  99.9  22.6 
  Retirement  0.1  13.1 53.2 86.6 98.1  96.8  19.1 
 disability  pension  3.0 13.4 5.4 1.9 0.1  3.1  3.5 
Source: own calculations based on HBS 1996-2004. 
For the years 2000-2004, when the survey question about retirement was modified and therefore 
is not compatible with previous years, the trend was similar, especially for the 55-59 people.  
Median income 
The median income of the elderly is lower than for younger generations. In 2004, the ratio 
accounted for 77.6%. It was slightly lower in previous years (74.2-74.5% in 2001-2003). During 
1996-1999 it was on a sliding trend, however it jumped to 85.1% in 1999, when the Estonian 
economy suffered from the Russian and Asian crises and incomes of working persons slowed 
due to growth in unemployment and the slow-down in wage dynamics, in contrast to a 
continued increase in pensions due to the inflation indexation). According to the structure of 
mean incomes presented in the official calculations based on HBS, the average income from 
pensions grew by almost 24% in 1999, while wages rose by only 0.4%, and income from self-
employment dropped by more than 5%.  
During the entire analysed period both age groups (below 55 and 55+) registered similar real 
median income growth: by 45% and 41%, respectively. It is worth mentioning that a slightly 
negative real growth of median income of the elderly occurred in 1997 and 1998.  
Most of the analysed elderly groups registered a median income lower than that for the below 
55 brackets, with only the median for 55-59 slightly exceeding that for the non-elderly group in 
three different years. The situation of the elderly is not homogenous. Median income tends to 
decrease with age (down to 70.2% of the non-elderly median in 2004 for the 75+ group), 
however it is relatively high for the 55-59 and 60-64 groups than for the 65+ group. This 
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For both years 1997 and 1998, growth in the median income for all the elderly groups was lower 
than for the non-elderly. The correction in relative incomes in 1999 (the Russian and Asian 
crises) pushed the cumulative growth in the median for the elderly well above the growth in the 
median among the younger age group. In later years the growth in median incomes for the two 
65+ groups was very close to that of the non-elderly. Moreover, in 2004 its real value compared 
to 1996 was 43% higher for the 65-74 group, 46% higher for the 75+ group and 45% higher for 
people below 55. A similar increase in the median income for the 65-74 population, as for the 
other age groups, is consistent with the stable – according to the HBS – employment rate for the 
65-74 group. However, it is in conflict with the LFS data, where a doubling employment rate for 
this group should have triggered relatively faster growth in their income level. Moreover, as the 
household structure did not change in this age group over time, it looks as if their average wages 
did not fully follow the wage path for younger generations. Indeed, the share of wages in their 
household budgets has fallen consistently in the last few years (from 19.6% in 2001 to 15.4% in 
2004 for 65-74, Table B4). The share of total labour income (that is, from wages and self-
employment together) has dropped recently as well. 
The path of a cumulative median growth for the 60-64 group looked similar to that of the 65+ 
group. It has gained momentum since 2003, and in 2004 the real median was 61% higher than in 
1996 (more than for the other age groups). Obviously, the growth in employment for this group 
was responsible for the relative improvement in its income level. This is also reflected in the 
growing share of wages in household budgets (from 35.9% in 2001 to 42.1% in 2004). For the 
60-64 group the median remains below the non-elderly level, however after some fluctuations in 
previous years (including around 1999) it improved consistently over the last period (an 
increase from 78.2% in 2001 to 93.4% in 2004). Clearly, improvement in the income level 
compared to all the age groups must reflect the adding of labour income to their previous 
sources, as this was the period when their employment rate started to gain momentum (a jump 
from 30.8% in 2000 to 38.4% in 2004 for the 60-64 group, according to HBS). 
The median income of the 55-59 group remained below the level of population below 55 for 
most of the time, although it has grown in recent years and in 2004 slightly exceeded the median 
of the younger generation. The cumulative real increase was less favourable than in the case of 
the other age groups: by 39%. People aged 55-59 remain very active although there was no 
obvious increase in their employment rate over the time and the share of wages as well as of 
overall labour income was quite stable. 
It is worth mentioning that the median incomes of the elderly experienced more volatility.
9 The 
biggest annual changes in median dynamics were for the 65-74 group, where a growth of over 
20% was noted in 1999 and a fall by over 5% was in 2000. The 60-64 group also experienced 
big variations in their income growth: from -1.7% in 2001 to +20.3% in 2004. The pace of the 
incomes of people below 55 was more stable: a disparity of between -2.7% in 1999 and +10.2% 
in 2000. 
The median income of the non-elderly equals nearly 72% of net average wages and has been 
quite stable since 1999. During 1996-1998, the median was relatively higher (closer to 80% of a 
net wage), which went along with a lower employment rate at that time and a lower share of 
wages in an overall income (Table B4). We may assume that the inequality of labour income 
was higher in earlier years, as the Gini coefficient for the total incomes of the persons below 55 
was slightly bigger (Table B7). The median income of the elderly 55+ equals 55.6% of the net 
wage in 2004. It fluctuated between 65.7% in 1996 and over 52% in 2001-2002. 
                                                      
9 Under an assumption of unified deflator for all age groups. However, people in different age groups may 
have dissimilar consumption baskets and using deflators with an appropriate combination of prices could 
change the picture of the relative income situation of particular age groups over the period analysed. ESTONIA | 55 
 
Summing up, the income of the elderly is lower on average than that of the non-elderly, 
although there are some differences between particular age groups. Groups above the age of 65 
are relatively more homogenous and their income level is respectively lower than for the rest of 
society. People aged 55-64 with higher incomes are much more economically active than the 
65+ population. Indeed, the role of the labour income in the total household budget is almost 4 
times for the 55-59 group and around 2.5 times for the 60-64 group higher compared to the 
share registered for the 65-74 population (Table B4). The differences have grown over time (in 
1996 around 2.5 and below 2, respectively). From the income level as well as economic activity 
point of view people 55-64 do not really fall into the category ‘elderly’. 
The relative income situation of the elderly did not really change between 1996-2004, except for 
the 60-64 group, who registered fast median growth in the very last years of the analysis. The 
pension income used to be considered a stable income source, especially during the first half of 
the 1990s, when the stabilisation programmes were just being implemented and recovery was 
still very fresh. The big flat rate element in the pension formula enabled strong cross-
generational support, the minimum pension level protected benefits from the bottom and the 
indexation allowed regular adjusting to rising consumer prices. Pensioners were considered a 
better-off social group, except of course the groups that were only entitled to the minimum 
pension. However, the relatively low level of income among the elderly in larger households 
stemmed from the need to include younger family members unable to adjust to the new realities 
(cf. the World Bank report, p. 11). In 2002, 24.4% of the 60+ group, 23.4% among the 65+ or 
28.3% among the 75+ group lived with their children (the PRAXIS study, in Ministry of Social 
Affairs (2005)), so the situation continued into the current decade. In our analysis for 2004 for 
particular age groups the share of the elderly living with their families is high as well (Table 
3.3). However, the role of pensions in their budgets is limited: 20% for the 55-59 group, 22% 
for those aged 60-64, 37% for the 65-74 persons, and 30% for people 75+. It is possible that the 
situation is reversing as children work more often and for higher wages, which enables them to 
support their parents to a greater extent. 
Table 3.3 Types of households (2004) 
  Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74  75 - 79  80 +  Total 
Single  5.6 23.0 28.0 33.5 45.3  41.8  13.2 
Couple  8.5 38.2 42.7 44.5 32.9  15.5  16.9 
parents and children up to 17  55.3  5.6  1.3  0.5  0.0  0.1  40.3 
parents and children above 17  17.3  22.7  15.6  11.1  11.3  16.0  16.6 
3  generations  6.2 4.4 5.8 5.8 5.2  9.3  6.1 
4  generations  0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4  0.6  0.2 
Other  6.9 5.8 6.4 4.5 4.8  16.8  6.8 
  100 100 100 100 100  100  100 
Source: own calculations based on HBS 2004. 
Concerning income structure, the biggest changes among the elderly relate to the growing role 
of labour income. As mentioned above, this has grown especially for the 60-64 group, along 
with their employment rate increasing. Another change, which relates to all age groups, is the 
declining role of farming income: from 8-10% in 1996 (across different age groups), to 1-3% in 
2004. On the other hand, launching the market economy liberated an entrepreneurial spirit in 
Estonian society. The share of self-employed people in the working population grew during the 
first half of the 1990s to around 8%, but has not grown further in the subsequent years (official 
register data). However, as a share in total incomes, incomes from self-employment (including 56 | KATARZYNA PIĘTKA 
 
farming income) have shrunk (from 11% to over 4%, where non-farming income has only partly 
replaced farming income).
10 The role of farming income in the budgets of the elderly accounts 
for slightly more, and non-farming income slightly less than in the case of non-elderly, although 
the differences are minor. The shares of farming and non-farming self-employment income are 
equal for the elderly (around 2% each in 2004). Property income plays a very minor role. Of 
course both sources of income may be underreported in the survey, as a reflection of tax evasion 
or unwillingness of business people or large property owners to take part in the survey. 
Income inequality 
The impact of the minimum pension, as well as the redistributive character of the pension 
formula (only gradually to be replaced by a formula with more individual elements), is visible in 
the inequality measures. The Gini coefficient is the lowest for the age groups eligible for a 
regular pension: 0.228 for the 65-74 population and 0.214 for the 75+ group (2004). The lower 
the age, the higher the inequality – the Gini was 0.317 for the 55-59 group and as much as 0.347 
for the younger generations below 55. The downward trend of the Gini coefficient in recent 
years has resulted from a growing employment rate in society. The elderly on the one hand may 
support other family members in a significant number of extended families, but on the other 
hand may gain from the labour income of their relatives. Social transfers in general have not 
played a very important role in Estonia (compared to other transition economies). Social policy 
in this area has been quite strict, as fiscal discipline has been an important macroeconomic goal 
in Estonia. According to Eurostat, in 2001 the social expenditures in Estonia accounted for as 
little as 9.2% of GDP, which places Estonia in the second lowest position in the EU after Ireland 
(the EU-25 average is 17.5% of GDP). In 2004 the share of social transfers in household 
budgets accounted for over 27% (Table B4) and only 15% for people below 55 and 28% for the 
55-59% group. The older generation (60-64) relied on social transfers to a greater extent (a 
share of 53%) but only the 65+ group’s budgets were dominated by social transfers (a share of 
over 80%).  
3.5  Poverty among the elderly, 1996-2004 
3.5.1 Relative  poverty 
In line with the lower median incomes of the elderly reported in the previous section, our HBS 
calculations indicate that the relative poverty rates of the various elderly groups are generally 
higher. Only in 1999 – a year of strong negative repercussions from the Asian and Russian 
economic crises – did poverty among the elderly fall below the level of the reference group 
(people under 55 years of age).   
In the period 1996-2004, the poverty rate for the entire population at the threshold of 60% of the 
median income has been quite stable: the lowest level was reached in 1999 (16.6%), with peaks 
in 1998, 2001 and 2004 (just over 19%, cf. table B8). It is quite surprising that in a transition 
country with such a high employment rate the poverty indices are high as well. Much greater 
volatility in the headcount index was registered among the elderly than among the younger 
generations: the highest level was reached in 1998 (25.0%) with a dip of 12.9% in the next year. 
A short methodological comment may be useful here. In this study for a given threshold (60% 
of the median or the subsistence minimum) the reference value is the same for all age groups 
(after making incomes equivalent). This approach allows one to compare the income situation of 
different groups directly. The National Strategy Report on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions 
                                                      
10 This would suggest that the productivity of the self-employed has lowered, which is rather unrealistic. 
It led to the conclusion noted above that income from self-employment may be underreported.   ESTONIA | 57 
 
uses a different methodology, as separate medians have been calculated for each age group 
there. This of course leads to group-specific poverty rates, which cannot be used as a common 
yardstick within a single country. Thus, the conclusion drawn in the Estonian report that “... the 
poverty risk of the elderly turns out to be relatively small in Estonia” (p. 12) does not reflect the  
situation of the elderly vis-à-vis their younger compatriots.  
The differences within the elderly age groups are significant, but it is difficult to recognise a 
clear pattern. For 1996-1999 and 2001-2002, the poverty rate among the elderly was the lowest 
for the youngest group (55-59), and grew with age. This suggests that either labour income 
better protects against poverty or that people with relatively high pensions tend to fall into 
poverty because they financially support younger family members within extended families. 
The income structure of households living in such families (presented in the previous section) 
suggests that the second explanation is partly true. In 2003-2004 the above ordering of age 
groups according to the poverty rate is similar, except for the position of the very economically 
active group of 60-64, for whom the poverty rate became the lowest (15.4% in 2004).  
It is interesting to note that for the oldest group (80+) and for the 60-64 age category (the latter 
is economically active but at the same time eligible for pensions) the drop in poverty rates 
between 1996 and 2004 was the biggest (respectively, by 3.1 and 2.6 percentage points). For the 
age groups 65-74 and 75-79 the situation did not really change. On the other hand, the 55-59 
group experienced an increase in poverty by 4.3 percentage points. One of the reasons for this 
situation could be changes in family structures. The number of children in households with the 
members from this age group has lowered (from 17 in 1996 to 15 children per 100 persons at 
the age of 55-59 in 2004), moreover the relative number of persons above 17 in households and 
the relative number of singles among them grew. All of this means that the average value of the 
equivalence factor has got bigger and it could have impacted on the relatively less dynamic 
increase in the commensurate income of the 55-59 age group. 
In general the differences in poverty rates for various poverty thresholds (40%, 50%, 60% and 
70% median) are noticeable, which indicates that we are not dealing with clusters of poverty 
around these particular income levels. The value of the 60% of the median income falls into the 
2
nd decile (cf. table B5) and this is where the elderly are represented relatively more strongly. 
This is the case for 60+ population, but it applies especially to the group over 65 years of age, 
who accounted for 36% of the entire 2
nd decile in 2004, compared with a 16% average share of 
that group in society. The share of the 55-59 group in the 1
st, 2
nd and 10
th deciles is similar to 
their average share in the whole population (around 5%). For almost all the elderly age groups 
the share in the extreme deciles (the 1
st and the 10
th) decreased between 1996 and 2004. Only 
the 60-64 group, on the wave of a growing role of labour income, lowered their share in the two 
lowest deciles and slightly increased their share in the 10
th decile (to 5.0% from 4.6% or more 
compared with 2001-2003).  
The elderly’s incomes are concentrated in the 2
nd decile three times more than in the 1
st decile. 
The 40% median income threshold falls in the 1
st decile and the 50% median threshold occurs at 
the very bottom of the 2
nd decile. These facts explain why the elderly’s poverty rates are lower 
than for the younger generations for the thresholds 50% and 40% of the median income. Poverty 
at 40% and 50% median was higher than for the non-elderly only for the 55-59 group in the last 
few years. This may be explained by the lack of access to pensions, which provide protection 
against poverty at low income levels and which are not a common source of income for this age 
group. 
Poverty gaps in Estonia are usually very wide. For society as a whole they amounted to 29-34%, 
using 60% of median income as a threshold (cf. table B9). It is characteristic that the gap does 
not fall below 30% for the younger generation below 55 and the 55-59 group, but lowers to 
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the effect of the minimum pension, which provides an income to people who did not qualify for 
regular pension benefits.  
Absolute poverty 
According to two absolute poverty measures, the income situation of the elderly looks more 
favourable. 
The subsistence minimum
11 is the lowest amount of means of subsistence needed by a person to 
live and work. The estimated minimum consists of two parts: 1) the estimated minimum food 
basket and 2) manufactured goods and services of primary importance (incl. dwellings). The 
cost of manufactured goods and services is calculated by multiplying the monthly expenditure 
per household member by an index determined by a group of experts. Expenditures on alcohol 
and tobacco are not taken into account in the estimated subsistence minimum. The subsistence 
minimum has been available since 1998. 
The absolute poverty line is based on an estimation of minimum expenditure. During the years 
1998–1999 researchers at the University of Tartu assessed the absolute poverty line for 
households based on household consumption data (HBS), using national equivalence scales 
(1.0, 0.8, 0.8). In calculating the absolute poverty line, the researchers were guided by the 
expenditure level of household members in Estonia and the expenditure structure measured 
prior to 1997. This line has been indexed since then with CPI dynamics. However, this absolute 
poverty line has not been officially deployed in Estonia. 
In 1997, the absolute poverty line fell between 60% and 70% of median income. In 1998-1999 it 
moved closer to 60%, and in 2000-2001 lay between 50% and 60%. Subsequently it moved 
close to 50% in 2002-2003, and close to 40% in 2004. That is why until 1998 the poverty rate 
based on the absolute measure has been higher for all elderly age groups than for the non-
elderly category. As of 1999 the situation of the elderly improved and their poverty rates have 
since moved lower than for younger generations following the breakthrough in relative incomes 
of pensioners compared with the working population in 1999, as well as a lowering of the 
absolute measure in relation to median income (with the exception of the 55-59 group in 2002-
2003). The explanation lies in the concentration of income levels of the elderly in the 2
nd decile 
and the falling of the absolute poverty line into the 2
nd decile brackets until 2002; then it fell into 
the 1
st decile. According to official estimates
12, absolute poverty rates for the 65+ group are 
higher than the one calculated in this study for the 65-74 and 75+ groups, although they have 
evolved in the same direction. The absolute poverty rate for the elderly in our study shrank from 
25.4% in 1997 to 4.7% in 2004, although with a break in this tendency in 2000-2001 (when 
some deepening of poverty among the elderly occurred). Similar developments were registered 
for the 60% median income threshold. In contrast to the outcomes based on the absolute 
measure, relative poverty deepening was not really offset in the subsequent years. As such, the 
elderly are better off in absolute terms in comparison with previous years, but slightly worse off 
than younger generations. 
The subsistence minimum is lower than the absolute poverty line. Since 2001 it has fallen into 
the 1
st decile. At that time it accounted for around 50% of the median income and since 2002 it 
has been between 40% and 50% of this amount. This explains why the poverty rate based on the 
                                                      
11 A short description of both national minima has kindly been prepared by Mari Kreitzberg from the 
Social Policy Information and Analysis Department of the Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs. 
12 Calculated using the Estonian equivalence scale (1.0, 0.8, 0.8), which impacts on lower income per 
household member compared with the scale used in this study (OECD modified scale with children up to 
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subsistence minimum is lower than according to the absolute or relative (60%) poverty lines. 
During most of the period, subsistence poverty for all elderly groups kept lowering with some 
minor reversal incidents in 2000-2002. However, subsistence poverty for all groups was much 
lower in 2004 in comparison with 1998 or even 1999.  
Subjective poverty 
As subjective measures of poverty for the period 1996-1999 we have picked one variable which 
indicates what income levels people regard as insufficient or totally insufficient (cf. Table 
B11a). For the 2000-2004 period two variables were included (cf. Table B11b):  
1)  The assessment of the income situation as – among others – very poor or sufficient to make 
ends meet (although only to the level of basic necessities); 
2)  The assessment of the current income situation compared with the situation a year earlier 
(as – among others – worse or much worse).  
Due to the change in the question an assessment of the situation before and after 2000 is of 
course not comparable. However, we can look into the trends during the two sub-periods. 
Subjective assessments of the income situation by the elderly were rather stable, which makes it 
more similar to the path of relative poverty than to the absolute poverty trend. Only in 1997 and 
2002 did most negative opinions (“totally insufficient income” or “very poor economic 
situation”) not correspond with the change in the 60% median poverty (in both cases they were 
more negative compared with the previous year). The share of elderly people assessing their 
incomes as totally insufficient decreased from 21.3% in 1997 to 16.4% in 1999; the share of 
those declaring incomes as insufficient fell somewhat less, that is, from 59.5% in 1996 to 57.3% 
three years later. During the 2000-2004 period the share of the elderly describing their income 
position as ‘very poor’ grew from 4.2% to 5.7% in 2002 and subsequently dropped to 3.8% in 
2004. The share of the less negative assessment (one can make ends meet but he/she purchases 
only basic necessities) fell more strongly in this period: from 57.4% in 2000 to 48.1% in 2004. 
Older generations are less pessimistic in the area of more radical assessments: the share of 
opinions expressing totally insufficient incomes or (later) a very poor income situation is lower 
for the 55+ group than for people below 55 (despite lower poverty rates for the latter). Older 
generations are also more positive in their retrospective assessment. A slightly smaller share of 
them (26.5% in 2004, 23.4% in 2003) find their current situation more difficult than a year 
earlier compared with the non-elderly group. 
Despite differences in poverty rates between the groups of the elderly, assessment of the income 
situation does not differ that much within the elderly sub-groups. This means that in most cases 
the elderly have a less pessimistic view on their position vis-à-vis people below 55. For 2000-
2004 there are stronger differences within the elderly groups concerning the less negative 
opinion (“can make ends meet but income is sufficient only for basic necessities”). The older 
groups (65+) chose such an answer relatively more often, in line with their higher relative 
poverty rates. 
Material deprivation 
In order to assess material deprivation we have chosen a variable indicating the existence of 
inconveniences in housing (that is, without cold water, sewage and inside toilet, see Table 
B11c). In 2000, the definition of the particular inconveniences must have changed in the 
questionnaire towards more extreme terms because deprivation levels have lowered 
significantly since then. In general among the elderly twice as many people experience extreme 
inconveniences than among the non-elderly; in some years the difference is bigger (e.g. 9.1% 
and 3.8% in 2002) or smaller (e.g. 6.8% and 4.4% in 2004), but this is rather a statistical error 60 | KATARZYNA PIĘTKA 
 
since it is difficult to believe that living conditions could have worsened for one year (e.g. in 
2002 for the elderly or in 2004 for the non-elderly).  
So, the elderly groups in Estonia are characterised not only by higher relative poverty rates but 
also by greater material deprivation. 
3.6 Marginal  groups 
We have checked several groups of people aged 55+ in order to assess whether they face a 
substantially higher poverty risk. From the point of view of family structures we have 
considered single women, single men and large households (that is with at least 5 members). 
Considering different sources of income we have checked the situation of disabled people, 
farmers (defined here as receiving any farming income) and beneficiaries of social assistance. 
At the end we looked at the nationality aspect and calculated some poverty measures for the 
minorities combined (that is, non-Estonians). 
The poverty rate according to the relative criterion (60%) in 2004 was examined for all the 
elderly age sub-groups belonging to these possible ‘marginal groups’. We have dropped the 
potential marginal groups for which the poverty rates have not exceeded the total poverty 
indices by more than 50%. Additionally, we did not consider candidates for marginal groups 
who accounted for too small a number of cases and would threaten the representation 
requirement. According to these criteria we have dropped: 
-  large households, because the biggest difference in the poverty rate was for the 60-64 group: 
15.7% for large households, as opposed to 15.1% for the total 60-64 group; for other age 
groups the poverty among large households was lower than for the total age group; 
-  farmers, because the biggest difference in the poverty rate was for 55-59: 20.2% as opposed 
to 19.5%, respectively, and for other age groups the poverty rate among farmers was lower. 
We decided to add single women and single men into one group of singles because the poverty 
rates for both groups exceeded the reference poverty to the similar extent.  
Table 3.4 Poverty among marginal groups 
 Total  population  Singles  Disabled  Receiving social assist.  Non-Estonians 
 Below  55  55 +  Below 55  55 +  Below 55 55 + Below 55  55 +  Below 55  55 + 
1996 17.5  20.7  24.8  39.9  -  -  31.0  18.2  20.0  24.3 
1997 16.9  19.8  23.7  35.2  -  -  24.2  13.3  17.3  22.0 
1998 16.8  25.0  21.4  48.7  -  -  36.4  29.3  18.3  29.1 
1999 18.2  12.9  24.3  20.6  -  -  34.0  22.8  20.0  13.1 
2000 18.1  18.1  28.3  37.3  21.6  21.1 18.8  11.9  18.1  18.2 
2001 18.0  22.2  29.1  46.8  27.0  22.8 -  -  18.1  18.6 
2002 17.4  21.7  31.9  45.4  24.1  24.5 9.4  3.5  18.5  22.7 
2003 17.9  20.3  27.2  41.8  25.6  24.4 12.9  13.8  22.2  24.5 
2004 18.3  21.8  36.3  45.2  29.7  24.4 18.2  32.0  20.1  27.8 
         
A given group as % of 55+  population 
(2004) 
32.1  47.9   0.7   31.0 
poor 55+ from a given group as % of a 
given group 55+ population (2004) 
14.5 11.7    0.2    8.6 
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The group most at risk of poverty among the elderly is single people, for whom poverty rates 
are twice the average for the total population of the elderly (cf. table B13). One of the reasons 
could be that life expectancy for Estonian men is much lower than for women (in 2006 the 
difference amounted to more than 11 years). Elderly women living in 1-person households 
accounted in 2004 for over 25% of the 55+ population and the share of men living alone was 
nearly 7%. Female wages compared with male wages are lower (by around 25%
13). Female 
pensions are most probably lower as well, as a result of shorter working careers (which is an 
element of the pension formula prevailing before 1999) and lower female wages (which is an 
element of the pension formula after 1999). Moreover, as mentioned in the Data section, many 
of the poor singles may qualify for housing subsidies, which is not reported in the HBS – after 
adding it to the overall income one might expect slightly lower poverty rates for this group. The 
difference between poverty for singles as opposed to non-singles is the strongest for the 60-64 
age group. This may reflect the important role played by incomes of spouses in this age group 
and/or usually fewer children in households in this age group (i.e. their presence in younger age 
groups lowers the average household income per capita and therefore the difference between 
singles and non-singles’ poverty is relatively small). 
Following the situation of the disabled is possible as of 2000 when the relevant question was 
introduced to the questionnaire. The disabled elderly are at a higher risk of poverty than other 
elderly by 3-4 percentage points. This small difference is the result of the disability pension 
system, which seems to protect effectively against poverty. Moreover, the system allows them 
to work: in 2004 12% of disabled elderly were in gainful employment. The disabled below 55 
are in a much worse income situation than the non-elderly altogether (in 2004 the poverty of 
30% vis-à-vis 18% respectively). Most probably non-elderly are assessed as being partially 
unable to work in a relatively higher proportion than the elderly. Disability pensions fall along 
with lesser incapacity and provide a relatively smaller income to the non-elderly disabled. 
Social assistance does not seem to be a very effective mechanism in preventing poverty in the 
population below 55, as people receiving such benefits have poverty rates twice as high as the 
total age group. Among the elderly higher poverty for people on social income are seen only in 
the case of the 55-59 group and for several years also for the 60-64 people. For other age sub-
groups of the elderly the poverty indices are lower or at least the same as for the total of a given 
age group. There are situations when extended families’ social assistance to younger 
representatives of a family (in many cases a poor family with children) is combined with the 
stable pension income of their parents/grandparents, with whom they live in one household. So, 
despite the household income includes social assistance, the total income level of household 
members is not that low. This group of the elderly is very small, however, and the outcomes of 
these calculations may not be that relevant (e.g. a big jump in poverty in 2004, precisely among 
the 55-59 and 75+ groups). 
The elderly from national minorities register higher poverty than their Estonian colleagues by 1-
6 percentage points, and differences are higher for people above 75 than for the 55-74 group.  
3.7 Prospects  on  poverty 
As all the EU members, Estonia has delivered to the European Commission a National Strategy 
Report on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions (Ministry of Social Affairs (2005)).  This 
provides projections of future replacement rates (up to 2050) and an analysis of the trends in 
factors influencing future pensions. The projections are based on the analyses by the PRAXIS 
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Center for Policy Studies (an independent think tank based in Tallinn) and the Ministry of 
Finance. 
3.7.1 Demographic  forecasts 
Challenges for the future pension system come mainly from demography. According to the 
baseline scenario of the Eurostat demographic forecast, the Estonian old-age dependency ratio 
(the share of people aged 65+ versus 15-64) is expected to grow from the current 25% to 43% in 
2050; for people 55+ it rises from 49% to 88% (Table 3.5). Such a burden on people of working 
age requires extending the working career far beyond current retirement age. In order to keep 
the old-age dependency ratio constant at the 2007 level, the standard pension age should be 
extended to 71 years. Such a scenario assumes a growing life expectancy at birth: for men from 
65.3 in 2002 to 77.4 in 2050; for women from 77.1 in 2002 to 82 in 2050. In 2006 life 
expectancy had risen to 67.4 for men and 78.5 for women, which is already above the levels 
assumed in the projection for 2010 (66.6 and 77, respectively) – so the probability of a higher 
dependency ratio than previously projected is increasing. Narrowing difference between life 
expectancy for women and men comes most probably from the assumption of diminishing 
mortality of men due to accidents, which is a current problem in Estonia. 
The dependency ratio of children 0-14 is projected to remain rather stable. 
Table 3.5 Dependency ratio 
  2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 
% of 15-64           
0-14  21.9 25.3 23.8 21.8 24.8 
65+  25.1 28.7 33.4 36.6 43.1 
% of 15-54           
55+  49.0 60.9 65.8 75.7 88.1 
Source: 2007 – Statistical Office of Estonia; 2020-2050 – Eurostat baseline scenario. 
3.7.2 Institutional  factors 
There are 3 main groups of institutional factors influencing the income level of future 
pensioners. First of all the pension reform has introduced changes in the pension formula in the 
first pillar of the system  (linking it to working career and paid contributions) and has launched 
the second (funded) pillar, which is supposed to provide additional pensions in the future. 
Secondly, important factors in the area of the labour market, education and macroeconomic 
developments are the employability of society, which influences the length of working career 
and the wage level – both having direct impacts on the value of future pensions. Thirdly, the 
social assistance system will influence the income levels of those elderly who did not qualify for 
the regular pension or its value happens to be very low. 
Pension reform 
According to PRAXIS calculations, gross replacement rates for the average earnings (33.3% in 
2003) will remain at a similar level in the forecast period. The second pillar of the pension will 
gradually replace part of the first pillar pension (in 2050 the second pillar will exceed the first 
pillar pension: 19% versus 17% of previous earnings). The net replacement rate is higher than 
the gross rate by around 7 percentage points (41.4% in 2005), and is expected to remain at this 
level (estimated at 43.0% in 2050).  ESTONIA | 63 
 
Table 3.6 Theoretical replacement rates in Estonia – current levels and forecasts
a 
  At 100%  
of average earnings 
At 2/3  
of average earnings 
At 200%  
of average earnings 
  2003 2005 2010p 2030p 2050p 2005  2050p  2005  2050p 
Gross 
replacement rate  33.3 34.2 36.1  30.5
 a  35.7 49.3  39.1  18.7  25.1 
1
st   pillar  33.3 34.2 35.3  24.7
 a 16.8  49.3  20.2  18.7  10.9 
2
nd  pillar  0 0 0.8 5.7
 a 18.9 0  18.9  0  14.2 
Net 
replacement rate  42.8 41.4 42.9  36.4
 a  43.0 57.8  45.6  23.4  31.3 
a The summary of the report contains different figures for 2030. It looks as if the difference is due to adding the 3
th 
pillar replacement rate to the 2
nd pillar. Correcting for this the figures are: gross replacement rate: 34; 1
st pillar gross 
replacement rate: 21; 2
nd/3
th pillar gross replacement rate: 13; net replacement rate: 42. 
Source: National Strategy Reports on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions, Tallinn 2005, p. 16. 
Currently, the social solidarity mechanism in the pension formula is very strong (for persons 
who withdrew from work before 1999, the state pension depends only on the flat rate base 
amount - which currently forms around 28% of the average old age pension - and the length of 
service). However, the pension formula will be gradually diverting towards a stronger link to 
individual earnings throughout a working career. For persons who entered the labour market in 
1999 or later, the state pension consists of two parts: the base amount and an insurance 
component. This institutional change will impact on the future replacement rate for people who 
had earnings significantly lower or higher than the average wage. According to the Ministry of 
Finance, in the case of a low wage (2/3 of average earnings) the net replacement rates will fall 
along with the growing role of past earnings in the pension formula: from 58% in 2005 to 46% 
in 2050. On the other hand, in the case of a high salary (200% of average earnings) the 
replacement rate will increase from 23% in 2005 to 31% in 2050. This gradual change in the 
pension formula will lead to greater income inequalities among the elderly, from a very low 
current level (0.23 for 65-74 and 0.21 for 75+, Table B7). 
The share of the funded element in the new pension formula will depend on the rate of return of 
the accumulated capital. Estonians are provided with the choice of 3 types of investment funds 
in the second pillar:  
a)  high risk level: up to 50% assets into equities (chosen by 71% of participants) 
b)  medium risk level: up to 25% assets into equities (chosen by 19% of participants) 
c)  low risk level: only fixed-interest instruments (chosen by 10% of participants) 
Taking into account that the high risk funds have attracted the biggest proportion of the 
participants the funded part of future pensions will depend heavily on developments in the 
domestic stock exchange and return on investments abroad. Such a division of participants 
between the three types of funds may trigger, however, stronger differences between the second 
pillar pensions. 
Participation in voluntary private pension schemes (introduced in 1998) is low (around 13% of 
labour force in 2004). So the contribution of pensions from the third pillar to the incomes of the 
future elderly will be rather small. 
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Labour market developments 
The insurance component in the new pension formula links future benefits to social taxes paid 
during a person’s working life. The length of a labour career depends on the pace of economic 
growth and institutional arrangements mediated via demand for labour but also on institutional 
arrangements motivating a deferment of retirement as well as on broadening of employers’ 
culture to employ more of older people. Estonia has already implemented reforms which 
stimulate high economic growth and high employment rates, including for older persons. From 
the point of view of future pensions the lowest wage inequality as possible would be desirable. 
Sectoral wage dispersion, as measured by the ratio between the standard deviation and the 
average wage for 16 different sectors of the economy, amounted to 27% in 2007 (37% in 2000); 
the regional wage dispersion for 16 counties was 19% in 2007 (21% in 2000). So there is some 
evidence on lowering wage inequality in the sectoral dimension. A similar tendency in the 
occupational and regional dimension would be desirable through policies designed to raise the 
educational level of society, increase competition in the labour market and promote the 
development of less advanced regions.  
Social assistance 
The second pillar was launched in Estonia starting 1
st July, 2002. By the end of June 2005, 
nearly 75% of the labour force aged from 16 to retirement age had joined it, which means that 
25% of the labour force will have the right only to a state pension from the first pillar. 
According to PRAXIS calculations, by the time the new formula applies to all (that is when the 
last person who entered the labour market after 1999 retires – around 2040-2050) nearly 7% 
would not qualify for the minimum required working period (i.e. 15 years) and another 10% 
would get very low earnings. All of them (17%) would become national (minimum) pensioners 
(based on Statistical Office data, in 2007 they amounted to 2.2% of all pensioners). Moreover, 
the state covers social tax on behalf of some economically non-active people (e.g. on parental 
leave); they account for around 15% of all insured persons. The level of these social 
contributions is very low, however (around 10% of contribution from average earning), so their 
future entitlements will most probably qualify only for a national pension. Putting it all together 
the share of recipients on a minimum pension could be as high as 20-30%.   
Summing up, the Estonian case is unique when compared with other countries, because the 
current replacement rate is low already, and the changes introduced in the pension system 
should not lead to any further deterioration on average. Although the system is aimed at 
extending financial sustainability, the concerns are about the potentially growing share of 
people eligible only for the minimum pension. ESTONIA | 65 
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4. Hungary 
András Gábos & Róbert Gál
* 
Summary 
1. The first national, fully funded, social security system of Hungary lost most of its assets in 
World War II. The scheme that replaced it, being financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, was 
‘funded’ by public and private investments in the human capital of future contribution-paying 
generations. In this way, and due to the lop-sided structure of the system of intergenerational 
transfers, this system partly financed the extensive projects of the centrally planned period, 
which mounted up losses due to the lack of feedback from a reliable price system. Human 
capital investments, or the lack of them, that should have ‘funded’ the scheme proved a large-
scale failure leading to a major employment shock in the 1990s.  
2. Between 1990 and 1997 the labour market lost about net one-quarter of the jobs while the 
number of beneficiaries of the pension system grew by 20 percent over the same period. The 
legislation responded by a series of ad hoc parametric adjustments until a comprehensive 
reform package in 1998 reshaped the entire system.  
3. The reform downsized the pay-as-you-go pillar and established a small new, funded, 
privately managed, pillar within the mandatory scheme. The reform managed to reduce the 
generational imbalance (the implicit pension debt) significantly. This, however, led to 
intergenerational redistribution by burdening currently active cohorts. 
4. The Hungarian pension system is exposed to an explicit electoral cycle. This resulted in a 
rapid increase in the generational imbalance (implicit pension debt) in the ten years after the 
reform. Now, the government is forced to introduce new austerity measures in the system. This 
will lead to a renewed intergenerational redistribution. 
5. Besides intergenerational redistribution there are clear signs of intra-generational 
redistribution as well. Due to distortions in the benefit formula and past indexation people 
having collected 10 service years get only about 30 percent fewer benefits than those who 
contributed for 40 years. Widespread tax avoidance redistributes the contribution burden 
among the active. 
6. The cohorts that have been hit by the labour market shock most severely show flatter age-
earning profiles than preceding and subsequent cohorts. Their age-employment profiles also 
run below the corresponding profiles of preceding and subsequent cohorts. These cohorts, 
mostly those born between 1945 and 1959, face financial difficulties in retirement. 
4.1  General background information 
The maturation process of the Hungarian pension system, 1950-90 
The first national pension system covering employees in trade and industry started its operation 
in 1929.
1 Being a fully funded scheme, its reserves were largely destroyed during World War II 
and the subsequent period of inflation. It was replaced by a new, pay-as-you-go system by 1950 
and unified with the pension scheme of agricultural workers in 1975. Since then the system 
offers a near-universal coverage. 
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The number of beneficiaries (including recipients of all pensions and retirement benefits) grew 
from 0.5 million in 1950 to 2.5 million in 1990. By 1990, more than 95% of people above 
retirement age received a pension, whereas the figure for 1960 was 36% (Baranyai, 1995). 
Maturation is also evident in the increase of the replacement rate from 21% to 66% over the 
same period, as a greater number of people spent longer periods of their working lives as 
contributors to the scheme. As a result, pension expenditure grew steadily as the pension system 
expanded to include more social groups and as it matured further. In 1950, it redistributed 2.0% 
of the GDP and by 1990 this figure had reached 9.7%. 
Labour market shock, declining administrative capacity and institutional adjustments: 1990-97 
In 1992,
2 about 58% of people between the age of 15 and 64 were employed. Employment 
declined steadily until 1997, down to 52%. It has started to climb back slowly since then, up to 
56% in 2005, due to the increasing retirement age.  
Since society was not equipped with institutions to handle the army of redundant workers most 
of them took refuge in the pension system. The number of pensioners, including recipients of 
disability and survivor benefits, pre-, minor- and early retirement pensions and beneficiaries of 
other smaller pension-type programmes
3 nearly reached 3.2 million by 1998, starting from 2.5 
million in 1990. The growth of coverage
4 is due in particular to early retirement and an 
expansion of disability pensions.
5  
The labour market shock was not the only challenge for the pensions system. The 
transformational crisis and the rapid decentralisation of centrally managed economies with the 
resulting growth of the shadow economy also added to this problem. This trend can be measured 
by wage coverage,
6 which measures the part of wages that is within the reach of the authorities. 
It declined significantly from 76% in 1992 (and 78% in 1994) to 71% in 1996 due to 
accumulating arrears and forced tax exemptions. Since 1996, in line with the consolidation of 
the economy, it is improving again; by 2005 it was again up to 76%.  
The effect of the rapid decline in activity was partly mitigated by an increase in wage efficiency 
(the amount of GDP produced by a unit of wage).  Since the productivity of the remaining 
labour force was higher on average than that of the workers who lost their jobs, labour 
productivity grew fast. Nevertheless, this progress was not enough to keep the pension budget 
under control. Subsequent governments tried to adjust the parameters of the system. One 
direction of such adjustments affected relative pensions (average pensions compared to average 
net wages), which declined from 66% in 1990 to 56% in 1997. We analyse the relative income 
position of the elderly and the replacement rate of pensions in detail in Section 5 and in a related 
paper (Keller and Gal 2008). This decline in the first part of the 1990s had two sources. First, 
                                                      
2 The Central Statistical Office started to publish the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in 1992. The LFS 
replaced the former Labour Force Balance, which was based on a different methodology. 
3 Due to the time horizon of the report, hereafter we follow trends and institutional changes up to 2005 
but no further. A brief summary of some of the newer modifications is presented in the Annex of the 
paper. 
4 Here coverage refers to the ratio of beneficiaries to the number of people above retirement age. 
5 Although by 2005 this figure slowly decreased to 3.0 million the coverage rate (number of recipients of 
pension benefits over the number of people above retirement age) continued to grow due to the increase 
in retirement age (149% in 2005 compared to 110% in 1990). 
6 Wage coverage is the covered wage bill over the total wage bill, where the covered wage bill is an 
imaginary wage bill calculated on the total amount of contributions as if all wages contributed to the 
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entry pensions lost value relative to final wages. The pension formula was adjusted several 
times. Before 1992, the base income used to calculate new pensions was the best three of the 
five years preceding retirement. Since then, all wages earned in 1988 or later are taken into 
account. This fact alone cuts new pensions, in particular for people with a steeper age-earnings 
profile. Moreover, the high inflation rate of the 1990s made indexation of previous wages 
(called ‘valorisation’) necessary; but valorisation is partial. First, wages of the last three years 
are not valorised but taken as nominal values in the formula. Second, the previous years are 
valorised to the level of second year prior to retirement, not the level of the last year.  Partial 
valorisation leads to inconsistencies allowing people with a longer labour market history to get 
lower entry pensions than people with a shorter employment history, other factors being equal 
(Toldi, 2000). 
According to Medgyesi (2001), government transfers make up about three-quarters of income of 
the elderly
7 (63.5% old-age pensions, 11.1% other social security pensions and 1.8% other 
government transfers). 
A further special feature of the pension formula was degressiveness. Base income was 
calculated from the individual’s net income in a way that higher income brackets contributed 
less to it. This effect increased through the 1990s, since degressivity brackets were not properly 
adjusted to the dynamics of wages.  
Table 4.1 General background information 
  1990  1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDP, 
previous 
year=100  96.5  88.1  96.9  99.4 102.9 101.5 101.3 104.6 104.9 104.2 105.2 104.1 104.4 104.2 104.8 104.1
GDP, 
1990=100 100.0  88.1  85.4  84.9  87.4  88.7 89.9 94 98.6 102.7 108 112.4 117.3  122.2  128.1 133.4
                     
Population 
(millions) 10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1
Age structure of the population (%) 
-15 21.8  21.2  20.7  20.2 19.8 19.4 19.1 18.7 18.4 18.2 17.9 17.6 17.3 17.1 16.9 16.7
15-29 18.6  19.2  19.8  20.2 20.6 21.0 21.2 21.2 21.1 21.0 20.9 20.9 20.8 20.7 20.2 19.7
30-49 29.0  28.9  28.7  28.5 28.3 28.2 28.2 28.1 28.1 28.1 28.0 27.8 27.8 27.6 27.5 27.6
50-54 5.8  5.9  6.0  6.1 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.7 7.9
55-59 5.7  5.6  5.5  5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.6
60-64 5.6  5.5  5.5  5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.6
65-69 5.1  5.1  5.0  5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8
70-74 2.9  3.3  3.8  4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2
75+ 5.4  5.2  5.0  4.8 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.9
                     
Students in higher education as % of the 19-24 cohort 
  12.9  13.3  14.4  16.0 18.0 20.1 21.5 25.1 27.4 30.8 34.3 38.1 43.5 48.5 51.3 52.8
Labour 
force 
participation 
rate  (%)                     
total      58.3  55.7 53.7 52.4 51.9 51.2 51.7 53.1 52.9 52.8 53.0 53.8 53.8 54.4
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in  cohorts                     
15-19     21.8  19.5  17.5  16.9 15.3 14.2 15.8 13.6 10.9 9.1 6.8  5.9  5.5 5.4
20-24      69.7  67.0 64.7 64.4 61.3 59.7 61.5 61.3 58.8 55.8 54.7 53.0 48.4 47.4
25-29      77.3  75.5 75.2 73.1 72.3 71.9 72.8 74.5 75.3 75.7 75.1 75.7 76.6 77.4
30-34      84.3  82.5 80.7 77.4 78.2 76.3 77.8 78.8 78.8 78.7 78.0 78.5 78.1 79.4
35-39      88.6  86.9 84.3 84.2 83.1 81.9 80.8 81.7 81.7 81.8 82.1 83.3 82.3 82.9
40-44      88.6  87.2 85.3 84.1 84.2 82.5 81.3 82.0 82.0 81.4 81.6 82.2 83.1 83.0
45-49      84.9  82.3 80.1 78.9 79.5 78.0 76.7 78.2 77.7 77.6 77.8 78.9 78.0 79.6
50-54      69.7  66.5 64.9 63.9 62.3 62.4 62.0 67.1 68.7 67.9 68.8 70.3 70.7 71.9
55-59      34.3  31.0 27.4 28.1 29.1 28.7 26.0 29.9 34.6 37.3 40.9 45.6 48.0 50.8
65-69      9.0  7.1 6.3 4.8 3.6 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.5 2.6 3.1 3.5 4.0 3.9
70-74      5.3  4.7 3.4 2.6 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.2
Source: Various statistics of the Central Statistical Office. 
The incremental effects of these small changes explain the loss of value of entry pensions 
relative to final wages. The other cause of the decrease in the replacement rate is the falling of 
the indexation of pensions behind inflation. After 1970 pensions grew by 2% every year. This 
was topped by ad hoc increases when inflation was higher. After 1992 the excessively high 
inflation rate forced the government to introduce wage indexation. Between 1992 and 1995, and 
since 1999, indexation has been forward-looking. Between 1996 and 1998 the Pension 
Insurance Fund (PIF) used backward-looking indexation. The switch between backward-looking 
and forward-looking calculation cut into pensions in 1996 as well as in 1999.  
A further effort to stabilise the pension budget aimed at improving old-age dependency by 
raising the retirement age was legislated for in 1993 but withdrawn in 1994. The government 
returned to the programme in 1996 but finally higher retirement ages did not come into effect 
before the comprehensive reform in 1998.  
Table 4.2 Predicted age dependency, total and by genders separately 
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045  2050
population  15-54,  millions  5.7 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.2  4.0
population  55+,  millions  2.8 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6  3.5
age dependency total (%)  48.7 54.4 59.4 60.8 63.7 68.9 77.8  82.1  85.5  88.3
age  dependency  men/men  (%)  39.3 44.2 48.4 49.7 52.7 57.9 66.5 70.9 74.3  77.0
age dependency women/women (%)  58.1 64.7 70.6 72.1 75.0 80.3 89.5  93.8  97.2  100.1
Source: Central Statistical Office Institute of Demography. 
4.2 Pension  institutions  and actors in pension policy 
The 1998 pension reform 
The growing tension in pension finances was on the agenda through the 1990s, though for years 
it generated mainly an ad hoc manipulation of the rules satisfying only short-term fiscal needs. 
As a result, actuarial distortions have increased, and incentives to take contributions as long-
term investments have weakened further. The system produced such perverse effects that people 
serving longer and contributing more had earned lower pensions just because they retired in the 
wrong year. A more comprehensive and consistent reform seemed necessary in order to 
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system. Deterioration in the demographic background is expected from the 2010s (see Table 
4.2) when large cohorts born in the 1950s will retire, while the newly entering generations, and 
the then highest-contributing cohorts born before 1965, will be far fewer. It was clear that either 
lifetime contributions had to be raised or lifetime benefits had to be cut, or both, making a 
necessary reform all the more complicated.
8  
The package
9 was passed in 1997 and came into effect on January 1, 1998. It established a new 
pre-funded tier managed by private companies that was at the heart of the Ministry of Finance 
proposal. However, the funds were to get only about 20% (6/31) of the contributions of those 
who switched, which should have grown to about 25% (8/31) in two years, instead of the 
originally suggested 50%. 
Fund membership was optional for those who had earned pension rights in the old system but 
mandatory for new entrants to the labour market. The option was left open for 20 months thus 
ending on August 31, 1999. During this period, the funds attracted 2 million people (93% 
optional, 7% mandatory). This represents slightly more than 50% of the working population. 
According to the transition rule, the reduction in the accrual rate (from 1.65% of lifetime 
earnings for every service year to 1.22%) due to redirecting a part of contributions to the funds 
was calibrated to the rate of partitioning of contributions, which was 8% of gross wages paid to 
the private funds out of the total contribution of 31% of gross wages (1.22/1.65 ≈ 1-(8/31). 
However, benefit reduction has been extended to include service years earned prior to the 
reform, when all contributions were paid to social security. In this way, in addition to the 
obvious elimination of a sizeable part of the implicit pension debt, the legislators wanted to 
assure that the actual age limit of switchers is low. Indeed, the age distribution of the fund 
members is skewed, as younger cohorts are represented in much higher proportions. A closer 
analysis also shows that besides age, labour market status, size of the employer company and 
individual time horizon played the most significant part in the choice of switching.
10 
At the end of 2005 the number of pension funds was 18. They have accumulated assets of about 
€4.5 billion. The market is rather concentrated, the largest five funds cover about 80% of the 
members.
11  
More importantly, the reform package considerably redesigned the pay-as-you-go pillar. 
Retirement age was raised from 60 to 61 in 1998 and to 62 in 2000 for men, whereas for women 
it was raised by one year every second year and will reach 62 in 2009. The new regulation was 
completed with a component of flexibility: 38 service years gave eligibility for full old-age 
pension, provided the person reached the retirement age effective at the time of the new 
legislation (57 years for women, 60 years for men).   
The pension bill had changes in indexation as well. Pure wage indexation has been replaced by 
Swiss indexation (a combination of half price and half wage indexation). A new, linear benefit 
formula was to replace the previous one (see above) with stricter requirements on service years. 
Pensions were to be calculated from gross wages but were to be subject to personal income 
taxation. Degressivity was to be phased out over a few years. With the exception of the phasing 
out of degressivity, all other steps contributed to downsizing the pay-as-you-go tier.  
                                                      
8 A detailed description of the institutional reform can be found in Gál et al. (2003). Early experiences are 
analysed by Simonovits (1999), Rocha & Vittas (2002) and Augusztinovics et al. (2002). 
9 Law on Eligibility and Contributions to Social Security and Private Pensions 1997/80; Law on Social 
Security Pensions 1997/81; and Law on Private Pension and Private Pension Funds 1997/82. 
10 On the analysis of the individual choice see Augusztinovics et al. (2002). 
11 Further details can be found on the homepage of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 
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Practically every detail was a result of compromise and was facilitated by shorter or longer 
transitions. The contribution rate to the private funds was reduced from 10 to 8% (and just 6 and 
7% in the first two years respectively). In addition, the government guaranteed pensions paid 
from the second pillar up to a certain limit. The upper age limit of 47 for switching was 
excluded from the final version of the law in the fear of intervention from the Constitution 
Court. Introduction of Swiss indexation was postponed to 2001. The new benefit formula and 
taxation regime was even suspended to 2013.  
Despite these measures, or perhaps precisely because of them, political dispute concerning the 
pension system has not ceased and the rules have kept changing even after the legislation. The 
period of transition from wage indexation to Swiss indexation was reduced to two years. As 
mentioned above, backward-looking indexation was replaced by forward-looking indexation 
arbitrarily, carving away a significant amount from pensions in 1999. Degressivity will also be 
phased out faster than originally planned. As for the second pillar, contributions paid to the 
private funds were not raised to 8% of gross wages after two years but were frozen at 6% up to 
2002. Only in 2003 did the government raise this proportion to 7%, and in 2004 to 8%. The 
overall contribution rate however, including parts nominally deduced from the employee as well 
as from the employer, was cut in 1999, 2001 and 2002 but raised again in mid-year 2006. These 
hectic changes were paralleled by unexpected increases in benefits (an extra 3% rise in 2001, 
one-time lump-sum payment in 2002, and an extra month of pension introduced step by step 
after 2003).  
Entry rules also changed several times. The option for voluntary switching was closed in August 
1999, but reopened in 2003 for one year for the under 30 years old. Voluntary members were 
allowed to return to the social security system with their full contributions until December 2000 
but this deadline was prolonged to December 2002. These are the voluntary members who have 
accumulated accrual rights before the pension bill was enacted. New entrants to the labour 
market were mandated to choose a private fund. However, for one year (2002) membership for 
newcomers was made optional. 
Pension politics 
The recurrent corrections were mostly motivated by short-term political gains and possibly 
international tax-competition. In Figure 4.1 we display trends in benefits and contributions. 
Average benefits (defined here by the official category: all pensions and other retirement 
benefits) are shown as a percentage of the previous year in real terms. Values below zero reflect 
decreases, those above zero increases. A positive slope of the curve means accelerating growth.  
The curve reveals an explicit election cycle. In every electoral cycle benefits grow faster in the 
year preceding general elections (that is, in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2005) than in the year before, 
and in every election year (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006) -except the last one- benefit growth even 
speeds up; this culminates in a more restrictive increase (or at times outright decrease) in the 
year after elections. Further research is required to clarify the true effect of this cycle: all 
incumbent governments lost elections except the one in 2006, the only year when the regular 
cycle did not hold. The incidence of the cycle, irrespective of the colours of the reigning 
coalition, also reveals that it is not party-specific trying to buy pensioner votes. 
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Figure 4.1 Pensions and relative contributions; previous year = 100 
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Source: Gál & Tarcali (2008: 149). 
The other curve in Figure 4.1 shows changes in the amount of total contributions relative to the 
total wage bill. In an economy with a significant share of the informal sector actual 
contributions compared to actual wages reveal more than changes in the contribution rules. In 
addition, since per capita contributions are affected by the dynamics of wages as much as by the 
contribution rate, we contrast here contributions
12 with the wage bill.
13 The contribution curve in 
Figure 4.1 is partly driven by the oscillating level of informality in the labour market, which 
increased until the economy reached its low in 1995-1996 and decreased since then (with some 
halts in more austere years). The other component influencing the contributions/wages ratio 
consists of changes in the contribution rate, in particular the radical cut of 4 percentage points 
from 30% to 26% of gross wages in the course of two years between 2000 and 2002. Still no 
well-established explanation exists for the sharp decline of the contribution rate. Whereas the 
benefit side was pulled by the electoral cycle, contributions could have possibly been cut by 
international tax competition. There are many signs that, in particular in the 1990s, governments 
in Eastern Europe fought price (that is, tax) competition for foreign investments. Competition in 
quality of governance came to the fore only recently. This hypothesis still requires more 
systematic empirical tests. 
4.3 Data   
Regular household surveys carried out by TARKI Social Research Centre are used for the 
analyses of the income situation of the Hungarian elderly in the last fifteen years. TARKI has 
been carrying out household surveys since 1992. The first six waves (1992-1997) make up the 
Hungarian Household Panel (HHP). Since 1998 the survey has been cross-sectional, under the 
                                                      
12 Total contributions, paid both by the employee and the employer, including the amounts directed to the 
new private funds. 
13 The wage bill is taken from the National Accounts as wages in cash and in kind and employers’ 
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name of TARKI Household Monitor Survey. Since 2001 these surveys have been conducted on a 
biannual basis, the last data collection process taking place in 2007.
14  
All samples are stratified random samples. The number of households regularly interviewed is 
around 2,000, containing some 5-6,000 persons (see table C1 in Annex C). All datasets are 
weighted to correct for the non-response biases. 
The questionnaires of both HHP and TÁRKI Monitor surveys include questions on the 
following main topics: 
•  Income. Detailed information on individual and household level income sources are 
collected using international standards. All main components of the Hungarian welfare 
system are incorporated in the questionnaires. Net incomes are available only. 
•  Consumption. The questionnaire contains information on main expenditure items of 
household on monthly, three-monthly, six-monthly or yearly basis, depending on the 
expenditure type. 
•  Labour market. Employment status, working hours, industry, occupation and civil servant 
status are available. 
•  Demography. General demographic information (age, gender, educational level, settlement, 
etc.) and information on household structure are collected. 
The survey scores better than the Household Budget Survey (HBS) of the Central Statistical 
Office (CSO) in capturing household income of the National Accounts (in 2005 net income data 
obtained directly from the survey represented 66% of macro income; the rate grows to 72% 
after imputation). The most important deficiency of the dataset is its small sample size that does 
not allow for reliable estimates when detailed results are needed. Furthermore, the consistency 
of time series could be affected by the replacement of the HHP, a panel dataset, by the 
Household Monitor, a cross-sectional survey. Another problem could be the deterioration of the 
starting HHP sample.  
In contrast, the HBS ensures an adequate sample size, but it has deficiencies that affect the 
reliability of results. Due to the data collection method, the non-response rate as well as the 
drop-out rate of households during the diary period is relatively high and systematically affects 
low-income households. 
Weighted data are used for estimations in this report. We apply the modified OECD scale for 
calculating equivalent household income.
15 Consequently, the income position of the elderly is 
assessed by the income position of households they live in. In a few cases data from the 2005 
wave of the EU-SILC were used for indicators not available in the Household Monitor.
16  
                                                      
14 Here, in line with the rest of the comparative volume, we cover the 1995-2005 period with some 
references to years between 1991 and 1995. 
15 The equivalence scale in this report differs from that used by the EUROSTAT in that here individuals 
are considered children up to the age of 17 years against the 13 age limit of the Eurostat. 
16 Whereas the reference year for this wave of the EU-SILC income data is 2004, other information, such 
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4.4  The income and labour market position of the elderly, 1990-2005 
The income position of the elderly
17 had been favourably compared to that of the non-elderly in 
both absolute and relative terms in the period after the transition started. Although their 
disposable income lagged behind between 1991 and 2005, the difference was significant only in 
the beginning of the nineties. Also, the elderly did not experience the massive loss in real 
incomes as the non-elderly in the middle of nineties, at the bottom of the employment crisis. 
Their relative income position has been improving permanently through the last fifteen years,
18 
while within-group income inequalities among the old were lower than among the non-elderly.  
The time-series of the income position of Hungarian households shows a U-shape in the last 
fifteen years. Median equivalent real income decreased in the first half of the 1990s reaching the 
bottom in 1996-97. The ascendant section of the curve started in 1998 and this gradual 
improvement in real income has been lasting ever since.
19 According to the TARKI household 
survey data, the median equivalent real income of the Hungarian population reached its starting 
value (HUF 925,000 in 1991) only in 2005 (about HUF 940,000), measured in constant prices 
(Table C2 in the Annex). 
The income situation of the elderly was similar. However, the shape of the U-curve is 
considerably flatter for them compared to the non-elderly. Both the starting and the final figures 
are significantly lower for people aged 55+, while there are only small differences between the 
incomes of the elderly and the non-elderly in the middle of the nineties. The different patterns of 
this U-curve suggest that the period analysed here can be divided to two distinct sections. The 
income position of the elderly strongly improved relative to the non-elderly between 1991 and 
1996. However, after 2000, their relative position fell behind again. This was mainly due to the 
strong increase in real wages that exceeded the indexation of pensions. 
Turning to the income position of different age groups among the elderly, the real income of the 
younger elderly (55-64) was always above the rest of the elderly (105-120% compared to 55+). 
This can be attributed to their higher labour force participation. Their median real income even 
exceeded that of the whole population for most of the period and was beyond the income of the 
non-elderly in some years.  
The income position of the elderly declines with age, as shown in Table C2. The median real 
income of cohorts aged 64-75 relative to average earnings varied below the average of elderly 
(75-85%). The corresponding figure for the oldest age group (75+) varied between 68-78% 
(Table C3). 
The relatively good income position of the elderly was assured by old-age pensions, which 
proved to be more reliable than labour income. Old-age pensions represented about half of the 
total income of households containing an elderly household member, while the share of labour 
market income (wages and income from self-employment) was about 20% of total income 
(Table C4). Other sources of income, mostly social transfers (including other than old-age 
pensions as well) also played an important role in the income composition of households with 
elderly household members and their weight increased over time. 
The favourable income situation of the elderly already described in real terms is also reflected 
by their position in the income distribution of the Hungarian population. While the elderly are 
underrepresented in the top income decile, this can also be said about the lowest decile for 
                                                      
17 The term ‘elderly’ is used in this report for people aged over 55 years of age. Four age groups are 
defined within the elderly population for analytical purposes: 55-59, 60-64, 65-74 and 75+. 
18 Due to the time-period limit of the study developments after 2005 are not discussed here. 
19 See previous footnote. HUNGARY | 75 
 
almost the whole period (Table C5). The share of the elderly shows a downward trend in both 
the lowest income decile and the lowest quintile.
20 While almost one third of the elderly 
belonged to the bottom quintile in 1991, only 17% of them were in the same position in 2005. 
This improvement took place mostly in the first half of the 1990s. The process had been 
characterised by a fast drop in the share of the elderly in the lowest decile (from 16% in 1991 to 
5% in 1996), and a relative stability in the second decile (16% in 1991 and 11% in 1996). In 
general the elderly moved upward during the last two decades, from the lowest to the middle 
deciles (Tóth, 2005: 208). 
While the aggregate picture looks favourable for the elderly, significant differences appear 
among elderly age groups. The data suggest that the good position of those aged 55-59 hides 
considerable within-group inequalities. While their share in the lowest quintile varied between 
15% and 23% during the period in analysis, it increased in the top decile (from 9% in 1996 to 
17% in 2005). The latter trend can be explained partly by the raise in retirement age in this 
period. Cohorts aged 60-64 years old were in a better income position compared to those aged 
55-59 due to the fast decrease in their share in the lowest quintile through the nineties (from 
27% in 1991 to 15% in 1998). At the same time, the relative income position of the older elderly 
(aged 65+) improved steadily between 1991 and 2005. The only deviation from this trend was 
observed in 2000, when the share of elderly aged 75+ in the bottom quintile increased 
significantly. As Table C5 reveals, the initial inequalities in the share of elderly age groups in 
the lowest quintile practically disappeared by the end of the period.  
Figure 4.2 Income inequality in Hungary, 1991-2005
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a No TARKI Household Monitor survey was conducted in 2001, 2002 and 2004. 
Source: own calculations based on HHP and TARKI Household Monitor survey. 
                                                      
20 Like in similar cases when positions of age groups change over time these changes do not apply to the 
same people. The 55-59 years old cohort in 1995 is 65-69 years old in 2005. The 55-59 years old of 2005 
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The within-group inequalities among the elderly are lower compared to the overall population 
(Table C7) and this applies to all years discussed here. The difference between the Ginis of 
these two groups had increased significantly between 1991 (0.26 for the non-elderly and 0.25 
for the elderly) and 1996 (0.31 for the non-elderly and 0.23 for the elderly), stayed stable for 2 
or 3 years, and has been decreasing since then. Results from 2003 deviate from this later 
development (see Figure 2). These trends have resulted in a quite stable level of overall 
inequalities, after the fast increase that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. The value of the 
overall Gini increased from 0.27 to 0.30 between 1991 and 1994, and varied between 0.28 and 
0.29 after that (with a temporary drop in 1998).  
The trend in overall inequalities does not differ considerably if measured by other income 
inequality indicators. The Theil-index reveals that inequalities reached their peak somewhat 
later (in 1996), and it shows a slight increase in the latest years. The differences between the 
Theil-index estimated for the overall population and that for the elderly show the same pattern 
as the Gini coefficient, 2003 being again an outlier. Also, income inequalities within the elderly 
population measured by the Theil-index are somewhat smaller than within the entire population.  
Income inequalities among the younger elderly are higher than among the older elderly. 
Inequalities within the youngest, 55-59 years old, elderly were stable (between 0.26 and 0.28) in 
the first half of the nineties and started to grow after that (0.29 in 1997 and 0.32 in 2000). 
Recent results show an even higher within-group inequality for this age bracket. Cohorts aged 
60-64 years experienced low within-group inequalities in the mid-1990s (0.22 in 1995) and 
higher inequalities at the beginning and at the end of the period of analysis (0.25 in 1991 and 
0.28 in 2005). The smallest Gini coefficients were estimated for the elderly aged 64-75, varying 
between 0.20 and 0.25. Low inequalities characterise the oldest age-groups also, but a greater 
volatility can be observed here.  
4.5  Poverty among the elderly, 1990-2005 
4.5.1  Trends in relative poverty 
The analysis of the income position of elderly in Section 4.4 has indicated in an implicit way 
that in terms of relative poverty, the Hungarian elderly are less poor than the non-elderly. The 
incidence of poverty followed the same trend already discussed before: the poverty risk of the 
elderly was higher than average at the beginning of the analysed period and it started to improve 
considerably from the middle of the 1990s.  
Measured by the poverty line of 60% of equivalent median income, almost one-fifth of the 
elderly were poor in 1991 compared to 9% in 2005, while the overall poverty rate was at the 
same level at the beginning of the period as at the end (12%), reaching a peak in the second half 
of 1990s (14% in 1996 and 1998). At the same time, the poverty risk of the non-elderly grew 
above the average after 1997 (see Table C9). The share of poor elderly halved in these fifteen 
years irrespective of the chosen poverty threshold. Comparing the poverty incidence of the 
elderly and the non-elderly after 1998, we can say that the higher the threshold, the smaller the 
differences between the poverty rates of these two groups.  Although the oldest elderly were 
estimated to be at a higher poverty risk in the first half of the 1990s by all thresholds, the 
situation became more balanced between the elderly age groups starting from the second half of 
the decade.  
While the picture regarding the poverty incidence is in line with other information interpreted 
previously or known from the related literature (Medgyesi 2001; Tóth 2005), estimations for the 
poverty gap in general are more volatile. What seems to be safe to say is that, the first years of 
the second half of the 1990s emerge again as the most unfavourable period in the income 
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The highest figures of the overall poverty gap are registered in 1997 and 1998. Estimates also 
indicate that the poverty gap was deeper for the non-elderly than for the elderly during the 
whole period of analysis. It can also be concluded that the higher the threshold is, the smaller 
the differences are between the poverty gaps estimated for the elderly and the non-elderly.  
4.5.2  Trends in poverty according to national criteria 
Minimum old-age pension is used in this report to estimate the poverty risk of the elderly as the 
national criteria. Starting from 1991, the CSO publishes regular reports on the subsistence level. 
The estimates are based on the value of minimally required food consumption. The total 
personal expenditure of a household consuming this amount of food is considered the 
subsistence level. This is calculated and published by household type on household as well as 
on individual level. The amount of the subsistence level was HUF 5,000 for a single elderly 
person in 1991 and about HUF 50,000 in 2005. 
Although it is regularly published by the CSO, the subsistence level has not been used in any 
way for administrative purposes. Instead, the minimum old-age pension was set as the income 
threshold for the eligibility of means-tested social benefits. The amount of the minimum old-age 
pension in 1991 was roughly the same as the subsistence level for a single elderly (HUF 5,200), 
but grew to only half of it by 2005 (HUF 24,700).  
As shown in Table C11, only a marginal share of the population falls below this administrative 
limit. Only 2% of the overall population could have been considered poor in 1991 on this 
ground and the 2005 figure is even lower (1.3%). Looking at the variation of this indicator over 
time, we observe that its value showed a peak in the middle of nineties (3.9% in 1997) and falls 
after that. The poverty risk of the elderly was below average during the whole period. The 
highest poverty in this definition was experienced by the elderly in 1997 (2%).  
4.5.3  Trends in relative poverty, material hardship and subjective income 
evaluations 
We use various indicators in order to consider other aspects of poverty: the square meters per 
person available in the household, the average number of rooms, having a flush toilet, the share 
of persons living in owner-occupied dwellings, the share of people who make ends meet with 
difficulty, and the share of people who run out of money by the end of the month. We also 
analyse the connection between relative income poverty and suffering from material hardship. 
In Hungary, the average floor space per household member was 30 m
2 in 2005, which is about 4 
m
2 larger than in 1991 (see Table C12). Older people live in households with an average floor 
space per capita of 41.5 m
2, much larger than that of non-elderly households (25 m
2). The 
differences in figures reflect both differences in household size and total floor space. Older 
people usually live in smaller households, but not always in smaller housing units than the non-
elderly. There is not much variance in the average floor space per capita among elderly age 
groups.  
The average number of rooms per household member was 1.03 in 2004. It increased slightly 
during the last fifteen years (Table C13). There is a considerable difference between the elderly 
and the non-elderly in this respect as the elderly score better. While non-elderly households had 
0.9 rooms in 2004, the elderly had 1.4. The average number of rooms increased by 0.24 between 
1991 and 2005 among the elderly. Within the elderly population, the average number of rooms 
increases with age. The poor elderly live in larger dwellings (by the number of rooms) than the 
non-poor elderly. The average number of rooms available to households of poor elderly was 
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The overwhelming majority of the Hungarian population own their own homes. In 1991, 80% of 
the total population lived in owner-occupied housing units. Due to privatisation in the housing 
market this rate increased to around 90% through the last fifteen years (Table C14). There is no 
significant difference among the elderly and the non-elderly in this respect, and neither among 
the subgroups of the elderly.  
The number of households without a flush toilet decreased dramatically during the last fifteen 
years. While 18% of the total population lived in housing units without a flush toilet in 1991, 
only 7% lived under similar conditions in 2005 (Table C15). At the beginning of the 1990s the 
share of the elderly living in housing units without a flush toilet was twice as high (27%) than 
among the non-elderly. By 2005 this difference disappeared. 
Asking people whether they are able to make ends meet is a commonly-used indicator for 
material hardship. Unfortunately, neither the HHP, nor the TARKI Household Monitor Survey 
contains this question. We used data from the EU-SILC for the year 2005 in order to get 
information on this dimension of material hardship. The question included six response 
categories: with great difficulty, with difficulty, with some difficulty, fairly easily, easily, very 
easily. Considering the first three categories, every four Hungarian people out of five reported 
that they are able to meet ends with difficulty in 2004 (Table C16). More than one half of them 
(45% of all respondents) however chose the weakest category (“with some difficulty”). There is 
no difference at all in the answers of the elderly and the non-elderly when looking at all three 
categories. A higher share of the non-elderly than the elderly (15% vs. 10%) reported that they 
are able to meet the ends with great difficulty. No considerable variance among the elderly age 
groups can be observed here. 
Finally, we tried to capture material hardship by using a question that was available in the HHP 
and the TARKI Household Monitor surveys: “Did you run out of money by the end of the month 
in the last 12 months?” We recoded the six original categories used in the questionnaire into 
four categories (Table C17) (1) the household did not run out of money at all in the last 12 
months, (2) they ran out of money once in 6 months, (3) every 2-3 months or (4) monthly. The 
share of households not facing any financial trouble has been increasing with some fluctuation 
since 1991. Almost half of the sample population lived in such households in 2005; this figure 
was only one third in 1991. The elderly are significantly overrepresented in this category: 
almost 60% of them checked response (1) in 2005. At the other end of the scale, one-fifth of the 
respondents reported regular material hardship in 2005, compared to 14% of the elderly. In 
general, the elderly are underrepresented in categories where financial problems are reported. 
When looking at the various age categories of the elderly, the reported financial crisis decreases 
systematically with age. Therefore, the older elderly (65+) tend to report fewer problems then 
the younger elderly. 
Consumer durables can be used as a proxy for the wealth status of a household. The absence of 
these kinds of commodities captures other dimensions of social exclusion. Medgyesi (2001) 
analysed this topic using TARKI data, with a special focus on elderly households. He included 
durables like hi-fi equipment, refrigerator, freezer, microwave oven, washing machine, 
dishwasher, personal computer, colour television, video recorder and car in his analysis. He 
generated quintiles of possession of these durables and found that the Hungarian elderly lived in 
less equipped households in both 1991 and 2000. The share of elderly people in the lowest 
quintile was about 34% in 1991 (against 17% among active aged persons) and 41% in 2000 (vs. 
16% ). However, the situation of the elderly improved in absolute terms during the 1990s in this 
respect. HUNGARY | 79 
 
4.6 Marginal  groups 
Single elderly women are often considered a potential marginal group among the elderly. Other 
groups that could have been considered here are missing from household surveys 
(institutionalised elderly), are represented by such a small number of cases in the sample that 
does not allow for analysis (Roma elderly), or there is no information about their status in 
regular surveys such as the HHP or the TARKI Monitor survey (minorities, migrants).  
Single elderly women clearly represent a marginal group within the elderly; however, their 
income position improved considerably during the period of analysis: almost 80% of them 
belonged to the bottom quintile in 1991, while only 35% in 2005. The shift in their relative 
position took place in 1995, when 40% of them were in the lowest quintile compared to 62% 
one year before.
21 Their presence in the top decile is negligible (Table C21). As for changes 
over time, a high percentage of single elderly women fell into the lowest decile at the beginning 
of the nineties (47% in 1991, 41% in 1992 and 35% in 1993), moving first upward (9% in 1998) 
and then slightly downward (14% in 2003 and 2005).  
Single elderly women in total are slightly overrepresented in the lowest two income deciles: 
66% in the first and 75% in the second compared to 59% of elderly women in total. In addition, 
single elderly women are overrepresented in both lowest and the second deciles, in comparison 
with the single non-elderly, but also compared to all elderly women (Table C19). 
The poverty rate among the single elderly was higher compared to the overall figures of both the 
elderly and the non-elderly during the whole period (Table C22). Setting 60% of the median 
income as poverty threshold, the highest figures were estimated for 1991 (53%), and the lowest 
in 1996 and 2005 (18%). The higher-than-average poverty risk of single elderly women is 
observed at the 70% threshold as well, meaning that they did not experience extreme poverty in 
this period (except for the first three years of analysis). In spite of their improved situation, 
almost two fifths of single elderly women earn an income lower than 70% of median equivalent 
income of the total population. Younger single elderly women are at higher risk of poverty than 
those belonging to older age groups, however the low number of cases in some age groups 
limits the power of interpretation in this respect (Table C20). 
4.7 Prospects  for  poverty 
Short run: labour market 
In section 4.1 we presented the immediate impact of the labour market shock on the pension 
system. Below we analyse how the crisis could affect the system in the decades to come.  
The labour market shock of the early 1990s hit the active cohorts to a different degree. In table 
4.3 we list labour force participation rates for 5-year birth cohorts in various years. The table 
reveals that in 1997, when the employment crisis was the deepest, only 62% of the 50-54 years 
old cohort (born between 1943-1947) participated in the labour market. In 2006 the 
corresponding figure for the then 50-54 years old (born between 1953-1957) was 73%. The 
difference is even sharper in the life-cycle period of 55-59 years. Those who were in this age 
group in 1997 (born between 1938-1942) had a participation rate of 29%. In 2006 the 55-59 
years old cohort (born between 1948-1952) had a rate of 52%. These changes are highlighted in 
the table. 
                                                      
21 The small sample size increases the volatility of estimates, but this striking shift is probably the effect 
of the economic stabilization package introduced in March 1995. The income position of pensioners was 
less affected by the package compared to the active population. A shift of similar magnitude can be 
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Table 4.3 Labour force participation rates by birth cohorts in various years 
 1992  1997  2002  2006 
1973-1977 21.8  59.7  75.1  81.1 
1968-1972 69.7  71.9  78.0  83.4 
1963-1967 77.3  76.3  82.1  83.7 
1958-1962 84.3  81.9  81.6  80.6 
1953-1957 88.6  82.5  77.8  73.0 
1948-1952 88.6  78.0  68.8 52.0 
1943-1947 84.9  62.4 40.9  13.8 
1938-1942  69.7 28.7 9.8 4.0 
1933-1937  34.3  7.4 3.1  1.2 
1928-1932 13.9  2.6  1.4  Na 
1923-1927 9.0  2.3  na  Na 
1918-1922 5.3  Na  na  Na 
Source: Authors’ calculation from OECD Labour Statistics. 
In addition, cohorts hit by the labour market shock most severely have flatter age-earning 
profiles than preceding and subsequent cohorts. The combined effect of broken earnings profiles 
and declining employment is presented in figure 4.3. The figure shows the age of the average 
taxpayer of labour related taxes including personal income tax and social security contributions, 
weighted by the amount of taxes paid. It is apparent that the average age of the taxpayer of 
labour-related taxes decreased significantly in parallel with the employment crisis. Around the 
turn of the century the average age of the taxpayer was about a year below the level at the 
beginning of the 1990s. This drop occurred despite the rapid growth in enrolment in higher 
education (see Table 4.1), which pushed up the age of taking up the first job. If participation in 
higher did not grow the decline in the average tax-paying age of labour-related taxes would 
have been even sharper.  
Augusztinovics & Köllő (2008) calculated the expected effects of the labour market shock of 
the early 1990s on future pensions. They collected retrospective information about the 
contributory period by cohort, gender and level of highest education, and applied the new 
benefit formula to be introduced in 2013. Based on information of the registers of the Central 
Administration of the National Pension Insurance (CANPI) on the contributory history in the 
years 2001-2005 they differentiated between three main groups of contributors. The alpha 
group consisted of people who had full-time contributory employment during the entire year 
under examination. The other group, people who collected less than a full year contributory 
period in the course of a calendar year – that is people in and out of the labour market – were 
called beta. Within this, they separated two subgroups: beta-1, who had at least half a year of 
contribution in a year and beta-2, who had less than half a year. The gamma category did not 
appear in the CANPI registration, neither as contributors nor as beneficiaries. These are people 
with labour income exclusively from the informal economy or without any labour income. Their 
number can be estimated as a difference between cohort sizes in the CANPI records and the 
census. Augusztinovics & Köllő estimated the relative share of these groups in the non-retired 
population. According to their calculations, the alpha group represented 40%, beta 51% and 
gamma 9% in the period of 2001-2005.  HUNGARY | 81 
 
Figure 4.3 Weighted average age of labour-related taxes (cohort-size effect filtered out) 
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a The effect of size-difference across cohorts were filtered out by applying a uniform cohort-size.  
Source: Authors’ calculation from tax declaration samples. 
The consequences for future pensions of the alpha and the beta-1 groups are shown in Table 4.4. 
This leads to the conclusion that various groups will have an entry pension below or just slightly 
above the 40% of average net wages, which is considered as a minimally sufficient replacement 
rate by the ILO or the OECD. Since the indexation formula is half-price-half-wage, an entry 
pension just above 40% of average net wages will fall below 40% in a couple of years. 
Particularly vulnerable are men with uncertain jobs and women, unless they have higher 
education. The table focuses on groups with better labour market position. Gammas and most 
beta-2s will not collect enough contributory period to become eligible for old-age pension. 
Due to problems of data accessibility, proper transition matrices could not been drawn up in the 
calculation. The estimations, based on Markov-chains, which were used instead, give only an 
indication. Recalculations currently being performed – based on individual panel data – will 
give more robust results. 
Table 4.4 Relative entry pensions by the 2013 formula
a 
Men with  Women with 
lower secondary higher lower Secondary higher 
 
level of education 
Alpha
b 63.1  74.7  129.8  49.9  68.7  93.4 
Beta-1
b 36.0  47.0  102.4 30.6  41.4  64.2 
Total 48.5 63.2 116.5  39.2 55.7 85.5 
a Relative entry pension: replacement rate of entry pensions. 
  2013 formula: the 1998 pension reform prescribed the application of a new, linear benefit formula (see Section 3). 
b Alpha, beta: groups of people in active age classified by their contributory period within a year;  
  alpha: people with full-time contributory  employment during the entire year;  
  beta-1: accomplishing at least half a year of contributory period. 
Source: Augusztinovics & Köllő (2008: 169).  
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Long run: demography and education 
Table 4.2 reveals that old-age dependency is expected to grow from 49% to 88% between 2005 
and 2050. These figures, however, may conceal the real process of ageing. The borderline 
between young and old, set in the above calculation at 55, may well change in the course of 
nearly half of a century. The age-threshold separating young and old depends largely on the 
output of the health care system and education. More specifically, these effects are double-
edged. On the one hand, improving health and higher education levels increase life 
expectancies, stretching pension budgets even further. But on the other hand, people in good 
health and having marketable skills can stay longer in the labour market.  
Although without clear predictive power, we have some indication of the potential effect of 
increasing education levels on future life expectancy. Table 4.5 shows recent changes in life 
expectancies by level of education. In the second half of the 1980s life expectancies at the age 
of 30 for men with incomplete primary education was about 9 years shorter than that of their 
contemporaries with a college or university diploma. By the early 2000s, this difference had 
grown to nearly 17 years. Whereas mortality at the lowest educational level declined over the 
years, it improved in other educational groups, especially in the higher categories. Tendencies 
were similar among women. 
The table offers different interpretations. One is a wide and broadening inequality in mortality 
by education. Another interpretation is a prediction of increasing pension expenses. The trends 
reflected in Table 4.5 allow for the conclusion that not only old-age dependency will grow, but 
also the educational composition of the pensioner society is likely to change. Since people with 
higher education tend to have higher incomes, and consequently higher pensions, this may 
indicate an even stronger pressure on future public budgets. A stronger budgetary pressure can 
in turn raise the risk of old-age poverty, depending on the way society distributes the extra 
burden across generations. 
Table 4.5 Life expectancy at the age of 30 by level of education, 1986-2004 
Calendar years  Less than primary Primary Secondary Tertiary  Total
Men         
1986-1990   34.8 36.8 40.5 43.7  37.9
1991-1995   32.0 35.7 40.6 44.5  37.0
1996-2000   32.3 36.5 42.6 47.0  38.3
2000-2004   31.9 37.8 43.9 48.4  39.6
Women         
1986-1990   43.8 45.0 46.0 47.8  45.4
1991-1995   42.9 45.2 46.7 47.8  45.6
1996-2000   43.3 45.7 49.7 50.8  46.6
2000-2004   42.2 47.2 51.0 52.4  47.6
Source: Kovács & Hablicsek (2006: 17). 
On the other hand, a society with a higher average educational level may accept a higher 
retirement age. This would relieve the pension budget in two ways, through longer contributory 
periods and a shorter retirement career. As Table 4.6 shows, the number of participants in higher 
education grew by more than 70 percent, from 255,000 to 439,000 between 1998 and 2006. This 
is not due to demography; indeed, the size of the 18-25 cohorts decreased by 15% through the 
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Table 4.6 Tertiary education participation (ISCED 5-6), 1998-2006 
  Number of participants (thousands)  Participants in % of 18-25 population 
1998  255 20 
1999 279  21 
2000 307  23 
2001 331  25 
2002 354  28 
2003 391  32 
2004 422  36 
2005 436  38 
2006 439  40 
Source: Eurostat, CSO. 
Consequently the cohorts reaching retirement age in the late 2040s will have a significantly 
higher educational background than the cohorts retiring around 2030 or before. If this 
improvement in education were to be translated to higher employment rates in the prime earning 
years, it will be easier to finance the pensions of the large cohorts born in the mid-1970s. This 
offers opportunities to reduce poverty among those who will be old in the middle of the 21
st 
century. 
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Further data on the Hungarian pension scheme 
The time horizon of the paper is 1990-2005. Trends and regulations are described accordingly. 
However, there were so many changes in the rules of the pension system that a brief summary 
could be useful. Below we summarise the most important modifications that directly affect old 
age income. Further changes (e.g. life-cycling and portfolio choice in mandatory pension funds, 
new regulations concerning asset management fees, etc.) are not listed here. 
 
1. Pension contributions (% of gross wage), 2005-2008 
 
Contribution of employee 
If in full PAYG  If fund member 
  Total 
contributions
To PAYG pillar To PAYG pillar To private fund
 
Contribution 
of employer 
2005  26.5  8.5 8 0.5  18 
2006
1  26.5  8.5 8 0.5  18 
2006
1  29.5  8.5 8 0.5  21 
2007  29.5  8.5 8 0.5  21 
2008 33.5
2  9.5 8 1.5  24 
Notes:  
1 Contribution rules changed during the year. 
2 Pension contributions were raised while health contributions were cut as the division of responsibilities 
between the two funds changed. 
 
2. Indexation 
The 1997 Law prescribed Swiss indexation of benefits replacing wage indexation. The index is 
calculated from projected wage index and CPI set in the budget. If projection differs 
significantly from real trends, the index is corrected before the end of the year retroactively. In 
the table below we show the net wage index and the consumer price index (both from the 
Central Statistical Office), the resulting Swiss index (which may differ even from the 
retroactively corrected index; after all even the correction is based on assumptions and not final HUNGARY | 85 
 
data), and the effective increase. In 2001, 2002 and 2008 the correction was given in two rather 
than one single move.  
Pension increase and related statistics in Hungary, 2001-2008 
  Effective 
increase
Swiss 
index
1 
Net wage 
index
CPI
2001 1.1587  1.1270  1.162  1.092 
2002 1.1578  1.1245  1.196  1.053 
2003 1.1078  1.0950  1.143  1.047 
2004 1.0736  1.0620  1.056  1.068 
2005 1.0736  1.0685  1.101  1.036 
2006 1.0555  1.0575  1.076  1.039 
2007 1.0650  1.0550  1.030  1.080 
2008 1.0732  Na  na  na 
1 Arithmetic average of the nominal net wage index and the consumer price index (CPI). 
A further note on benefit increases: a 13
th month of benefit was introduced step-by-step between 
2003 and 2006. In 2003 one extra week, in 2004 two, in 2005 three and in 2006 three extra 
weeks were paid. 
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5. Poland 
Katarzyna Piętka
* 
Summary  
1. The income position of the elderly tended to be more favourable in Poland than for the 
younger group in 1994-2004. The median income of the elderly is higher and grew faster than 
among the non-elderly. The main reasons for this are the legacy of the social security system 
inherited from the centrally planned economy, as well as the considerable political influence of 
the elderly in Poland. On the other hand, one of the lowest employment rates in the EU-25 
impacted on low incomes among the population of working age. 
2. The sub-groups 55-59 and 60-64 tended to have relatively higher incomes because they 
worked more often than older persons and/or received pensions, calculated on the basis of more 
recent average wages than older pensioners. The share of wages was twice as high for the 55-
59 age groups than for the 60-64 group. 
3. Income inequalities among the elderly were smaller than among the non-elderly. The current 
diversity of the pension level consists more of differences between privileged and non-privileged 
professional groups than intergenerational differences. 
4. Throughout the analysed period, the elderly were substantially less poor than the non-
elderly, according to both relative and absolute thresholds. The poverty gap for the non-elderly 
exceeded the gap among the elderly by several percentage points. Within the elderly group, 
poverty rises with age. 
5. Relative poverty levels among the elderly remained rather stable over time. Absolute poverty 
decreased among the elderly, but grew among the non-elderly. 
6. The elderly assess their income position and income streams more negatively than the 
poverty measures would suggest. The trend in the subjective income evaluation corresponds 
with the development of relative poverty rates. 
7. Although the elderly tend to live in larger accommodation, the condition of their homes 
suggests higher levels of material deprivation than for the non-elderly. 
8. Among the elderly, several groups experienced more severe poverty, including persons 
belonging to households living off social income (other than pensions), farmers and extended 
families. 
9. As a consequence of the pension reform, future pensions will depend on paid contributions 
throughout the entire working career, the age of retirement and the returns on capital 
accumulated in the second pillar pension funds. Current replacement rates are considered to be 
high, but these will be much lower under the new system.  
10. There is a strong possibility that in the near future the elderly will be threatened by poverty 
in cases of relatively short careers or low earnings due to unemployment, care responsibilities, 
low qualifications or unofficial income. Poland could thus make a transition from a high 
adequacy of pensions combined with low financial sustainability, to high sustainability but low 
adequacy. 
                                                      
* Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), Sienkiewicza 12, Warsaw, Poland. 
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5.1  General background information 
The size of the Polish population (38.2 million in 2005, which gives a population density of 122 
people per square kilometre) was quite stable over the period analysed in this chapter (1994-
2004). The period of population growth, which lasted continuously until 1997 (by 0.1% 
annually on average from 1990), was followed by a period of negative growth rates (-0.05% 
until 2007
1). The main reason for the falling trend was emigration, which has intensified since 
EU enlargement (a permanent outflow of 272,000 in 1990-2006; the size of temporary job 
emigration during 2002-2006 is much bigger: 1.2 million people
2). Since 2002 we have also 
observed slightly negative natural growth of the population. The birth rate per 1,000 inhabitants 
dropped at the beginning of the transition (from 14.3 in 1990 to 11.2 in 1992, and further down 
to 9.2 in 2003). Although Polish society can still be regarded as fairly young (41% below 30 
years of age, 69% below 50: data from 2005), it is ageing slowly (in 1990 these figures were 
45% and 73%, respectively). The drop in the last 15 years is visible especially in the under-15 
age group, whose share decreased from 22% to 16%. In 2004, the birth rate started to grow, 
along with an improvement in the economic situation and better prospects for the economy after 
EU accession (up to 10.2 in 2007). Firstly, members of the ‘baby boom’ generation that 
occurred in the early 1980s are now starting to build their own families. Secondly, that part of 
the generation over 30 that deferred having children earlier in order to enhance their working 
careers also started procreating. The trend in the natural growth of the population became 
positive again as of 2006. 
From the beginning of the transition until 2005, GDP per capita in constant prices increased by 
67%. However, Poland started from a low base, as GDP per capita (in PPP) was the lowest 
among the new member states that entered the EU in 2004
3. In spite of relatively robust 
economic growth, the employment rate fell from the beginning of the transition: from 53.3% in 
1992 to 45.2% in 2005. This reflected the great necessity to improve labour productivity, and 
affected both women and men, although net male participation remains much higher: 52.4%, 
against 38.6% for women (2005). An additional factor enhancing productivity growth was the 
generous policy on social transfers, where early retirement schemes and easy access to disability 
pensions mitigated growth in unemployment. As a result, the activity rate (gross participation) 
of people aged 55+ decreased from 25% in 1992 to 17% in 2000 (a threefold stronger drop than 
for society as a whole) and has remained more or less stable over the subsequent years. The 
current employment rate in Poland is the second lowest among the EU-25 countries, while the 
activity rate is the fourth lowest (Eurostat, 2007).  
After the economic downturn at the beginning of the transition (negative economic growth, a 
jump in unemployment, amongst other things), GDP started to grow in 1992 and gained 
momentum around the mid-1990s. The employment rate stabilised around 51% between 1994 
and 1998. The Russian crisis and the world economic slow-down at the end of the last decade 
brought about another wave of pressure for enterprise restructuring through productivity 
improvement. Unemployment rose to close to 20%, employment fell to 45%, and the trend 
continued until the year Poland entered the EU (2004). Subsequently, an economic recovery has 
taken place, but it has been work emigration which has in the main contributed to the 
unprecedented fall in the unemployment rate (below 9% in 2008).  
                                                      
1 Estimates of the Central Statistical Office for the middle of each year. 
2 Official estimates 
3 According to Eurostat, 53.6% of the EU-27 average in 2007; the next country with higher GDP per 
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Many of the unemployed who were without jobs for more than a year were not entitled to 
unemployment benefit (close to 50% of registered unemployed in the mid-1990s, 80% by the 
end of 1998 and 86% by the end of 2004). In some cases they gained access to social assistance, 
in others they relied on unofficial income sources or simply did not make ends meet. On the 
other hand, the level of social transfers for the elderly (in relation to GDP
4) was maintained. The 
high level of unemployment made the labour market more favourable for employers, with wage 
pressures remaining relatively weak compared to productivity growth for a long time. In effect, 
the role of wages in disposable incomes in national accounts decreased from 43% in 1991 to 
37% in 2004. Also, since the beginning of the transition unemployed people closer to (early) 
retirement age have been treated more favourably than the younger unemployed. In 1997, such 
privileges were even extended and streamlined into pre-retirement pensions and benefits. 
Moreover, since 1997 the level of unemployment benefit has been linked to employment 
history, which is of course most favourable for older people. All of this has impacted on total 
income distribution: the elderly being secured with generous provisions throughout most of the 
analysed period, while the younger part of society being affected by severe changes in the 
economic situation and on the labour market. 
During the transition the level of education of the Polish workforce has risen. The share of 
economically active people with tertiary education increased from 9% to 20% between 1990 
and 2005. The share of those with at least secondary education rose as well, from 33% to 37%. 
In line with this, the share of people with only primary or lower education fell (from 25% to 
11%). This development creates a strong potential for economic growth, provided the 
emigration of the young and educated workforce to EU-15 countries stops. 
The transition process has also led to structural changes in employment. The most spectacular 
shift has been from agriculture to services. The share of farmers in the working population 
dropped from 26% to 16% between 1992 and 2005
5, and a slight fall has been noted for industry 
as well (from 26% to 23%). The weight has shifted towards employment in services (from 49% 
to 61%), which was heavily underdeveloped during the communist period. The latter ratio, 
however, is still behind the average level in the EU, while the share of farmers remains 
comparatively high.  
Taking into account that value added in agriculture contributed only 4.5% to total gross added 
value in Poland (8.0% in 1995), it is a sector with very low productivity. Farmers, therefore, 
tend to register relatively low incomes. Their difficult income situation tends to be reinforced by 
family composition. Families living in the countryside (38% of society) tend to have more 
children: according to the 2002 census, on average 2.0 per family, against 1.6 among urban 
families. This implies that income per person is lower among farmers. 
5.2 Pension  institutions  and actors in pension policy 
The old-age pension system in Poland has two main schemes: one for most of employees, the 
other for farmers. In addition to this, there are separate schemes for specific occupational 
groups, such as military personnel, judges, prosecutors and the police force. Under the standard 
employee scheme there are also exceptional provisions for certain occupational groups. These 
entitle miners, teachers, artists etc. to retire earlier (5-15 years, without age limit).  
                                                      
4  The fall of the aggregated value of old-age, disability, survival and pre-retirement pensions to 12.7% of 
GDP in 2000 was due to delayed indexation of pensions until 2001; a jump to 14% in 2001-2003 , some 
deterioration to 13.4% in 2004 and 12.8% in 2005. 
5 Data prior to 2002 are not reliable, since according to the National Census 2002 the number of 
individual farmers was substantially overestimated (by almost half). The Statistical Office did not correct 
the series backwards. Data for 1992 are therefore based on the previous census from 1988. POLAND | 89 
 
The 1999 pension reform introduced (mainly) a NDC (notional defined contribution) system for 
calculating future pensions and replaced part of the PAYG (pay-as-you-go) system with a fully 
funded pillar. Under the new system, pensions depend fully on the social tax contributions paid 
during the entire working career, with the standard pension age being 60/65 years, and early 
pensions are no longer available. A short transition period for early retirement schemes was 
introduced for people close to retirement age at the moment of the reform’s implementation 
(until 2006, but lately postponed for 2 years). Those obligatorily covered by the two-pillar 
system were under-31 years old in 1999 and those offered an option to participate in the new 
system were in the 31-50 brackets. Occupational privileges are to be maintained through the 
introduction of bridging pensions, which will be financed probably through higher employers’ 
contributions, although this issue has not yet been resolved due to bargaining over the list of 
occupations to be included. Farmers have remained covered by a separate scheme known as 
‘KRUS’. 
The general conditions for entitlement to an old-age pension are: age 60/65 and 20/25 years of 
employment history. Before the reform the pension formula consisted of 2 elements:  
(1) the ratio of the person’s wage during 10 years chosen out of the last 20 years to the average 
wage in the economy, multiplied by the average wage at the moment of retiring and by the 
percentage of a component representing the number of years in service;
6 
(2) a ‘social element’ equal to 24% of the average wage in the economy at the moment of 
retiring.  
The 1999 reform
7 introduced a pension formula fully based on contributions paid during the 
entire contribution history – indexed with the wage bill growth – divided by life expectancy at 
the moment of retiring. For people in the age class 31-50 in 1999, who chose not to participate 
in the two-pillar system the formula change will happen in the first pillar only. For people not 
covered by the reform (older than 50 in 1999) the pension formula generally remained the same. 
The only change was extending the period of wage records taken into account. This group was 
also allowed to retire at age 60/65 if they had less than 15/20 years of contributing, although 
they did not have a guaranteed minimum pension level then.  
Future pensions should gradually become much more diversified than currently, as a result of 
the new pension formula, which does not contain the ‘social element’ (implying a rather strong 
cross-generational solidarity). On the other hand, current diversification mainly stems from 
differences between the pensions of privileged and non-privileged groups. Miners, soldiers, 
police, prison staff, (who account for around 18% of expenditure in non-farming schemes), on 
average have pensions more than double all other pensions in the non-farming pension scheme. 
This role of privileged pensions should shrink gradually, which will impact in the direction of 
lowering the variety of future pensions.  
The minimum pension level was 90% of the minimum wage at the beginning of the transition. 
In 1996 it was expressed as 35% of the average wage (which amounted to more or less the same 
level as previously). Since 1999, the minimum pension has been fixed as a lump-sum (at that 
time 33% of average wages), which is indexed for inflation. This implies that the minimum 
pension under the new scheme tends to fall behind average wage growth.  
                                                      
6 This amounted to a sum of 1.3% for each contributory year, and 0.7% for each non-contributory year 
included in the calculation (e.g. due to parental leave). 
7 It should be noted that disability pensions of people who reach retirement age were not automatically 
transferred into old-age pensions. Therefore the statistics related to these kinds of transfers are not 
comparable with EU data. An automatic transformation from disability to old-age pensioners was 
introduced in the 2005 data, but only within the farmers’ scheme. 90 | KATARZYNA PIĘTKA 
 
The pensions’ indexation mechanism has been subject to many changes. Until 1996 pensions 
were indexed by wage growth. After that, indexation was based only on price dynamics. In 1999 
a mixed mechanism was introduced: anticipated CPI plus 20% of the real growth in average 
wages. In 2001 this was changed, and registered CPI became the indexation criterion. As of 
early 2008, mixed indexation has been reintroduced. 
Private pensions from the third pillar, which were widely promoted after the 1999 reform, are 
not yet paid to anyone. The same applies to pensions from the second pillar; the first wave of 
recipients will occur in 2009. 
People who are not entitled to pensions may apply for social assistance, which is means tested. 
However, a lack of income is not enough to get social assistance benefit. There must be a 
combination of poverty and at least one other social problem (e.g. inability to work due to 
physical impairment or old age). The maximum amount of such a benefit could be PLN 418 (in 
2004), which was around 22% of the average net wage in the economy.  
Politics has played a very important role in shaping income distribution in Poland. The 
transition was initiated by the Solidarity trade unions. The obligation towards workers, 
especially older workers at that time, was equated with providing them with social protection 
against the labour market turmoil that followed the systemic changes in the economy. Policies 
aiming to make older workers retire in order to create job opportunities for the younger 
generations turned out to be illusory – their places were not filled by young people and in reality 
have turned out to be part of enterprise restructuring processes on the state’s account, although it 
may have reduced some political tension during the period of implementing the reforms. These 
policies included opening up the gate for disability pensions widely, the introduction of early 
pensions (55/60), and a more favourable treatment of older unemployed who were close to the 
retirement age and had a sufficient working history. The later post-Solidarity government 
(1997-2001) introduced some additional instruments that protected the elderly (pre-retirement 
pensions, mixed pension indexation). 
In the current public debate about the future Polish pension system there is a growing concern 
about the rising number of very low pensions in the new system. This risk particularly applies to 
those who have not paid enough contributions to gain a suitable pension, due to long periods of 
unemployment during the transition phase, or their choosing to work in the shadow economy.  
5.3 Data 
The analysis below is based on the Polish Household Budget Surveys for the years 1994-2004, 
which were conducted by the Central Statistical Office
8. The sample contains over 31,000 
households, or about 100,000 individuals, which is considered large enough to make various 
profiles (Kuhl, 2003, p. 3). The survey is based on monthly rotation, which means that each 
household is surveyed during the period of one single month. The non-response rate of the 
Polish HBS is quite high (around 50%; among the non-responsive households pensioners 
account for a big group, around 30% of the total). A quarter consists of outright refusals to 
participate. The CSO weights adjusted to the sample size have been applied in the current 
analyses. “... [The] Polish HBS sample looks underrepresented with respect to specific sub-
populations, such as excluded or marginalised groups and, on the other hand, the most affluent 
and powerful.” (Kuhl, 2003, p. 4). 
The available data only provide information on the income of households, not on the income of 
the individual household members. For 1994-1996, only total income is included, that is: 
monetary and in kind income together; for 1997-2004 both categories of income are available 
                                                      
8 Calculations for 1994-1999 were performed by Dr. Irena Topinska (CASE). POLAND | 91 
 
separately. For the entire analysed period, farming income is available only in the total version, 
that is monetary income and income in-kind taken together. 
In 1997 the Central Statistical Office slightly changed the HBS income concept, introducing a 
new classification and new measurement approach to the use and repayment of loans and 
credits. Also, the CSO changed the definition of the main income in the total household budget. 
This may have affected one of the topics of our analysis, as the composition of two of our 
‘marginal groups’ may have changed. Therefore, the income analyses will be presented 
separately for the 1994-1997 period (here 1997 according to the old methodology) and the 
1997-2004 period (here 1997 according to the new methodology). 
Subjective questions about income as well as labour market information were not available 
before 1997. 
In the dataset, income from farming is sometimes registered as negative. This could be the result 
of an accumulation of expenditures related to farming in the month of the HBS survey, which is 
not smoothed out over the year. In cases where negative farming income resulted in a negative 
total disposable income, household income has been set to zero. Incomes are net of direct taxes. 
For the years 1994-2000 (when annual average inflation was higher than 5%), all monthly 
incomes have been expressed in average prices for a given year (which in practise meant, in 
June prices).  
Poverty indices for 2004 were based on both monetary income and expenditure data. The reason 
behind this was to underline the issue of differences between the two methods. The expenditure 
approach seems to be more reliable in a number of ways. The Polish HBS was constructed with 
special attention to the expenditure side of budgets. Moreover, people tended at the time to be 
more accurate in reporting their spending patterns than their incomes from various other 
sources. Also, farmer income streams are particularly volatile due to the seasonality of farming 
production; in some cases this may lead to overestimation, in others to underestimation of their 
income. The consumption approach allows smoothing budgets over the year.  
In order to take account of economies of scale, total household income has been made 
equivalent, in line with the modified OECD scale, which attributes a weight of 1.0 to a single 
person or a head of household, 0.5 to each next adult member of a household, and 0.3 to a child 
(the latter has been defined as a person below the age of 18 here). 
Each part of the subsequent analyses has been undertaken in 4 dimensions:  
-  the elderly 55+ versus non-elderly population (static) 
-  differences between age sub-groups among the 55+ (static) 
-  trends in the situation of the elderly versus non-elderly population (dynamic) 
-  trends in the situation of different age sub-groups among the 55+ (dynamic) 
5.4  The income and labour market position of the elderly, 1994-2004 
As mentioned above, the available HBS data do not equip us with information on the individual 
incomes of household members. This means that the income position of the elderly refers to the 
income situation of the household they live in. On the one hand we get less insight into the 
income streams of the elderly, but on the other hand we examine the financial situation they 
face in reality, that is, depending not only on their individual income, but also on the incomes of 
other household members and on their household composition. 
The median monthly equivalised income of the elderly amounted to PLN (zloties) 1050 in 2004, 
which equalled 231 EUR, according to the average exchange rate (see table D2 in the Annex). It 92 | KATARZYNA PIĘTKA 
 
grew in real terms in each year reviewed here, except for 2000
9. The cumulative real growth of 
the median between 1994 and 2004 reached 29%. The real growth in the median income of the 
elderly resulted from favourable indexation (for some years CPI + part of wage growth), but 
also from the pension formula linking the level of initial pension to the current average wage in 
the economy at the moment of retirement. In effect, all new pensions tend to be higher than 
pensions assigned in previous years. 
The differences between the median income for different age groups among the elderly are 
rather small. The median incomes for the sub-groups 55-59 and 60-64 are relatively higher (2-
4% of the average for 55+), mostly because they receive income from work. The employment 
rate for these two age groups is considerably higher (38% for 55-59 and 21% for 60-64 
compared with 12% for 65-74, Table 5.1); and although the net replacement rate of pensions is 
fairly high in Poland, it is still below 80% of previous earnings (2005, see Table 5.3). The 
median income of older people (65+) varied between 96% and 100% of the median for the 55+. 
Table 5.1 Employment rate by age 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
15  -  54  62.3 63.2 60.8 58.3 57.2 55.9 55.7 
55  -  59  42.1 40.8 41.2 39.2 41.0 38.6 38.5 
60  -  64  24.4 25.8 25.0 23.7 22.8 21.4 20.8 
65  -  74  15.1 16.6 16.5 14.1 14.2 13.2 12.5 
75  +  4.7 7.6 5.7 5.4 5.2 4.9 4.2 
75  -  79  7.6 8.8 7.8 7.8 7.2 6.9 6.1 
80  +  1.5 5.9 2.6 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.6 
55  +  22.2 23.1 22.4 20.4 20.6 19.5 19.3 
All  51.6 52.5 50.8 48.6 48.0 46.6 46.5 
Source: own calculations based on HBS. 
The strongest real growth in median income over the analysed period was registered for the 75-
79 (39%) and 65-74 (35%) groups. This implies that the gap between their income level and the 
overall average among the elderly became smaller over the years. The trend is due to both the 
favourable indexation of pensions and the falling employment rate among the ‘younger elderly’. 
In general, the income position of the elderly (55+) seems to be more favourable than that of the 
non-elderly (Table D6 in the Annex). In 2004, the median income of the elderly amounted to 
116% of the level among those below 55. The ratio was relatively low in 1994 (103.4%) and 
was characterised by an upward tendency for most of the period. On the other hand, the median 
income among the elderly fell in comparison with the average net wage in the economy, from 
63-64% during 1994-1997 to 57-58% since 2000. Moreover, average wages grew faster than 
average pensions. This indicates that the main reason behind the widening gap between the 
median income for the elderly and non-elderly was loss of jobs, which started in 1999 and 
affected people below 55 the most. In addition to this, people who lost their jobs did not get 
much social support, as opposed to a stable stream of pensions and pre-retirement transfers (see 
chapter 5.2). In effect, the significant drop in employment among the working age population 
led to only a limited drop in the share of wages in total disposable income (from 60.2% in 1998 
to 58.7% in 2004, Table D4).  
                                                      
9 In 2000 the anticipated inflation (used for the indexation of pensions) was far below the registered one 
(indexation by 4.5% versus average CPI at 10.1%). POLAND | 93 
 
Another issue which sheds some light on the more favourable income position of the elderly is 
that their households tend to have fewer children. Among the adult population (18+) 44% of 
individuals in the 18-54 age bracket lived in households without children, while the figure was 
85% for the 55+ group (including 82% for the 55-59 sub-group: 2004 data). Obviously, the 
income position of people below 55 was not favourable enough (compared to the elderly) to 
cover the additional child-related expenses. 
Not only does the income position of the elderly look more favourable than that of the younger 
generations, but income inequalities were smaller as well. Generally, the elderly are 
underrepresented in the extreme deciles (the 1
st, 2
nd and the 10
th ten-percent groups), while the 
younger generations are over-represented there (Table D5). Inequalities among the elderly 
occur, however, as this group is very evenly spread over the middle deciles (from the 4
th to the 
9
th decile). Although the current pension formula still includes a substantial social element, the 
current diversification of pensions comes mainly from differences between pensions of 
privileged and non-privileged professional groups (cf. above).  
The presence of the elderly in the lowest two deciles fell over the analysed period. In 1994-
1997, their share in the 1
st and the 2
nd deciles dropped from 14.5% to 11.6%, and from 20.4% to 
16.7%, respectively. In 1997-2004 the changes were smaller. In the 1
st decile the share dropped 
from 11.2% to 8.4%, while it fluctuated in the 2
nd decile (15% in 1997-2000, falling to 12.3% in 
2003, and rising back to nearly 15% in 2004). The share of the elderly in the highest decile was 
more stable, with a slight increasing tendency in recent years.  
The changes in shares in the two lowest deciles mostly reflect modifications to the indexation 
mechanism. The shift from wage- to CPI-based indexation in 1996 slowed down the decreasing 
share of the elderly in the lowest deciles, and the introduction of the mixed mechanism (CPI and 
wages) in 1999 led once again to a falling trend (2000 was an exception, cf. footnote 9). The 
share in the lowest deciles stabilised after the pure CPI mechanism was re-introduced.  
At the start of the period analysed here, many schemes and policies protecting the elderly had 
already been implemented. There was a substantial growth in the number of new disability 
pensioners in 1990-1993, a huge increase in the number of early pensioners at the very 
beginning of the transition, more privileges were awarded to the older unemployed, and the 
pension formula was strongly linked to average wage developments. Therefore, from the very 
first year of the analysis, the income situation of people 55+ looked more favourable in 
comparison with the younger generations. The further relative improvement of the elderly’s 
situation in the following years resulted from the presence of those mechanisms, launching 
some favourable new policies (such as the introduction of pre-retirement pensions in 1997), and 
especially the deteriorating labour market situation since 1999, which affected the working age 
population the most. The income position of the elderly fluctuated somewhat due to changes in 
the indexation mechanism; however, such effects were short-term, as low indexations in some 
years were usually corrected in the following year. 
Previously we concluded that the sub-groups 55-59 and 60-64 were better off than the ‘older 
elderly’, due to their higher labour market participation and the income-smoothing effects of 
social transfers among older persons. We can observe, however, that the inequality of income 
within the 55-64 group was higher than in the other elderly sub-groups. The ‘younger elderly’ 
are better represented in both the highest
10 and lowest deciles – the latter in case of people aged 
60-64 since 2001. Up until 1999 both sub-groups were significantly less represented in the 2
nd 
decile, but since 2000 their presence compared with their share in overall society has exceeded 
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the analogical relation for the oldest sub-groups. Income inequality among the elderly, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, for most of the period decreased with age (it was 0.31 for 55-
59, 0.27 for 60-64, 0.25 for 65-74, 0.24 for 75+ in 2004). 
Table D7 in the Annex shows that throughout the period reviewed here, income inequality 
among the elderly is smaller than in the younger age groups (e.g., in 1999 the Gini for 55+ was 
0.247, against 0.310 for the non-elderly). These inequalities fluctuated slightly over time; in 
general, the higher the economic growth the greater the inequality, and vice versa. 
The shares of particular types of incomes differ substantially over age groups (Table D4). 
Household budgets for the group below 55 are dominated by wages (57-59% in recent years); 
the shares of social transfers (19-21%) and non-farming self-employment (10-11%) are far 
lower. For the elderly, the opposite occurs: the main income stream consists of social transfers 
(74-76%), and labour income accounts for 17%. The role of other sources of income is very 
limited. Interestingly enough, the role of farming income is only twice as low among the elderly 
compared to the younger age groups. The main reason for this is that relatively more elderly live 
in extended families whose main income is from farming (which implies that in this group the 
role of farming income does not diminish with age that much). A second explanation could be 
that the labour productivity of farmers is relatively low. So when the share of farming 
pensioners increases along with the age groups, a gradual drop in the role of farming income is 
not as influential as labour income is in other sectors of the economy.  
There are large differences in the income structure between the elderly sub-groups. The share of 
wages is twice as high for people aged 55-59 than for the 60-64 group, and this continues to 
decrease as ages climb. For people 80+, however, the role of wages, as well as of self-
employment income, is higher than for those in the 75-79 age bracket. This is mainly due to 
differences in family structures. In 2004, 25% of people 80+ lived with their children (against 
15% for the 75-79 group), so their children’s income affected the composition of the household 
budget to a greater extent.  
In this context, it is important to note that the number of older people living with their children 
decreases over time; for 80+ it was around 40% in the mid-1990s, and for the 75-79 it was 25%. 
This reflects, on the one hand, the general improvement of living conditions in Poland, as a 
result of which generations are less often forced to live together for economic reasons. On the 
other hand, the trend could also indicate a gradual process of loosening children’s sense of 
responsibility to take care of their older parents.  
The biggest changes in the shares of income sources occurred between 1994 and 1997, and 
mostly relate to the growth in the share of wages, which has offset the fall in the role of farming 
income and social transfers for the non-elderly. This happened on the back of the restructuring 
process of the Polish economy, and the tightening of welfare policy for the non-elderly. Since 
then, income shares have remained fairly stable in all analysed age groups. Less important 
changes included a fall in the share of wages for 75+ (from 12% to 8%) - probably as a result of 
the decreasing number of older people living with their children. For the elderly, the role of 
social transfers gained in importance between 1997 and 2004 (its share rose from 73% to 76%). 
This occurred especially in the 75+ age group, but also among people in the 60-74 age bracket, 
as a result of lower employment rates and an increasing reliance on social transfers. 
In general, social transfers have contributed to the more favourable income situation of the 
elderly. The possibility of the 55-64 age group to combine labour income and pensions places 
them in the most comfortable position. POLAND | 95 
 
5.5  Poverty among the elderly, 1994-2004 
Relative poverty indices 
In general, the Polish elderly are less poor than the non-elderly. In 2004, relative poverty 
according to the 60% median
11 income threshold was 18.3% for the entire population, but was 
only 8.9% for 55+ and 21% for the population below 55 (Table D8). At the beginning of the 
analysed period the poverty rate among the elderly was 35 percentage points lower than among 
people below 55, and the difference grew to over 40 percentage points in 1995-1997. Poverty 
calculated based on monetary income alone (according to the new methodology introduced in 
1997) was slightly higher for the non-elderly, which made the difference between the rates for 
both groups expand to nearly 50 percentage points. In 2001, it widened further to around 55 
percentage points and remained stable until 2004. The increasing divergence in these poverty 
rates reflects a higher incidence of poverty among people below 55, as the level for the elderly 
remained fairly stable.
12 Stable and long-term social transfers (pensions) for the elderly and the 
favourable indexation mechanisms kept their average incomes growing faster than those of 
younger generations. 
Figure 5.1 Poverty rates by elderly age groups, 1994-1997
a and 1997-2004
b (60% median 
income threshold, in %)
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Source: own calculations based on Polish HBS. 
The situation of the elderly was not homogeneous. First of all, the highest risk of poverty was 
noted for the 55-59 sub-group (12.4% in 2004). For most of the analysed period poverty 
decreased with age: the older the group, the lower the poverty rate. The degree of differentiation 
among the sub-groups increased over time, especially when comparing the 55-59 group to the 
rest of the elderly. The poverty incidence for the 55-59 sub-group grew from 10.1% in 1997 to 
12.4% in 2004, while it remained stable for the 60-64 category (8.5% in 2004) and decreased 
for the oldest groups (from 9% to 7.7% for 65-74, and from 7.8% to 6.6% for 75+). This leads 
to the conclusion that pensions, which play a much bigger role in the budgets of 60+ people 
than in the case of the 55-59 group, protect individuals from relative poverty more effectively 
than other sources of income.  
It looks as if there is not much clustering around any of the poverty lines equal to or lower than 
70% of the median income. In 2004, decreasing the poverty line from 70% to 60% (that is, by 
14%) reduced the overall headcount index by around 30%; dropping the threshold value from 
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60% to 50% (that is by 17%) reduced the overall headcount index by around 35% (from 18.3% 
to 11.9%); and lowering the line from 50% to 40% of the median (by 20%) reduced the poverty 
rate by around 43%, to 6.9%. Thus, the reduction in the headcount index is rather proportional 
to the degree by which the poverty line is decreased. However, among the elderly we observe 
some clustering around 50% of the median. Increasing the threshold by 20% (to 60% of the 
median) almost doubles the poverty rate (from 4.6% to 8.9%); while lowering the threshold by 
20% (to 40% of the median) reduces the headcount index by nearly half (to 2.5%). The 
elasticity of the poverty rates at different threshold values is therefore greater for the elderly 
than for non-elderly population.  
The three lowest relative poverty lines (40-60% of the median) all fall into the first two deciles 
of income distribution. Low poverty rates among the elderly according to these criteria 
correspond with evidence on their under-representation in the bottom deciles (cf. above and 
table D5).  
In each year the difference in poverty rates between the elderly and the non-elderly decreases if 
the threshold value is raised. In 2004, poverty among the non-elderly was 1.9 times higher than 
among the elderly if the 70%-threshold is applied; using the 40%-criterion, the relative rate was 
much higher (3.3). This pattern can be explained by the stronger inequality among the non-
elderly, who were over-represented in the highest and the three lowest deciles, while the elderly 
were concentrated in the 4-9
th deciles. 
Figure 5.2 Shares of age groups in each decile in 2004 
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Source: own calculations based on Polish HBS. 
The growing discrepancy between both groups over time at 50%, 60% and 70% thresholds was 
less obvious than at 40% of the median. This implies that income levels above 40% of the 
median were changing for both groups in a similar way.  
Poverty gap ratio 
The poverty gap ratio at 60% median income is 30-31% (Table D9). The elderly are not only 
less poor than younger generations, but their poverty is also slightly less severe: the gap is lower 
by 2 to 5 percentage points compared to the below-55 group. 
Similar to what we saw in the headcount index, within the elderly group the poverty gap ratio 
decreases somewhat with age, at least until the age of 75 (22% for 65-74 in 2004); the gap is 
slightly higher among the oldest group (26.7% for those aged 75 or more).  POLAND | 97 
 
Figure 5.3 Poverty gap ratios by elderly age groups, 1994-1997
a and 1997-2004
b (60% median 
income threshold, in %) 
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Source: own calculations based on Polish HBS. 
There is no clear trend in the poverty gap ratio of the total elderly group; the changes that occur 
do not seem significant (fluctuations of between 20.9% and 22.8% during 1994-1997, and 
between 26.1% and 28.9% during 1997-2004). Some trends may be discerned in the poverty 
gap ratios of the age sub-groups, however. Among the 55-59 age group, the gap steadily grew in 
1994-1997. After a one-off downward correction in 1998 it remained stable during 1999-2004. 
The poverty gap ratio for the 60-64 age category also grew between 1994 and 1997, but in the 
second period a decreasing trend was dominant (27.4% in 1997, 25.3% in 2004). For the two 
oldest groups there were a few one-off peaks, but on the whole the poverty gap ratio remained 
fairly stable, especially during 1997-2004.  
For the 3 highest relative thresholds, the poverty gap ratios for the elderly and the entire 
population are rather similar. Applying the lowest threshold value (40% of the median income), 
however, the gaps among the elderly are significantly higher (in 2004: 42% at 40% of the 
median, against 33% at 50% of the median). This means that among the poorest elderly the 
share of those with comparatively low incomes is high. The situation did not really change 
much over time: the poverty gap ratio in 2004 was nearly the same as in 1997 (44%), with some 
fluctuations in between. 
The gaps in the case of the lowest threshold have lowered over time for society as a whole, 
following the trend among the non-elderly. Gaps for the elderly remained stable, while at the 
same time they have become (since 1998) higher than the gaps for the non-elderly. As such, in 
general the poverty rate among the low-income elderly is lower than among people below 55, 
but there are some very poor individuals among the elderly whose average income below the 
40% median threshold is lower than for the younger generations. These groups may consist of 
the elderly with very low pensions, most probably farmers and disabled pensioners in the 
employee system, or people in extended families sharing their income with other household 
members. Both arguments seem to make sense. According to official information about the 
distribution of non-farming pensions
13 in 2004, 0.3% of retirement pensioners and around 15% 
of disabled pensioners received benefits below the level corresponding to 50% of the median 
income. Also, in 2004 among the elderly with income below the threshold of 30% of the median 
income, 31% lived in households with at least 4 adults, 56% with at least 3 adults, 18% with at 
least 3 adults and 2 children. 
Applying the lowest relative threshold, the smallest gap occurred among the youngest poor 
elderly (55-59). This is probably due to a comparatively high labour participation (including 
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spouses), and also reflects the fact that the minimum wage is above the minimum pension. Even 
if they are poor, they attain a somewhat higher income. The poverty gaps at 40% median 
income grew with age. This could be related to the relatively high share of pensioners receiving 
pensions according to the old formula, which have become relatively low over time, due to 
limited indexation (not linked to the current average wage level for most of the time). 
National poverty lines 
We have used 3 criteria for calculating national poverty:  
(1) The  subsistence minimum represents the value of a basket of goods which are deemed 
necessary to exist for a single pensioner (calculated by the public Instytut Pracy i Spraw 
Społecznych).  
(2) The legal threshold represents the maximum level of income which qualifies for social 
assistance; its level is set at around 25-30% above the subsistence minimum for a single 
pensioner.  
(3) The  social minimum represents a complex basket of goods and services which allow a 
satisfactory lifestyle. This criterion has also been developed by Instytut Pracy i Spraw 
Społecznych.  
Incomes below the social minimum (or rather ‘social threshold’) are often equated by politicians 
and the media – rather erroneously – to a situation of poverty requiring state intervention. 
Taking into account the high level of the social minimum threshold, it is obvious that this 
generates the highest poverty rates, as 34% of the entire population cannot afford a satisfactory 
lifestyle (2004, Table D10). Poverty according to the legal threshold was 11%, while on the 
basis of the subsistence minimum over 6% of the population was classified as poor.  
The differences in poverty between age groups according to the national criteria are very similar 
to those generated by the relative poverty lines. The elderly generally are in a more favourable 
position, with poverty rates 3 times as low as the non-elderly in the case of the subsistence and 
legal minimum criteria, and close to 2 times as low applying the social minimum threshold.  
Overall poverty according to the national criteria decreased in 1994-1997, but has been growing 
since 1999. Growth in poverty was registered among younger generations only; according to the 
national thresholds it remained stable for the elderly (after the initial drop in 1994-1997). 
Among the elderly the highest poverty rates occurred within the youngest generation (55-59), 
which is in line with the results based on the relative poverty lines. Households with a low 
labour income and/or with children are more exposed to the risk of poverty. 
Poverty rates using the expenditure approach 
It was suggested in the data section that an expenditure approach to household budgets is more 
reliable. We have undertaken an alternative analysis of poverty rates in 2004 using equivalised 
expenditures and relative as well as national poverty lines (Table D14). The overall headcount 
index at 60% of the median expenditure amounts to 16.3%, which is somewhat lower (by 2 
percentage points) than the rate calculated on the basis of equivalised monetary income only. 
This conclusion holds for all variants of the relative and national poverty lines, except for the 
social minimum. The latter can be explained by the fact that the social minimum represents a 
wide basket of goods and services, and therefore represents a relatively high threshold value. As 
such, dealing with higher household budget levels and neglecting accumulation of savings
14 
(when moving from the income approach to the expenditure approach) leads to a higher poverty 
rate under the expenditure approach (compared to the monetary income approach).  
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Generally speaking, the expenditure approach reduces poverty rates among the non-elderly, and 
increases poverty rates among the elderly (by 1.6 percentage points at 60% of median 
expenditure). This applies in fact only to the 60+ age groups, which show a larger gap between 
the median monetary income and median expenditure (which could be interpreted as 
accumulation of savings or underestimated consumption) than for the younger age categories. 
This leads to the conclusion that either people below 60 more often receive unreported incomes 
(which are hopefully captured under the expenditure approach), or that the level of consumption 
of the 60+ group is comparatively more modest, which places them in a lower position in 
society than according to monetary incomes.  
According to the legal threshold, the headcount index would be higher for all sub-groups of the 
elderly. Using the subsistence minimum (which is lower than the legal threshold), poverty rates 
are higher only for the 75+ population). According to both criteria, among the non-elderly 
poverty is lower using the expenditure approach than if one applies it to monetary income. 
Using the rather high social minimum as a threshold, all age groups register higher poverty rates 
when equivalised expenditures are considered. What is most important, however, is that using 
the expenditure approach does not change our main conclusions. The ordering of individuals 
slightly changes, but according to all thresholds the elderly are still less poor than the non-
elderly if one looks at expenditures instead of monetary income. 
Poverty according to subjective criteria 
We sought to answer two questions on the subjective assessment of income in the Polish HBS. 
One is about ‘making ends meet’, according to which the elderly are a little less dissatisfied than 
the non-elderly: 37% versus 45%, respectively, in 2004 (Table D11). This is in line with their 
objective situation. It is rather interesting that a similar share of all the age groups stated that 
they have ‘difficulty’ in making ends meet, but that the ‘great difficulty’ category is mainly the 
domain of the non-elderly. This corresponds with the wider poverty gap for the group below 55, 
using the 60% median income threshold. The assessment by the elderly of their income situation 
is less negative as age increases, which once again is in agreement with their ‘objective’ income 
position. Over time, the assessment of difficulty or great difficulty in making ends meet has 
remained fairly stable among the elderly as well, which is similar to the development of poverty 
rates and gaps in the 1997-2004 period. It seems that older Poles tend to assess their income 
subjectively in the same way as the objective measurement suggests. The levels of 
dissatisfaction, however, are much higher than the poverty rates. 
The assessment of their general material situation is slightly less negative among the elderly: 
27% found it ‘very bad’ or ‘insufficient’, which is less than among the younger generations 
(36%, Table D11b). In line with the facts, the share of the elderly qualifying their situation as 
‘very bad’ is less than half the rate among the non-elderly. The less elderly also assess their 
material circumstances as ‘insufficient’, but the difference between the two age groups is much 
smaller here. In line with objective indicators, subjective assessments of material situation as 
‘very bad’ tends to decrease with age. The claims of insufficient material situation are highest 
among the 55-59 group, but the shares for the other elderly sub-groups are very similar. 
Although the poverty rate among the elderly was quite stable during the 1997-2004 period, the 
share of negative assessments of material situation has decreased since 2001. Thus, we can draw 
the conclusion that the elderly tend to assess their material situation in nominal terms as well as 
by comparing themselves to others.  
Material hardship 
We have selected two indicators that may represent material hardship among the elderly: a per 
capita floor space of less than 7 m
2 and/or the lack of a flush toilet in the house (Table D11c). 
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generations (0.4% and 3.2% respectively in 2004). However, according to the other indicator, 
the elderly tend to live in worse conditions – as much as 11.6% do not have a flush toilet at 
home, while it is 8.1% for the non-elderly population. The trend for this indicator is improving 
for both groups, though - the share of people without a flush toilet has dropped by a half since 
1994. There is no such obvious downward trend regarding the share of households living within 
a small floor space. Living conditions in terms of floor space seem to have improved somewhat 
in 2004, when emigration and growth in newly built apartments in 2003 (by 67%) may have 
contributed to reducing the share of people living on a limited per capita floor space.  
Situations where persons both have limited floor space and no flush toilet are quite rare (in 2004 
this amounted to 0.2% among the elderly, and to 1.1% among the non-elderly). Most probably 
these are mainly people living in rural areas, in poorly equipped houses and with no resources 
for renovation. 
5.6 Marginal  groups 
Based on previous research (e.g. Kohl 2003) we assume that the income position of the Polish 
elderly is not only heterogeneous according to age, but also in terms of some other personal or 
household characteristics. To assess this, we have investigated 4 potential ‘marginal groups’ 
among the elderly: 
-  farmers, that is people living in a household where the main share of declared income 
comes from agriculture; 
-  large families (consisting of 5 household members or more); 
-  people living on social income,
15 other than pensions; 
-  single women. 
Looking at the poverty figures, three of these actually turned out to be marginal. 
Farmers 
Poverty rates among farmers are very high: 26.4% for the elderly (at the 60% of the median 
income threshold), against 41.5% for non-elderly (in this case based on monetary and non-
monetary incomes, 2004; cf. table D13 in the annex). These figures are two times as high as for 
the total population in the case of the non-elderly and three times as high for the elderly.  
There are several reasons for the marginal income position of farmers. First of all, farmers’ 
pensions are lower than in the employee scheme. Secondly, there are many farmer households 
which operate with little monetary income (they do not place their products on the market), 
which is considered a structural obstacle in the economy. As a result, an average income from 
farming compared with an average labour income is substantially lower. Including estimates for 
non-monetary income (as measured in the available data) does not really change the picture.  
The situation may have improved since EU enlargement in 2004. The high demand in the EU 
for Polish agricultural products has pushed prices up (also on the internal market) and raised 
farmers’ incomes. In the micro data we see some lowering of monetary poverty among farmers 
in 2004, and macro data for 2005 indicate likewise.  
Pensions provide a better income than farming: again, the income situation of the elderly in 
farming households is more favourable than that of non-elderly farmers. This conclusion does 
not change when we use the expenditure approach, although the poverty rates among farmers 
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are significantly smaller then: by nearly 3 percentage points for the elderly and 12 percentage 
points for the non-elderly.  
Large families 
Poverty in large families is much higher than for the entire population, but to a much smaller 
degree than in the case of farmers: using the 60% of median income threshold, the poverty rate 
among the elderly living in large families is 19.1%, which is over two times as high as among 
all elderly. For the non-elderly large families the rate is much higher: 31.8%, 1.5 times as much 
as among the entire non-elderly group. 
The more favourable situation of the elderly living in large families as compared to their 
younger counterparts can be explained by the smaller number of children. As discussed earlier, 
the role of social transfers in protecting against poverty is quite strong among the elderly. 
Higher poverty among the elderly in big families compared with all elderly tend to be caused by 
the presence of children – for 85% of the elderly children are members of their households. 
Some of these elderly may live with the families of their children that have low incomes. 
Living on social income (other than pensions) 
Among the a priori selected marginal groups, poverty is highest for the non-elderly living on a 
social income: 55.3%, if one applies the 60% of median income threshold. For the elderly living 
in a household where social income is the main source of income, the poverty rate is much 
lower (33.6%). In the past, however, the latter figure was considerably higher, amounting to 
more than 50% in 1997-1998. The introduction of pre-retirement pensions (which are counted 
here as social income, following the CSO) was most probably responsible for this improvement 
of the relative income situation. This group also includes people at retirement age who have no 
right to any kind of a pension and have to rely on social assistance.  
Single women 
Single women are not a marginal group in Poland. Their poverty rates are below levels for all 
the elderly, which is the case not only for the 55+ group but also for the non-elderly group. 
Among the elderly the poverty rate for the 60% median threshold was 7% and 13.4% among the 
non-elderly (as opposed to, respectively, 8.9% and 21% for total given age groups). 
5.7 Prospects  for  poverty
16 
The income situation of the elderly described in the previous sections looks quite favourable. 
Some of the elderly, especially those below 65, may feel satisfied that they do not need to work 
and can devote their spare time to themselves or their families (e.g. taking care of grandchildren 
in a situation of scarcity of child-care infrastructure). We can discuss the extent to which the 
elderly – let’s say those below 65 – are happy not to work. 
However, the future situation for the elderly will change gradually.  
Demographic developments 
Polish society is currently relatively young. The dependency ratio measured as the share of the 
elderly 65+ of the 15-64 population was below 19% in 2007, or in other words 5.3 persons of 
working age 15-64 per 1 elderly 65+. However, according to baseline projections by Eurostat, 
the ratio is worsening quite fast. In 2020, the elderly 65+ will account for 27% of the 15-64 
population and in 2050 as much as 51% (2 persons at working age per 1 elderly 65+, Table 5.2). 
The latest demographic projections by the Central Statistical Office for 2008-2035 are very 
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similar. The share of the 55+ group, analysed in the report, will more than double and their 
number will exceed the younger generation – 15-54 – in 2050. These scenarios assume a fairly 
stable share of children. The new pension formula based on the DC (defined contribution) rule 
should introduce independence of the system from adverse changes in demography. However, 
as long as pensions are paid based on the old DB (defined benefit) pension formula (that is until 
around 2035) – with some professional groups also left out of the system (as it is currently) – 
the increasing burden of the elderly above the retirement age on the working age population will 
negatively affect the sustainability of the system.  
Moreover, according to projections, we will observe a diminishing total population (to 33.7 
million in 2050), which will reflect a shrinking number of children and persons aged 15-64. In 
the new pension system the accumulated capital in the first pillar is indexed with wage bill 
growth and in the second pillar with the rate of returns on investments in capital markets. If the 
low current employment rate does not grow substantially in the coming years, adverse changes 
in demography may impact on future pensions indirectly, despite the new formula. The 
lowering number of working age people may gradually halt economic growth rates, though 
smaller returns on domestic capital markets may be offset by investing abroad and the second 
pillar pensions would not be affected by this. However a lowering number of working people 
means a less dynamic wage bill and smaller indexation of accumulated capital in the first pillar, 
which would produce less attractive future pensions. The growing birth rate since 2004 gives 
some hope for less disadvantageous demographic developments, however, with some 
extraordinary occurrences (deferred maternity of women in their thirties), meaning Eurostat 
projections may still remain valid. 
Table 5.2 Dependency ratio 
  2007 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Total population (‘000 000)  38.0  37.1 36.5 35.4 33.7
0-14 6.0  5.4 5.2 4.6 4.4
15-64 27.0  24.9 23.1 22.1 19.4
65+ 5.1  6.7 8.2 8.8 9.9
%  of  15-64       
0-14  22.2 21.5 22.4 20.6 22.6 
65+  18.8 27.1 35.7 39.7 51.0 
% of 15-54       
55+  40.7 59.2 68.0 88.0 103.2 
Source: Eurostat baseline scenario. 
Another important demographic development is life expectancy. People live longer in Poland 
compared to previous years. Life expectancy has increased by 4 years since the beginning of the 
1980s: for women from 75.4 in 1980-81 to 79.4 in 2005, for men from 66.9 to 70.8. The trend 
will continue and have an adverse impact on the level of future pensions because life 
expectancy at the age of retiring is in the denominator in the pension formula. 
Pension system 
The application of the new pension formula (that is starting in 2009) will gradually cover more 
pensions along with the process of the retiring.
17 If the retirement age remains 60 for women 
and 65 for men, the first cohort of women who were obligatory included in the new system 
would retire in 2030 and the first cohort of men would retire in 2035 (some of them may though 
have incentives to work longer). The new pension will depend fully on the capital (that is, paid 
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social tax) accumulated throughout entire working careers, as well as life expectancy at the age 
of retiring. As mentioned above, the accumulated capital in the first pillar is indexed according 
to growth in the nominal wage bill. In this respect its value will depend on the number of 
working persons and the level of the average wage in the economy. The capital in the second 
pillar will be indexed with the rate of return on investments in financial instruments. The 
original plan assumed the option of choosing investment schemes in respect to their level of 
risk, however, currently only a universal scheme is available. During 1999-2006 the capital 
accumulated in the second pillar of pension funds has grown much higher than the ‘notional 
capital’ in the first pillar. The third (voluntary) pillar may supplement the level of the pension 
from the first and the second pillars, although interest in such programmes is still very low.  
Table 5.3 Current and prospective theoretical replacement rates 
 Gross 
replacement rate
a  
Net  
replacement rate
a 
2005 63.2  77.7 
In 10 years  43.5  53.5 
2010 63.2  77.7 
2030 51.7  63.8 
Base case 100% of average earnings 
2050 35.7  43.9 
2005 63.2  77.7  2/3 of average earnings 
2050 38.7  43.8 
2005 61.9  76.1  Concave earnings profile 
2050 33.9  41.7 
2005 60.4  74.7  Rising earnings, from 80% to 120% of average 
2050 29.7  36.6 
2005 59.5  73.2  Rising earnings, from 100% to 200% of average 
2050 26.8  33.0 
2005 55.9  68.7  Interrupted career (30 years of seniority at retirement) 
2050 26.8  32.9 
2005 57.8  71.1  Woman, retirement age of 60 and 35 contributory years 
2050 25.9  31.9 
2005 63.2  77.7  4% real rate of return 
2050 38.7  47.6 
2005 65.3  80.4  Retirement age of 67, 42 contributory years 
2050 40.4  49.7 
a The replacement rate is the ratio of the old-age pension benefit in the first year after retirement to the earnings in the 
last year of employment. 
Source: Ministry of Social Policy (2005), p. 40. 
According to the projection in the Pension Strategy 2005 (Table 5.2), the replacement rates from 
the new system will be much lower than those from the old one. An insured person whose 
earnings were in each year equal to the national average will decrease from 63.2% to 35.7% 
(gross) or from 77.7% to 43.9% (net) between 2005 and 2050. For all the variants of working 
career presented in the table the drop in the replacement rate is substantial (the smallest by 
nearly half). 
Jajko-Siwek looked at the combination of conditions that would guarantee protection of future 
pensioners from poverty at 30% of average earnings in the economy. According to her 
projections, women will tend to face an especially difficult situation, due to a shorter 
contribution history (breaks for bringing up children, earlier legal retirement age, unofficial 
employment). A woman earning average wages in the economy will need at least 28 years of 
insurance period to reach the minimum (Table 5.4). With earnings e.g. between 65-85% of the 
national average a woman would avoid poverty if she retired at the age of 60 or 61 after 42 
years of working history. Men earning average wages and retiring at legal retirement age (65) 
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Table 5.4 Conditions of accumulating pension rights protecting from poverty 
Item Sex  Earnings  during 
insurance period 
Variables 
analysed 
Values guaranteeing protection from poverty  
(pension equal or higher than 30% of average 
earnings) 
1.  Women  1. Insurance period > 28 years 
2. Insurance period <25; 28> years and retirement age > 
63 years 
2. Men 
Constant: 100% 
of average 
earnings 
Always 
3.  Women  Insurance period > 26 years 
4. Men 
Rising earnings
a  
Retirement age, 
Insurance period 
Always 
5.  Women  1. Earnings > 112% of average earnings 
2. Earnings (<85; 125> and insurance period > 29 years 
3. Earnings (<65; 85> and insurance period > 37 years 
and retirement age > 61 years 
4. Earnings <65; 85> and insurance period > 42 years 
and retirement age 60 or 61 years 
6. Men 
Various earnings 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period, 
Earnings 
1. Earnings > 72.5% of average earnings 
2. Earnings <55; 72.5> and insurance period > 32 years 
3. Earnings <45; 55> and insurance period > 39 years 
7.  Women  1. Insurance period <26; 28>; retirement age <62; 65> 
and rate of return > 4.0% 
2. Insurance period (<29; 32>; retirement age <62; 65> 
and rate of return ≤ 4.0% 
3. Insurance period <29; 32> and rate of return  
≥ 4.0% 
4. Insurance period > 32 years 
8.   Men 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period, 
Rate of return of 
OFE
b 
Always 
9.  Women  Little relevance of charges 
10. Men 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period,  
OFE’s charges 
Always 
11.  Women  1. Insurance period 23 years; retirement age 64-65 years 
and 1 out of 9 best OFEs 
2. Insurance period 24-26 years; retirement age > 61 
years and 1 out of 9 best OFEs 
3. Insurance period 27-31 years; 1 out of 11 best OFEs 
4. Insurance period 27-31 years; retirement age 64-65 
years and 1 out of 4 worst OFEs without the worst 
5. Insurance period more than 31 years 
12. Men 
Constant: 100% 
of average 
earnings 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period,  
OFE 
Always 
a From 70% of average earnings by 1.1839% yearly for men and 1.1818% for women (based on empirical data); 
b OFE= open pension funds 
Source: Zukowski (2007) p. 13, after A. Jajko-Siwek, Do the new retirement pensions protect from poverty? (2007) 
Looking for the conditions that would guarantee a maintaining of previous living standards (that 
is receiving a pension at a level of at least 60% of last earnings before retiring) Jajko-Siwek has 
projected that a woman who was earning an average wage in the economy and wanted to retire 
at the current legal retirement age of 60 would not be able to reach a pension level of 60% of her 
previous earnings. To earn such a pension, a woman would need to work much longer, for 
example at least 41 years, retire no earlier than 62 years and belong to one of the best-
performing open pension funds (Table 5.5). The conclusion Jajko-Siwek draws is that the vast 
majority of women will not earn a pension enabling them to maintain their previous standard of 
living. For men it will be possible on condition of a longer insurance period and higher 
retirement age. In the base case of an average earner, a man can earn such a pension retiring at 
the legal retirement age of 65 after only at least 44 years of insurance. 
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Table 5.5 Conditions of accumulating pension rights enabling to maintain previous living 
standards
a  
Item Sex  Earnings during 
insurance period 
Variables 
analyzed 
Values guaranteeing to maintain previous 
living standard (at least 60% of last earnings before 
retirement) 
1. Women  Never 
2. Men  100% of average 
earnings 
1. Insurance period <36; 39>; retirement age > 68 years
2. Insurance period <39; 43>; retirement age > 67 years
3. Insurance period > 43 years 
3. Women  Never 
4. Men 
Rising earnings
b 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period 
Insurance period <40; 47>; retirement age > 68 years 
5. Women  Never 
6. Men 
Earnings 
from 36% to 
60% of average 
earnings 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period, 
Earnings 
1. Insurance period <36; 39>; retirement age > 68 years
2. Insurance period <39; 43>; retirement age > 67 years
3. Insurance period > 43 years 
7. Women  Never 
8.   Men 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period, 
Rate of return of 
OFE
c 
1. Insurance period <35; 38>; retirement age > 68 years 
and rate of return = 5% 
2. Insurance period <35; 38>; and rate of return > 5% 
3. Insurance period > 48 years; retirement age > 68 
years and rate of return at least 3% 
4. Insurance period <39; 44>; retirement age > 68 years 
and rate of return = 4% 
5. Insurance period > 44 years and rate of return = 4% 
6. Insurance period > 38 years and rate of return > 4% 
9. Women  Never 
10. Men 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period,  
OFE’s charges 
Little relevance of charges 
11. Women  1. Insurance period 39 or 40 years; retirement age 
above 61 years and 1 out of 14 best OFEs 
2. Insurance period <41; 44> years; retirement age <60; 
62> years and 1 out of 5 best OFEs 
3. Insurance period > 44 years; retirement age <60; 62> 
years and 1 out of 7 best OFEs 
4. Insurance period > 40 years; retirement age > 62 
years and 1 out of 7 best OFEs 
12. Men 
100% of average 
earnings 
Retirement age, 
Insurance period,  
OFE 
1. Insurance period <31; 34> years; retirement age 65 
or 66 years and 1 out of 6 best OFEs 
2. Insurance period <31; 34> years; retirement age > 66 
years and 1 out of 6 best OFEs 
3. Insurance period <32; 34> years; retirement age > 68 
years and 1 out of 10 best OFEs 
4. Insurance period > 34 years and 1 out of 8 best OFEs
5. Insurance period <35; 40> years; retirement age > 68 
years and 9., 10. or 11. OFE 
6. Insurance period > 40 years and 9., 10. or 11. OFE 
7. Insurance period <41; 45> years; retirement age > 69 
years and 12. or 13. OFE 
8. Insurance period > 45 years; retirement age > 67 
years and 1 out of 5 worst OFEs without the worst 
a It was defined that a pension equal to at least 60% of last earnings before retirement enables maintaining living standard; 
b From 70% of average earnings by 1.1839% yearly for men and 1.1818% for women (based on empirical data); 
v OFE= open pension funds 
Source: Zukowski (2007) p. 13, after A. Jajko-Siwek, Do the new retirement pensions protect from poverty? (2007) 106 | KATARZYNA PIĘTKA 
 
Poverty and politics 
There is a lot of concern that the disparities among future pensions will increase substantially. 
First of all, a replacement of the intergenerational solidarity element in the old pension formula 
with the direct link to individual earnings will introduce greater differences between pensions. 
Although there is a mechanism in the system of pension funds aimed at guarantying similar 
returns on capital, the differences between future pensions will also take place in the second 
pillar component of the pension. This will result – as in the first pillar – from the level of 
individual earnings and length of working history. There are concerns that many people, due to 
interrupted careers or low earnings, will not qualify for adequate pensions and will fall into 
poverty in relative terms (that is, compared to the rest of society). The projected gradual fall in 
the replacement rate may cause social unrest, especially given that the growing number of the 
elderly means a larger elderly electorate as well. In order to avoid political tensions in the 
future, actions should be taken now. The key challenges for economic policy are: the necessity 
to increase the employment rate among society as a whole, as well as among the elderly alone, 
introducing mechanisms motivating the elderly to defer their retirement, develop social 
infrastructure that would enable (mainly) women to avoid interruptions in their working history 
(child care in the forms of kindergartens etc., elderly care).  
The impact of work emigration that has intensified since EU enlargement in 2004 may have a 
double effect. If employment of emigrants is official and they pay social taxes then the accrued 
pension rights to relatively higher benefits should impact on higher overall future pensions for 
emigrants after they return to the country. However, this is not so if employment history is non-
registered, with no pension insurance. Future pensions of these people would be low, unless 
they work longer or secure their future incomes through the third pillar pensions.  
Summing up, Poland will gradually transform a costly pension system with highly adequate 
benefits into much more financially sustainable one, but with lower adequacy of pensions. One 
should keep in mind, however, that full financial sustainability can be achieved only if 
privileged professional groups are covered by the unified system with a single pension formula 
and integrated legal requirements. 
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6. Romania 
Ádám Lénárt
* 
Summary 
1. Absolute poverty in Romania decreased from 36% to 15% in the period of economic growth 
between 2000 and 2005. The rate of absolute poverty peaked in 2000, following the years of 
economic recession in 1997-1999. In spite of the sharp decline, Romania’s poverty level is still 
among the highest in Europe. In particular single old women and the rural elderly have a high 
poverty incidence. 
2. Poverty is shallow; the population is densely concentrated around the poverty threshold. This 
suggests a high elasticity of poverty to economic changes. It also means that inequalities have 
been moderate throughout the period discussed in this paper. 
3. The income position of the elderly has improved relative to the non-elderly in the period of 
1995-2005. In 1995 the elderly had a higher chance of being in the lowest income deciles than 
the non-elderly; this has reversed since then. However, in absolute terms they are still in the 
least favourable position of all age groups. 
4. Self-consumption has an important share in the income structure of all age groups. Its share 
increased in the years of recession due to a combination of a large-scale land reform and 
industrial restructuring. This induced a massive outflow of less qualified workers, in particular 
older workers, from cities to villages and from industry to agriculture. In the absence of an 
adequate safety net and a labour market able to absorb excess labour supply this move to 
subsistence agriculture represented a survival strategy. In 2005, 15 percent of household 
revenues stemmed from self-consumption, down from 23 percent in 2000.  
5. Subsistence agriculture protected pensioners the most. The land reform in 1991 granted two-
thirds of agricultural lands to pensioner-led households. The relative share of self-consumption 
in total income, which was 23 percent for the society as a whole, was 29 percent among the 
elderly (55 years old and older) and 32 percent among the oldest elderly (75 years old and 
older) in 2000. 
6. The pay-as-you-go pension system inherited from the state socialist era granted pensions 
over 50 percent of the average net wages to the elderly. In the turbulent 1990s the replacement 
rate fell rapidly, plunging to 33 percent by 2006. Pensions have improved recently. Since 2006 
they have been raised in multiple steps, leading to an almost doubling of pensions in real terms 
by 2009. This move is motivated by political considerations and poses a threat to the emergence 
of a political business cycle in pensions also known in other Central and Eastern European 
countries. 
7. The number of beneficiaries exceeds the number of contributors to the pension system. 
Although the Romanian population is ageing and the population is decreasing, the ratio of the 
active population to pensioners has been stable so far. Demographic tendencies will collide 
with the pension system in the future; currently it is the labour market trends that jeopardise the 
pension system. 
8. A multi-pillar pension system started to operate in 2007-2008. In reaction to the 
demographic trends the government has enacted initiatives to move towards a pre-funded 
pension system since 2000 and in 2007 private pension funds could start to recruit members.  
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6.1  General background information 
6.1.1  Trends in the economy and the labour market 
After the economic turmoil that followed the collapse of the state socialist system in the 1990s, 
the increasing domestic demand gave impetus to the Romanian economy (Gligorov and 
Podkaminer 2007). The real GDP growth was 42.1 percent between 2000 and 2006, which 
means an approx. 5.2 percent growth annually. However, the GDP reached the 1990 level again 
only by 2004-2005. The main drivers of growth were (i) the growing contribution of the private 
sector to the economy; (ii) the absorption of EU funds; (iii) the facilitation of acquiring 
consumption credits; (iv) the introduction of a flat tax of 16 percent in 2005 and (v) foreign 
direct investments stimulating capital formation (Ciobanu and Ciobanu 2008). 
Table 6.1 Economic and labour market indicators 1995-2005
79 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP growth (%)
a  7.1 3.9 -6.1 -4.8 -1.2 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.5 4.1
Final consumption (%)
a 13.1 8.0 -4.2 1.1 -2.5 1.4 6.3 4.9 8.3  10.2 9.4
Real wage growth (%)
a 12.5  9.4 -22.8 4.0 -2.5 4.3 5.0 2.4  10.8  10.5  14.3
Activity rate (%)
b -  - 64.8 63.6 68.7 68.8 67.7 63.6  62.4  63.2  62.4
Employment rate (%)
b -  - 60.9 59.6 63.5 63.6 62.9 58.0  57.8  57.9  57.7
Unemployment  (%)  9.5 6.6 8.9 10.4 11.8 10.5 8.8 8.4 7.4 6.3 5.9
a Methodological changes in 1999 that can disturb time series. 
b Methodological changes in 1999 (calculation reduced from the entire 15+ cohorts to the 15-64 cohorts) and in 2002 
that can disturb time series. 
Source: NIS, Eurostat, own calculations. 
The real wage growth also supports the escalating internal demand but it also adds to the 
increasing demand for foreign goods, which, in turn, affects the export-import balance. The 
negative trend in the net export might decelerate the real GDP growth (Table 6.1) in the future. 
The labour market is characterised by a rate of unemployment
80 decreasing in recent years in 
line with the rate of activity (Table 6.1). The restructuring of the economy that has accompanied 
the systemic changes caused employment to reduce by more than 2.3 million jobs. Early 
retirement, external migration and unemployment are the main sources of the decline of 
employment (Zaman and Stanculescu 2007). The shrinking participation in the labour market 
combined with falling unemployment suggests an intensive emigration, and an inflow of the 
labour force to subsistence agriculture and the urban informal economy (Kotzeva and Pauna 
2006). The structure of unemployment reflects labour market rigidities, including a high ratio of 
long-term unemployment and youth unemployment (see Figure 6.1). 
As for the participation in the informal economy, estimations vary from 1.2 million participants 
(11 percent of the labour force; cf. Zaman and Stanculescu 2007) to two third of the households 
in 2002 (Neef 2002) or more than one third of the households in 1996 (Pelinescu 2003). The 
size of the informal sector is estimated from 25-28 percent (Albu 2007) to 37 percent (Schneider 
(2006) of the GDP, and the income generated by the shadow economy is believed to reach one 
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quarter of the total household income (Albu 2007). This has long-term consequences for future 
pension eligibilities. 
The continuous decline of the employment rate stopped in 2002. Since then Romania has 
experienced a marginal increase in employment. This increase is bolstered by the recent 
economic growth and the introduction of the less constraining flat tax of 16 percent on personal 
income and corporate profits (World Bank 2006). 
Figure 6.1 Youth and long-term unemployment in Romania and in the EU 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
6.1.2 Demographic  trends 
The population of Romania was about 21.6 million in 2007, 1.6 million less than in 1990. This 
decline is caused by the sinking birth rate combined with emigration. The net reproduction rate 
has been deteriorating continuously since the mid 1970s and it dropped below 1 in 1983. 
Increasing life expectancy, however, could balance the low rate of net reproduction until 1990, 
which was the first year registering shrinking population. 
Despite the significant decrease of the population, old-age dependency basically remained 
unchanged during the observed time period. Decline of the population size occurred mostly in 
the youngest age groups (less than 15 years old). The old-age dependency ratio between the age 
groups 55+ and 15-54 was almost identical in 2007 and 1990. While the number of children 
(<15) decreased by about 2.2 million after 1990, the volume of the age groups of 15-54 years 
and 55+ increased by 300 thousand each (Figure 6.2). The ratio of youths decreased so fast that 
the total age dependency decreased between 1990 and 2007 (cf. Table E1 in Annex E). The 
sharp fall in fertility in the 1990s will, however, likely produce a rapid increase in old-age 
dependency from the current 44 percent to over 100 percent by 2045 and 113 percent in 2060 
(Table E2 in the annex). Migration furthermore exacerbates the gloomy demographic situation. 
According to NISR figures almost 400 thousand permanent emigrants left the country between 
1990 and 2006, in contrast with the 90 thousand immigrants.  However, temporary emigration 
for working opportunities abroad has also been significant since the second half of the 1990s. 
According to estimations based on the last census, temporary emigration was about 360 
thousands people (Sandu et al 2004). 110 | ÁDÁM LÉNÁRT 
 
Figure 6.2 Population structure and old-age dependency
81 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
In the beginning of the 1990s there has been a considerable internal migration from rural areas 
to cities (Table E1 in the Annex), but this trend has turned to its reverse after 1997, when the 
second recession generated a massive outflow from cities to subsistence agriculture in villages. 
This outflow was induced by a combination of a rapidly shrinking labour market and an 
insufficient social assistance system (Zaman and Stanculescu 2007) and the labour-intensive 
character of Romanian agriculture, which has gained impetus by the privatisation of the former 
collective farms (Macours and Swinnen 2005, Zaman and Stanculescu 2007). Thus subsistence 
agriculture was able absorb some of the urban unemployed population. 
6.2  The pension system 
6.2.1  History and reforms 
Romania inherited a fragmented mandatory pay-as-you-go pension regime from the state 
socialist period. Separate social security systems were available for different sectors and 
professions. Besides the State Social Insurance Fund
82 and the Supplementary Pension Fund 
other funds provided pensions to numerous professions such as farmers, servicemen and war 
veterans (Toma 2004). High contributory rates were necessary to finance the generous 
replacement rates: for the mandatory State Social Insurance Fund the rates of the contribution 
equalled 14-40 percent of the gross wage bill paid by the employer, and 3 to 5 percent of the 
total monthly gross wage bill for the Supplementary Pension Fund, which was also paid by the 
employer. Participation in the State Social Insurance Fund was obligatory only for wage and 
salary earners. The self-employed were offered to partake in the public insurance system, but 
their involvement was negligible. 
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As employment, and consequently social security contributions, decreased following the first 
transitional shock in 1992, it became quickly apparent that the pension scheme should be 
reformed in order to be sustainable in the long run. In 1993 a White Book concerning the need 
for pension reform was published (Pop and Calugaru 2004) which concluded that: 
(i)  the defined benefit pay-as-you-go scheme should be transformed;  
(ii) the fractured pension system should be integrated into a universal public pension system;  
(iii) the low retirement age, 55 years for women and 60 years for men, should be raised;  
(iv) it should be made more difficult to obtain early retirement pension, an escape route from the 
labour market, which lowered the actual retirement age by about 4 years. 
During the 1990s only ad hoc measures were implemented by the government to compensate 
the falling replacement rate, which accounted for 51 percent of the average net wage in 1990, 
but dropped to 33 percent by 2006. The recent pension increases in 2007-2008 raised again the 
replacement ratio, to 47.2 percent of the average net wages by March 2008.  
The first profound reform of the pension system was enacted in 2001 by the Law No. 19/2000 
on the public systems of pension and insurance rights. This reform consisted of the following 
main elements (Toma 2004, Pop and Calugaru 2004, Vasile and Zaman 2005):  
•  Integration of the existing funds into a universal pension system. The former State Social 
Insurance Fund, the Supplementary Pension Fund and the Farmer’s Fund were abolished, 
and a universal system covering every profession was introduced. 
•  The National House of Pensions and Other Social Insurance Rights (CNPAS, by its 
Romanian acronym) was established as an independent agency for the management of the 
pension system, whereas the Ministry of Labour, Family and Equal Opportunities (MMSSF) 
got the responsibility of creating social policy. 
•  Every person who earned a wage above a certain level was mandated to participate in the 
pension system. The objective of this article of the law was to extend the coverage to the 
whole active population.
83 This change made possible the involvement of the self-employed 
and farmers. Compulsory coverage of farmers in the pension system was later revoked and 
it became voluntary for them to participate in the system. 
•  Contributions were made more visible for the insured by legally redistributing a part of the 
contributions from the employers to the employees. This move did not change the actual 
incidence of contributions but made it more evident. By introducing direct involvement of 
the insured to the pension system, the legislator wanted to emphasise personal responsibility 
and raise the willingness to contribute.  
•  The contribution base was enlarged as all payments to the employee were made subject to 
contribution. Previously contributions were deducted only from permanent payments. 
•  Retirement age was to be gradually raised from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 60 for 
women by 2014. 
•  As the age of retirement was raised the number of service years requested for full eligibility 
also increased from 25 to 30 years for women, and from 30 to 35 years for men. The 
minimal contributory period was set at 10 and 15 years for women and men, respectively. 
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•  A new benefit formula was introduced that takes into account the amount of contribution 
and the lengths of the contributory period. Up to a threshold value a minimum pension was 
granted; above that contributions defined the benefits. Thus a mixture of a defined benefit 
and a defined contribution system was created. 
•  Revision of the jobs classified as arduous and very arduous reduced the number of 
employees who were eligible to lower contribution rates. 
The declining number of contributors (employees) combined with the increasing number of 
beneficiaries show a gloomy picture of the economic-demographic tendencies (Figure 6.3). 
Despite the, for the time being, relatively favourable demographic background in international 
comparison, low employment creates financial difficulties already now.  
Self-employment (self-employed and contributing family worker) accounts for one third of the 
total employed population; over 3 million in 2005. The number of the elderly is overrepresented 
in these economic categories: 37.1 percent of all self-employed and 26.2 percent of the 
contributing family workers were older than 55 years. Self-employment is largely agricultural. 
Whereas only 3 percent of employees, 33 percent of the total labour force including the self-
employed worked in this sector in 2005. 
Figure 6.3 Number of contributors and beneficiaries of the pension system
84 
  
Source: NIS. 
Being aware of these tendencies, a public debate has been going on for a decade about the 
introduction of private pension funds into the pension system. Finally in 2004 the legislation 
regulating the creation of private pension funds was enacted. The main features of the second 
reform were: 
•  The creation of a multi-pillar pension system. The first pillar remained the regular PAYG 
pension system. The second pillar is made of the mandatory private pension funds whereas 
the third pillar is that of voluntary funds. 
                                                      
84 Here the number of employees means the full time equivalent number; the actual number of employees 
was 5.9 million, 1.4 million higher than presented in the figure, in 2005. ROMANIA | 113 
 
•  Participation in the private pension scheme was made compulsory for employees below the 
age of 35 years (already members of the first pillar) and voluntary for employees between 
the age of 35 and 45 years. This benefit formula, above a minimal threshold, is based on 
defined contributions. Funds are managed by private investment companies. The 
contribution to funds is increasing through the gradual reallocation of some of the 
contributions from the first pillar. In the beginning 2 percentage points will be reallocated, 
increasing by 0.5 points annually up to a limit of 6 percentage points. 
•  The third pillar, the voluntary private pension scheme, is also based on defined 
contributions and managed by private companies. The upper ceiling of the voluntary 
contributions is 15 percent of wages. The government offers an income tax deduction up to 
200 euros per year for each contributor. The employer can receive the same deduction. 
Licensed insurance companies, investment companies and pension funds are allowed to 
administer this pillar. 
•  The Private Pension System Supervision Commission (CSSPP, by its Romanian acronym) 
was created in 2005 in order to regulate and supervise the functioning of the private pension 
system. 
The current pension system 
As noted above, the current Romanian pension system is a multi-pillar pension system, as 
shown in Figure 6.4. 
The first pillar. The previously purely defined benefit PAYG pension system exhibits the 
characteristics of a defined contribution scheme to some extent. It covers the risk of old age, 
disability and survivorship. Benefits are calculated by a points system; the employee receives a 
maximum of 3 credit points for a full year of contribution from an average wage. The pension is 
then determined by multiplying the pension points with the pension point value, which is set by 
the social security budget law every year. 
The objective is to ensure a replacement ratio of 45 percent for an employee having a full time 
contribution period. By 2014, men will be eligible for full old-age pensions at the age of 65, and 
women at the age of 60 after 35 years and 30 years of contribution, respectively. Early 
retirement is possible 5 years before the retirement age if the required full service period has 
been collected. 
The contribution of employers amounts to 19.75 percent of the employee’s gross wage. The 
employee’s contribution rate equals to an additional 9.5 percent of gross wages. This rate is 
going to be reduced by 0.5 annually until it reaches 3.5 percent, because of the contributions 
paid to the mandatory private pension system. 
The first pillar offers State guaranteed pensions in case of bankruptcy. 
The second pillar. Mandatory private pension funds started to operate in 2008. Participation is  
mandatory for all employees under 35 years of age, and voluntary for the 36-45 years old age 
group. The second pillar is financed by a part of the employee’s contributions. During the first 
years a maximum of 2 percent of the wages is directed to the private pension funds. This rate is 
to be increased by 0.5 percent annually, until it reaches 6 percent after 8 years. The retirement 
age is the same as in the PAYG-pillar, including the same possibility of early retirement 5 years 
below retirement if the participant has served the full contribution period. 
The private pension funds started to recruit members in September 2007. In four months every 
mandated person, and also those aged between 36 and 45 years who wished to participate in the 
second pillar, had to choose a licensed pension fund. By March 2008 the operating pension 
funds recruited 4.2 million members (CSSPP 2008) with a total of more than 24 million euro 114 | ÁDÁM LÉNÁRT 
 
monthly contribution to this pension scheme. The market is rather concentrated, as the market 
share of the two (out of 14) largest funds (ING and Allianz-Tiriac) is about 60 percent. 
The third pillar. Voluntary private pensions are available for employees and the self-employed. 
It is possible to participate in any number of occupational pension schemes. The contributions to 
this pillar are determined by the specific pension scheme. These are paid simultaneously with 
the mandatory social insurance contributions to the employee’s own account at a private 
pension institution. The contributions can reach a maximum of 15 percent of the gross wage of 
the employee. Participants of this pillar can retire at the age of 60 years if they have achieved a 
contributory period of at least 90 months. By the end of December 2007 50,887 participants had 
joined this pension scheme.
85 
Figure 6.4 The Romanian pension system 
 
Source: Vasile and Zaman (2005: 11). 
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6.3 Data
86 
The data used for analysing the income position and poverty of the elderly in Romania are taken 
from the Integrated Household Survey for the years 1995-2000, and the Family Budget Survey 
for the period 2001-2005. The Family Budget Survey preserves the Integrated Household 
Survey modules on expenditures and incomes, although some adjustments to the Eurostat 
definitions and classifications were made. Despite these adjustments the data gained from the 
two types of surveys are comparable (Tesliuc et al 2003). These nationally representative 
surveys were carried out by the NISR in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour, Family and 
Equal Opportunities (MMSSF) and designed with the assistance of the World Bank. The first 
survey was completed in 1994 and has been carried out since then annually. 
Each month a cross-sectional interview of 3000 households is administered, totalling in an 
intended sample size of 36,000 households annually. The monthly response rate equals to 2600-
2800 households on average. All datasets are weighted to avoid non-response bias (see Table E3 
in Annex E). These questionnaires provide information regarding demographics, assets, labour 
market, income, purchases and consumption. They offer only limited information on material 
hardship. The information is collected by a household questionnaire with a complementary 
diary. 
The main strength of these surveys lays in measuring monthly current consumption. The total 
household consumption aggregate consists of the consumption of food (including home 
produced food), purchases of non-food and services, and the amortisation value for a small 
number of selected durables. Due to data constraints (both in terms of quality and availability) 
the consumption aggregate ignores housing, consumption of non-food home products or 
services, as well as publicly provided education, health services and other in-kind public 
services. Current household consumption is deflated with a robust price index, which accounts 
for the consumer price index, cross-regional cost differences, and seasonality. 
The datasets have some limits. Only food self-consumption (agricultural self-employment) can 
be estimated. The recall period is short. Share of seasonal income is relatively large, as well as 
the share of informal income, which is difficult to record (Tesliuc et al 2003). The regular 
incomes are measured adequately by the surveys, but the more volatile sources of income, such 
as farming, cannot be evaluated precisely because of the one-month recall period. Thus, the 
same household could appear poorer before harvesting than after. 
Weighted data were used for the calculations in this chapter. The equivalence scale applied in 
this chapter is based on two parameters: the cost of children relative to adults, and the 
economies of scale of household size. The formula used to determine the number of equivalent 
adults is: E=(A+0.5C)
0.9, where A represents the number of adults and C the number of children 
(0-14 years), and 0.9 is the economies of scale parameter.
87  
We had no direct access to these datasets. The tables that are analysed and interpreted here were 
prepared by Manuela Stanculescu and Lucian Pop. 
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Romanian Household Budget Survey see Tesliuc et al (2003). 
87 This equivalence scale developed by the World Bank is different from the rest of the country chapters, 
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6.4  The income and labour market position of the elderly, 1995-2005 
Between 1995 and 2005 the income position of the elderly
88 improved compared to the non-
elderly. In most years the income growth of the elderly exceeded the income growth of the non-
elderly. The same  applies to the years of declining incomes; as the second transitional recession 
hit Romania between 1997 and 1999, the incomes of all age groups fell, but the revenues of the 
elderly decreased less (Figure 6.5). Nevertheless, the median income of the non-elderly always 
surpassed the median income of the elderly, with the exception of the young elderly aged 55-59 
years, whose incomes were higher than those of the non-elderly. 
The relative improvement of the income position of the elderly, especially the oldest elderly, 
can also be seen in their decreasing share in the lowest decile (Table E11). In 1995, one fifth of 
the age group over 75 years was to be found in the lowest decile, and more than one third 
belonged to the lowest quintile. By 2005 their share in the lowest decile halved, and their share 
in the lowest quintile dropped to one fourth. These values would be one or two percentage 
points higher if self-consumption was not taken account of. The income position of the elderly 
between the ages of 65 and 74 years also improved, although not to the same extent, as they 
started from a higher base. In 1995, their share in the lowest and the second lowest deciles was 
above 10 percent; by 2005 both indicators sank below 10 percent.  
The income position of the elderly declines with age. The young elderly, aged 55-59, are in the 
best position. Their income is above the population average. The income position of people in 
higher age brackets gradually decreases. The elderly population over 75 years are in the worst 
income position. On the other hand, their income position improved the most between 1995 and 
2005, as they did not share the burden of the economic meltdown to the same extent as other 
age groups, but profited more from the economic success. Their relatively favourable position 
was caused by their independence from the volatility of the labour market, and the political 
weight of pensioners. As the elections were coming, the Romanian government enacted a law in 
June 2007 to increase the pensions to the level of 37.5 percent of the average gross wage in 
2008. A further rise to 45 percent of the average gross wage is expected in 2009. This meant a 
43 percent growth in 2008 and a further increase by 33 percent in 2009 (ICEG-EC 2007).  
Figure 6.5 Income growth and median income, excluding self-consumption, 1995-2005 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (for 1995 -2000), Family Budget Survey (for 2001-2005). 
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In 2005 the old-age pensions accounted for more than half of the income of households with 
members 65 years old or older, while in households consisting of exclusively non-elderly 
members earnings had a similar share (Figure 6.6). In contrast with the 12.3 percent median 
income growth (in constant prices) of the non-elderly from 1995 to 2005, the respective growth 
of the income of the elderly over 75 years was 26.4 percent (Figure 6.7). 
Figure 6.6 Income structure in 2005 
 
Figure 6.7 Median income growth 1995-
2005, by age group 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005). 
During the two transitional shocks of 1990-1992 and 1997-1999, as the gross domestic product 
of Romania decreased by 30 and 12 percents, respectively (OECD 2002), the inflation rose and 
net wages sank. The unemployment rate also grew, but it never reached the exceptionally high 
values of other Central and Eastern European countries. Reacting to the volatile macroeconomic 
environment of the 1990s many Romanian households found shelter in the informal economy. 
The household surveys try to quantify the effect of this phenomenon on the income of 
households by integrating the measurement of “other agricultural activities”, that is, self-
consumption. 
Self-employment accounts for one third of the total employment, due to the high level of self-
employment in subsistence agriculture. As mentioned above, the elderly are overrepresented 
among the self-employed (37 percent) and the contributing family workers (26 percent). In 
addition, they also give a disproportionately high share (37 percent) of agricultural workers. 
This is a direct consequence of the land reform in 1991, which granted two-third of agricultural 
lands to pensioner-led households (Cartwright 2003, 171). 
The importance of self-consumption increased during the years of the economic crisis in 
households of all age groups but in particular in pensioner households (Figure 6.8). Combined 
with pensions, self-consumption was sufficient to keep many of the rural elderly away from 
poverty (Chirca and Tesliuc 1999). The high level of self-consumption in pensioner households 
also suggests that these households have the most limited capabilities to collect revenues from 
alternative income sources, in particular labour (Petrovici and Gorton 2005, 221). Although the 
ratio of self-consumption in the income structure of elderly households decreased over the years 
after the recession this is due to the increasing importance of old-age pensions. 118 | ÁDÁM LÉNÁRT 
 
Figure 6.8 Share of self-consumption in the incomes of the households, 1995-2005 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995 -2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005). 
The Gini-coefficient provides evidence for the equalising effect of self-consumption. The 
difference of the within-group Ginis between the incomes with and without self-consumption, 
grows in line with the share of self-consumption in the income structure. For example, the Gini 
with self-consumption was lower for the elderly over 75 years than for the non-elderly, but 
without self-consumption it was the other way around. This effect was particularly explicit until 
the increasing old-age pensions in the very recent years have not decreased the within-group 
inequalities in the oldest age group (Table E10 in the annex).  
Dynamics of the inequalities within the age groups of the elderly and the non-elderly showed an 
opposite tendency. While the inequalities among the younger elderly and the non-elderly 
reached its peak during the 1995-2005 period, inequalities among the older elderly decreased. 
These two adverse changes resulted in a relatively stable inequality (around a Gini-value of 
0.30), with a small decrease in the years of the economic recession when wages provided a 
differentiating effect to a lesser extent. 
6.5  Poverty among the elderly, 1995-2005 
6.5.1  Trends in relative poverty 
In line with the previous findings, the elderly population of Romania is less struck by poverty 
than the non-elderly. In contrast with the non-elderly whose relative poverty indicators got 
worse between 1995 and 2005, the relative poverty of the elderly decreased, meaning their 
relative position became better in this period. 
As for the total population, the structure of relative poverty seemed to be stable during 1995-
2005, while relative poverty in general rose (Table E12). Nevertheless, disaggregation at the age 
group level reveals that the relative poverty incidence of all elderly age groups has a generally 
decreasing tendency except for a sudden increase in 2000. Since 1995 the relative poverty of the 
75+ age group has improved the most (30 percent in 1995 and 21 percent in 2005, by the 60 
percent of median income poverty threshold). The poverty incidence of the non-elderly (18 
percent in 2005) has moved to the opposite direction. It increased by 1-2 percentage points, 
depending on the applied threshold. Among the observed age groups the younger elderly had ROMANIA | 119 
 
the most favourable rates of poverty incidence (12.4 percent for the 55-59 age group, 11.9 
percent for those aged 60-64).  
If self-consumption is not taken into account the share of households under the poverty line 
grows but this increase is particularly large in the case of households that are more dependent on 
self-employed agricultural labour, that is, the older elderly. 
The relative poverty gap followed a similar trend as the poverty incidence although with more 
oscillation. It entails that as the income position of households improved (declined) the depth of 
poverty decreased (increased) as well. In the years of recession there were more people living 
under the poverty line and the relative depth of the poverty was higher as well.  
Figure 6.9 Trends in relative and in absolute poverty of the age groups of elderly and non-
elderly, 1995-2005 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995 -2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005). 
The trend in the poverty gap indicates a shallow poverty; it seems the majority of the population 
is densely concentrated around the poverty threshold. In 2005, the poverty gap was 4.4 percent 
(total population) and 3.3 (55 years old or older population) at a 60 percent level of the median 
income (Table E13). Excluding self-consumption the poverty gaps would have been larger by 3-
4 percentage points depending on the year of observation and the age group. 
6.5.2  Trends in poverty according to the national criteria 
The minimum old-age pension is applied here as the national absolute poverty line. The trend in 
absolute poverty shows a different dynamics. It peaked in 2000, when it affected 36 percent of 
the population. By 2005 the economic growth reduced absolute poverty to 15 percent, which has 
been the lowest since 1995. Comparing the trends of relative and absolute poverty, the elderly 
experienced the most favourable relative poverty incidence and the least favourable absolute 
poverty simultaneously during the years of the second recession, 1997-1999 (Figure 6.9). This 
suggests that the position of cohorts in their active age worsened faster than that of people above 
55 years. It also hints that income inequalities decreased. This is corroborated by the Gini-
coefficient of the total population, which reached a low in 1999, the year when absolute poverty 
peaked. 120 | ÁDÁM LÉNÁRT 
 
Breaking down further to smaller age brackets, each age group experienced a relatively similar 
pace of change in absolute poverty (Figure 6.10). The rate of absolute poverty incidence 
dropped in 1995-1996, then rocketed up, and subsequently flattened in the case of the elderly, 
while it continued to increase in the non-elderly age group. After 2000, however, it decreased 
for all age groups. The steepest decrease was experienced by the elderly over 75 years old, 
whose absolute poverty incidence actually sank below the level of the non-elderly in 2005. 
Indeed, in 2005 the absolute poverty rate of the non-elderly was higher than that of any older 
age group (Table E14). In spite of these tendencies, the median income of pensioner households 
is lower, implying a smaller variance in pensions. The Gini-coefficients showing smaller within-
group inequalities confirm this.  
The absolute poverty gap shows the same trend. It has contracted in all age groups, more among 
the 55+ cohorts, and still more among the oldest old, the 75+ age group. (Table E16). The 
absolute poverty gap is also low, between 2 and 4 percents for all age groups, which suggests 
that the poor could leave absolute poverty by a small increase of their incomes. 
Figure 6.10 Absolute poverty and changes in absolute poverty year over year, 1995-2005 
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Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995 -2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005). 
Poverty also has a spatial dimension relevant for a poverty analysis by age. There are 
considerable differences between urban and rural poverty. The disparity between urban and 
rural areas is exacerbated by the internal migration tendencies, as the urban poor took escape 
from the cities to find employment in subsistence agriculture. In addition, after the dissolution 
of large collective farms rural households had to pursue inefficient labour intensive agricultural 
work (Macours and Swinnen 2006). A large share of the population employed in agriculture is 
over 65 years old and used to work on collective farms. Pensions of farmers are much lower 
than state social security pensions; in January 2008 the average farmer pension amounted to 
42.7 percent of the state pensions (RON240 compared to RON562), even though they have been 
raised faster. These rural pensioners have to farm in order to make a living. 
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Figure 6.11 Absolute and relative urban and rural poverty, 1995-2005 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005). 
The rural and urban absolute poverty incidence followed a similar trend between 1995 and 
2005. After the initial drop, absolute poverty rates reached their peak in 2000, with 26 percent in 
urban areas and 46 percent in villages. Since 2000 the absolute poverty incidence is steadily 
decreasing in both groups. In line with this, the gap between rural and urban poverty is also 
narrowing, from 20 percentage points in 2000 to 16 percentage points by 2005. 
The trend in relative poverty incidence, however, developed in the opposite direction. While the 
relative poverty in urban areas stayed around the same level, relative poverty in villages slowly 
grew (Table E17).  
In the case of rural poverty, self-consumption played a dominant role in reducing poverty. In 
2005, the relative poverty rate with self-consumption was 26 percent of the rural population; 
without self-consumption it would have been 41 percent. By contrast, the corresponding figures 
for the urban population were 10.1 percent and 9.7 percent, respectively (Table E18). 
6.5.3 Material  hardship 
Neither the Integrated Household Survey nor the Family Budget Survey provides data on 
material hardship. Fortunately, the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) offers although it 
applies a different definition of old age, set at the age of 65 years, than the rest of this chapter.  
The average number of the rooms at the disposal of the elderly was higher in 2003 than the 
average number of rooms for the non-elderly. The elderly possessed 1.7 rooms, while an 
average member of the age group under 50 years had 1.1 rooms. This is due to difference in the 
number of cohabiting children and widowhood in older ages especially among women. About 
one third of the elderly lived in single-person households, usually following the loss of their 
spouse (Eurofound 2006).  
The EQLS measured material hardship by asking respondents if they were able to pay for food 
(Table E24). Unlike the EU-25 average, the share of households who could not afford to pay for 
food increased in line with age in Romania. Compared to the European average, every 
Romanian age group registered a very high rate of inability to pay for food. The rate was four 
times higher in the youngest age group (0-29 years), and seven times higher in the oldest age 122 | ÁDÁM LÉNÁRT 
 
group (65 years or older) in Romania than in the EU-25. The rate of the youngest age group 
falling into the category of not being able to purchase food was 48 percent; the corresponding 
rate among the elderly was even higher, 58 percent.  
Satisfaction with the standard of living was slightly declining with age in Romania, whereas it 
was constant, and even increasing among the old in the EU-25 (Table E25). 
6.6 Marginal  groups 
Single elderly women and the elderly from rural areas live on the margin of society. Women are 
overrepresented among the elderly and in particular among the oldest old (Table E19). Single 
elderly women have a disproportionately high share in the lowest income decile and quintile. 
Their share has been oscillating from year to year, but shows an overall decreasing tendency, 
with 1995 being the highest at the rate of 24 percent and 2000 being the lowest at 16 percent. 
Since 2000 was the year when absolute poverty was highest, the lower share of single elderly 
women in the lowest decile can be attributed to the effect of the economic recession. It is not 
their incomes that increased, but the incomes of others that decreased to the rate to crowd out 
single elderly women from the first decile. Their share in the second decile was stable during 
the observed period, except for 2000. Altogether the share of single elderly women in the lowest 
quintile amounted to 34-40 percent during 1995-2005, being 36 in 2005. In the top decile they 
have been underrepresented, having a share of about 1-2 percent. 
Since 1995 the relative poverty of single old women has been gradually decreasing, although it 
still surpasses almost twice the population average. Their poverty rate was 31 percent compared 
to the overall rate of 17 percent (Table E22).  
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7. Slovakia 
Ján Košta, Jaroslav Vokoun & Menbere Workie Tiruneh
* 
Summary 
1. The economic transformation that began in Slovakia in the early 1990s was followed by a 
severe deterioration in economic growth and massive unemployment. While there was a 
significant improvement in later periods, long-term unemployment remained a serious concern 
for policy makers. As a result, there has been a continuous migration of the labour force, mainly 
to Western European countries, which now accounts for around 7 percent of the Slovakian 
labour force.  
2. While at present economic problems dominate over demographic issues in Slovakia, the 
prognoses look gloomy, as the ageing index is expected to rise from the current 80% to 228% in 
2050. The declining rate of fertility and population ageing are expected to be the major causes 
of future unfavourable demographic dynamics, with serious budgetary repercussions. 
3. In order to mitigate the potential negative effects arising from demographic problems, the 
Slovak government undertook a pension reform in 2004. The transformation of the pension 
system in 2004 is believed to generate a greater incentive for future pensioners to work longer. 
However, the new system turned out to be less generous when it comes to solidarity between 
generations. This was reflected in the mounting financial difficulties of the national social 
insurance in order to finance current pensions. Due to these and other reasons, the system is 
currently being modified again. This, includes the opening of the system for a six month period, 
which allows people to enter or opt out. 
4. For most of the current pensioners the poverty risk is limited, due to the widespread 
ownership of housing and government assistance. However, the future situation may deteriorate 
as a result of socio-economic changes and adaptations in the pension schemes. Income 
inequality is low, and the elderly have a more favourable income positions than the non-elderly. 
In terms of material hardship, the elderly are worse off compared to their non-elderly 
compatriots.   
5. Poverty risks are high among the low educated elderly, those living in backward regions, the 
long-term unemployed, and those with a single family. The most vulnerable group is the Roma 
minority, many of whom combine these characteristics.  
7.1  General background information 
In the end of 1991, one year after the start of the Czechoslovak economic transformation, the 
number of unemployed persons in Slovakia reached 302 thousand. This brought the rate of 
unemployment to 11.8%, from almost zero in the pre-1989 years. Throughout the 1990s 
Slovakia had been confronted with the consequences of unfavourable demographic 
developments on the labour market. Between 1990 and 1998 the number of people in the 
productive age group (15-55 years for women and 15-60 for men) increased by 305,400 
persons. Some portion of this population had been retained in the education system, which 
contributed to the reduction of labour supply, subsequently decreasing the rate of 
unemployment. Nonetheless, labour supply continued to grow and reached around 150 thousand 
persons. In addition to this, the development on the labour market was strongly supported by 
women and workers of post-productive ages who left their jobs and were partly replaced by 
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male employees in the productive ages. In this regard, the number of working pensioners that 
was 238 thousand in 1990 went down to only 65 thousand in 2000. Between 1998 and 2002, the 
number of people in the productive age group reached 79.4 thousand, leading to high labour 
supply. However, during this period the second phase of the restructuring of large state 
enterprises (including the selling of enterprises to foreign owners) was also accomplished. This 
led to a further rise in unemployment, because the new owners kept only a certain portion of the 
employees. As a result, in 2001 the number of unemployed persons reached 508 thousand, 
pushing the rate of unemployment up to 19.2 %. Slovakia has always had one of the highest 
unemployment rates in the EU. The most significant problems of the labour market in Slovakia 
currently include: a high ratio of long-term unemployed persons (more than 50 per cent of all 
registered unemployed), a high rate of unemployment of young people, and a generally low 
participation rate. 
The restructuring of the economy was accompanied not only a by high rate of unemployment, 
but also by a substantial deterioration in real wages and real pensions (Table F1 in Annex F). 
The year 1991 was the worst regarding the development of real wages where average real wages 
amounted to only 67.3% of the values in 1989.  However, the decline in pension income was 
slightly higher than that in average real wages. In 1993 average real old pension remained at 
only 66.5 % of the level in 1989. Up until 2006, the average real wages and old pensions did not 
reach their levels in 1989. In 2005 real net wages and real average pension reached 98.7 % and 
83.6 %, respectively, of the 1989 levels. Real wages reached their 1989 level only by the end of 
2007.  In this context, one of the key factors that had a negative impact on the Slovak economy 
was the split of the former Czechoslovak Federation. Since the Slovak economy was primarily 
dependent on the production of heavy military ammunition for the Federation, the complete 
suspension, and in some cases, significant capacity cuts, of this industry brought about a higher 
rate of unemployment in the respective regions within Slovakia.  
Table 7.1 presents the size and share of age groups over the total population. From the data in 
the table it is apparent that while the share of those below the age of 15 was declining across 
years (suggesting a fall in fertility) the share of the age group 50-54 shows a slightly increasing 
trend. The recent figures show a modest growth in the number of children born where after a fall 
from 74.6 thousand (total fertility rate of 1.992) newly born children in 1992 to 50.8 thousand 
(total fertility rate of 1.185) in 2002, there was an increase to 54.4 thousand (total fertility of 
1.239) children in 2007. The increase in the average age of giving birth to the first child after 
1989 has also contributed to the fall in total fertility. In 2000 this was 23.9 years, in 2007 it had 
risen to 26.3 years in 2007.  
Therefore, when we take at a longer time horizon, there an unfavourable demographic 
development prevails, with potential negative income consequences for the elderly. Table 7.2 
indicates that while fertility (indicated by the size of the age group 0-14) will either remain 
stable or decline, the share of economically active age group (15-54) is projected to worsen. In 
contrast, those who are 55+ show a rising trend. This is captured by the ageing index; this is 
projected to rise rapidly, indicating that the number of pensioners will outweigh those of people 
of working age. 
Table F2 in Annex F shows the density of the total and regional population. The Bratislava 
region ranks first, and population density decreases as one goes from the western to the eastern 
part of the country. When it comes to overall economic development and living standards, the 
western part of Slovakia dominates over all the other regions, and this may aggravate the 
already existing high regional disparity in Slovakia.  
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Table 7.1 Population size and share of age groups (1990-2005) (%) 
  1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 
Total  (mil.)  5.29 5.34 5.39 5.38 5.38 
-15  25.5 23.5 21.0 18.7 17.1 
15-29  22.7 23.4 24.3 25.3 24.9 
30-49  27.7 28.8 29.5 29.0 29.1 
50-54 4.7 4.9 5.3 6.7 7.3 
55-59 4.8 4.3 4.5 4.8 5.6 
60-64 4.5 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.4 
65-69 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.6 
70-74 1.9 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 
75+  4.3 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.8 
Source: own computation based on data from the Statistical Office. 2007 
Table 7.2 Selected demographic indicators (2005 – 2050) (%) 
    2005  2010  2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Age  group  0-14  16.4  14.8  14.5 14.6 14.2 13.4 12.7 12.6 12.8 13.2 
Age  group  15-54  61.2  59.6  57.2 54.8 53.5 51.3 48.4 45.7 43.4 42.0 
Age  group  55  +  22.5  25.6  28.3 30.5 32.4 35.3 38.9 41.7 43.8 44.9 
Ageing  Index  73.2  86.3  100.2 118.1 139.0 161.5 179.5 199.1 216.4 228.5 
Life  Expectancy  (Male)  70.3  71.3  72.2 73.3 74.4 74.9 75.4 76.0 76.6 77.1 
Life  Expectancy  (Female)  78.2  79.0  79.9 80.2 81.8 82.2 82.2 83.0 83.5 84.0 
Source: Own computations based on data from INFOSTAT - Institute of Informatics And Statistic, Demographic 
Research Centre, Bratislava, November 2002. 
Table F3 in Annex F indicates the level and dynamics of real GDP per capita for the period 
1994-2006. The figures suggest that the high real GDP per capita growth in 1995-1997 period 
was followed by a severe decline right after the election in 1998, mainly due to deeper 
economic reforms undertaken by then government. However, the reform programs started to 
yield high growth rates of GDP per capita in the latter period. This persists until now: Slovakia 
is one the fastest growing economies in the EU.  
Table 7.3 indicates there were no significant changes in the gross participation rate during the 
period 2000-2006.
1 The only noticeable change was the replacement rate among females, which 
slightly declined in the past three years. On the other hand, significant changes occurred when it 
comes to labour participation rate that showed a descending trend for most age groups except 
that of 55-64 (Table 7.4).  
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Table 7.3 Gross Participation Rate (%) 
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total  60.3  60.7  60.2  60.3  60.2  59.5  59.1 
Male  68.6  69.2  68.5  68.4  68.5  68.4  68.2 
Female  52.6  53  52.6  52.9  52.5  51.3  50.7 
Source: Labour force survey, Statistical Office. 
Table 7.4 Labour participation rate (%) by age cohorts, 1990-2005  
   Labour force participation rate (%)
Age  group  1990 1995 2000 2005 
15+  66.8 59.9 60.1 59.7 
15-24  58.3 46.5 46.1 41.4 
25-54  93.2 88.4 88.3 87.9 
55-64  33.8 23.5 24.3 29.8 
65+  6.3 1.7 1.1 0.9 
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO) (2006), Key Indicators of the Labour Market Programme, Geneva, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/ 
Unfortunately, Slovakia not only belongs to the countries with the highest rate of 
unemployment but also with lowest rate of employment in the EU. In 2006, the rate of 
employment for the age group 15-64 was only 59.4%, which slightly increased to 60.7% in 
2007, still remaining behind the EU average of 65.4% in 2007. This holds true for the age group 
60-64 as well as to those who are 65+ (Table 7.5). This was mainly caused by a high rate of 
unemployment and the policy change that entitled women for retirement in the PAYG system at 
an early age. Partly as a result of the new amendment, the rate of employment for average age 
group 55-59 increased from 34.3% in 2000 to 47.7% in 2006 (Table 7.5).   
Table 7.5 Employment rates according to age groups (%) 
Age  group 15-64 15-24 25-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ 
1995 Total  60.2 34.8 79.9 70.5 35.6 7.5  1.6 
Men  67.6 38.4 86.0 80.4 63.0 12.2 2.8 
Women  53.0 31.1 73.6 61.7 12.7 3.8  0.9 
2000 Total  56.5 28.4 75.4 70.1 34.3 6.1  0.9 
Men  61.5 28.5 80.1 76.2 56.1 9.9  1.8 
Women  51.5 28.2 70.7 64.3 15.7 3.2  0.4 
2005 Total  57.7 25.6 75.6 73.8 44.7 12.4 1.3 
Men  64.6 28.0 82.1 77.4 68.6 20.1 2.2 
Women  50.9 23.0 68.9 70.5 23.6 6.1  0.8 
2006 Total  59.4 25.7 77.6 74.9 47.7 13.6 1.1 
Men  67.0 29.0 85.0 79.0 68.7 22.7 1.9 
Women  51.9 22.4 70.1 71.1 28.8 6.5  0.7 
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As far as changes in the sectoral structure of employment is concerned, there was a fall in 
employment in the agriculture sector from 9.2% in 1995 to 4.8% in 2005. In contrast, there was 
increase in employment in the service sector from 51.9% in 1995 to 56.4% in 2005 (Table F4 in 
Annex F), which shows the standardization process in the Slovak economy. Likewise, positive 
developments have been registered in the qualification structure of the employed persons (Table 
F5 in Annex F). There was a substantial rise in the share of employment for those with 
vocational secondary education (increasing from 28.5% in 1995 to 35.1% in 2005) and for 
university graduates (rising from 12.6% in 1995 to 14.7% in 2005). 
In contrast, there was a fall in the employment share of those with an apprenticeship, which 
declined from 35.1% in 2000 to 31.6% in 2005. In spite of growth of the qualified youth labour 
force, currently there is a growing problem of finding suitable employees in technical fields, 
mainly in the automobile industry resulting from the absence of interest in technical field studies 
(OECD, 2006). In addition, as we have mentioned earlier, lack of employees is also linked to 
migration of Slovak workers to western European countries in search for highly paid job 
opportunities. In this context, we expect that those currently working in high-wage countries 
will have relatively higher pension incomes when they return to Slovakia to retire.  
The process of labour force migration from Slovakia to the old EU member states began in the 
early 1990s. Slovakia’s membership in EU has made it easier, especially for young people, to 
find a job in other EU Member States. The rising number of Slovak citizens after 2004 was the 
consequence of the opening up of the labour markets by some old EU member states. It should 
be stressed, however, that the low wage rates on the Slovak labour market
2 have been a major 
factor pushing migration. Currently about 7 per cent of the labour force are working abroad 
(Table F6 in Annex F). 
The average wage in Slovakia will reach to the current average statutory minimum wage of four 
EU countries
3 by 2023, if we assume a 6% average annual wage growth rate in Slovakia (Figure 
7.1). It will be in 2029 if we expect a 4% average annual wage growth rate. With the growing 
level of income, income disparity will exacerbate since more income clusters will emerge 
compared with the periods of low income level.  
One of the fundamental determinants of the future old age income level will probably be the 
development of knowledge and educational qualifications. In the context of a knowledge-based 
economy, those without the necessary human capital run a higher risk of being marginalized. 
                                                      
2 The main factors include low wage levels and a low level of economic activity in some regions, 
especially in the eastern part of Slovakia. For instance, while average monthly wages in 2007 amounted 
to 26.4 thousand SKK in the Bratislava area (western part of Slovakia), it was only 15.0 thousand SKK in 
the Presov area (eastern part of the country).  
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Figure 7.1 Estimation of the average wage development compared to the recent EU4 average 
statutory minimum wage (in EUR). 
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As far as entrepreneurial activities are concerned, Slovakia has been lagging behind. Under 
pressure from the general economic transformation, there has been a gradual increase in the 
number of self-employed persons, one of the more positive features of recent labour market 
developments (Table F7 in Annex F).  
Grey pressure 
Estimates by various institutions suggest that the elderly dependency ratio for Slovakia may 
jump from the current 16% to 28% in 2025 and to 51% in 2050. As we have already mentioned, 
the earlier decline in fertility rates combined with ageing of population are the main causes for 
this unfavourable demographic development. This obviously would put public finance under 
pressure. Various estimates indicate pension expenditure is bound to rise from 7.2% of GDP in 
2004 to 9.0% in 2050, while all age-related expenditures are projected to increase from 15.5% 
of GDP in 2004 to 17.9% of GDP in 2050.  
7.2 Pension  institutions 
Like in other European societies, the ageing of the Slovakian population is expected to cause 
serious obstacles for public finance (see Table 7.2). A pension reform was put in force in 
January 2004 in order to minimize the negative effects of a declining trend in fertility rates and 
a rising trend in ageing of population. The new pension system split the previously monopolistic 
statutory old-age pension scheme into a first pillar scheme (also known as redistributive and 
defined-benefit pay-as-you-go financed) and its counterpart in the second pillar, the funded 
defined contribution scheme (Law on Pension Income Amendment, No. 43/2004). The reform 
was designed in such a way that contributions to both pillars would account equally 9% of gross 
wages. At the outset all who were employee at the time had two choices: either to stick to the 
PAYG system, or invest into a personal retirement account managed by private investment 
funds
4. The system obliges those who have enrolled in the second pillar to stay in the scheme 
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for a minimum of 15 years, in order to be eligible for a pension. But all new entrants to the 
labour market will automatically be put into the mixed system, making the system compulsory 
to all new entrants. In December 2006 around 1.5 million workers were registered in six private 
pension funds; of which almost 70% of the registered were below the age of 40 years. One other 
crucial component of the pension reform was the rise of statutory retirement age from 60 years 
for men and 53-57 for women (depending on the number of children raised) to 62 years for 
both.  
The second pillar offers three investment options:  
-  investment with a ‘growth’ option, where more than 80% of the funds is to be invested in 
stock markets;  
-  investment with a ‘balanced return’ option, where funds would be almost equally split into 
the stock and bond markets; 
-  investment with a ‘conservative return’ option, where virtually all the funds would be 
invested in the bond markets.  
Almost 65% of those enrolled have opted for the growth portfolio (Table 7.6). According to the 
rules, the investment options are dependent on the ages of employees (Law 43/2004). For 
example, if a person cannot save a minimum of 15 years (due to shorter number of years to 
retirement) in the system, he/she will not be allowed opt for the growth model upon enrolment. 
Likewise, if the number of years spent in the system before someone becomes entitled to a 
pension income is shorter than 7 years, the person cannot apply for the balanced portfolio. This 
is just to make sure that enrolees would have the highest level of benefit from the pension 
scheme at old age. 
Table 7.6 The distribution of pension funds (in mil. EUR) Jan. 2005-Dec. 2006 
 Conservative  portfolio Balanced  portfolio Growth  portfolio Total  value 
Net Values
a  34  247  532   814  
Percentage   4.2  30.5  65.3  100.0 
aValues converted into Euro using the May 22, 2007 exchange rate (33.7SK/EUR). 
Source: Social Insurance, 2007, and Law on Pension Income No. 43/ 2004. 
Significant changes underway in the pension system 
The critical problem of the current pension system in Slovakia is the deficit in the PAYG system 
where an estimated 24 to 26 bn. Slovak Crown is lacking every year to pay for the current 
pensioners. The deficit arises because 9% of gross wages now goes to private investment funds 
and therefore not available for the national social insurance in the PAYG to pay for the current 
pensioners. While this deficit was expected at the outset of the reform, the former government 
was counting on raising funds through privatizing state owned companies, something that has 
been rejected by the current government. Therefore, the current government is openly 
questioning the advantages of the second pillar for those who save only for a rather short period 
of time. Therefore, once the new government took office in 2006 there were frequent 
discussions in the Slovak parliament as to how the system could be adjusted so that more money 
would be available for current pensioners. Despite a strong opposition of the private pension 
funds, opposition parties, and voluntary organizations, the new government (with the support of 
labour unions) decided to revise the system. Apart from the financing bottlenecks there are also 
concerns about the vulnerability of savings administered by private investment funds. 
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1. Opening up the second pillar for a period of six months  
In November 2007 the Slovak parliament passed a law that allows more than 1.5 million people 
who have been saving for their pensions in private accounts (administered by pension fund 
management companies) to reconsider their decisions and quit from or enter to the so-called 
second pillar between January 2008 and June 2008 (Law No. 555/2007: Amendments on Social 
Insurance). The second most important aspect of the amendment is one that, as of 2008, the 
second pension pillar will be voluntary for people born after December 31, 1986. New entrants 
to the labour market therefore will have the option of enrolling within six months of starting 
their first job, which is in contrast with the initial plan to make the second pillar mandatory for 
all new employees (Balogová, 2007). However, implicitly the scenario of the new government 
is to allow more people to exit from the system and join the PAYG.  This is because the 
proposal also suggests to increase the number of years of mandatory contribution to the second 
pillar from originally 10 to 15 years. This clearly makes the second pillar less relevant to those 
who are in their late 40s, which was expected to provoke an exodus of savers from the second 
pillar. The result is that January 1
st 2008 and June 30
th 2008, of the 1.5 million registered savers, 
an estimated 80 thousand have quit from the second pillar and returned to the PAYG system, 
while around 13 thousand new entrants have been registered to the second pillar.  
2. Reduce the contribution to the second pillar 
Another important aspect of the amendment is that the state will no longer pay the contributions 
to the second pillar for those who receive disability pensions. People on parental leave and 
caretakers still have their contributions covered by the state.
5  
In general, the adoption of Euro in Slovakia in January 2009 will imply a radical change for the 
Slovak economy, as the country will give up monetary policy tools to the European Central 
Bank. One of the negative expectations is obviously linked to the potential rise in basic food and 
energy prices after the adoption of Euro and those who are elderly are expected to be hit more 
severely compared to non-elderly. Estimates by the National Bank of Slovakia (2006) and other 
institutions indicate that adopting the Euro should have more benefits than costs to the Slovak 
economy. By implication, pensioners could also be better off.  
7.3 Data  description 
We have used Household Budget Survey data compiled by the National Statistical Office for 
selected years (1997, 2000, 2003, and 2005). Information regarding individuals is missing due 
to the nature of the database, which is based on households. Interpretation of the more detailed 
results may be problematic, as the number of individuals in each age group sometimes is small. 
This might be due to problems encountered in collecting data from high or low income groups, 
including marginalized groups such as the Roma population.  
The method of data collection changed in 2005. The number of participating households was 
raised from 1845 in 1997 to 4710 in 2005. The share of the population older than 55 years was 
11% in the 1997-2003 period, but rose considerably to 23% in 2005. As a result of the 
methodological change, 2005 cannot be compared with the previous years. Therefore we 
confined our trend analysis to the 1997-2003 period, and analysed the data for 2005 separately. 
Table F8 in Annex F describes the structure of the various samples.  
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Because household incomes are gathered only during the first month of the year in 2005, this 
does not allow capturing seasonal and other special incomes during the progress of the year, 
which may have distorted the reliability of the data.  
In terms of poverty, the Roma minority probably remains the most vulnerable group, which 
among other things is due to their low education level and their lack of formal labour market 
qualifications. However, since the Statistical Office does not record separate information on the 
Roma, this group cannot be identified in the micro data. Therefore it is not possible to analyse 
their income and poverty position in any detail. 
We define the elderly as persons aged 55+. For more detailed analyses we use four age classes 
within the elderly group: 55-59, 60-64, 65-74, and 75+. Disposable household income was 
weighted using an equivalence scale where the first adult in the household is assigned a 1.0 
weight; all other adults are discounted at 0.5 and all children (below 18 years of age) at 0.3. 
7.4  Income and labour market position of the elderly, 1997-2005  
The real income of employees was expected to reach its pre-1989 level for the first time in 
2007. Moreover, unlike the pre-1989 period when there were no unemployed persons, the LFS 
indicated about 291 thousand unemployed persons in the second quarter of 2007 having low 
unemployment benefits. Slovakia currently belongs to the countries with the lowest average 
wages in the EU and has the second lowest rate of urbanization (57%) in the EU. People in 
villages are often self supporting to a great extent, through fruits, vegetables and domestic 
animals. This way of life is mainly typical for the older generation leaving in villages.  
In Slovakia ageing of population was not a serious problem in the 1990s.  However, the rise in 
real estate prices and the mounting rate of unemployment have led to a fall in fertility, though 
with the recent fall in the rate of unemployment and improvement in the living standards, 
fertility may rise again in the future, which may affect the projected size of the population in 
2050.  
In 1997-2005 earnings show improvements in the income position of the elderly (Table F9 in 
Annex F). During the same period, the elderly generally had a more favourable income position 
in comparison to non-elderly (Table F14 in Annex F). The median equivalised disposable 
income among the elderly is 50% higher than among their non-elderly counterparts.  
Changes in the share of income groups reflect the dynamics of the economic transformation that 
started in 1990. In this respect, the most significant change has been registered among the 
elderly. There was a rise in the share of earnings in total income, while the weight of social 
transfers declined for the 55-59 and 60-64 age groups (Table F11 in Annex F). This was mainly 
due to the mix of economically active and pensioners in these age groups. Between the age 
groups 55-59 and 60-64, there was an inverse change in the structure of earnings/social transfers 
from 60/30 to 31/63 in 2005. This seems to suggest that the numbers of pensioners in the age 
group 60-64 grew, which reduced the weight of wages. Therefore the pensioners’ income 
currently mainly depends on social transfers, mostly retirement income (Table F12 in Annex F). 
The education system belongs to the sectors with the lowest level of wages, which discourages 
people to work for education institutions. The education system is lagging behind technological 
progress and is not flexible to adjust to the current global trends. This influences the 
employment prospects of graduates, who in many cases do not fit the work qualifications 
demanded by employers in the private sector. The low level of competitiveness of the labour 
force would then influence the level of wages. This also has some regional implications, as the 
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The subjective assessment of living standards can be assessed through a survey conducted by 
the Research Institute on Public Opinion (2006), in which respondents were asked the following 
question: ‘What is the standard of living in your household today in comparison to 
1989/1993/1996?’ The outcomes results suggest that since 1993 there has been a persistent 
increase in the number of respondents who responded to have experienced an improvement in 
their living standards (increasing from 15% in 1999 to 30% in 2006). However, there are others, 
mainly elderly, who responded differently, indicating a deterioration in living standards. 
7.5  Poverty among the elderly, 1997-2005  
Like in most former socialist countries, in the beginning of the 1990s poverty was not 
widespread in Slovakia. Poverty was primarily related to household structure - incomplete 
families, number of children in a household, and the like. However, since 1996, other factors 
that determine poverty gained in influence, such as education, position on the labour market and 
geography (Filadelfiová, 2007, p. 11).  
Generally, the incidence is relatively low for every level of relative poverty line (Table F17 in 
Annex F), although it gradually increases. A higher rate of increase was registered in the age 
group 55-59, which was mainly due to the heterogeneous nature of this age group.  
In 2005, the difference between elderly and the non-elderly was minimal for all threshold 
values.  The poverty gap in the elderly group was higher than among the non-elderly (Table F18 
in Annex F). In the 1997-2003 period the poverty gap became wider. In 2005 the poverty gap 
was highest in the age group 65-74.  
In general, income inequality remains limited over time (Table F15 in Annex F). The income 
differences -using the Gini coefficient- rose slightly, reaching 0.374 in 2005. The figure is 
somewhat higher in the non-elderly group (0.388), but considerably lower among the elderly 
(0.278). The special pension formulae for employees in the ministries of Defence and Justice, 
and the police increase the income disparities within the elderly group.  
Relative poverty among the elderly was fairly low and stable in the 1997-2003 period (6% in 
2003; the rate for 2005 is much higher, but there is a trend break in the data here). 
From the perspective of material hardship the elderly are worse off in comparison with the non-
elderly
6. In this respect, the 65-74 age group is the most seriously affected one (Table 7.7). 
Table 7.7 Indicators of material hardship for age groups, Slovak Republic. 
  16-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75  and  over 55  and  over 
A  52.0 50.6 53.4 73.2 60.3  58.9 
B  69.2 67.7 76.6 95.5 82.8  79.7 
C  94.0 85.7 88.2 85.6 84.5  85.6 
Where: 
A - Share of poor who are not able to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second 
day. 
B - Share of poor who are not able to afford paying for one week annual holiday away from home. 
C - Percentage of poor who have flush toilet in dwelling. 
Source: Stropnik. & Kump (2008). 
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The subsistence minimum is a generally recognized income limit. The government provides 
assistance to individuals who experience material hardship and are below this threshold, if they 
do not have any assets that can be used, rented, or sold for profit purposes. The share of elderly 
below the subsistence minimum is very low (<2% in 1997-2003). Among the non-elderly the 
rate is substantially higher and increasing over time, which results in larger differences between 
the two age groups over the last decades (table F19). 
7.6 Marginal  groups 
The development of poverty in Slovakia shows that among the social groups endangered by a 
growing level of poverty are the following: families with children, households with long-term 
unemployed persons, the Roma minority, people with low education, and older persons 
(Azudová, 2002). The Roma minority living in segregated communities is the most 
marginalized group. The number of the Roma minority in Slovakia, according to estimates by 
the Socio-geographic Mapping is around 320,000 (Radičová, 2004), of whom around 60% live 
fairly integrated within the majority of the population. Unemployment among the Roma 
minority has been estimated at 88%, and around 80% of them depend on social benefits. The 
Roma minority has a 30% share in the long-term unemployed persons in Slovakia (Fagan, 2006, 
p. 112).  
In spite of the fact that since 1989 the average increase of old age pensions has been slower than 
that of wages, the old pension system in principle did not generate higher incidences of poverty 
(in relative terms). A high rate of (long-term) unemployment will continue to be the main causes 
of marginalization during retirement. 
The poverty rate of the age groups 50-64 and 65+ is the lowest among all age groups (Table F20 
in Annex F). The poverty rate of the 50-64 group is the same for men and women (8.3%), but 
among the elderly we see gender differences, as the poverty rate of men is only 2.7%, against 
9.8% among women. However, this relatively high poverty rate among elderly women is still 
lower than the incidences in all younger age groups, both women and men. The system of social 
assistance contributes to the relatively low poverty rates of old people, as it gives a preferential 
treatment to persons over 62 years of age.  
Social transfers fulfil an important role in the Slovak redistribution of income. This is clear from 
the generally high poverty rates before social transfers (Table F21 and F22 in Annex F). Current 
benefit recipients are a main risk group for future poverty among the elderly: household with 
long-term unemployed persons are likely to be poor as they reach old age. 
7.7 Prospects  on  poverty 
Slovakia’s high economic growth has been accompanied by rising wages, which is one of the 
most important preconditions for high pension income. However, since the year 2000 there was 
a substantial degree of decrease in the level of income redistribution. If this continues for a 
protracted period of time, then we can expect higher income inequality at old age. In order to 
minimize the future risk on poverty in old age, policies targeting at raising the level of 
education, regional development, health, services for the elderly and improving living standards 
of the Roma minority living in segregated communities seem desirable. 
It is almost sure that Slovakia will join the Euro area in January 2009. Given the current 
exchange rate deviation index (ERDI) differences among EU member states, membership in the 
Eurozone may serve as a serious constraint for Slovakia to converge towards the living 
standards of the EU. The Maastricht criteria may now allow relatively poor countries to grow 
faster, as high growth is often accompanied by high inflation. 
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Due to the less redistributive and less ‘solidaire’ nature of the revised pension system, we expect 
increasing income disparities among the elderly in the future. This may lead to a larger share of 
pensioners experiencing (relative) poverty. However, the rise in the statutory retirement age 
from 60 to 62 years (with the possibility of a further extension) may help to mitigate this income 
gap – at least for those with professions that do not demand physical endurance –, i.e., jobs that 
are not physically challenging. Regional income disparities are a cardinal problem in this 
respect. These are mainly due to poor infrastructure, which in certain areas serves as a 
bottleneck to economic investments and development. EU funding aiming to reduce regional 
disparities is a policy in the right direction. From 2008 on funds will be available for 11 
operational programs (financed by the European Commission); positive effects of these funds 
are expected to become apparent by 2010. The package contains a ‘social agenda’ aimed at 
operational programs for employment and social inclusion.  
It is also evident that the current low wages will determine the level of future pensions.
7 R+This 
will imply lower actual replacement rates. The challenges to the health service will become 
greater, as the number of people older than 65 will increase from the current 645 thousand to 
1.15 million in 2030. The relatively low level of male life expectancy (70 years at present) 
reflects the lower quality of life on the one hand, and leads to a short pension period in 
comparison with women. However, as living conditions improve, men are expected to live 
longer and their share in the group of pension recipients will increase. This tendency will be 
strengthened by the improvement of special facilities for pensioners. 
The vast majority of the elderly in Slovakia own real estate. Theoretically, this could be used to 
finance the health services they need. However, up till now this form of wealth accumulation 
has not been convertible into adequate services for pensioners, as the latter are ill-developed in 
Slovakia.  
Summing up, as far as future prospects are concerned the income position of the elderly is rather 
uncertain, mainly due to the following factors:  
-  The degree of sustainability of the current co-existence of different age cohorts (young and 
elderly in one household), 
-  The growth rate of real wages, 
-  The rate of return from the pension funds, 
-  The rates of unemployment and migration,  
-  Strategy as how the deficit in the PAYG pension system will be covered,  
-  The political cycle, which changes the rules of the game in the pension system,  
-  The sustainability when it comes to the privileged groups in pension income (the army, 
police and judiciary), 
-  The improvement in quality of life and life expectancy. 
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8. Slovenia 
Nada Stropnik & Nataša Kump
*
 
Summary  
1. In Slovenia, the employment rate of the population aged 55-64 years is one of the lowest in 
the EU (just over 30% in 2005 and 2006), but has been increasing. Slovenia is also the EU 
country with the lowest age at retirement (59.6 years for old-age retirement in 2005) and one of 
four EU countries with the largest impact of demographic developments on old-age pension 
spending. 
2. At the beginning of the 1990s, early retirement was encouraged and subsidised by the 
government. In the period 1990-2005 the number of old-age pensioners rose by 22%. Following 
the 1999 pension reform, the effective age at retirement increased by 2 years and 3 months for 
both men and women in 2000-2005. The employment rate of the population aged 55-64 years 
increased notably.  
3. Income inequality is not high, and a decreasing trend was registered between 1997 and 2005. 
Inequality among the population aged 55 years and over exceeds that among the younger 
population and the total population, but is decreasing at a quicker pace.  
4. Compared to other European countries, relative poverty in Slovenia is not high and has 
decreased in the period 1997-2005. It has been higher for the population aged 55 years and 
over (17.8% in 2003-2005) than for the younger population (9.5%).  
5. Poverty increases with age. In 1997-1999, the poverty rate for pensioners was below the 
average for the total population, but in 2003-2005 it was higher. In 2003-2005, 20% of the poor 
elderly made ends meet with great difficulty, and an additional 43% made ends meet with 
difficulty. 
4. Pension reform will probably lead to a decline in the relative income position of pensioners 
and the elderly, but the full effects will be evident only in the long run. On the one hand, lower 
accrual rates and permanent maluses as well as broken, fragmented or short labour market 
careers due to unemployment will have a negative impact on future pensions. On the other 
hand, bonuses for having worked longer will lead to higher pensions. If increases in the 
retirement age do not lead to higher labour force participation rates, there will be a threat of 
increased poverty among pensioners.  
5. The relative difference between male and female average pension will be decreasing since it 
is assumed that the higher rate of female activity will enable more women to meet the qualifying 
conditions for an old-age pension.  
6.More opportunities to combine pension and flexible forms of work, more flexible regulations 
regarding the combining of retirement and part-time employment, and continuous training and 
lifelong learning are needed in order to increase the duration of economic activity of the elderly 
population (particularly those aged 55-64 years) and positively affect their economic position.  
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8.1  General background information  
Slovenia has a population of 2.0 million (2,025,866 in 2007) living on a territory of 20,273 km
2. 
The population density is 97 persons per km
2. The rate of natural increase was negative from 
1997 to 2005 and the population was increasing solely owing to positive net migration. Today, 
the proportion of the foreign population is about 2.5%. The net migration rate increased to 3.2‰ 
in 2005. In 2005 (and 2006) international migration flows in Slovenia intensified. Compared to 
the 2000-2004 average, in 2006 almost 2.5 times more people immigrated to Slovenia or 
emigrated from it: 20 thousand people immigrated and 14 thousand people emigrated (Povhe, 
2007). The most frequent reasons for migration were the opportunities for (better) employment 
or to perform seasonal work. Most people immigrating to Slovenia come from non-EU Member 
States (accounting for 94.4% of the total foreign population in the country); immigrants from 
the territory of ex-Yugoslavia account for about three-quarters of all foreign immigrants. 
Among people immigrating to Slovenia from EU Member States, those coming from Slovakia 
prevail. These represent 20% of all EU immigrants in 2005 and 25.8% of all EU immigrants in 
2006. Most of the foreign immigrants came to live in Slovenia for less than a year. Most of the 
persons in employment (60.9%) who moved to Slovenia in 2005 had elementary education, 
30.6% had secondary education and only 6.3% had post secondary education. 
Due to the decades of polycentric economic development and the relatively small size of 
Slovenia, the population is spread throughout the country. There are only two settlements with a 
population over 50,000, and 18.0% of the total population lived there at the time of the 2002 
population census. A total of 44.4% of the population was living in settlements with less than 
1,000 inhabitants. A further 17.2% were living in settlements with 1,000-5,000 inhabitants, and 
20.4% in those with 5,000 up to 50,000 inhabitants (SORS, 2006). 
Following the economic decline during the second half of the 1980s, continuing until 1992, 
Slovenia has been experiencing economic growth since 1993. However, it was only in 1998 that 
GDP first reached its pre-transitional level. A relatively high GDP growth rate has been 
characteristic for the country in the last decade (see Table 8.1). 
Due to the 1999 pension reform, the employment rate of the population aged 55-64 increased 
substantially (see Table 8.3), but it nevertheless remains one of the lowest rates in the EU. 
Kajzer (2007, p. 2) finds the reasons for that in: a) the early retirement wave in the early 1990s, 
which was a way of solving the problem of unemployment, b) the continuation of the practice of 
retiring relatively early, c) a high structural unemployment, which particularly affects older 
unemployed persons. She points to a high relevance of this situation in the context of the 
population ageing 
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Table 8.1 General indicators
a 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP per capita 
(annual real growth rates) 
-  -  -  -  -  -  3.7 5.0 4.1 5.3 3.8 3.0 3.5 2.7 4.4 4.0 
Population (on 31 December), 
in 000 
2,000 1,999 1,994 1,989 1,989 1,990 1,987 1,985 1,978 1,988 1,990 1,994 1,995 1,996 1,998 2,003 
Average annual population 
growth rate (%) 
0.18  -0.05  -0.24  -0.23 0.00 0.04  -0.16  -0.10  -0.33 0.48 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.29 
a The new definition of GDP was adopted in 2002. Old data were recalculated from 1995 on. 
Source: SORS (http://www.stat.si). 
 
Table 8.2 Share of population by age groups (on 31 December) (%) 
Age (years)  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
below  15  20.6 20.1 19.6 19.1 18.5 18.1 17.5 17.0 16.6 16.1 15.7 15.4 15.0 14.6 14.4 14.1 
15-29  22.5 22.4 22.3 22.3 22.2 22.3 22.2 22.1 22.0 21.9 21.8 21.7 21.5 21.4 21.0 20.7 
30-49  29.4 29.6 29.7 29.9 30.2 30.7 31.1 31.2 31.2 31.3 31.1 30.9 30.8 30.6 30.4 30.3 
50-54  5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.8 
55-59  5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.8 6.5 
60-64  5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.0 
65-69  4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
70-74  2.1 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 
75  and  over  4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.6 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of the Interior – Central Population Register (http://www.stat.si). 
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Table 8.3 Population by activity and sex, 2
nd quarter  
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Activity rate, % 
Total 
(15 +)  57.8 57.6 58.7  57.6 59.1 60.0 58.3 57.7 57.8 58.1 56.5  59.0 58.7 
55-59  29.6 29.8 32.1  30.6 28.8 34.1 29.6 31.4 34.7 36.7 33.8 45.6 46.9 
60-64  13.2 15.9 16.0  16.1 18.2 17.8 17.9 14.9 14.4 15.7 13.5 16.4 16.0 
65-69  7.3  11.3 9.3  10.7 15.3 15.3 13.0  9.9 13.4 10.2 (9.5) 12.0 10.8 
70 +  4.3 6.2 5.6  4.0 6.1 7.2 7.0 5.9 6.1 6.3 5.3 5.1 5.5 
Men 
(15 +)  65.0 64.3 67.7  64.4 65.7 66.6 65.1 64.1 64.8 64.7 63.2 65.6 65.3 
55-59  38.4 44.7 48.6  43.1 37.1 44.5 43.2 44.2 48.7 53.3 48.2 62.3 62.1 
60-64  17.3 20.3 19.4  20.4 24.1 21.0 23.4 19.2  (19.0)  (21.4)  (17.5) 21.5 22.7 
65-69  9.2  12.9 11.8  15.1 17.2 19.1 17.6 14.0  (16.2)  (10.8)  (11.0) 15.5 14.1 
70 +  7.6 7.6 6.4  (5.7) 7.5  11.8 9.5 8.4  (9.1)  (10.5)  (8.2) 8.0 9.6 
Women 
(15 +)  51.2 51.4 53.5  51.3 52.9 53.7 51.9 51.7 51.3 51.9 50.2  52.9 52.5 
55-59  21.6 16.4 16.6  18.4 20.6 23.3 16.7 18.5 20.2 19.9 20.1 28.5 30.1 
60-64  9.6  12.0 13.3  12.6 13.5 14.9 12.8 11.4  (10.5)  (10.6)  (10.1) 11.9  (10.2) 
65-69  6.3 10.1  7.5  7.5  13.9  12.4 9.8 6.5  (11.1)  (9.8)  (8.1) 9.0  (7.9) 
70 +  2.6 4.9 5.2  (3.3) 5.4 5.1 5.8 4.6  (4.6)  (4.2)  (3.7) 3.5  (3.5) SLOVENIA | 141 
 
 
Employment rate   
Total 
(15 +)  52.4 52.2 54.4 53.4 54.9 55.4 54.0 53.6 54.4 54.7 52.8 55.5 55.4 
55-59        29.5 27.9 32.8 28.0 28.9          
60-64        15.6 17.7 17.8 17.8 14.7          
65-69        9.7  15.3 15.1 13.0 (9.9)          
70 +        (3.8)  (6.1)  7.2 6.7 (5.9)           
               
(15+)  52.4 52.2 54.4 53.4 54.9 55.4 53.5 53.6 54.4 54.7 52.8 55.5 55.4 
50-64  33.1 34.4 35.8 36.1 35.7 37.4 35.3 37.1 40.2 42.7 40.9 46.4 48.0 
65+  5.3 7.7 7.0 6.0 9.6 10.3  8.1 7.3 8.4 7.8 6.6 7.2 7.5 
Men 
(15 +)  58.5 58.1 61.0 59.6 61.1 61.6 60.4 59.6 61.2 61.1 59.3 61.8 61.8 
55-59        41.2 35.3 42.6 40.0 40.0          
60-64        20.1 23.5 (21.0)  23.4 (18.7)           
65-69        (13.8) (17.2) (18.9) (17.6) (14.0)          
70 +      ((5.6))  (7.5)  (11.8)  (9.1)  (8.4)       
               
(15+)           61.1  59.3  61.8  61.8 
50-64           53.3  51.1  55.8  55.7 
65+          10.6  (9.3)  10.8  11.7 
Women 
(15 +)  46.9 47.1 48.4 47.7 49.1 49.6 47.9 47.9 48.1 48.6 46.7 49.5 52.5 
55-59        18.1 20.5 22.6 (16.4)  (17.7)           
60-64        (11.9) (12.9) (14.9) (12.6) (11.4)          
65-69        (6.7) (13.9)  (12.4)  (9.8) (6.5)          
70 +        ((2.9))  (5.4) (5.1) (5.5) (4.6)          
               
(15+)           48.6  46.7  49.5  49.3 
50-64           32.3  30.9  37.6  40.4 
65+           6.1  (4.9)  (5.0)  (5.0) 142 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
 
Share of persons employed in ... (% of all persons in employment) 
Agriculture  10.7 11.5 10.4 10.1 12.0 12.0 10.8  9.5  9.8  9.7  8.4  9.7  8.8 
Industry  44.1 42.3 43.2 42.1 40.5 39.5 37.8 37.4 38.2 38.5 36.9 35.9 37.2 
Services  45.1 46.2 46.3 47.5 47.1 48.2 51.1 52.3 50.9 51.3 54.1 53.3 53.4 
Share of persons in employment 
Self-
employed 
12.2 12.2 12.3 12.5 11.9 12.5 12.6 11.2 11.8 11.7 9.8  10.2 10.0 
Unpaid 
family 
workers 
3.2 5.4 4.6 4.3 6.7 6.7 5.8 4.9 5.2 4.6 4.2 5.5 4.7 
Persons in employment by educational attainment   
Total 
Lower secondary 
or less 
    23.0       18.9  17  16.9  16.4 
Higher secondary      62.2       63.6  63.8  62.9  62 
Post secondary       14.6       17.6  19.4  20.2  21.7 
Men 
Lower secondary 
or less 
    21.5       17  16.1  15.6  15.6 
Higher secondary      65.9       68.4  68.6  67.9  66.5 
Post secondary       12.7       14.6  15.6  16.5  17.9 
Women 
Lower secondary 
or less 
    25.0       21.1  15.9  15.6  17.4 
Higher secondary      58.0       57.6  68.6  67.9  56.6 
Post secondary       16.8       21.3  15.6  16.5  26.0 
Note: The Labour Force Survey was introduced in Slovenia in 1993. For the sake of comparability in the observed period, the data refers to the 2
nd quarter of the year. 
() Less accurate estimation: 0.10 < CV < 0.20  
(()) Inaccurate estimation: 0.20 < CV < 0.30 
Source: SORS, http://www.stat.si. SLOVENIA | 143 
 
The productive potential of the Slovenian people in their fifties and sixties is insufficiently used 
(Svetin, 2007). According to Eurostat, the average employment rate of the population aged 50-
64 years was just over 30 % in 2005 and 2006 (29 % in 2004 and 23.5 % in 2003; it was 
considerably lower for women), which is very far away from the EU goal in the Employment 
Guidelines, which aims for a 50 % employment rate of the elderly by the year 2010 (SORS, 
2007). 
Slovenia is the EU country with the lowest effective retirement age: 59.6 years for old-age 
retirement and 52.4 years for disability retirement in 2005 (IPDI, 2006). 
Population ageing 
People in Slovenia are getting older – the young-to-old ratio is already negative: at the end of 
2005 there were 14.2% of young people (below 15 years of age) and 15.5% of old people (aged 
65 years and over) (Ilić and Žnidaršič, 2006). In the past 50 years the number of births was cut 
in half, while life expectancy was prolonged by 16 years (to 77.8 years in 2005). The share of 
children (0-14) is falling, while the shares of the population of working age (15-64) and older 
people (65+) are rising. At the end of 2005, 15.5% of the population in Slovenia was 65 years 
old or more (see Table 8.2). 
In 2030, about a quarter of the population is expected to be aged 65 years and over (Malačič 
2005; Sambt, 2005; Eurostat 2006; Kraigher, 2005) (see Table 8.4). According to the baseline 
projections, this group will account for almost a third of the total population of Slovenia in 2050 
(only 15.0% in 2004). 
Table 8.4 Baseline population projection for Slovenia, Institute for Macroeconomic Analyses 
and Development (2003, 2030 and 2050) 
Age group  Population (x 1000)  Population (%) 
  2003 2030 2050 2003  2030  2050 
0-14 years  294.8 268.9 247.6  14.8  13.5  13.3 
15-64 years  1,404.8 1,234.1 1,048.4  70.4  61.9  56.3 
     15-49 years  1,040.7 797.3 700.6  52.1  40.0  37.6 
           female  507.7 389.8 341.4  25.4  19.5  18.3 
65-79 years  242.1 365.3 375.5  12.1  18.3  20.2 
80 years and over  55.0 126.3 190.6  2.8  6.3  10.2 
Total  1,996.8 1,994.6 1,862.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Kraigher, 2005, Table 21 (and unpublished results).  
In 2005, pensioners accounted for 26.5% of the total population of Slovenia.
1 The majority 
(59.3%) were old-age pensioners. Disability pensioners accounted for 18.2  %, family and 
widow’s for 17.6 %, and all others for 4.9 % (IPDI, 2006). Due to the retirement of the “baby 
boom” generation
2 and the increasing life expectancy, the number of pensioners is expected to 
increase by 21% in the period 2002-2030 (Table 8.5).
3 In spite of a rise in the total number of 
                                                      
1 The ratio between persons in employment and retired people in Slovenia has been changing in favour of 
retired people; it was 1.67 to 1 in 2005. 
2 In the period from1949 to1953, for the first time after 1934, the annual number of births was over 33 
thousand (up to 36 thousand). From 1954 till the end of the 1970s, it was between 28 and 32 thousand a 
year, and since 1992 it has been below 20 thousand. 
3 Since there is no early retirement scheme, and at permanent penalties (i.e. negative accrual rates) for 
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elderly men, the share of male old-age pensioners would drop due to assumed retirement at 
higher age (at 63 years, which is the full retirement age, and/or with an insurance period of 40 
years). The assumed higher rate of female activity would contribute to a relatively larger 
increase in the number of female old-age pensioners compared to male old-age pensioners. 
Namely, higher activity will enable more women to meet the qualifying conditions for an old-
age pension (consequently, they will not opt for a widow's pension) (Stanovnik et al., 2006). 
Table 8.5 Population projections for Slovenia 
  2002 2005 2010 2020 2030 
Population aged 65 years and over  100 106 114 138 158 
- male  100 109 122 160 188 
- female  100 104 109 125 141 
All pensioners  100 104 111 115 121 
- male  100 104 112 110 112 
- female  100 104 110 119 128 
Old-age pensioners  100 101 105 102 109 
- male  100 101 107  95  95 
- female  100 101 103 108 121 
Source: Stanovnik et al., 2006, Tables 22 and 23; own calculations. 
Slovenia is one of four EU countries with the largest impact of demographic developments on 
the old-age pension spending (European Commission, 2006, p. 78). Retirement even before age 
of 55 – with relatively high and increasing life expectancy - means an exceptional burden for 
public finances. 
8.2 Pension  institutions  and actors in pension policy  
In Slovenia, pensions are mostly insurance-based and financed through contributions. They are 
widespread and received over a relatively long continuous period. In the 1990s, they were also 
fairly generous, which has been changing since the introduction of stricter rules in 2000. The 
Slovenian pension system is well performing its function of providing income security in old 
age and reducing poverty among the elderly.  
The Slovenian pension system consists of three pillars. The dominant role is still played by the 
first, public pillar which covers the risks of old-age, disability and survivors. The first pillar of 
the contributory pension system is mandatory in the sense that all employees and self-employed 
persons are covered (including unemployed persons receiving unemployment benefits).
4 
Inactive persons can join the system voluntarily – for example students, unemployed people 
who do not receive unemployment benefits, persons in military service, persons caring for a 
child or disabled person, farmers with very low incomes, etc.
5 The scheme is financed on a pay-
                                                                                                                                                            
there is almost no probability of an increase in early retirement. Disincentives were implemented in 2000; 
the number of early retirees, that was over 20 thousand in 2002 when it reached its peak, dropped to 
below 14 thousand by 2005. 
4 Workers performing contractual work are not included in pension insurance: they are though obliged to 
be covered for disability insurance, health insurance and insurance for injury-at-work. 
5 “The specific feature of this voluntary inclusion into the mandatory system is that these groups can be 
insured for an insurance base which is lower than the insurance base for persons in the mandatory system 
– which is set at some 64% of the average earnings. The ”rationale” for such an extra provision in the 
1999 PDIA is that these marginal groups have very low incomes, and paying contributions from the SLOVENIA | 145 
 
as-you-go basis. It is earnings- related, and pensionable earnings are not capped. The total 
contribution rate is 24.35%, paid by employees (15.5% of gross earnings), employers (8.85% of 
gross earnings), self-employed (for the total) and through state compensatory contributions. 
The reformed public pension scheme 
The 1992 Pension and Disability Insurance Act (1992 PDIA) introduced the earliest possible 
retirement for men at age 55 and for women at age 50, which was gradually increased by 
amendments to that act to respectively 58 and 53 years by 1998. The 1994 and 1996 
amendments changed the indexation rule and limited the possibility of the self-employed in 
choosing their base for contributions (Stropnik and Stanovnik, 2002). 
A new Slovenian Pension and Disability Insurance Act (PDIA) was passed in December 1999, 
and became effective in 2000. Eligibility criteria have been tightened and benefit levels reduced. 
The act introduced a number of elements that improved the system in terms of horizontal equity. 
The gender gap regarding eligibility and benefits was considerably narrowed. Not only were 
accrual rates equalized, but also eligibility criteria for women became very similar to those for 
men. Actuarial fairness is also being more closely observed, since there are penalties for 
retirement prior to and bonuses for retirement after the full pensionable age (63 for men, 61 for 
women). The period for calculating the pension base has been extended to the best eighteen 
years. Benefit levels were considerably reduced. Provided an insured person is not subject to 
penalties, his or her pension will be 72.5% of the pension base after 40 years of work. This 
compares to 85% under the 1992 PDIA. Taking into consideration further that the pension base 
in the 1999 PDIA is the best 18-year average earnings (instead of the 10-year average under the 
1992 PDIA), the reduction in pensions is even greater than the ratio of 72.5% to 85% might 
imply.  
An even greater emphasis was laid on the principle of vertical equity (solidarity). Thus, the ratio 
between two comparable pensions (i.e. for two persons entering the pension system under 
similar conditions, where both have met the pension qualifying period) cannot exceed 4:1. This 
is a considerably narrower spread than the previous 4.8:1. A further redistribution element lies 
in the fact that social security contributions are not capped (Stropnik and Stanovnik, 2002).  
Legal retirement ages are: 
Full retirement age: 63 years of age for men (gradually increasing until 2008) and 61 years for 
women (gradually increasing until 2017). E.g., in 2007: 62 years 6 months for men, and 55 
years 8 month of age for women. 
With a minimum of 20 years of paid insurance: 63 years of age for men and 61 years for women 
(gradually increasing). 
With a minimum of 15 years of paid insurance: 65 years of age for men and 63 years for women 
(gradually increasing). 
Minimum retirement age: 58 years, at 40 years of paid insurance for men and 38 years for 
women (gradually increasing). 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
minimum insurance base which is set for the mandatory system would be a too great burden. These 
groups consequently also have a somewhat smaller bundle of pension rights than persons that cannot 
chose their contribution base. The pension legislation also provides the possibility of ‘opting out’; it is 
given to self-employed and farmers whose taxable income (for personal income tax) is less than 50% of 
the minimum wage in the previous six months” (Stropnik et al., 2003, p. 69). 146 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
The age criterion is decreased for child rearing; for one child the deduction is 8 months, for two 
it is 20 months, for three 36 months and for each additional child it is 20 months. It is important 
to stress that this option has been introduced gradually since 2000 and that these child-rearing 
deductions will be subject to a lower age limit, which is set at 56 for women and at 58 for men. 
Child rearing is also being credited, though this is relevant only for women who were not 
insured at the time. The credit amounts to one year of insurance period, and is of course not 
relevant for women on maternal leave, as these retain their employee (and insured) status.  
Some non-contributory periods are credited or taken into consideration as well. The former is 
the case of persons taking care of a child below three years of age (or a disabled child) and 
working part-time, but with full time insurance. Different from that, some periods of inactivity 
are counted as pension qualifying periods, but with a 0% accrual rate. If having to be counted in 
the pension base (due to a short work history), these periods would (considerably) lower a 
pension. In order to prevent that, these "credits" can be purchased ex post and be taken into 
account with appropriate accruals (Stanovnik et al., 2006. pp. 143-144). For example, one can 
purchase periods of university schooling and military service, and the periods during which the 
person was registered as unemployed. Employers can purchase up to five years of service for 
their employees, under certain conditions. Of course, crediting or an ex post purchase of years of 
service may influence the effective retirement age. 
The minimum and the maximum levels of pension are determined statutory. These amount to 
35% of the minimum pensionable earning and four times the minimum pensionable earning, 
respectively. 
The 1999 act also introduced the national pension, which is in fact a form of income tested 
benefit granted to a person who is not receiving any pension. There are a number of other 
conditions which the applicant must fulfil (like at least 65 years of age, and thirty years of 
residence in Slovenia between the age of 15 and 65 years). The inclusion of national pension in 
the pension and disability insurance act was the result of considerable horse-trading among 
political parties. The Peoples Party (SLS), a member of the ruling coalition, was in fact catering 
to its own (rural) electorate (Stropnik et al., 2003).  
Early retirement 
The 1999 PDIA introduced disincentives for retirement before the legal retirement age (63 years 
for men and 61 years for women) if the person does not have a full pension qualifying period. 
These are permanent penalties (i.e. negative accrual rates) amounting to at least 0.1% of the 
pension base, per month, for persons below the age of 63 years, up to 0.3% for persons aged 58 
years. In addition, the accrual rate is 1.5% lower for each year missing to the full pension 
qualifying period.  
According to the 1999 PDIA, early retirement without penalties is possible only under certain 
conditions: 
1)  persons aged 58 having a full pension qualifying period (40 years for men and 38 years for 
women),  
2)  persons who are unemployed, or disabled, etc., and fulfil the minimum conditions for old-
age retirement,  
3)  women who have raised children and are between 56 and 58 years (depending on the 
number of children), having a full pension qualifying period, and  
4)  women aged at least 55 years who were insured before the age of 18 years, with a full 
pension qualifying period.  SLOVENIA | 147 
 
Stanovnik (2001) pointed to the injustice of such a regulation for people who became 
unemployed and – due to their age and inadequate qualifications, and in the absence of active 
labour market policy measures at the time of the implementation of the 1999 PDIA – had no 
better choice but to retire early and consequently permanently receive lower pension. 
Indexation 
According to the 1999 PDIA pensions are indexed according to growth of earnings; in practice, 
net earnings were taken into account. In the period 2001-2005 pensions were indexed for 80% 
to earnings and for 20% to prices. As of 2006, pensions are (generally) fully adjusted to the 
growth of gross earnings. 
The 1999 PDIA introduced the (downward) adjustment of pensions for those who had retired 
prior to the implementation of that act in order to increase fairness among pensioners, i.e. to 
prevent differences among pensions with regard to the date of entrance into the pension system. 
Therefore the indexation mechanism for existing pensioners also takes into account the new 
(lower) pensions of new entrants
6 (Stropnik et al., 2003). This means that pensions are not really 
adjusted to the growth of earnings (IPDI, 2006). 
Flexible retirement 
According to the 1999 PDIA, flexible (part-time) retirement is possible for persons fulfilling the 
conditions for old-age pension. Such persons working half-time or less may apply for a partial 
pension, which is half of the person’s old-age pension. These conditions for part-time retirement 
are very tight, and Kajzer (2007. p. 9) argues that they prevent people to retire gradually and 
work part-time.  
One can receive pension only if his/her earnings are below the amount of minimum wage. This 
means that in fact pensioners are not stimulated to work. 
Private pensions 
The second pillar (private forms of pension provision) was first introduced in 1992, but one 
could say that it was reintroduced in 2000 when collective and individual voluntary 
supplementary pension schemes were introduced by the new pension act, accompanied by a 
very favourable tax treatment (Stropnik et al, 2003). The schemes are funded, and cover only 
the risk of old-age. Monthly contributions are accumulated in an individual’s personal account. 
These schemes are managed by pension funds. In the end of 2007, the number of persons 
included in voluntary supplementary pension schemes accounted for about 55% of those 
included in the mandatory disability and pension insurance scheme (European Commission, 
2006, Table 3-1; http://www.mddsz.gov.si/si/statistika/dodatno_pokojninsko_zavarovanje/). So 
far, due to low monthly premiums, the second pillar is not likely to significantly contribute to 
the total amount of an individual’s pension. Also part of the second pillar is a mandatory 
supplementary pension scheme, which covers insured persons in certain occupations, for whom 
employers are obliged to pay higher contributions in order to finance earlier retirement. This 
additional contribution, above the normal contribution rate, is earmarked for this mandatory 
scheme, which is managed by the Pension Management Fund, a state owned institution 
(Stropnik et al., 2003).  
The third pension pillar consists of voluntary individual savings for old-age, mostly in the form 
of life insurance administered by insurance companies. 
                                                      
6 According to Article 151 of the 1999 PDIA, the adjustment factor is obtained by dividing the 
accumulated accrual rate for a man with 40 years of service in year t with the accumulated accrual rate for 
a man with 40 yers of service in year t-1. Thus, in 2000, the multiplying factor (downward adjustment) 
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Current reform plans 
Further changes to the Pension and Disability Insurance Act are currently being discussed. 
These aim at prolonging the active period of individuals through:  
•  higher and progressive (currently regressive) bonuses (for extending active period), and 
extension of the period of their application (now up to 5 years);  
•  employers not having to pay social security contributions for elderly employees; 
•  flexible retirement at employment ranging form one to seven hours per day (currently up to 
four hours) (Government Communication Office, 2006). 
The political influence of the elderly 
The Democratic Party of the Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) was founded in 1990 and has 
since been represented in the Parliament, however considerably disproportionably (4 seats out 
of 90) regarding the fact that pensioners constitute about a third of the electorate
7. It happened 
several times that their votes were decisive for gaining the majority, which increased their 
importance in political decision making and gave them a kind of a “trading” power. In the 
current governmental coalition, DeSUS is awarded one ministerial position (out of sixteen) and 
one position of a deputy minister. 
Public opinion surveys indicate that the elderly tend to vote major political parties in the country 
more or less proportionally to the average share of votes these parties obtain from the electorate 
(Toš et al., 2004). The 2000 survey showed that almost 70 per cent of the DeSUS supporters 
were aged 61 years and over, and over 80 per cent were pensioners Toš et al., 2000).  About 60 
per cent were women and about 55 per cent were people from countryside. The average 
supporter had a rather low educational level compared to other political parties 
In the late 1990s, DeSUS, which was in the ruling coalition, opposed the introduction of a 
mandatory fully funded second pillar due to a suspicion (and fear) that it would result in serious 
transition costs and fiscal problems, with a quite possible downsizing of the first (public) pillar 
(Stropnik et al., 2003). 
Since 2001, one of the main aims of DeSUS has been to have pensions indexed according to the 
rise in earnings. The experience of 2005 illustrates the political power of this party. Pensioners 
and the Democratic Party of the Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) seriously protested and 
demanded a more »equitable« method of indexation. In December 2004, DeSUS joined a new 
governing coalition and already in July 2005 an amendment to the 1999 PDIA was passed that 
introduced the indexation of pensions according to rise in earnings. This kind of pressure may 
become even more serious as the elderly account for an increasing proportion of the total 
population and the electorate. DeSUS keeps on trying to enact the indexation of pensions 
according to net earnings (instead of gross earnings, as currently) and it insists on the clause of 
government responsibility for financing any future pension deficits. 
DeSUS does not want to seem selfish fighting for pensioners’ rights. One of their arguments is 
that pensioners help to maintain unemployed members of the extended family, also their grown-
up and educated grand-children (http://www.desus.si/?nav=6&blog=132). 
8.3  Data and definitions  
The empirical part of this chapter is based on the Slovenian Household Budget Surveys, 
undertaken by the Statistical Office of Slovenia. The surveys contain data on the social and 
demographic characteristics of household members, household income and expenditure, 
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housing, the ownership of consumer durables, etc. Since 1997 the data have been collected on 
an annual basis. The samples are rather small (about 0.2% of the households/population), so 
three consecutive annual surveys are merged here, in order to produce a dataset of the size that 
allows for statistical analyses of population subgroups. In our case these are the datasets for:  
-  1997-1999 (3,867 households containing 12,912 persons)
8  
-  1999-2001 (3,806 households with 12,372 persons)  
-  2001-2003 (3,687 households with 11,652 persons) 
-  2003-2005 (3,725 households with 11,303 persons). 
Our research interest is focused on the elderly, who are defined as people aged 55 years and 
over, in order to allow the inclusion of labour market exits. 
The elderly not living in private households but in institutions are not included in the sample. At 
the end of 2005, only 4% of old people in Slovenia were living in old people’s homes (Ilić and 
Žnidaršič, 2006). 
In order to allow comparisons across households of different size and composition, household 
income was weighted using the following equivalence scale: the first adult in the household was 
assigned the weight 1, all other adults 0.5 and each child (below 18 years of age) was assigned 
the weight 0.3. The sum of values for household members produced the number of equivalent 
adults (see Table G22 for the number of equivalent adults and age structure per dataset). The 
household income divided by the number of equivalent adults is the equivalised household 
income. 
The current monetary disposable household income is used as the measure of resources. This 
definition of income includes income from employment (including fringe benefits), self-
employment income, income from occasional work, pensions, social benefits, income from 
capital and royalties, and private transfers. It does not include benefits in kind, savings 
withdrawals or loans received. It is after tax, meaning that direct taxes and social security 
contributions are subtracted. In the Household Budget Survey databases, income is at prices in 
May of the middle year. 
8.4  The income and labour market position of the elderly, 1990-2005  
8.4.1  Trends in early retirement 
The reasons for Slovenia having one of the lowest employment rates of the elderly in the EU 
are:  
a)  the early retirement wave in the early 1990s,  
b)  still relatively early retirement,  
c)  high structural unemployment which particularly affects older unemployed persons (Kajzer, 
2007).  
Up to 1999, the Slovenian pension system allowed for early retirement under very generous 
conditions, i.e. with only temporary reductions in pensions until the early retiree reached the 
required age (58 years for men, 53 for women). Early retirement was conditional on the insured 
person reaching a minimum age (55 for men, 50 for women), minimum pension qualifying 
period (35 for men, 30 for women) and other conditions, such as bankruptcy of the firm or long-
term unemployment, etcetera. In 1990, the average age at retirement was 57.5 years for men and 
53.6 years for women.  It was decreasing in the following two years and then started to increase.  
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After the start of the economic restructuring in the beginning of the 1990s, many companies 
went bankrupt while others underwent organisational changes. Traditional industries were 
abandoned, and there was a shift from manufacturing industry to services. All of this resulted in 
more redundancies. The older (and least educated) workers were among the first to loose their 
jobs and among those for whom it was the hardest to obtain a new one. After a certain period of 
unemployment they tended to retire early.
9 Early retirement was encouraged and subsidized by 
the government with the aim of protecting older workers from greater hardships brought about 
by transition reforms. This caused a large withdrawal of the 55-59 age group from the labour 
market. In the course of the 1990s, early retirement seemed to be the best option particularly for 
men over 51 years of age and women over 46 years of age with rather low productivity and thus 
also low earnings (Stanovnik, 2001).  
Unemployment
10 and favourable conditions for (early) retirement in the 1990s, as well as a wish 
to escape the negative consequences of the announced reformed pension system regarding 
retirement rules and pension formula, led to a considerable decrease in the employment rates of 
people aged 50 years and over. The impact of this is evident from Table 8.6. In 1993, only 
55.6% of people aged 50-54 years were in employment. Later on, an increasing share of people 
of that age was in employment: 74.0% in 2006. The same can be observed for people aged 55-
59; their employment rate increased from 28.5% in 1993 to 44.7% in 2006. The impact of early 
retirement preceding the pension reform implemented in 2000 is evident from the drop in the 
employment rate between 1997 and 2002 (see cells marked grey in Table 8.6). In 1997, 17.6% 
of the population aged 60-64 years (1993-1937 cohorts) was in employment, which was true for 
13.6% of the population of the same age (1938-1942 cohorts) in 2002. After that point and due 
to the pension reform, the rate increased to 15.9% in 2006. The same can be observed for people 
aged 65-69 years: their employment rate was 14.2% in 1997 (1928-1932 cohorts), 9.8% in 2002 
(1933-1937 cohorts), and 12.7% in 2006 (1938-1942 cohorts). 
Table 8.6 Employment rates by birth cohorts in various years
a 
Cohort  Age  in  1993 1993 1997 2002 2006 
1973-1977  15-19  8.1  58.3 80.2 89.6 
1968-1972  20-24  56.7 83.3 90.1 90.8 
1963-1967  25-29  83.6 89.0 90.4 88.9 
1958-1962  30-34  88.1 86.7 87.3 85.0 
1953-1957  35-39 87.0  87.7  83.6  74.0 
1948-1952  40-44 87.2  81.4  67.7 44.7 
1943-1947  45-49 80.2  60.7 34.8 15.9 
1938-1942  50-54  55.6 29.0 13.6  12.7 
1933-1937  55-59  28.5  17.6  9.8 7.1 
1928-1932  60-64 12.4  14.2 8.5  n/a 
1923-1927  65-69 (7.1)  10.0  n/a n/a 
1918-1922  70-74  (6.1)  n/a n/a n/a 
a The Labour Force Survey was introduced in Slovenia in 1993. The data are for May 1993, and are annual averages 
for 1997, 2002 and 2006. 
() Less accurate estimation: (10<=coefficient of variation<20)  
Source: SORS, Labour Force Surveys.  
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situation of their enterprises), pensions were higher than the income in the period before retirement. 
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In the period 1990-2005 the number of old-age pensioners rose by 22% (Ilić and Žnidaršič, 
2006) (see Table 8.7). Current incentives for working more years include bonuses for each 
additional month of service for retirement after the standard age (63 for men, 61 for women).
11 
Employers are encouraged to employ older workers through reimbursement of social security 
contributions for regular full-time employment. However, the results of the of the 2006 Labour 
Force Survey show that most persons in employment (almost 40%) who fulfil conditions for 
retirement plan to retire before they reach 60 years of age (men at age of 61 years and women at 
age of 59 years). Among them women represent the ‘lion’s share’. Slightly more than 30% plan 
to retire between 60 and 64 years of age, and slightly less than 20% after they reach 65 (Svetin, 
2007). So far, the result is positive: early retirement has decreased. The number of early 
pensioners, that was over 20 thousand in 2002 when it reached its peak, dropped to below 14 
thousand by 2005 (disincentives were implemented in 2000). It should be noted, though, that 
this was also due to the fact that many had retired early before the introduction of the new 
legislation, so the number of “candidates” was decreased considerably.  
Table 8.7 Average monthly number of recipients of pensions 
 1990  1995  2000  2005 
Old-age pensions  259,253 282,055 308,443 315,092 
All pensions  454,722 477,242 503,193 509,510 
Early pensions   19,576  18,337  13,783 
Sources: SORS, 2006; Internal material of the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute (early pensions). 
8.4.2  Consequences of the 1992 and 1999 pension reforms for elderly 
activity rates 
It is evident from the data that the higher legal retirement age and the increased foregone 
income in case of early retirement have positively influenced the effective age of retirement. In 
the period 2000-2005 it increased by 2 years and 3 months for both men and women: to 60 years 
plus 5 months for men, and 57 years plus 1 month for women (IPDI, 2006). There is a persistent 
growth in activity rates and a diminishing share of pensioners in the age group 50-59 (see Table 
8.3). In the second quarter of 2006 the employment rate of population 50-69 years was 42.2%: 
almost 50% for men and slightly less than 35% for women (Svetin, 2007). The employment rate 
of the population aged 55-64 years increased notably as well. It was 19.9% in 1996, 22.3% in 
2000, and 33.6% in 2006 (LFS, 2nd quarter). The speeding up of the increase following the 
pension reform is clearly evident.   
In the second quarter of 2006, almost 15% of persons aged 50-69 years and still in employment 
(slightly more men than women, and more than half of them being agricultural workers) had 
already fulfilled the conditions for receiving old-age pensions (Svetin, 2007). Two thirds have 
spent 30-39 years working for pay of profit, while more than a quarter have worked for 40 years 
or more. Among them, a tenth decided to continue to work in order to have a higher pension, 
and almost 40% in order to increase their current income (otherwise income would not be 
enough to meet the needs of their households) (Svetin, 2007). It should be noted that more than 
half continue working for non-financial reasons.  
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by 3.6%, by 2.4 for the second year, by 1.2% for the third year and by 1.5% for each additional year of 
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Part-time retirement (as an intermediate phase between full-time employment and retirement) is 
opted for by a relatively small number of people (several hundreds).
12 This may be due to:  
a)  the low compatibility of the pension system and part-time employment, and  
b)  the fact that part-time jobs are relatively expensive for employers (Kajzer, 2007, p. 3).  
Only about 3% of the population aged 50-69 years opted for a reduction in working hours due to 
partial retirement (less than 10% did so for other reasons) (Svetin, 2007) . 
8.4.3  Trends in the absolute income position of the elderly 
In the observed period, the median equivalised disposable income of the population aged 55 
years and over has been over 90% of the median disposable income of the younger group (<55). 
It is true that the income position is worse for each older age group of the elderly, but in the 
oldest group (75 years of age and over) in 2001-2003 the median disposable income still 
accounted for three quarters of the median disposable income of the population below 55 years 
of age (82% in 1999-2001). 
In the 1997-2005 period, the median equivalised disposable income was steadily increasing for 
all age groups, with hardly any difference between the population below 55 years of age and the 
elderly (cf. table G1). The average increase in real terms was by 7%; the highest increase was 
registered for the age group 65-74 years (11%), the lowest for the population aged 75 years and 
over (2%). For the population aged 65 years and over, most of the positive change occurred in 
the late 1990s, when retirement conditions were more favourable.
13 From 2000 on, early 
retirement became “costly” and the indexation of pensions lagged behind the increase in 
earnings. The population below 60 years of age experienced a more intensive positive change in 
the 2000s due to the evidently improved situation in the labour market (less unemployment, 
increase in real earnings).  
The median equivalised disposable income was getting ever smaller compared to the average 
net earnings (Table G2). While in 1997-1999 the non-elderly and those aged 55-59 years 
disposed of a medium income that was somewhat higher than net earnings, in 2003-2005 this 
was not the case in any of the observed age groups. Nevertheless, in 2003-2005 the median 
disposable income of the population aged 75 years and over accounted for 72.1% of average net 
earnings, up to 97.3% for the population aged 55-59 years. This would not be bad had the 
average earnings not been quite low compared to the costs of living.  
There is almost no difference between the non-elderly and the elderly concerning the decrease 
in their median disposable income relative to average net earnings: they suffered a drop of 5.9 
and 5.7 percentage points, respectively. Among the elderly, however, a clear pattern may be 
observed: the older the age group, the smaller the reduction (5.9 percentage points for persons 
aged 55-59 years, 4.4 percentage points for those aged 60-64 years, and only 2.5 percentage 
points for those aged 65-74 years). The greatest decrease was experienced by population aged 
75 years and over: by 8.7 percentage points. 
                                                      
12 There is a significant direct transition form work into retirement in Slovenia. In 2006, almost 90% of 
persons in employment in the age group of 50-69 years stated that they did not work fewer hours after 
reaching the age of 50 years (Svetin, 2007). 
13 It is interesting to note that in 1999-2001 the level of median disposable income of persons aged 60 
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There are several explanations for this. 
•  In the youngest age groups of the elderly in 2003-2005 there still were men who retired 
early before the implementation of pension reform in 2000 and consequently received lower 
pensions until reaching the age of 58 (as set by the 1992 PDIA).  
•  In the younger age groups of the elderly there are people who retired early after 1999, 
meaning that they have permanent maluses for having done so. 
•  Pensioners in the age group 65-74 generally have no deductions on their pensions because 
they retired before the pension reform started to be implemented. 
•  The oldest group relies much more on social transfers and less on pensions than other age 
groups of the elderly. Social transfers were indexed by consumer price index, which was 
lower than the earnings index. 
For persons below the age of 55 years, earnings have accounted for the greatest (and slowly 
increasing) part (over 72% in all observed periods) of their disposable income (Table G3). For 
older persons, they have contributed a quarter of their respective disposable income in 1997-
1999 and 22.6 in 2003-2005. The share of pensions in the disposable income of persons below 
the age of 55 years was over 10% in 1997-1999 and decreased to 8.5% by 2003-2005; in the 
income of persons aged 55 years and over, it increased from 66.5% to 69.4% respectively. 
There have been obvious changes within the income sources of persons aged 55 and over, 
particularly by age groups. Figures G1-G4 in the Annex show how the scissors open as we 
move from 1997-1999 to 2003-2005. On the left-hand side we can see an increasing share of 
earnings and a decreasing share of pensions in the disposable income of persons aged 55-59 
years. We can see the opposite for persons aged 65 years and over.  
In the income of population aged 55 years and over, the share of earnings decreased (by 2.4 
percentage points; by 7.4 percentage points for persons aged 75 years and over) while the share 
of pensions increased (by 2.9 percentage points; by as much as 10.9 percentage points for 
persons aged 75 years and over) in the observed period. The opposite trend was registered only 
for the youngest age group (55-59 years) where pensions decreased by 8.6 percentage points 
while earnings increased by 5.3 percentage points. 
The share of pensions is decreasing in the income of the population below 55 years of age (the 
shares of earnings and social transfers remain stable), which may be partly attributed to the 
pension reform. In the observed period, the change amounted to 1.9 percentage points. Social 
transfers are a more important income source for the population below 55 years of age than for 
the elderly, mainly due to family transfers. For the elderly, social transfers are getting less 
important. In 2001-2003 they accounted for only 1.5% of the disposable income of population 
aged 65 years and over. 
The impact of retirement just before the pension reform, observed in Table 8.6, is also evident 
from Table G3 in the Annex. In 1997-1999, persons aged 60-64 years had a higher share of 
earnings and a smaller share of pensions in their disposable income compared to the persons of 
the same age in 1999-2001.  
8.4.4  Trends in the relative income position of the elderly 
Until the beginning of the 2000s, the population aged 65 years and over was under-represented 
in the top income decile (Table G4). Since 2001 this has been true for population aged 60 years 
and over. 
The population aged 60 years and over has been overrepresented in the bottom income decile, 
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and second income decile, the income position of the population aged 55-59 years was 
improving in the period 1997-2005. This was due to higher employment rates, lower 
unemployment rates and less early retirement. It is also relevant, as pointed out by Čok (2003, p. 
340), that this age group
14 “includes pensioners with relatively low income as well as high 
income individuals at the end of their working period.” Obviously, the latter factor has 
prevailed. 
It is evident from Table G4 that the relative income position of the population below 55 years of 
age has improved considerably in the period 1999-2001, compared to the period 1997-1999. 
The opposite holds for the population aged 55 years and over. In the following two observed 
periods both trends continued, but at a slower pace. However, data on the median disposable 
income of the population aged 55 years and over, compared to the population below that age 
(Table G5), leads to different - even opposite - conclusions. When the absolute amount of the 
median income is observed rather than the distribution across income deciles, it is the 
population aged 55 years and over that improved its relative income position (compared to the 
younger population) between the periods 1997-1999 and 1999-2001. This implies different 
developments occurred in the middle and in the bottom plus top of the income distribution. 
The median person aged 55 years and over had an equivalised disposable income at about 91% 
of that of the median younger person in both 1997-1999 and 2003-2005. In the intermediate 
period, it was somewhat higher. Again, the age group 55-59 years differs from other elderly age 
groups, as on average they had a more favourable relative income position than the population 
below the age of 55 years throughout the observed period.  
It is clearly evident from Tables A4 and A5 that the relative income position of the elderly 
worsens with increasing age. Nevertheless, presuming that the needs and consumption of the 
elderly are lower than those of the younger population,
15 the median equivalised disposable 
income of the elderly would not be evaluated as particularly low. For instance, the median 
income at the age of 75 years and over was equal to 75.2% of the median income of persons 
below the age of 55 years in the period 2003-2005, and to even 82.5% in 1999-2001. At the age 
of 65-74, in 2003-2005 the median equivalised disposable income was at almost 90% of that of 
the population below the age of 55 years. 
An analysis of income inequality in and between age groups should take into account that, on 
general, inequality in Slovenia is not high, and that a decreasing trend was registered in the 
observed nine-year period. In 1997-1999 the Gini coefficient was 0.246, and in 2003-2005 it 
was 0.239. The Theil indices took the values of 0.102 and 0.096, respectively. 
The Gini coefficient and Theil index show that inequality among the population aged 55 years 
and over exceeds those among the younger population and the total population (Table G6). 
However, in the period 1997-2005 inequality decreased more among the elderly than among 
both the total population and the population below the age of 55 years. The highest inequality is 
among the population aged 75 years and over. 
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59. 
15 At the old age, people are supposed to have solved their housing problem, they usually do not have 
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8.5  Poverty among the elderly, 1990-2005  
8.5.1  Trends in relative poverty 
Generally speaking, and compared to other European countries, relative poverty in Slovenia is 
not high and has decreased in the period 1997-2005 (Table G7).
16 In the whole observed period, 
the poverty rate was higher for the population aged 55 years and over than for the population 
below 55 years of age, or for the total population. The difference among the former two was 1.9 
percentage points in 1997-1999, and 1.6 percentage points in 2003-2005, applying a poverty 
threshold set at 40% of the median equivalised disposable income. It amounted to 7.0 
percentage points in 1997-1999 and 8.3 percentage points in 2003-2005 if the poverty threshold 
is set at 60%. 
Relative poverty increases with age. The difference is particularly pronounced between the age 
groups 60-64 years and 65-74 years. In the period 1997-2001 - no matter which level of the 
poverty threshold is chosen - the poverty rate was lower for the population aged 55-59 years 
than for the population below 55 years of age. The situation has reversed afterwards. In fact, one 
would have expected the opposite - namely, that a higher activity rate, increasing share of 
earnings, higher age at retirement and the decreasing share of pensions in the disposable income 
of persons aged 55-59 years (see Table G3) would result in their relatively more favourable 
economic situation. It seems, however, that the lower unemployment rate and the rise in 
earnings of the population below 55 years of age have had a stronger impact.  
In the period 1997-2005, a decrease in deep poverty (equivalised disposable income below 40% 
of the median disposable income) was somewhat greater for the population aged 55 years and 
over than for the younger group. According to this criterion, in the period 2003-2005 4.1% of 
the elderly were relatively poor, compared to 2.5% of the younger group and 3.0% in the total 
population. However, if the poverty threshold is set at 50%, 60% or 70% of the median 
disposable income, the decrease in the relative poverty was greater for the population below 55 
years of age. 
With the poverty threshold set at 70% of the median disposable income, the poverty rate 
decreases considerably for the population aged 65-74 years: from 34.8% in 1997-1999 to 25.9% 
in 2003-2007 (see Table G7).  
Different from that, the poverty rate for the population aged 75 years and over remained almost 
the same in the period 1997-2003, no matter which poverty threshold is applied. In 2003-2005, 
there is a pronounced drop in deep poverty (income below 40/50% of the median), but there is 
an increase in the poverty rate at the two higher thresholds (60% and 70% of the median). It is 
interesting to note that the comparison of poverty gaps shows quite a different development 
(Table G8). On the one hand, if the poverty threshold is set at 40% or 70% of the equivalised 
median disposable income, the poverty gap has hardly changed in 2003-2005 compared to 
2001-2003. On the other hand, it has decreased at poverty thresholds of 50% and 60% of the 
median (the latter by as much as 8.8 percentage points). 
Between the first and the last observed period, poverty gaps generally decreased for both major 
age groups, but the difference is more pronounced for the elderly. In 1999-2001 compared to 
1997-1999, the poverty gap - at poverty threshold at 40% of the median disposable income - for 
the population below 55 years of age decreased considerably, while that of the population aged 
55 years and over increased, resulting in an almost 10 percentage point difference. In the 
following observed period the trends reversed and the poverty gaps came (and remained) close 
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to each other, amounting to 20.5% and 22.4% in 2003-2005, respectively. At higher poverty 
thresholds, the differences were not large Poverty gaps are, as a rule, higher for the population 
aged 55 years and over. In 1997-1999 and 2003-2005, however, this was not the case if the 
60%-threshold is applied. 
The age group 55-59 years is quite often the one with (by far) the highest poverty gap, even 
rising above 30%. The age group 60-64 years mostly had the lowest poverty gap at the poverty 
threshold set at 40% of median disposable income. 
8.5.2  Trends in poverty according to national criteria  
In the period from 1993 to mid-2001, the guaranteed minimum income (social assistance) in 
Slovenia was very low. Its level was the result of a political decision, and not based on any 
assessment of a basket of commodities necessary for subsistence. Research has shown that the 
minimum income was only sufficient to cover the costs of a rather poor nutrition, with nothing 
remaining to meet other basic needs. This meant that social assistance beneficiaries were not 
really pulled out of absolute poverty (Stropnik et al., 2003). The Social Assistance and Services 
Act was amended in April 2001. The new benefit levels were gradually implemented from 
September 2001 to January 2003. The minimum income weight for the first adult in a family, 
which is equal to one, was only 0.8 from September 2001 to June 2002 it and 0.9 from July to 
December 2002. The minimum income was set at a more appropriate level (e.g. it increased by 
26% for a single person or for the first adult in a household).  
In Table G9, the shares of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the social 
minimum are presented. It should be noted here that the equivalence scales applied in our 
analysis differ from those used for defining the minimum income of households, and that these 
were different in the periods 1997-August 2001, September 2001 – June 2002, July 2002 – 
December 2002, and from 2003 on. Since 2003, the weight has been 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for 
each other adult in the household, and 0.3 for each dependent child. In the case of a single 
parent family, the minimum income was increased by 0.3 of the basic amount of minimum 
income. 
Other reasons for the differences between the disposable income and the minimum income may 
be  non take-up of social assistance
17 and denial of social assistance to persons non-complying 
with the rules of the active labour market policy (for instance, not fulfilling the condition of 
active job search and non-acceptance of the job offered by the Employment Office). The 
information in Table G9 may be misleading, due to the fact that it may include persons with an 
income just below the social minimum who do not think that the amount they are entitled to is 
worth the effort of applying. 
The shares of persons with equivalised disposable income below the social minimum (minimum 
income) differ across age groups and vary in time. They are generally higher for people aged 55 
years and over (i.e. the elderly) than for those below 55 years of age (2.2% compared to 1.1% in 
2003-2005). They also increase with age of the elderly and are the highest for the oldest age 
category (2.8% of persons aged 75 years and over had equivalised disposable income below the 
social minimum in 2003-2005). It is quite probable that the main reason lie with non take-up of 
benefits and under-reporting of income. 
It is evident from Figure G5 that the shares of persons with an equivalised disposable income 
below the social minimum increased in 2001-2003. This was due to a higher and increasing 
level of minimum income from September 2001. In 2003-2005 the shares of persons aged 60 
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years and over under the social minimum dropped below the 1999-2001 level. Since the number 
of applicants for social assistance aged 60 years and over has not decreased, the reason may be 
in the improved income situation of the households where the elderly live together with younger 
generations. 
Since social assistance is aimed at preventing absolute poverty, only those persons in need who 
somehow remained out of the system would finally remain poor. Consequently, on the one 
hand, once people start receiving social assistance, they should be pulled out of poverty, so they 
should not be considered as poor anymore. On the other hand, however, the level of social 
assistance is usually sufficient only for covering basic needs in a short term. Particularly if the 
status is kept for a longer period, a person/family may nevertheless be living in poverty. This 
explains why the receiving of social assistance is sometimes used as a measure of poverty (e.g. 
by Kangas and Ritakallio, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the characteristics of social assistance recipients indicate the population groups 
that run the risk of being poor. It is evident from Table G10 that the share of social assistance 
recipients in the population aged 55 years and over remained stable at 2-3 per cent in the period 
1997-2005. The opposite is true for the younger population, which experienced an increase first 
from 1999-2001 to 2001-2003 and particularly by 2003-2005. In that period, the share increased 
from 2.7% to 7.1%.
18 Consequently, the average share of social assistance recipients in the total 
population more than doubled (from 2.6% to 5.9%).  
It would, however, be wrong to conclude that the own income of the population below 55 years 
of age decreased. In fact, the minimum income - being the income threshold for entitlement to 
monetary social assistance - was increased in 2001-2003, resulting in a higher number of 
entitled persons. It should also be noted that, according to the social assistance regulation, some 
important income sources of households with low income (for instance, relatively high child 
allowances and educational grants) were not counted as the household own income, resulting in 
a high number of persons with own income below the minimum income. This implies that a 
certain proportion of the social assistance recipients disposed of a monetary income that was 
(much) higher than the minimum income. 
Another reason for an increase in the number of social assistance recipients was the relatively 
high unemployment among young people. Young first-time job seekers tend(ed) to declare 
themselves as living in single households – although they most probably lived with their parents 
– with no (or low) income. The revisions in the legislation implemented in 2006 decrease or 
deny monetary social assistance in such cases, which has resulted in a smaller number of young 
applicants (a decrease by 18% from December 2005 to December 2006).  
It is also true that in the period 1999-2001 - which is the basis for our comparison – the number 
of social assistance recipients was relatively low due to changes in the regulation. In 1998, a 
closer cooperation and exchange of information between the centres for social work and the 
employment offices was established. The conclusion of a contract between the beneficiary and 
the centre for social work on actively resolving the social problem of the beneficiary became a 
condition for the entitlement to social assistance. As a consequence, the number of social 
assistance recipients decreased in 1999.  
Changes in the level of minimum income did not have any positive impact on the share of social 
assistance recipients among persons with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the 
median. Quite the opposite: their share has decreased for both major age groups; the average 
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share was just below 40% in 2003-2005, compared to almost 60% in 1997-1999 and 1999-2001. 
The improvement in the income position of the poor is also evident from the decrease in their 
share in the population and particularly from smaller poverty gaps. The dynamic developments 
within the 60-64 age group, however, do not have a logical explanation, especially not between 
the periods 1999-2001 and 2001-2003 when a relatively high increase in the poverty gap was 
registered.  
8.5.3  Trends in relative poverty and material hardship 
On average, more than 93% of the persons were living in owned housing units in the whole 
observed period
19, and more than 95% of those aged 55 years and over. These proportions were 
somewhat lower for relatively poor people, but not below 86% and 92%, respectively (Table 
G11 in the Annex).  
The average floor area per person is smaller for people below 55 years of age than for the 
elderly, both for the poor (at 60% of the median disposable income) and for the total population 
(Table G12). It increases with age among the elderly: from 34.6 m
2 in the age group 55-59, to 
45.5 m
2 in the age group 75 years and over. The floor area is bigger for poor persons aged 55 
years and over than for the non-poor elderly. The opposite is true for the younger population. 
An increasing trend is evident in the average floor area per person in the observed period, 
particularly for the poor elderly, and, among them, those aged 65 years and over. 
The housing standard, measured by the average number of rooms per household member, is not 
much worse for poor people than on average (Table G13). A positive trend in this indicator is 
particularly evident for the poor population aged 55 years and over (from 1.17 to 1.51 rooms per 
household member in the period from 1997-1999 to 2003-2005).  
The interesting finding that the average floor area per person and the number of rooms per 
household member increase with age can be partly explained by the information presented in 
Table G11. It is specific for Slovenia that people own the houses and apartments they live in and 
that, as a rule, they do not move after their children have left the parental home. Since elderly 
households are smaller than the households of people below 55 years of age, the average 
number of rooms per household member is greater. So, for instance, in 2003-2005, the relatively 
poor persons were (on average) living in a household with 1.10 rooms per member: those below 
55 years of age had 0.82 rooms per member at their disposal, while the elderly had 1.51 rooms 
(Table G13). The difference is not that great for the total population: compared to the relatively 
poor population, the total population below 55 years of age has more space per member, while 
the total elderly population has less. The latter may be explained by the fact that the better-off 
elderly can afford to move into better quality housing; and they choose the one that suits their 
changed needs, also in terms of the number of rooms.  
A considerable share of the poor elderly live in dwellings without a bathroom: 12.8% in 2003-
2005 (compared to 9.4% of poor persons below 55 years of age, and 3.9% of non-poor elderly) 
(Table G14). However, the share was as high as 22.3% in 1997-199 and 1999-2001, which 
indicates that the situation has been improving. The decreasing trend in this indicator is present 
in all poor elderly age groups, except for the youngest one (55-59 years of age). Here it has been 
increasing in the 2000s after a considerable drop.
20 
The share of poor persons aged 55 years of over who live in dwellings without central heating 
has decreased too (from 49.2% in 1997-1999 to 31.7% in 2003-2005), but is still rather high 
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(Table G15). The situation is not much better for the poor below 55 years of age (27.8% in 
2003-2005). The share of non-poor elderly living in dwellings without central heating is 13.3%. 
Generally, the shares are higher for each older age group, indicating that older people live in 
older dwellings where the living standard is lower than in newer ones. 
8.5.4  Trends in relative poverty and subjective indicators of poverty 
The poor
21 population below 55 years of age makes ends meet with great difficulty much more 
frequently than the elderly poor, and the scissors have been opening since 1999-2001 (Table 
G16). This problem is least pronounced among the poor population aged 65 years and over, who 
much more frequently declared making ends meet “with difficulty” than “with great difficulty”. 
One of the possible explanations may be lower needs and more modesty in old age.  
All in all, (great) difficulties in making ends meet, by the two major age groups of the poor 
(non-elderly and elderly), show different patterns in the observed period. The share of poor non-
elderly making ends meet with (great) difficulty decreased between 1997-1999 and 1999-2001, 
then increased by 2001-2003 and remained almost the same in 2003-2005. For the elderly, it 
was increasing from 1997-1999 to 2001-3003 and then decreased substantially. 
8.6  Marginal groups  
Since the early 1980s, farmers have been included in the same pension scheme as other persons 
insured for old age and disability. The number of farmers’ pensions decreased considerably 
between 1990 and 2005: in 2005 it was just about a quarter of the number in 1990, and about 
half the number in 1995 (Ilić and Žnidaršič, 2006). 
Persons living in pensioner households (i.e. households without any active person and with 
pension as the only or main income source) accounted for 56.4% of all persons aged 55 years 
and over in 2003-2005 (Table G17). Due to the tendency of the Slovenian population to retire 
early, almost of a quarter of persons aged 55-59 years were already living in pensioner 
households, and more than a half of those aged 60-65 years. 
In 2003-2005, persons living in pensioner households were generally over-represented in the 
two bottom income deciles and under-represented in the top income decile. The poverty rate for 
this population group (considerably) exceeds that of all persons in all age groups (Table G18 
compared to Table G7). This indicates that the elderly living with at least one active person 
have a higher standard of living and are (much) less frequently experiencing financial hardship. 
For instance, with the income threshold set at 60% of median disposable income, 17.8% of all 
persons aged 55 year and over had an income below the poverty line, which was true for 23.4% 
of persons in the same age group who were living in pensioner households.  
On the one hand, it is interesting to note a particularly high relative poverty in 2003-2005 
among persons below 55 years of age living in pensioner households (28.5% at poverty rate set 
at 60% of the median disposable income, compared to the average of 9.5%). Obviously, people 
do not retire early because they have enough income to live on, but mostly because of not being 
able to continue working due to health problems, disability, unfavourable working conditions, 
redundancy and inability to get another job, etc. Some have land to cultivate and in fact enjoy a 
higher standard of living than shown by the income indicator. On the other hand, the poverty 
rate for people aged 60-74 living in pensioner households was just 2.3 percentage points lower 
than the average for persons of that age. This means that being a pensioner does not necessarily 
result in a financial hardship if one earned the full pension (or is receiving one having reached 
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the full pensionable age - for those who retired before 2000). But it is true that the relative 
poverty increases with age. 
In the same period, unemployed persons accounted for less than 2% of the population aged 55 
years and over (Table G17). Their share was higher (6.6%) only among persons aged 55-59 
years, particularly in the bottom income decile where one could find one out of five unemployed 
persons aged 55-59 years. It is not surprising that the relative poverty rate, too, is much higher 
for the unemployed than for the rest of population (Table G18). In all age groups, from 32% to 
44% of unemployed persons aged 55 and over are relatively poor if the poverty threshold is set 
at 60% of the median equivalised disposable income.
22 For them, unemployment is an 
intermediate stage between employment and retirement. 
Women aged 55 years and over are, on general, in a worse income position than men, which can 
be seen from their over-proportional shares in the bottom income deciles (except for women 
aged 60-64 in the first decile) and an under-proportional share in the top income decile (Table 
G19). The situation is particularly bad for women aged 65-74 years. In 2003-2005 they 
accounted for 57.6% of all persons in that age group, and 75.0% of those in the bottom income 
decile. The same is true for women living in single households. Those aged 65-74 years 
accounted for 18.5% of all persons and 48.7% of persons in the bottom income decile. It should 
be noted that the number of cases in the surveys represents a limitation for analyses by age 
groups. In the Slovenian 2003-2005 HBS sample, only 558.2 weighted persons
23 are women 
living in single households (see Table G20). Only 20.2 are aged 55-59 years, and 46.9 are aged 
60-64 years, which causes the problem of small numbers and may lead to wrong conclusions. 
The poverty rate for women (as for men) increases with age, and is much higher for women 
aged 65 years and over than for men of the same age (Table G20 compared with Table G7). The 
fact that the income position of women below 65 years of age generally does not differ much 
from that of men should be attributed to the similar activity rates of both sexes. Older women, 
however, did not earn as high pensions as men of the same old age,
24 and there are also 
considerably more women than men aged 65 years and over (and almost one in four of them 
lives in a single household), which results in high(er) relative poverty among women compared 
to men. In 2003-2005, with the poverty threshold set at 60% of the median equivalised 
disposable income,
25 23.2% of women aged 65-74 years and as many as 34.4% of older women 
were relatively poor. The situation was much worse for women living in single households. 
45.2% of women aged 55 years and over living in such household were relatively poor, and 
among younger women the rate was high as well (34.1%) The same was true for almost half of 
the women aged 75 years and over who live in single households.
26  
                                                      
22 Note that there are small numbers of the unemployed aged 60 years and over. 
23 The difference between unweighted and weighted number of persons in the total 2003-2005 sample is 
about 10%: there are 11,303 persons and 10,146.4 weighted persons. 
24 Gender differences in pensions derive mainly from differences in earnings during the active period, and 
the gender earnings gap is rather small in Slovenia (9% in 2002) (Stanovnik et al., 2006). Men had (and 
still have) higher gross earnings than women with the same education level. This is a consequence of both 
the sectors where women were mostly employed and the horizontal gender segregation. On average, 
today’s female pensioners have less years of schooling than their male counterparts. In addition to that, 
women had shorter labour market careers. Decades ago, maternity leave was only three months long and 
there hardly were any childcare facilities, so women temporarily left the labour market when they had 
small children; and for some it took very long to re-enter the labour market. 
25 There is a problem of small numbers if poverty thresholds are set at 40% or 50% of the median 
equivalised disposable income. 
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The relative position of pensioners improved in the course of the 1990s, which was due to the 
fact that, unlike most other central and eastern European countries in transition, pensions in 
Slovenia have remained a remarkably stable source of income both in real and relative terms 
during the 1990s. They were regularly received and adequately indexed, which cannot be said of 
most of other income sources (Stropnik and Stanovnik, 2002, p. 55). In 1997-1999 the poverty 
rate for pensioners was below the average for the total population (Stropnik and Stanovnik, 
2002). In 2003-2005, however, the poverty rate is higher than the average one, both for male 
and female pensioners.
27 The poverty rate remains lower for male pensioners aged 55 years and 
over than for the total population of the same age.
28 
In 2003-2005, the income position of all pensioners was much better than that of persons living 
in pensioner households. This is true for both male and female pensioners (Table G21). This is 
due to the fact that one in three pensioners lives in a non-pensioner household, and enjoys a 
higher equivalised disposable income. It is interesting to note that in 2003-2005 the relative 
poverty rate was lower for female pensioners below the age of 65 years than for their male 
counterparts. The logical explanation seems to be that these women had partners who were 
either active or received relatively high pensions or other income.  
Pensions used to be relatively generous in Slovenia, but starting from 2000, the average pension 
has accounted for an ever smaller percentage of the average net earnings. The replacement rates 
are presented in Table 8.8. The rate decreased from 74.5% in 1998 to 69.1% in 2005 (and 
further to 68.6% in 2006).
29 Obviously, the pension reform is effective in punishing those who 
opted for early retirement. The unfavourable indexation formula in the first half of the 2000s has 
also added its share. Since 2006, however, pensions are fully indexed to (gross) earnings, which 
will slow down the decrease in their real value compared to earnings. 
Table 8.8 Replacement rate after retirement, 1998-2006; Slovenia 
Year  Average old-age pension as % of average net earnings 
1998  74.5 
1999  75.8 
2000  75.3 
2001  73.2 
2002  72.8 
2003  71.1 
2004  70.2 
2005  69.1 
2006  68.6 
Source: Pension and Disability Insurance Institute, Annual Report 2005 and 2006. 
                                                      
27 Also Kump and Stanovnik (2006) have pointed to the gradual deterioration of the income position of 
pensioners in the early 2000s. Pensioners in pensioner households, whose pensions on average accounted 
for 95% of their disposable income, experienced the greatest decline in their income position. Pensioners 
in pensioner households were the only group experiencing an increase in relative poverty in the period 
2001-2003. 
28 When discussing the economic position of pensioners one should keep in mind that not all of them 
receive an old-age pension. In fact, the latter group of pensioners accounted for less than 60% of all 
Slovenian pensioners in 2005. While the average replacement rate was 69.1% for old-age pensions, it was 
55.4% for disability pensions and only 48.0% for family pensions. This, of course, results in different 
income position of the latter two categories. 
29 The replacement rate is by about one percentage point higher for the old-age pension. 162 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
It should be kept in mind that poor households often have an above average self-consumption, 
which increases their living standards. This is evident from the generally lower relative poverty 
rate and lower income inequality if the poverty measure is based on both income in cash and in 
kind (Intihar, 2007). However, this is not the case for all marginal population groups. For 
instance, there are more poor unemployed women if income in kind is taken into account when 
calculating the poverty threshold.  
Income in kind is very important for farmers and other persons living in their households. Their 
income position is hard to evaluate realistically, as is their income position in comparison with 
other population groups. This is also due to the fact that income from land/farming is calculated 
according to a specific formula which has been highly underestimating that income. However, 
this is not a very important issue in the poverty problem as such, as active farmers account for 
only 1.09% of the weighted persons in the 2003-2005 HBS database. It is also not possible to 
identify pensioners receiving farmers' pension in the Slovenian HBS, so we cannot analyse the 
income position of this group. In 2005, only 0.9% of all pensioners in Slovenia received 
farmers' pension. Some farmers (mostly women) receive a national pension, which in fact was 
introduced with the primary aim to provide them with a non-means-tested income in their old 
age. 
8.7  Conclusion: prospects on poverty  
There are many factors influencing the economic position of the elderly population. At this 
place we will only point to those that are generally considered as the most important 
determinants of the current and future poverty among the elderly in Slovenia. 
Demographic developments 
As in other European countries, the demographic factor will doubtlessly play a key role in the 
development of the pension system and pension entitlements in Slovenia. This will be due to 
both a very low fertility rate in recent decades and an increasing life expectancy. Due to 
population ageing, it will become difficult for Slovenia to maintain a sustainable pension system 
in the long term.  
So far, the pension reform has been alleviating the pressure to budgetary outflows for pensions. 
In 2000, pensions accounted for 12.1% of GDP in 1999, 11.4% in 2000, and 10.6% in 2006. 
However, according to the EC projections (2006, Table 3-3), the share of public pensions is 
going to increase to 14.4% by 2030, 16.8% by 2040 and 18.3% by 2050, which is the second 
largest increase in the EU.
30 An additional pension fund deficit of 7-9% of GDP (depending on 
the scenario) in 2030 was estimated if no further reforms of the pension system are implemented 
(Majcen et al., 2005).  
The demographic pressure may pose limits on the share of pensions in GDP. If the share is kept 
constant at 10%, pensions will start to decrease in 2011. People who are now aged 40-44 years 
and will retire around 2025 will receive only 75.6% of the amount they would receive if current 
regulation of pensions is left intact, without any limitations of the share of pensions in GDP 
(Majcen et al., 2006, p. 26) (Table 8.9). 
 
 
                                                      
30 This is largely due to the full indexation of pensions to the earnings growth as of 2006 (EC, 2006, p. 
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Table 8.9 Percentage of life-long pensions compared to the situation where the share of 
pensions is not limited 
Age in 2005  Limited share of pensions in GDP 
  15% 13% 10% 
40-44  98.3 93.2 75.6 
50-54  99.7 97.9 86.1 
60-64  100.0 99.7 93.3 
70-74  100.0 100.0  96.7 
Source: Majcen et al., 2006, Table 19. 
New pension formula 
There is no doubt that public pensions will decrease in importance and that more stress will 
have to be put on the other two pillars of the pension system. Pension reform leads to the 
decline in the (relative) income position of pensioners and the elderly on general, but its full 
effect on the income position of pensioners will be evident only in the long run.  
The consequences of the 1999 pension reform are lower accrual rates and a higher full 
retirement age. Since the replacement rate for specific age cohorts declines, age cohorts in their 
fifties need to work longer to achieve the same replacement rate (Stanovnik et al., 2006, p. 156). 
The theoretical net replacement rate for a male worker with a working career of 40 years was 
82% in the year 2005, but it is projected to decline to 60% by 2050 (ISG, 2006, Table 52).
31 As 
stressed by Stanovnik et al. (2006, p. 155), if increases in the retirement age do not lead to 
higher labour force participation rates, there will be a threat of increased poverty among 
pensioners. 
In addition to that, those who retire early suffer permanent maluses. Taking that into account, 
one would predict that people would not retire early. However, the surveys prove that the 
Slovenians nevertheless wish to retire as early as possible and considerably earlier than the full 
retirement age. Although the actual age at retirement will probably show an increasing trend, it 
is quite probable that ever more people will retire early. This will happen if the actual age at 
retirement increases by less than an increase in the legal retirement age. 
Labour market developments 
Probably nobody doubts that an increase in employment among the elderly (55-64 years of age) 
is needed. Kajzer (2007) argues that - in order to achieve this goal - revisions in employment 
policy are required. Labour market flexibility should focus also on the elderly population. More 
opportunities to combine pension and flexible forms of work should be offered, and the 
regulation regarding the combination of retirement and part-time employment should be 
changed. Part-time employment arrangements should become an intermediate phase between 
full-time employment and retirement. It would positively affect the employment rate of older 
people. Kajzer (2006, p. 79) recommends activation of those with a low level of education, for 
instance, through the development of the care sector. She argues that the reserve can be found 
particularly in part-time employment of older women.
32 Continuous training and lifelong 
learning should be much more practiced by both companies and individuals in order to avoid 
                                                      
31 This result holds under current pension legislation and Eurostat demographic projections but not taking 
into account of recent changes in the tax legislation. 
32 In the 2
nd quarter of 2006, the prevalence of part-time work among men aged 50-64 years was close to 
the EU average, while that among women was only at one third of the EU average (Kajzer, 2007, p. 9). 164 | NADA STROPNIK & NATAŠA KUMP 
 
unemployment of the older people and prolong their activity if wished so. However, currently 
there is a very limited possibility to earn additional income while receiving a pension, and 
additional earnings are subject to payment of all social security contributions. This should be 
changed, otherwise many potentially active elderly persons will remain out of the labour 
market. Partial retirement should also become more flexible in terms of hours worked. 
Taking account of changes in the pension policy,
33 a large decrease in the take-up ratio 
(pensioners / population aged 65 years and over) was foreseen for Slovenia (EC, 2006, pp. 76-
77 and Table 3-10). This means that people will remain on the labour market longer and thus 
potentially earn higher pensions.  
It is assumed that the higher rate of female activity will enable more women to meet the 
qualifying conditions for an old-age pension (Stanovnik et al., 2006, p. 155). Consequently, the 
relative difference between male and female average pensions will be decreasing. 
In the 1990s, unemployment became a massive phenomenon in Slovenia, affecting young 
people (aged 15-24 years) much harder than other age groups. Broken or fragmented or short 
labour market careers due to unemployment will have a negative impact on future pensions, 
through short contribution period and consequent negative accrual rates. 
The informal economy 
Many people, who are now approaching the retirement age or have already retired, were 
engaged in undeclared work. In the cases where such work was not performed in the periods of 
their regular employment or while they were receiving unemployment benefits, people have 
shorter labour market careers and therefore lower pensions (particularly if they retired after the 
1999 pension reform).  
It has been estimated that undeclared work currently accounts for about 7% of the Slovenian 
GDP and that it is, to a great extent, due to the high (though decreasing) direct and indirect tax 
burden on labour (social security contributions, payroll taxes, personal income taxes) (Polanec, 
2005; MoLFSA, 2006). In order to decrease the benefits of undeclared work for both employers 
and “employees”, payroll taxes are being gradually abandoned, and the highest marginal income 
tax rates were reduced. Also, the abandonment of unemployment assistance, active labour 
market policies, new regulation of suitable work and strict inspection of the registered 
unemployed and employers act as disincentives and prevent fraud. Dismissal of workers is 
planned to become less complicated and costly for the employers, which would make them 
more ready to offer regular jobs. The systematic efforts to prevent undeclared work started in 
1997, including the adoption of relevant legislation.  
Living arrangements 
The constantly increasing proportion of pensioners living in pensioner households – where 
pensions are the main or the only income source – is expected to continue. Due to that, an 
increasing share of the population has been and will be rather sensitive to the changes in the 
pension system (replacement rate, indexation of pensions).  
Political power of the elderly  
One cannot predict how the burden of pensions will be distributed between generations (lower 
pensions vs. higher contributions). It will be influenced by many factors, the political power of 
                                                      
33 These changes are aimed at increasing the effective retirement age through increases in the statutory 
retirement age and tightening of the access to early pension schemes. SLOVENIA | 165 
 
the pensioners’ party being among the most important ones. The pensioners’ political party has 
been a Parliamentary and the Government coalition party in Slovenia. Due to its political 
influence, proposals to index pensions only to the costs of living have not been adopted so far. 
Such indexation would lead to pensions lagging behind earnings, which would in the long run 
lower the ratio of individual’s full pension entitlement to his/her earnings in the year preceding 
retirement to 35% of the latter (ISG, 2006). However, experts (Stanovnik et al., 2006, p. 157-
161) warn that, due to demographic ageing, full indexation of pensions with earnings is fiscally 
unsustainable and that it is only a matter of time until it will be abolished, and less than full 
indexation will be resumed.
34  
While one can speculate on the future absolute income position of the elderly, it is far more 
difficult to predict their relative status. This is because the latter also depends on the 
development of the income position of the rest of the population, implying that one would need 
to consider the factors influencing employment, gross and net earnings, social security for the 
younger age groups, the pension system, retirement decisions, etc. If the income situation of the 
population of working age were to improve less (or deteriorate more) than that of the older age 
groups, the relative position of the elderly could even be better than now, in spite of the negative 
impact any further pension reforms may have on their income.  
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9. General  conclusions 
Cok Vrooman
* 
This chapter sketches some overall conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of this 
comparative study into the situation of the poor elderly in the European Union’s New Member 
States (NMS) – that is, the group of countries that entered the EU since 2004. It relates to a 
rather general level; specific summaries of the outcomes have been included at the beginning of 
chapters 2 to 9. 
The first section highlights the outcomes of a general cross-comparative analysis performed for 
2005, using an integrated dataset. It concentrates on the level of income inequality, relative 
poverty, and material deprivation in all NMS except Malta, Romania and Bulgaria. Section 9.2 
provides an overview of the main results relating to poverty developments in six selected 
countries. The final section deals with the main theme of the book: the prospects on poverty 
among the elderly in the NMS. 
9.1  General cross-sectional results  
Chapter 2 provided a cross-sectional analysis of the income situation of the elderly in the New 
Member States, based on the EU-SILC data gathered in 2005. This gives an overview of the 
starting position of the elderly: how do they fare nowadays, before the great wave of ageing 
strikes? Figure 9.1 lists some of the main indicators for the countries which accessed the 
European Union in 2004, minus Malta.
1 The ‘old’ EU-15, Denmark (an old member state with 
little relative poverty and inequality) and Portugal (more poor, more unequal) have been 
included as points of reference.  
The graph shows the relationship between national income inequality in the population at large, 
and poverty and material deprivation among the elderly aged 55 or more. For the latter we use 
the general index scores that have been calculated by Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2008) in the 
context of a related project.
2  
                                                      
* The Netherlands Institute for Social Research|SCP, P.O. Box 16164, 2500 BD The Hague, The 
Netherlands. Email: c.vrooman@scp.nl 
1 Romania and Bulgaria did not participate in EU-SILC 2005, as they had not yet joined the EU. 
2 The index for material deprivation is a sub-scale of the measuring instrument for social exclusion, as 
developend for the Netherlands by Jehoel-Gijsbers (2004; cf. Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman, 2007) and 
elaborated for the EU-context by Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2008) in the context of the AIM project. It 
was constructed by applying categorical principal component analysis (CatPCA), a technique which 
combines nonlinear optimal scaling with principal component analysis (cf. Gifi 1990). CatPCA is an 
appropriate technique if different indicators are expected to refer to one common underlying latent 
concept, and some or all indicators have nominal or ordinal measurement level. The material deprivation 
scale was constructed over the total EU-SILC sample (24 EU-countries, plus Norway and Iceland) and 
turned out to be fairly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha=0.77). It was based on 15 items in EU-SILC 2005, 
which include the ‘material hardship’ indicators in chapter 2: arrear payments; financial burdens of 
housing, et cetera; being able to fulfil basic needs in terms of heating, every second day a full meal, and 
costs for medical and dental treatment; the subjective evaluation of difficulties in making ends meet and 
dealing with unexpected expenses; the possession of consumer durables (telephone, colour TV, washing 
machine and personal computer). GENERAL CONCLUSIONS | 169 
 
Figure 9.1 Relative poverty and material deprivation among the elderly (55+) in relation to 
total income inequality (16+); NMS-9, EU-15, Denmark and Portugal (2005) 
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Source: chapter 2; Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman, 2008 (EU-SILC 2005). 
There are wide differences in relative poverty among the elderly in the NMS. Using the standard 
EU Laeken-criterion (in which a person is classified as poor if he lives in a household with an 
equivalised disposable income below 60% of the median), the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Hungary have very few elderly poor (6-8%). This is far below the EU-15 average (19%), and 
less than the Danish level (11%).  
In Poland, the relative poverty rate is the same as in Denmark, and therefore still considerably 
below the average of the old member states. Lithuania and Slovenia are just under the EU-
average, and Estonia and Latvia score slightly above it – but the poverty rate in these two 
countries lags behind the level of Portugal, one of the countries with a high incidence among the 
elderly in the EU-15(24%). Cyprus has a very high relative poverty rate (34%), exceeding the 
Portuguese level by far. 
If most NMS perform quite well vis-à-vis the EU-15 in terms of relative poverty, the conclusion 
is quite different if one looks at the scores on the general index for material deprivation. In 
Denmark the elderly experience the least material deprivation in the EU, as the small size of the 
‘bubble’ in the graph indicates. The EU-15 average is substantially higher, mainly due to the 
elevated scores of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece (cf. Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman, 2008, 
figure 4). However, in all NMS the average material deprivation of the elderly is well above the 
EU-15 average. Among these countries, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia do fairly 
well, as the average score is below the Portuguese level. Hungary, Slovakia and Cyprus have 
somewhat more material deprivation among the elderly than this high-scoring old member state. 170 | COK VROOMAN 
 
The highest scores, however, occur among the elderly in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, who 
experience the most material deprivation in the EU-24. 
Thus, these two indicators of the financial position of the elderly lead to very different 
conclusions. The correlation between relative poverty and material deprivation among the 
elderly is rather weak (r=0.16 in this set of countries). The results in terms of relative poverty 
run counter to what most observers would expect: e.g., the fact that elderly in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary are better off than their Danish counterparts seems rather 
unfeasible, especially if one considers the policy consequences it would have (namely, that 
Denmark should increase its efforts if it ever wants to reach the Czech, Slovak of Hungarian 
levels). This only holds within a strict relativist perspective; but one may wonder if this is the 
best basis for social policy in the EU and its member states.  
On the other hand, the ranking of countries in terms of their material deprivation scores seems 
fairly plausible. In all NMS the elderly are more materially deprived than in the EU-15 (and 
certainly in comparison to Denmark). A few NMS are slightly below the level of ill-performing 
old member states, but in most of them the elderly are worse off, especially in Poland, Lithuania 
and Latvia. 
The graph also shows that relative poverty is very much related to income inequality, as 
indicated by the Gini coefficient in the population at large. The higher the income inequality, 
the more relative poverty. The correlation is very high, especially if one leaves Cyprus and 
Slovenia aside (r=0.85), where relative poverty among the elderly is somewhat higher than one 
would expect on the basis of general income inequality. This is due to the fact that in these two 
countries income inequality within the elderly group is comparatively high (cf. below). 
Generally speaking, however, one may consider relative poverty as a form of “inequality in 
disguise” (cf. Van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004)
3. 
While income inequality is related to the material deprivation scores of the elderly, the 
association is much weaker than in case of relative poverty (r=0.54).  
Figure 9.2 lists the same variables, but focuses on the differences between the elderly (55+) and 
the non-elderly (55-). For relative poverty and income inequality raw differences are presented, 
for material deprivation the ratios between the two groups have been used
4. The green bubble in 
the graph indicates the reference category (no differences between the two age groups in terms 
of income inequality(Δ=0), relative poverty (Δ=0) and material deprivation (ratio=1).  
                                                      
3 Van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004: 295) illustrate their point by assuming that disposable income is 
distributed in a log-normal way, i.e. the logarithms of the incomes are normally distributed. The original 
incomes then no longer display the characteristic ‘bell shape’ of a normal distribution, but are skewed to 
the right, with a relatively large group of individuals or households with lower incomes, and a long tail of 
reducing shares as income increases. Given this – not uncommon – assumption, they show that the 
poverty rate depends solely on the standard deviation, which can be interpreted as a measure of income 
inequality. In practice, incomes are not precisely log-normal in their distribution; for example, there may 
be more peaks at the lower end due to the divergent social assistance norms in different types of 
household. The log-normal distribution does however provide a good approximation of the actual income 
distribution. 
4 The ratio has been used because difference scores result in several negative values, which are difficult to 
represent as the third variable in a bubble graph.  GENERAL CONCLUSIONS | 171 
 
Figure 9.2 Income inequality, relative poverty and material deprivation: elderly (55+) vs non-
elderly (<55); NMS-9, EU-15, Denmark and Portugal (2005) 
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Source: chapter 2; Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman, 2008 (EU-SILC 2005). 
In terms of the difference scores between the two age groups, relative poverty is once again 
strongly related to income inequality: the observations on the x- and y-axes are almost on a 
straight line (r=0.89).  
The graph furthermore shows that in five NMS the elderly experience less relative poverty and 
inequality than the non-elderly. This is the case in Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Poland. In the latter country, the poverty rate among the elderly is 12.5 percentage 
points lower than in the 55- group, and the Gini coefficient is 0.08 points less. For Lithuania 
these figures are -3 and -0.04, respectively; the other NMS in this group fall in between these 
two countries.  
In Estonia and Latvia, income inequality is slightly lower in the 55+ group as well, but the share 
of poor elderly is slightly higher (by about 3 percentage points) than among the non-elderly. 
Slovenia, and especially Cyprus, diverge from the general pattern. Here the elderly are more 
often poor, and incomes are more widely dispersed, than among the non-elderly.  In Cyprus the 
difference amounts to +24 percentage points in the poverty rate, and +.08 points on the Gini 
indicator. These two countries tally with the general picture in the EU-15 and Portugal, where 
elderly are more often poor and show a higher degree of income inequality among themselves 
as well. Denmark, however, is the odd one out: the income inequality within the elderly group is 
higher than among the non-elderly, but they experience less relative poverty. 
A remarkable conclusion, however, is that the common notion that old people tend to be poor, 
and that this would be all the more so among elderly in the NMS (cf. the introductory chapter) 172 | COK VROOMAN 
 
currently does not hold for five out of the nine countries that have been considered here. In 
terms of relative poverty, the elderly are actually better off than the non-elderly in Lithuania, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland; and not much worse off in Estonia and Latvia. 
Only in Cyprus the postulated difference between the two age groups emerges clearly, and to a 
lesser extent it also occurs in Slovenia. 
As the rather equal sizes of the bubbles in figure 9.2 suggest, the age group differences 
regarding material deprivation scores are not very pronounced. Denmark is the exception: here, 
material deprivation is considerably less among the elderly than among the non-elderly 
(ratio=0.56). In the EU-15 the latter also applies, but somewhat less evident (ratio=0.83). In the 
NMS the ratio is close to 1, which implies the scores of the elderly and non-elderly do not differ 
very much. In Slovakia and Poland the scores of both groups are equal; in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Cyprus and Slovenia the elderly are somewhat less materially deprived than the non-
elderly, and in Latvia and Lithuania a bit more. With the possible exception of the two latter 
countries these results do not indicate there currently is a specific material deprivation problem 
among the elderly in the NMS, in the sense that old people experience considerably more 
problems in this respect
5 than their younger fellow-countrymen. 
9.2  In-depth analyses in six New Member States 
Chapters 3-8 elaborated on these issues, by providing in depth analyses of six New Member 
States, which are mostly based on national statistics and the various Household Budget Surveys 
for the period 1995-2005/7. These chapters focus on income trends, a number of additional 
indicators for poverty among the elderly, and the general demographic, institutional and socio-
economic setting. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the selection (comprising of 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) covers half of the countries that 
entered the EU in 2004 or 2007, and 77% of the population of all the NMS.  
Table 9.1 lists the main indicators on the poverty situation of the elderly and a number of 
relevant context factors. It should be noted that this overview is very general. The separate 
chapters contain much other relevant information, e.g. on the development of median incomes 
and income inequality, on relative poverty below other threshold values (40%-70% of median 
income), on various elderly age groups, and on the specifics of the pension institutions in each 
country. 
Trends and differences in relative poverty 
The trends in relative poverty (using the threshold at 60% of median income) could not be 
ascertained on the basis of EU-SILC 2005, as that survey has not been running for a sufficiently 
long period yet. The national sources indicate that the poverty rates of the 55+ group remained 
rather stable since the midst of the 1990s. Hungary is the exception, as relative poverty among 
the elderly decreased somewhat.  
However, in many countries the difference with the poverty rates among the non-elderly has 
increased in recent years. Given the stable pattern among the non-elderly, this implies that 
relative poverty rates among the non-elderly have increased (or, in the Hungarian case, over the 
years decreased less than in the elderly group). Slovakia and Estonia are exceptional in this 
respect, because there is no clear change in the poverty rates of the two age groups. 
 
                                                      
5 However, Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2008) point out that on another indicator of social exclusion, the 
degree of social participation, older people in the EU-24 are generally worse-off, the more so the older 
they are.  | 173 
Table 9.1 Main indicators on elderly poverty and related factors in six NMS 
Indicator Estonia  Hungary  Poland  Romania  Slovakia  Slovenia 
Relative poverty (60%) 
- trend
a incidence 55+ 
 
stable with random 
volatility 
 
decreasing  
 
Stable 
 
stable 
 
stable 
 
stable 
- trend
a poverty gap 
55+ 
-  peak in 1997/1998, volatile in 
other years 
no clear pattern  small gap (‘shallow’ 
poverty), some 
fluctuation 
increasing 1997-2003  increasing up to 2001, 
decreasing afterwards  
- trend difference 
55+/55- 
no clear pattern  since mid 1990s: 55+ less relative 
poverty than 55-, slightly 
increasing 
increasing,  
because incidence non-
elderly rises 
increasing,  
because incidence non-
elderly rises 
stable 1997-2003  slightly decreasing at 
40% criterion, slightly 
rising at 60% criterion 
Poverty incidence, 
national criteria 
- trend
a incidence 55+ 
 
 
‘absolute’ and 
subsistence’ criteria: 
decreasing 
 
 
‘subsistence’ criterion: very low, 
small peak in 1997, decreasing 
since 
 
 
‘subsistence’ and ‘social’ 
minimum, legal 
threshold: stable since 
1999 
 
 
‘minimum old-age 
pension’ criterion: 
decreasing since 2000 
 
 
‘subsistence minimum’ 
slightly rising 1997-
2003 
 
‘social assistance 
minimum’: low (<3%) 
and rather stable; peak in 
2001-03, as benefits were 
raised 
- incidence 55+ vs 55-
b   elderly less poor since 
1998 (absolute criterion) 
Elderly less poor  elderly less poor  elderly less poor  elderly less poor  elderly poorer 
Material hardship 
- trend
a incidence 55+ 
 
volatile (maybe due to 
measurement issues) 
 
decreasing 
 
decreasing 
 
- 
 
- 
 
decreasing 
- incidence 55+ vs 55-
b  elderly more material 
hardship 
elderly less hardship (per capita 
floor space), or no difference 
(flush toilet) 
elderly less (per capita 
floor space), or more 
hardship (flush toilet) 
elderly less hardship in 
terms of average no. of 
rooms; but more unable 
to pay for food 
poor elderly more 
hardship, except for 
flush toilets 
elderly less (p.c. floor 
space)/ more hardship 
(no bathroom, c heating) 
Subjective poverty/ 
negative income 
assessment 
-trend
a incidence 55+ 
 
 
 
rather stable 
 
 
 
decreasing  
 
 
 
Stable 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
increasing 1997-03, 
decreasing afterwards 
- incidence 55+ vs 55-
b  elderly less negative  Elderly less negative  elderly less negative  elderly slightly less 
satisfied  
- elderly  less negative 
Marginal groups  
- high risk on relative 
poverty 55+ 
1. single elderly 
2. social assistance  
recipients 
3. disabled 
4. non-Estonians 
1. single elderly women  
2. probably: Roma minority and 
migrants (no data) 
1. social income (≠ 
pension) 
2. farmers 
3. large families 
1. single elderly women 
2. rural elderly (self-
consumption included) 
1. Roma minority (no 
data) 
2. old unemployed/low 
educated 
3. women 65+  
1. (single) elderly women 
2. old unemployed 
3. pensioners not living 
in extended family 
Labour force 
participation 55-64
c 
comparatively high 
(62%) 
low  (35%)  low (32%) fairly  low  (42%)  fairly low (39%)  low (35%) 174 | COK VROOMAN 
 
Political organisation/ 
influence of the elderly  
some, but rather weak  high: electoral cycle   rather high (initiated by 
Solidarity trade unions) 
- -  very high: DeSUS pen- 
sioners party in coalition 
Recent pension reforms  yes, major Æ low 
replacement rates 
yes, but rather eclectic: many 
compromises, long transition 
periods, repeated changes in 
indexation  
yes, major  yes, major (2001-04); 
recent eclectic raises of 
pensions (2006-09) Æ 
electoral cycle? 
yes, major; but political 
cycle changes pension  
rules  
yes, major (1992, 1999), 
more underway;  eclecti- 
cal indexation raises  
Future ageing process  severe, dependency ratio 
55+ almost doubles 
between 2007 and 2050 
severe, dependency ratio 55+ 
almost doubles between 2007 and 
2050 
severe, dependency ratio 
55+ almost triples 
between 2007 and 2050 
very severe, high 
dependen-cy ratio 55+ 
doubles to very high 
2045 level (>100%)  
very severe, 
dependency ratio 55+ 
almost triples between 
2007 and 2050 
severe, dependency ratio 
50+  doubles between 
2005 and 2050 
Future sustainability  fair, due to low 
replacement rates 
problematic;  
Short run: cohorts hit by labour 
market shock in 1990s.  
Long run: negative demographic 
trend, possibly mitigation 
through rising educational level 
fair, due to pension 
reforms; but possible 
transition:  
low sustainability+ high 
adequacy Æ high sustain-
ability +  low adequacy  
problematic; Short run: 
less  contributors 
(subsistence agriculture, 
migration abroad) 
Long run: collision with 
demographic trend 
problematic; Short run: 
less contributors 
(migration abroad)  
Æ deficit PAYG 
system 
Long run: unfavourable 
demographic trend 
problematic:demographic 
pressure, political power, 
less extended families. 
Partly offset by pension 
formula, rising particip., 
less early retirement  
Prospects on poverty 
among the elderly 
concern about possible 
growing share eligible to 
minimum pension only 
concern about cohorts hit by 
1990s labour market shock; long 
term if budgetary pressure cannot 
be solved   
concern about low 
pensions due to 
interrupted contri-butions 
(unemployment 1990s) or 
low formal earnings 
(shadow economy) 
-  concern:currently low 
wages translate into 
low pensions; higher 
disparities due to re-
migrating elderly  
concern: low pensions 
(accrual rates, maluses 
early retirement, short/ 
interrupted careers). 
Maybe partly offset. 
a Trend from mid-1990s until mid-2000s
 
b Most recent data 
c 2007 
Source: chapters 3-8. 
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The poverty gaps of the elderly (the average income lack of the poor vis-à-vis the poverty line) 
do not show a clear development in most countries. Remarkable is the shallow nature of poverty 
in Romania, where many of the poor have an income close to the threshold value (which is 
rather low, in line with median income). 
Alternative poverty indicators 
Most countries also have some kind of national poverty line which can be interpreted in a more 
absolute sense. This sometimes consists of a policy (or ‘legal’) threshold, such as the national 
norm for social assistance or the minimum old age pension. In other instances it refers to a 
‘basket of goods’ which is deemed necessary in the local context. The latter may vary between a 
bare minimum or ‘subsistence’ level (e.g. only costs for food), and a more elaborate package. 
Of course these specific criteria cannot be used to compare total poverty incidences between 
countries, as they vary too much. However, they may give some indication on diverging trends 
and on the relative differences between social groups. If we for instance compare the differences 
between the elderly and the non-elderly in the selected countries, a familiar pattern emerges. In 
all NMS but Slovenia, the 55+ age group is less poor in national-absolute terms than their 
younger compatriots. This corroborates the outcomes based on the relative poverty line (cf. 
figure 9.2), with the sole exception of Estonia. In that country, the elderly are slightly poorer in 
relative terms, but less poor in an absolute sense. 
There are no clear trends in poverty among the elderly according to these national-absolute 
criteria. In Estonia, Hungary and Romania absolute poverty decreased in this age group, while 
in Poland and Slovenia it has been rather stable in recent years (if one dismisses the artefactual 
increase in the latter country, which resulted from a raise in the benefit levels). Only in Slovakia 
a small rise in absolute poverty among the elderly is observed. 
Most chapters also contained information on material hardship. Usually this has been measured 
in a less elaborate way than in the ‘material deprivation’ index based on EU-SILC (cf. figures 
9.1 and 9.2). Per capita floor space, and the availability of a flush toilet, a bathing room or 
central heating are common indicators in the various country chapters. Once again, the different 
indicators and varying survey setups make a direct comparison of material hardship not feasible. 
Moreover, the ‘per capita floor space’ indicator probably is of limited value. In almost all 
countries the elderly are better off than the non-elderly, but that is to a large part due to the fact 
that elderly tend to stay in the same house after their children leave, or their partner dies. 
On the other indicators the elderly tend to experience more material hardship than the non-
elderly with the exception of Hungary (no difference in the final measuring year). However, the 
trend is rather positive: in the countries where time series are available, material deprivation has 
decreased considerably (mostly implying that many elderly have had flush toilets installed over 
the last decade).  
The  subjective evaluation of the income situation is a further way to grasp poverty 
developments. This is mostly based on answers people give in national survey questions, such 
as whether they are not able to make ends meet, express a negative view on their income 
situation or prospects, or are dissatisfied with their income. Given the diverging nature of the 
questions used in the national surveys, once again they cannot be used to compare the levels of 
negative evaluations between the countries that have been analysed here; but they may be 
informative as to trends and differences between age groups. Regarding the latter, for four out 
of six countries the outcomes are in line with the results on absolute poverty. In Estonia, 
Hungary and Poland the elderly are less negative about their income situation than the non-
elderly, just as they experienced less absolute poverty (and, with the exception of Estonia, less 
relative poverty as well). In Slovenia the elderly also have a less negative view of their own 176 | COK VROOMAN 
 
income than the non-elderly, in spite of their higher rates of national-absolute and relative 
poverty. Romania is the exception here: the 55+ experience less absolute poverty than the 
younger age group, but is slightly less satisfied with the income situation. The Slovakian 
chapter does not provide data on this issue. 
Marginal groups 
In all country chapters an attempt was made to identify marginal groups within the elderly, 
usually indicated by an over-representation in terms of the relative poverty rate. These analyses 
were sometimes hampered by the fact that not all marginal groups were suitably represented or 
identifiable in the national surveys (most notably, the Roma population in Hungary, Romania 
and Slovakia).  
A common finding is that single elderly people are among the marginal groups. Poland is the 
exception here. In most countries, single elderly women attain even higher levels, but this does 
not occur in Estonia. In Poland and Slovenia certain other types of family emerge as a high risk 
groups as well; Polish large families, and Slovenian elderly not living in an extended family 
have higher poverty rates. 
Elderly living on social benefits other than pensions (unemployed, social assistance, disabled) 
also regularly belong to the marginal groups. Farmers are specific high risk groups in Poland 
and Romania (the latter in spite of the shift to subsistence farming after the land reforms in the 
early 1990s). Non-Estonians (largely of Russian descent) are a high risk group in Estonia.    
9.3  Prospects on poverty among the elderly in the New Member States 
A favourable current income position 
The overall conclusion emerging from all of these analyses is that the elderly in the NMS 
currently are not that bad off – at least not in comparison with their non-elderly fellow-
countrymen. In most countries they experience less relative poverty, attain lower poverty rates 
according to the national criteria, and have a more positive evaluation of their income position. 
Slovenia is the notable exception, because the elderly attain higher scores in terms of absolute 
and relative poverty than the non-elderly. The proverbial equation of ‘old and poor’ still holds 
here (although the Slovenian elderly have a somewhat more positive appraisal of their income 
than their younger compatriots). To a somewhat lesser extent Estonia also has a divergent 
pattern (elderly are more often relatively poor, but less so in absolute and subjective terms). And 
of course, not all elderly in the NMS are better off than the non-elderly; single elderly 
(especially females in some countries), and recipients of non-pension benefits (elderly living on 
social assistance etc.) are among the most common risk groups. 
Moreover, one should not forget that in all NMS material deprivation among the elderly 
generally is well above the EU-15 average (cf. figure 9.1). Of the countries analysed in detail 
here, this applies the least to Slovenia and Estonia, and the most to Poland (the elderly in Latvia 
attain an even higher score, though). 
The main explanation for the relative favourable current position of the elderly in most NMS is 
that the elderly were spared from the negative consequences of the transition period to a greater 
extent than their younger compatriots. Although unemployment among the elderly generally 
rose, they often benefited from rather generous early exit programmes and a rather favourable 
indexing of pensions, also due to electoral reasons. It is true that most NMS reformed their 
pension schemes in recent years; but the negative consequences of that on the income position 
of the elderly do not strike the current pensioners very severely yet (gradual implementation, 
transition rules). The non-elderly were more affected by the shocks in the economy and on the GENERAL CONCLUSIONS | 177 
 
labour market. If they lost their job, they had to fall back on less generous social security 
provisions than the elderly; if they kept it, the growth in their earnings often was rather limited 
for a number of years. The entry to the EU has accelerated growth, but the gains in earnings 
have not been sufficient yet to make up for earlier losses. 
An unfavourable future? 
However, the future prospects of the elderly in the NMS may be far more gloomy. There are 
four common reasons for this: 
1. The implementation of new pension formulae recently agreed upon will lead to lower 
pensions in the first pillar for future cohorts. It is doubtful whether this will be fully 
compensated for in new second and third pillar pension schemes. This will probably not occur 
for the most vulnerable groups (women, short or broken careers, subsistence farmers, Roma). 
2. Demographic pressure and migration processes might in the near future lead to further 
adaptations of pension schemes, in order to keep the system sustainable. This could imply a 
further reduction of the adequacy of pensions. 
3. In some countries, the after-effects of the transition period will become apparent in certain 
cohorts of the elderly. Due to labour market exits in the 1990s, a considerable share of the new 
cohorts reaching formal retirement age may on the short run have lower pensions than the 
previous generations (less contribution years and no growth in real earnings once they were out 
of the labour market, in combination with the new pension formulae). 
4. Some NMS will experience a decreasing importance of household-sharing. In Slovenia, for 
instance, the share of elderly which reside in the household of their children currently is quite 
high. This is an efficient way to avoid old age poverty through economies of scale. However, it 
may not be taken for granted that this situation will persist in future. In line with the historical 
developments in OMS, preferences of both the elderly and their children could change in favour 
of separate dwellings. This will be driven by the rising female labour participation, the erosion 
of traditional family roles as a consequence of the modernisation process, and greater physical 
distances between elderly and non-elderly as a consequence of internal and external migration 
processes (as a result of the younger generations moving to large cities or temporarily working 
abroad). 
It seems unlikely these developments will have the same impact in all NMS, however. 
Analysing the poverty-related factors in table 9.1, of the countries studied in depth here, Estonia 
seems to have the most favourable future perspective in regard to the future income position of 
the elderly. The elderly are currently less poor than the non-elderly, and experience little 
material deprivation. Elderly labour force participation is already comparably high, which 
means more people will accrue higher pension rights than elsewhere. Major pension reforms 
have been implemented, leading to fairly low replacement rates and a comparatively fair future 
sustainability of the pension schemes. The political influence and organisation of the elderly 
seems less than elsewhere, which implies ‘median voter effects’ will probably remain within 
limits. All of these factors may make it possible to manage the future ageing process –which 
will be severe, as in all NMS – successfully. Even then there is concern about the growing 
group of pensioners that is only eligible to the minimum pension. 
Slovenia shows the opposite pattern in several respects: the elderly currently are poor more 
often than the non-elderly (although their score on the material deprivation index in relation to 
the EU-15 average is rather good). The labour force participation in the 55-64 group is low, and 
the elderly have a high degree of political organisation and influence, most notably through the 
participation of the DeSUS pensioners party in the national government, in which they often 
hold the crucial vote needed for a majority. The recent eclectic increases in the indexation 178 | COK VROOMAN 
 
mechanism illustrate the potential intervening role of the elderly interest group, which in future 
may secure adequacy at the cost of sustainability. For such reasons, it may be more difficult to 
manage the severe ageing problem in Slovenia than in Estonia; and it is by no means certain that 
a high economic growth and rising labour participation will be sufficient to avoid more elderly 
becoming poor. 
The other four countries in table 9.1 are somewhere in between these opposites, where the 
future income position of the elderly is concerned. With Estonia they share the rather favourable 
poverty rates in comparison with the non-elderly. Material deprivation among the elderly, as 
compared to the EU-15 average, however, is much higher in these countries (especially in 
Poland) than in Estonia. The labour force participation of the 55-64 group resembles the low 
level of Slovenia (Slovakia and Romania are somewhat higher). Apart from that, each country 
has some peculiarities. Hungary has reformed its pensions, but in a rather eclectic way, with 
many compromises and an explicit electoral cycle. This may make it difficult to ensure 
sustainability. Poland has had major revisions, but – given the already high degree of material 
deprivation – this could mean sustainability has been ensured at the cost of adequacy. Romania 
and Slovakia are faced with a high migration abroad, which implies a flight of contributors from 
the national pension scheme; and Romania also has a specific poverty problem among the 
elderly living on subsistence farming. 
Thus, contrary to the common notion mentioned in the introductory chapter, the elderly in the 
NMS  currently do not have a very unfavourable income position, in the sense that they 
experience more relative or absolute poverty than their younger compatriots, or evaluate their 
income position more negatively. Of the six countries studied ‘in depth’ here, this by and large 
only applies to Slovenia. In terms of material deprivation, however, the elderly in the NMS are 
worse off than the EU-15 members; the least in Slovenia, the most in Poland.  
In the future, however, the income position of the elderly can generally be expected to be on the 
decline in most NMS. The future prospects are more positive in some countries than in others. 
Estonia has the best potential to find a reasonable balance between the sustainability and 
adequacy of future pensions. It could be much more difficult for Slovenia (low labour force 
participation, higher current poverty rates for the elderly, high political influence) and Poland 
(severe pension reforms, high current material deprivation).  
Although this report mainly served a descriptive and analytical purpose, some recommendations 
for monitoring the future income position of the elderly can been made. A first issue is the use 
of the relative poverty line (60% of median income) as the central criterion in the EU’s 
monitoring of social policy. As indicated by graph 9.1, this may not be optimal if one wants to 
assess whether elderly experience poverty in the NMS; the poverty rates mainly reflect 
differences in income inequality, but do not have a clear relation with the actual circumstances 
these elderly live in. It could be advisable to measure poverty in a more ‘absolute’ way, which is 
closer related to the income actually needed for inevitable expenditure in the local context. 
Soede & Vrooman’s (2008) ‘generalised budget approach’ for measuring poverty provides an 
example of this. Preferably, this should be linked with a direct measurement of the main 
dimensions of social exclusion – which is different from poverty, both as a theoretical concept 
and as an empirical phenomenon. Within the context of the AIM-project, Jehoel-Gijsbers & 
Vrooman (2008) elaborated a measurement model for this at the EU-level. 
A further recommendation regards the measurement of the poverty risk of marginal elderly 
groups in the NMS. In the current analyses it proved difficult to get a clear picture on this, as 
such groups often were underrepresented or unidentifiable in surveys. A serious monitoring of 
their problematic situation requires such groups be to oversampled and identifiable, at 
acceptable survey response rates. This applies especially to the Roma minorities in the EU’s 
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Table B1 Number of cases (household members) in the total sample by age groups 
Below 55  77.8 75.5 76.07 5 .3 75.9 75.07 5 .47 5 .57 4 .7
55 - 59  5.8  6.1  5.7 5.5  5.3  5.2 5.0 5.1 5.4
60 - 64  5.1  5.3  5.7 5.7  5.7  5.7 5.7 5.1 5.2
65 - 74  7.7  8.8  8.6 8.7  8.3  8.8 8.8 9.0 9.0
75 +  3.6  4.4  3.9 4.8  4.7  5.4 5.1 5.3 5.6
75 - 79  1.6  2.1  2.1 2.5  2.5  2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9
80 +  2.0  2.2  1.8 2.3  2.2  2.5 2.3 2.5 2.7
55 +  22.2 24.5 24.02 4 .7 24.1 25.02 4 .62 4 .52 5 .3
All 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
  In  percent  (weighted)       
Below 55  72.8 71.1 71.57 1 .0 73.9 73.27 3 .87 3 .47 2 .9
55 - 59  6.6  6.6  6.1 6.0  5.3  5.0 4.8 4.8 5.5
60 - 64  6.3  6.2  6.8 6.5  6.3  6.1 6.2 5.1 5.4
65 - 74  10.0  10.8  10.8 10.7  9.6  10.0 9.8 10.7 10.1
75 +  4.2  5.2  4.7 5.8  4.9  5.6 5.5 6.0 6.1
75 - 79  2.0  2.7  2.6 3.3  2.7  3.3 3.2 3.2 3.5
80 +  2.2  2.6  2.2 2.6  2.2  2.3 2.3 2.7 2.6
55 +  27.2 28.9 28.52 9 .0 26.1 26.82 6 .22 6 .62 7 .1
All 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table B2 Median income by age group 
Age  group  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 Kroons/month 
Below 55  1926.92 2146.86 2447.43 2454.91 2811.83 3064.94 3342.33 3688.34 4068.50
55  -  59  2020.70 2064.00 2370.08 2627.30 2625.74 2970.00 3179.56 3584.30 4102.50
60  -  64  1620.57 1746.00 1984.54 2265.00 2307.78 2395.99 2606.35 3068.47 3801.77
65  -  74  1421.47 1553.72 1655.11 2052.74 2023.46 2200.06 2397.94 2670.93 2967.39
75  +  1344.98 1454.64 1595.83 1863.00 1983.90 2051.44 2339.09 2513.26 2856.92
75  -  79  1351.97 1399.15 1609.51 1830.56 1999.54 2026.10 2319.89 2599.75 2856.92
80  +  1336.67 1506.68 1576.14 1903.24 1947.60 2094.24 2341.58 2462.05 2897.61
55 +  1535.04 1635.67 1775.97 2089.71 2149.12 2272.91 2490.46 2747.12 3155.29
All  1806.15 1970.90 2233.65 2310.83 2570.28 2789.75 3050.00 3347.22 3815.89
  Kroons/month (2004 prices) 
Below 55  2804.70 2858.94 2995.59 2914.41 3212.83 3316.32 3490.80 3798.99 4068.50
55  -  59  2941.20 2748.60 2900.92 3119.06 3000.20 3213.60 3320.79 3691.82 4102.50
60  -  64  2358.79 2325.13 2429.03 2688.95 2636.89 2592.51 2722.13 3160.52 3801.77
65  -  74  2069.00 2069.06 2025.81 2436.96 2312.03 2380.50 2504.46 2751.06 2967.39
75  +  1957.66 1937.12 1953.26 2211.71 2266.83 2219.70 2443.00 2588.66 2856.92
75  -  79  1967.83 1863.24 1970.00 2173.19 2284.69 2192.28 2422.94 2677.74 2856.92
80  +  1945.56 2006.42 1929.16 2259.48 2225.35 2266.00 2445.60 2535.91 2897.61
55 +  2234.31 2178.21 2173.75 2480.85 2455.61 2459.33 2601.08 2829.54 3155.29
All  2628.91 2624.62 2733.94 2743.35 2936.84 3018.56 3185.48 3447.63 3815.89
  1996=100 (in 2004 prices) 
Below  55  100 102 107 104 115 118 124 135 145
55 - 59  100  93  99  106  102 109 113 126 139
60 - 64  100  99  103  114  112 110 115 134 161
65  -  74  100 100  98 118 112 115 121 133 143
75  +  100  99 100 113 116 113 125 132 146
75  -  79  100  95 100 110 116 111 123 136 145
80  +  100 103  99 116 114 116 126 130 149
55  +  100 97 97  111  110 110 116 127 141
All  100 100 104 104 112 115 121 131 145
  Annual real change 
Below 55  -  1.9 4.8 -2.7 10.23 .25 .38 .87 .1
55 - 59  -  -6.5 5.5 7.5  -3.8 7.1 3.3 11.2 11.1
60 - 64  -  -1.4 4.5  10.7  -1.9 -1.7 5.0 16.1 20.3
65 - 74  -  0.0 -2.1 20.3 -5.1 3.0 5.2 9.8 7.9
75 +  -  -1.0 0.8  13.2 2.5 -2.1 10.1 6.0 10.4
75 - 79  -  -5.3 5.7  10.3 5.1 -4.0 10.5 10.5 6.7
80 +  -  3.1 -3.9 17.1 -1.5 1.8 7.9 3.7 14.3
55 +  -  -2.5 -0.2 14.1 -1.00 .25 .88 .81 1 .5
All  -  -0.2 4.2 0.3 7.1 2.8 5.5 8.2 10.7
 
Table B3 Median income as percent of the average wage by age group 
Age  group  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Below 55  82.4 76.7 77.7 70.6 73.2 70.87 0 .17 1 .3 71,7
55  -  59  86.5 73.8 75.3 75.5 68.3 68.6 66.7 69.2 72,3
60  -  64  69.3 62.4 63.0 65.1 60.1 55.3 54.7 59.3 67,0
65  -  74  60.8 55.5 52.6 59.0 52.7 50.8 50.3 51.6 52,3
75  +  57.5 52.0 50.7 53.6 51.6 47.4 49.0 48.6 50,3
75  -  79  57.8 50.0 51.1 52.6 52.0 46.8 48.6 50.2 50,3
80  +  57.2 53.9 50.1 54.7 50.7 48.4 49.1 47.6 51,1
55 +  65.7 58.5 56.4 60.1 55.9 52.55 2 .25 3 .1 55,6
All  77.3 70.5 70.9 66.4 66.9 64.4 64.0 64.7 67,2
  Kroons/month 
Av. net wage
a  2337 2798 3148 3478 3842 4329 4769 5176 5675
a Nominal figures unavailable for entire period due to legal changes. Figures in italic calculated based on official growth rates 186 
Table B4 Income components (mean per capita, per month, kroons per month) 
     Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All 
1996     
Wages  73.1 62.8 40.3 18.5 20.9 15.2 26.2 37.5 63.0
Farming  income  8.7 9.5 8.7 9.6 9.2 9.8 8.7 9.3 8.9
Self-empl  2.5 1.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.7 0.6 2.0
Property  0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.4
Social  transfers  12.8 23.8 48.1 69.1 68.1 73.6 63.0 50.1 23.4
Other  2.5 1.9 1.8 2.3 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.9 2.3
1997     
Wages  73.5 61.0 39.6 17.8 13.6 12.4 14.6 33.8 62.1
Farming  income  7.0 7.5 6.5 9.0 8.1 9.2 7.2 7.9 7.3
Self-empl  4.5 2.2 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.7 1.2 3.5
Property  0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2
Social  transfers  12.9 26.3 50.5 71.7 77.4 77.5 77.3 55.5 25.2
Other  1.9 2.4 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2 1.3 1.7
1998     
Wages  78.7 60.8 42.5 20.5 15.3 14.1 16.8 35.6 66.6
Farming  income  3.7 6.9 5.1 5.1 5.4 6.0 4.6 5.6 4.2
Self-empl  2.4 1.5 1.4 0.6 1.1 1.7 0.4 1.1 2.0
Property  0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.7 2.4 0.9 0.5 0.4
Social  transfers  12.6 28.7 48.7 72.8 75.4 74.6 76.5 55.8 24.7
Other  2.2 1.8 1.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.4 2.0
1999     
Wages  76.4 67.6 41.6 16.6 14.9 10.8 20.2 35.0 63.7
Farming  income  3.5 3.3 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.5 2.4 3.3 3.4
Self-empl  2.8 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.5 1.8 0.8 2.2
Property  0.7 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.6
Social  transfers  14.5 26.1 52.3 78.3 80.5 84.9 74.9 59.5 28.2
Other  2.2 1.0 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.8 1.8
2000     
Wages  75.4 59.8 37.0 18.5 17.3 14.9 20.3 33.1 64.9
Farming  income  2.5 3.9 3.5 3.0 3.4 2.8 4.1 3.4 2.7
Self-empl  2.6 2.4 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 1.1 2.3
Property  0.8 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.1 2.0 0.0 0.7 0.8
Social  transfers  16.2 33.0 56.5 75.8 76.9 78.9 74.6 60.6 27.3
Other  2.5 0.5 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 2.1
2001     
Wages  76.8 65.0 35.9 19.6 16.3 11.2 23.1 33.5 65.8
Farming  income  2.5 3.6 4.2 3.7 2.6 2.4 2.9 3.6 2.8
Self-empl  2.0 2.7 3.0 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.8 2.0
Property  0.9 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.8
Social  transfers  15.6 26.8 55.7 74.1 79.9 84.9 73.2 59.8 26.8
Other  2.1 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.9 1.8
2002     
Wages  77.2 64.6 39.8 16.5 21.6 17.2 27.1 33.8 66.3
Farming  income  2.5 4.3 3.4 3.1 3.7 5.2 1.9 3.6 2.7
Self-empl  2.7 1.6 0.8 1.4 0.8 1.1 0.4 1.2 2.3
Property  0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5
Social  transfers  15.4 28.8 55.0 77.2 73.0 75.8 69.4 60.3 26.6
Other  1.7 0.7 0.8 1.6 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.5
2003     
Wages  76.5 66.8 39.8 15.9 15.6 11.9 11.9 32.4 65.6
Farming  income  2.2 1.5 2.4 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2
Self-empl  2.4 4.0 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.5 2.2
Property  0.6 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Social  transfers  15.4 26.7 55.7 78.6 79.0 82.3 82.3 62.1 27.0
Other  2.9 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.9 2.5 2.5 1.0 2.4
2004     
Wages  77.4 66.4 42.1 15.4 15.3 12.2 19.4 34.0 65.9
Farming  income  1.4 2.3 2.1 1.6 2.2 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.6
Self-empl  3.1 2.4 2.2 1.6 1.5 2.4 0.4 1.9 2.8
Property  0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3
Social  transfers  15.3 27.9 52.9 80.5 80.5 82.1 78.4 61.3 27.4
Other  2.3 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.9
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Table B5 Distribution of the population by age groups and income deciles (in %) 
Decile      Age  group 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 Below  55  79.2 77.4 74.8 82.0 83.18 0 .78 0 .57 9 .58 4 .8
  55  -  59  5.7 6.9 6.1 5.9 4.7 4.2 5.4 6.1 5.3
  60  -  64  3.6 4.2 6.7 4.7 3.0 4.7 4.7 3.2 2.0
  65  -  74  7.3 7.5 8.2 4.6 6.2 5.7 5.8 7.7 5.3
  75  +  4.2 4.1 4.2 2.9 3.0 4.7 3.6 3.6 2.6
  75  -  79  1.7 2.3 1.9 1.3 1.2 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.3
  80  +  2.5 1.8 2.2 1.6 1.7 2.3 1.5 1.9 1.3
 55  +  20.8 22.6 25.2 18.0 16.91 9 .31 9 .52 0 .51 5 .2
  All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2 Below  55  57.4 53.8 50.5 66.7 60.05 6 .55 6 .46 0 .75 2 .2
  55  -  59  5.5 6.1 6.0 5.1 5.2 4.2 3.8 4.0 5.6
  60  -  64  9.1 9.2 9.6 7.2 8.1 8.7 10.0 6.7 6.5
  65  -  74  19.0 19.3 23.7 11.9 16.5 19.2 17.4 16.5 20.5
  75  +  9.0 11.6 10.2  9.2 10.3 11.5 12.3 12.0 15.2
  75  -  79  4.5 6.1 6.2 5.5 6.1 7.0 7.7 5.9 9.4
  80  +  4.5 5.5 4.0 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.7 6.1 5.8
 55  +  42.6 46.2 49.5 33.3 40.04 3 .54 3 .63 9 .34 7 .8
  All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
10 Below  55  82.2 82.2 85.0 80.2 86.98 7 .58 9 .18 8 .08 8 .1
  55  -  59  8.6 8.4 6.0 8.4 5.0 5.0 4.1 5.6 4.1
  60  -  64  4.6 4.7 5.3 6.0 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.8 5.0
  65  -  74  3.2 3.1 2.6 4.0 2.7 2.6 1.8 1.9 1.9
  75  +  1.4 1.6 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.9
  75  -  79  0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4
  80  +  0.7 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.5
 55  +  17.8 17.8 15.0 19.8 13.11 2 .51 0 .91 2 .01 1 .9
  All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Below  55  72.8 71.1 71.5 71.0 73.97 3 .27 3 .87 3 .47 2 .9
  55  -  59  6.6 6.6 6.1 6.0 5.3 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.5
  60  -  64  6.3 6.2 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.1 6.2 5.1 5.4
  65 - 74  10.0  10.8  10.8  10.7  9.6 10.0 9.8 10.7 10.1
  75  +  4.2 5.2 4.7 5.8 4.9 5.6 5.5 6.0 6.1
  75  -  79  2.0 2.7 2.6 3.3 2.7 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.5
  80  +  2.2 2.6 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.6
 55  +  27.2 28.9 28.5 29.0 26.12 6 .82 6 .22 6 .62 7 .1
  All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
 
Table B6 Median income by age group as percent of the median income of the non-elderly [0-54] 
Age  group 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
           
Below 55  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
55 - 59  104.9  96.1  96.8 107.0  93.4  96.9 95.1 97.2 100.8
60 - 64  84.1  81.3  81.1 92.3  82.1  78.2 78.0 83.2 93.4
65 - 74  73.8  72.4  67.6 83.6  72.0  71.8 71.7 72.4 72.9
75  +  69.8 67.8 65.2 75.9 70.6 66.9 70.0 68.1 70.2
75 - 79  70.2  65.2  65.8 74.6  71.1  66.1 69.4 70.5 70.2
80  +  69.4 70.2 64.4 77.5 69.3 68.3 70.1 66.8 71.2
55 +  79.7 76.2 72.68 5 .1 76.4 74.27 4 .57 4 .57 7 .6
All  93.7 91.8 91.3 94.1 91.4 91.0 91.3 90.8 93.8
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Table B7 Inequality of equivalised disposable income per head 
   Below 55  55 - 59 60 - 64 65 - 74 75 - 79 80 +  55 +  75 +  All 
1996                
Gini coefficient  0.343  0.340 0.301 0.262 0.251 0.280 0.309 0.267 0.339 
Theil entropy measure  0.213  0.199 0.155 0.129 0.122 0.141 0.171 0.132 0.206 
Theil mean log deviation  0.217  0.206 0.150 0.115 0.108 0.130 0.159 0.120 0.205 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.100  0.095 0.073 0.059 0.055 0.065 0.079 0.061 0.096 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.195  0.186 0.139 0.108 0.102 0.122 0.147 0.113 0.185 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.445  0.417 0.272 0.203 0.192 0.222 0.288 0.208 0.409 
1997                
Gini coefficient  0.353  0.343 0.308 0.248 0.227 0.339 0.308 0.289 0.348 
Theil entropy measure  0.250  0.206 0.171 0.115 0.095 0.291 0.180 0.207 0.239 
Theil mean log deviation  0.228  0.208 0.161 0.104 0.091 0.212 0.161 0.156 0.214 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.109  0.097 0.079 0.053 0.045 0.115 0.081 0.084 0.104 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.204  0.188 0.149 0.099 0.087 0.191 0.149 0.144 0.193 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.482  0.400 0.303 0.184 0.184 0.381 0.293 0.293 0.437 
1998                
Gini coefficient  0.350  0.326 0.339 0.278 0.256 0.271 0.318 0.263 0.350 
Theil entropy measure  0.224  0.179 0.213 0.173 0.128 0.191 0.194 0.157 0.224 
Theil mean log deviation  0.220  0.191 0.191 0.133 0.110 0.132 0.168 0.120 0.212 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.104  0.088 0.095 0.072 0.057 0.075 0.085 0.065 0.102 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.198  0.174 0.174 0.124 0.104 0.124 0.155 0.113 0.191 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.400  0.381 0.521 0.210 0.180 0.191 0.343 0.185 0.391 
1999                
Gini coefficient  0.364  0.357 0.323 0.247 0.211 0.255 0.302 0.233 0.351 
Theil entropy measure  0.238  0.220 0.184 0.116 0.088 0.122 0.169 0.105 0.223 
Theil mean log deviation  0.235  0.224 0.179 0.103 0.078 0.108 0.154 0.092 0.214 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.110  0.104 0.086 0.053 0.040 0.056 0.077 0.048 0.103 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.210  0.200 0.164 0.098 0.075 0.103 0.143 0.088 0.193 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.417  0.393 0.318 0.178 0.138 0.182 0.264 0.158 0.378 
2000    
Gini coefficient  0.364  0.345 0.296 0.260 0.236 0.282 0.300 0.258 0.356 
Theil entropy measure  0.236  0.208 0.153 0.142 0.108 0.152 0.168 0.128 0.228 
Theil mean log deviation measure 0.235  0.199 0.142 0.116 0.093 0.131 0.147 0.110 0.219 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.110  0.097 0.071 0.062 0.049 0.068 0.075 0.057 0.105 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.210  0.181 0.133 0.109 0.088 0.123 0.137 0.104 0.197 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.419  0.350 0.237 0.183 0.152 0.206 0.240 0.176 0.381 
2001                
Gini coefficient  0.354  0.329 0.310 0.260 0.222 0.267 0.296 0.243 0.348 
Theil entropy measure  0.215  0.189 0.171 0.131 0.101 0.125 0.162 0.112 0.210 
Theil mean log deviation measure 0.222  0.182 0.159 0.114 0.085 0.114 0.144 0.098 0.208 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.103  0.088 0.079 0.059 0.045 0.058 0.073 0.051 0.099 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.199  0.166 0.147 0.108 0.081 0.108 0.134 0.093 0.188 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.404  0.311 0.266 0.198 0.140 0.189 0.239 0.161 0.368 
2002    
Gini coefficient  0.355  0.340 0.330 0.243 0.259 0.326 0.305 0.290 0.352 
Theil entropy measure  0.216  0.195 0.214 0.116 0.148 0.281 0.185 0.210 0.217 
Theil mean log deviation measure 0.230  0.208 0.181 0.103 0.121 0.188 0.159 0.151 0.218 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.104  0.095 0.093 0.053 0.063 0.107 0.081 0.083 0.102 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.205  0.188 0.166 0.098 0.114 0.172 0.147 0.140 0.196 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.906  0.508 0.283 0.186 0.401 0.255 0.323 0.355 0.872 
2003    
Gini coefficient  0.349  0.344 0.316 0.236 0.197 0.267 0.291 0.231 0.344 
Theil entropy measure  0.213  0.201 0.178 0.107 0.077 0.162 0.160 0.117 0.208 
Theil mean log deviation measure 0.214  0.213 0.162 0.095 0.067 0.123 0.141 0.093 0.202 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.100  0.097 0.081 0.049 0.035 0.067 0.072 0.050 0.097 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.193  0.192 0.150 0.090 0.065 0.115 0.132 0.089 0.183 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.393  0.420 0.260 0.162 0.117 0.186 0.242 0.150 0.362 
2004    
Gini coefficient  0.347  0.317 0.312 0.228 0.204 0.226 0.285 0.214 0.339 
Theil entropy measure  0.209  0.167 0.178 0.093 0.077 0.088 0.147 0.082 0.201 
Theil mean log deviation measure 0.215  0.176 0.159 0.088 0.068 0.085 0.134 0.076 0.199 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.100  0.082 0.081 0.044 0.036 0.042 0.067 0.039 0.094 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.193  0.162 0.147 0.084 0.066 0.082 0.125 0.073 0.181 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.407  0.322 0.254 0.165 0.116 0.159 0.227 0.135 0.366 
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Table B8 Poverty incidence (headcount)  
                [percent of persons with equivalised income below 40%, 50%, 60% and 70% of the overall median equivalised income] 
     Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All  Poverty  
threshold  
(in Kroons)
1996              
40% Median  8.4  6.1 3.8 4.3 4.6 3.9 5.2 4.7 7.4 722.46
50% Median  12.2  9.7 7.3 9.8 13.3 11.7 14.7 9.7 11.5 903.07
60% Median  17.5  15.2 17.9 22.8 28.7 27.9 29.4 20.7 18.4 1083.69
70% Median  23.9  22.0 28.4 37.1 42.5 41.2 43.8 32.2 26.2 1264.30
1997                 
40% Median  7.3  6.6 4.0 3.4 3.8 4.7 2.8 4.3 6.5 788.36
50% Median  11.4  11.0 7.8 7.8 9.0 9.7 8.3 8.8 10.6 985.45
60% Median  16.9  17.7 19.5 19.3 23.8 25.6 21.8 19.8 17.7 1182.54
70% Median  23.5  25.5 28.3 36.4 44.7 47.1 42.3 33.7 26.4 1379.63
1998                 
40% Median  7.3  7.1 4.1 2.7 3.5 4.4 2.4 4.1 6.4 893.46
50% Median  11.5  11.9 11.9 10.0 11.7 10.5 13.2 11.1 11.4 1116.83
60% Median  16.8  19.3 23.2 27.8 28.5 29.0 27.8 25.0 19.2 1340.19
70% Median  23.2  25.8 30.7 44.1 47.0 46.9 47.2 37.5 27.3 1563.56
1999               
40% Median  8.0  7.2 5.5 2.2 2.1 1.1 3.3 3.9 6.8 924.33
50% Median  13.0  10.2 8.0 4.9 6.6 5.6 7.8 7.0 11.3 1155.41
60% Median  18.2  15.3 12.8 10.6 14.7 14.5 14.9 12.9 16.6 1386.50
70% Median  25.4  22.4 22.2 25.1 33.5 35.5 30.9 25.6 25.5 1617.58
2000       
40% Median  7.5  5.6 3.1 3.0 2.8 1.7 4.1 3.5 6.4 1028.11
50% Median  12.2  10.7 5.7 8.2 8.9 7.2 11.0 8.2 11.2 1285.14
60% Median  18.1  17.0 14.5 19.2 21.8 21.1 22.7 18.1 18.1 1542.17
70% Median  24.2  24.9 26.2 37.0 39.6 38.3 41.1 32.4 26.3 1799.20
2001       
40% Median  8.1  5.2 5.5 2.8 4.6 4.8 4.4 4.2 7.1 1115.90
50% Median  13.7  11.7 11.2 12.7 14.3 13.9 14.8 12.5 13.4 1394.88
60% Median  18.0  16.6 20.4 23.3 27.2 27.7 26.5 22.2 19.2 1673.85
70% Median  26.8  23.9 31.7 41.3 45.9 46.7 44.8 36.8 29.5 1952.83
2002       
40% Median  7.5  7.3 3.3 3.4 3.1 2.7 3.6 4.0 6.6 1220.00
50% Median  11.6  12.2 9.1 7.5 8.2 8.4 7.8 8.8 10.9 1525.00
60% Median  17.4  18.5 22.2 21.1 24.9 27.2 21.7 21.7 18.5 1830.00
70% Median  23.0  24.6 32.5 36.2 41.0 42.4 39.1 34.2 25.9 2135.00
2003       
40% Median  6.4  9.0 3.3 4.4 3.4 2.7 4.2 4.8 6.0 1338.89
50% Median  12.2  14.2 7.6 8.7 7.4 6.2 8.9 9.2 11.4 1673.61
60% Median  17.9  19.9 16.5 20.6 23.3 19.5 27.7 20.3 18.6 2008.33
70% Median  23.8  25.4 29.0 34.8 41.7 37.8 46.4 33.5 26.4 2343.05
2004       
40% Median  8.7  8.0 1.9 4.1 1.9 0.8 3.3 3.9 7.4 1526.35
50% Median  12.8  13.2 5.6 8.6 6.4 6.0 6.9 8.4 11.6 1907.94
60% Median  18.3  19.5 15.4 23.4 26.9 27.4 26.3 21.8 19.2 2289.53
70% Median  24.6  24.0 21.2 38.7 43.7 43.5 44.0 33.4 27.0 2671.12
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Table B9 Poverty gap ratio (in %) [thresholds 40%, 50%, 60% and 70% of the overall median equivalized income] 
     Below 
55 
55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74  75 +  75 - 79  80 +  55 +  All 
1996           
40% Median  40.8 39.4 38.1 40.1 45.8 45.5 46.0 40.4  40.7
50% Median  39.1 35.8 30.3 27.3 25.4 24.4 26.1 29.5  36.9
60% Median  36.9 33.1 21.6 21.0 21.7 20.1 23.1 23.4  32.7
70% Median  35.4 31.7 23.4 22.6 24.5 23.9 25.0 24.7  31.8
1997           
40% Median  41.8 47.4 39.1 36.3 41.1 44.6 35.1 41.5  41.7
50% Median  38.1 38.6 30.1 25.7 27.0 31.5 21.6 30.5  36.3
60% Median  35.2 33.5 21.2 20.0 20.1 21.2 18.7 23.1  31.3
70% Median  34.0 31.8 24.6 20.3 20.3 21.0 19.5 23.1  30.0
1998             
40% Median  42.9 41.2 31.4 32.9 20.4 16.4 29.2 33.9  41.2
50% Median  37.9 35.0 20.9 18.5 16.3 17.9 14.8 22.5  33.6
60% Median  35.3 31.3 21.2 16.5 17.0 16.3 17.9 20.1  29.7
70% Median  34.1 32.4 26.5 20.7 20.3 20.3 20.3 23.5  30.0
1999           
40% Median  39.7 38.1 48.8 44.8 26.0 32.2 23.4 41.5  40.0
50% Median  35.1 38.5 43.7 29.7 19.0 16.1 21.7 33.9  34.9
60% Median  35.3 34.8 35.5 23.4 18.3 15.3 21.9 27.7  33.6
70% Median  33.7 32.5 29.2 18.0 16.3 14.6 18.9 22.3  30.4
2000    
40% Median  37.8 27.1 31.3 29.1 29.0 32.0 27.4 28.9  36.5
50% Median  34.8 26.1 28.8 21.7 19.3 16.9 21.4 23.6  32.7
60% Median  39.7 26.9 22.6 22.2 19.1 15.0 23.9 22.5  35.2
70% Median  33.8 28.0 21.3 19.5 20.0 18.8 21.4 21.3  29.8
2001    
40% Median  34.5 39.4 27.2 32.7 22.1 23.7 19.6 30.2  33.8
50% Median  32.1 28.1 24.3 15.8 18.3 19.1 17.3 20.3  29.1
60% Median  34.2 35.4 21.4 18.4 16.7 16.6 16.9 21.0  30.1
70% Median  33.1 31.3 27.2 22.5 24.0 24.1 23.9 24.9  30.4
2002    
40% Median  36.0 32.5 30.8 29.2 17.0 17.0 17.0 28.6  34.8
50% Median  34.8 31.4 20.5 24.6 18.4 17.5 19.7 24.1  32.6
60% Median  35.6 31.0 20.4 18.9 15.4 14.8 16.4 20.3  30.9
70% Median  34.0 32.3 23.0 20.3 20.3 20.6 19.9 22.5  30.0
2003    
40% Median  35.1 47.7 28.3 20.0 13.2 15.4 11.5 29.5  33.9
50% Median  29.5 39.9 22.4 21.7 17.7 18.0 17.5 26.2  28.8
60% Median  31.7 39.0 22.9 19.6 14.7 15.1 14.3 22.3  29.0
70% Median  32.2 37.9 22.0 21.2 18.7 17.9 19.5 22.9  29.1
2004    
40% Median  36.4 38.2 23.6 25.4 19.3 6.2 23.7 29.8  35.5
50% Median  36.7 33.6 20.1 22.4 17.5 12.1 23.9 24.8  34.3
60% Median  38.0 33.7 17.4 18.0 12.8 11.1 15.1 19.3  32.3
70% Median  34.8 35.9 22.5 21.0 18.3 18.1 18.5 22.5  30.7
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Table B10 Poverty incidence (headcount) according to national criteria [percent of persons with equivalized income below local thresholds] 
        
     Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All  65+  65+
a 
(MSAE) 
Poverty threshold 
(in Kroons) 
1997       
Subsistence  min.  -  - - -  -  -  -  -  -  - -  - 
Absolute poverty  19.0  20.7 22.7 26.3 32.7 33.7 31.7 25.4 20.9 33.9 40.6 1  250
1998       
Subsistence min.  12.6  13.6 14.0 13.8 15.1 13.6 16.9 14.1 13.0 13.8 - 1  177
Absolute poverty  17.2  19.6 23.6 28.4 29.5 30.5 28.3 25.6 19.6 28.8 36.8 1  353
1999        
Subsistence min.  13.2  10.4 8.1 5.1 7.0 5.6 8.8 7.2 11.5 5.2 - 1  172
Absolute poverty  18.4  15.4 12.8 10.8 15.4 15.4 15.5 13.1 16.9 11.9 17.6 1  398
2000        
Subsistence min.  11.0  9.2 5.1 6.5 6.3 4.6 8.4 6.7 9.9 6.1 - 1  229
Absolute poverty  15.2  14.0 10.9 14.0 15.2 13.6 17.3 13.5 14.8 13.9 21.2 1  454
2001        
Subsistence min.  9.9  7.3 6.1 4.4 6.8 6.4 7.3 5.8 8.8 4.9 - 1  306
Absolute poverty  14.2  11.9 12.8 13.8 15.3 15.1 15.5 13.5 14.0 14.1 22.4 1  538
2002        
Subsistence min.  10.1  9.8 4.6 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 6.0 9.0 5.3 - 1  389
Absolute poverty  13.0  13.1 12.2  9.4 11.2 12.2 9.9 11.1 12.5 10.1 15.5 1  593
2003        
Subsistence min.  7.1  9.3 3.8 4.8 3.4 2.7 4.2 5.1 6.6 4.3 - 1  411
Absolute poverty  10.4  12.1 5.4 7.1 6.0 5.3 6.9 7.4 9.6 6.7 9.7 1  614
2004        
Subsistence min.  8.1  6.2 1.7 3.5 1.4 0.4 2.8 3.2 6.7 2.7 - 1  489
Absolute poverty  9.9  9.0 3.1 4.6 2.6 1.2 4.5 4.7 8.5 3.7 7.3 1  662
 
a Estonian scale: 1.0:0.8:0.8 - Ministry of Social Affairs of Estonia 
 
 
Table B11a Subjective poverty: considering the everyday needs of the household, the percentage of households whose income is insufficient 
or totally insufficient 
     Below 55  55 - 59 60 - 64 65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All 
1996    
Insufficient or totally insufficient 86.0  79.6  77.5  81.6  78.8 75.9  81.5 79.7 84.3 
Totally  insufficient  29.5  20.4 18.9 21.2  19.8 16.6  22.8 20.2 27.0 
Insufficient  56.5  59.2 58.6 60.4  59.0 59.3  58.7 59.5 57.3 
1997                 
Insufficient or totally insufficient 83.3  77.3  78.1  80.0  79.0 80.0  78.1 78.8 82.0 
Totally  insufficient  28.2  22.1 21.8 22.2  18.0 16.9  19.3 21.3 26.2 
Insufficient  55.0  55.2 56.2 57.8  61.0 63.1  58.8 57.4 55.7 
1998                 
Insufficient or totally insufficient 80.8  77.8  79.4  82.7  79.5 81.1  77.7 80.3 80.7 
Totally  insufficient  23.8  22.9 22.7 23.0  15.4 17.5  13.0 21.7 23.2 
Insufficient  57.1  54.9 56.7 59.7  64.1 63.6  64.7 58.7 57.5 
1999                 
Insufficient or totally insufficient 81.9  74.7  70.5  76.8  70.8 73.0  67.9 73.7 79.5 
Totally  insufficient  24.0  19.1 16.8 16.4  13.2 15.3  10.6 16.4 21.8 
Insufficient  57.9  55.6 53.6 60.4  57.5 57.7  57.3 57.3 57.7 
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Table B11b Subjective poverty: assessment of the current situation
a and in comparison with the situation from a year ago 
 
     Below 55  55 - 59 60 - 64 65 - 74 75 +  75 - 79 80 +  55 +  All 
2000      
Economic situation     46.8      54.1     54.1     67.2     68.6     71.8     64.4     61.6      50.7  
very poor       5.1        6.0        4.3       3.0       4.4       6.1       2.2       4.2        4.9  
ends meet but minimum     41.7      48.1     49.8     64.1     64.2     65.8     62.2     57.4      45.8  
Change of the situation 1 year ago      
worse     26.1      29.5     30.4     30.8     26.1     28.6     23.0     29.6      27.0  
much worse       9.7      12.8     10.3     10.0       8.4       9.0       7.6     10.4        9.9  
2001      
Economic situation     47.9      48.5     61.3     69.2     71.4     75.5     65.6     64.0      52.2  
very poor       5.9        3.7       4.8       5.8       6.7       7.9       4.9       5.4        5.8  
ends meet but minimum     42.0      44.8     56.5     63.4     64.8     67.6     60.7     58.6      46.5  
Change of the situation 1 year ago      
worse     23.3      26.4     32.0     32.4     28.1      29.3     26.4     30.3      25.2  
much worse       8.4      11.9     10.1     11.0     10.2       9.1     11.7     10.8        9.0  
2002      
Economic situation     45.8      50.0     57.9     64.0      65.0     66.4     63.2     60.2      49.6  
very poor       5.7        5.7       5.5       5.3       6.5       7.9       4.6       5.7        5.7  
ends meet but minimum     40.1      44.2     52.4     58.7      58.5     58.5     58.6     54.5      43.9  
Change of the situation 1 year ago      
worse     20.1      22.7     24.0     23.0     19.7     20.3     18.8     22.5      20.8  
much worse       6.9        7.7        9.8       8.7       7.2       8.3       5.7       8.5        7.3  
2003      
Economic situation     42.9      46.9     51.4     60.6     58.2     58.1     58.3     55.8      46.4  
very poor       5.7        4.9       4.2       2.2       3.9       3.4       4.4       3.4        5.1  
ends meet but minimum     37.2      42.0     47.2     58.4     54.3     54.7     53.8     52.4      41.3  
Change of the situation 1 year ago      
worse     18.3      19.2     16.5     19.7     18.0     17.6     18.4     18.6      18.4  
much worse       6.5        9.3       5.7       3.8       2.2       2.5       1.8       4.8        6.0  
2004      
Economic situation     44.8      46.3     44.8     59.1     51.3     55.5     45.5     51.9      46.8  
very poor       3.7        4.6       2.9       3.5       4.3       3.3       5.7       3.8        3.7  
ends meet but minimum     41.2      41.7     41.9     55.6     46.9     52.2     39.7     48.1      43.0  
Change of the situation 1 year ago      
worse     20.2      23.2     21.5     22.9     20.0     21.7     17.7     22.1      20.7  
much worse       6.5        7.0       2.9       3.8       4.8       4.2       5.6       4.5        6.0  
 
a Percent of households who consider themselves very poor or they can make the ends meet but only necessities are covered.  193 
Table B11c Material deprivation – percentage of persons living in substandard housing conditions by age groups 
  
     Below 55  55 - 59 60 - 64 65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 +  All 
1996                 
No  conveniences    12.8  15.4 17.0 22.4  29.9 29.3  30.4 20.6  14.9 
Only cold water, sewage, inside toilet  22.0  21.7  26.5  25.8  26.1 29.9  22.7 25.0  22.8 
1997                 
No  conveniences  11.6  17.2 15.5 22.1  31.0 28.8  33.2 21.2  14.3 
Only cold water, sewage, inside toilet  24.1  24.3  25.1  30.5  24.6 26.4  22.7 26.8  24.9 
1998                 
No  conveniences  11.4  18.1 16.2 19.1  29.0 30.0  27.7 19.8  13.8 
Only cold water, sewage, inside toilet  23.6  22.8  26.0  29.7  27.1 27.7  26.3 26.9  24.5 
1999                 
No  conveniences                 
Only cold water, sewage, inside toilet                   
2000                 
None of below conveniences  4.4  -  -  -  -  -  -  8.1  5.4 
No running water  9.4  13.6  13.2  17.8  24.0 23.2  25.1 17.0  11.4 
No  sewerage  8.4  12.3 12.8 15.9  23.0 21.7  24.7 15.7  10.3 
No inside toilet   6.0  7.8  8.3  10.5  14.7 14.4  15.1 10.2  7.1 
2001                 
None of below conveniences  4.3  -  -  -  -  -  -  8.6  5.5 
No running water  9.4  13.1  12.6  18.4  23.7 20.0  29.1 17.2  11.5 
No  sewerage  8.2  11.1 11.7 16.6  21.3 17.5  26.6 15.5  10.1 
No inside toilet   5.8  7.5  9.0  11.1  14.5 12.4  17.5 10.6  7.1 
2002                 
None of below conveniences  3.8  -  -  -  -  -  -  9.1  5.2 
No running water  9.3  16.3  14.7  18.9  20.7 18.1  24.5 17.8  11.6 
No  sewerage  8.2  13.0 14.9 17.6  19.4 16.3  23.7 16.5  10.4 
No inside toilet   4.8  9.1  10.4  12.4  11.1 9.8  13.0 11.1  6.5 
2003                 
None of below conveniences  3.4  -  -  -  -  -  -  8.4  4.8 
No running water  8.7  13.0  17.9  20.7  20.3 19.5  21.3 18.7  11.4 
No  sewerage  7.3  11.5 15.9 19.0  17.8 16.2  19.7 16.8  9.8 
No inside toilet   4.3  7.6  10.3  12.4  11.0 9.2  13.1 10.8  6.0 
2004                 
None of below conveniences  4.4  -  -  -  -  -  -  6.8  5.0 
No running water  9.9  10.9  14.0  15.8  17.6 17.1  18.3 14.9  11.2 
No  sewerage  8.9  10.5 12.4 15.8  18.3 18.4  18.2 14.7  10.4 
No inside toilet   6.1  7.0  8.0  10.2  8.2  6.9  9.9  8.6  6.8 
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Table B12a Marginal groups: distribution of persons in single households by age groups and deciles [%] 
SINGLES 
Decile    Age group  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 Below  55  8.0 8.6 11.0 10.8 10.69 .81 3 .31 1 .61 2 .6
  55 - 59  24.1  33.8  36.3  32.9  43.2 36.5 28.3 34.2 39.0
  60 - 64  39.9  33.9  56.1  40.1  29.8 28.5 48.6 30.4 42.3
  65 - 74  44.1  49.8  62.9  48.0  40.6 44.8 33.0 45.1 29.8
  75  +  50.8 60.7 60.3 39.8 39.4 61.3 57.0 64.2 66.6
  75 - 79  40.0  55.6  52.2  46.2  30.0 52.6 47.0 66.9 76.2
  80  +  58.4 67.6 67.4 34.6 46.0 70.4 71.9 61.8 57.1
 55  +  39.3 44.0 54.2 39.7 39.24 3 .03 9 .94 3 .24 1 .0
  All  14.6 16.6 21.9 16.0 15.4 16.3 18.5 18.3 16.9
2 Below  55  6.2 6.0 7.5 7.3 5.89 .88 .46 .09 .7
  55 - 59  39.3  48.5  49.2  54.1  48.6 41.9 48.2 44.7 47.2
  60 - 64  74.5  72.0  74.6  65.3  68.3 73.5 75.1 74.5 68.0
  65 - 74  77.2  78.8  86.8  75.7  75.0 78.0 75.9 73.9 80.2
  75  +  75.7 79.7 83.2 81.3 79.2 73.3 83.8 78.8 83.8
  75 - 79  84.2  80.8  84.6  85.6  78.6 78.4 84.1 78.6 88.0
  80  +  67.3 78.4 81.1 74.8 80.0 65.3 83.5 78.9 77.1
 55  +  71.4 73.7 79.1 71.7 71.37 2 .47 5 .67 2 .97 5 .8
  All  34.0 37.3 43.0 28.7 32.0 37.0 37.6 32.7 41.3
10 Below  55  6.3 7.8 9.6 9.2 6.64 .35 .84 .54 .5
  55 - 59  20.3  13.7  9.7  20.3  4.6 11.8 23.2 16.5 27.5
  60 - 64  21.1  9.9  22.9  18.6  18.0 8.5 11.6 21.1 12.6
  65 - 74  10.8  12.1  17.1  10.9  16.2 0.0 5.0 0.0 15.6
  75  +  0.0  35.5 6.1 6.4 6.4 7.4 13.6 21.1 0.0
  75 - 79  0.0  16.7  12.5  14.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 38.0 0.0
  80  +  0.0  41.0 0.0 0.0  11.3 14.6 20.5 0.0 0.0
 55  +  17.3 14.4 15.4 16.9 11.57 .91 5 .11 5 .71 7 .2
  All  8.3  9.0 10.4 10.7  7.2 4.8 6.8 5.8 6.0
Total Below  55  5.0 5.7 7.5 7.2 5.86 .16 .45 .95 .9
  55 - 59  20.6  24.5  24.0  25.8  23.0 19.7 20.0 20.4 21.9
  60 - 64  29.9  29.2  32.9  27.8  23.5 26.2 27.5 28.7 27.5
  65 - 74  36.1  38.8  42.0  36.2  30.8 32.0 29.2 28.1 33.6
  75  +  38.9 48.1 46.1 43.6 39.3 40.2 43.4 40.4 43.0
  75 - 79  42.7  48.0  44.3  49.5  37.9 40.4 43.6 39.7 44.1
  80  +  35.5 48.1 48.2 36.0 41.1 39.9 43.2 41.3 41.4
 55  +  31.3 35.2 36.7 33.7 29.13 0 .13 0 .12 9 .63 2 .1
  All  12.2 14.2 15.8 14.9 11.9 12.5 12.6 12.2 13.0
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Table B12b Marginal groups: distribution of disabled persons by age groups and  deciles [%] 
DISABLED 
Decile    Age 
group 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 Below  55  12.1 11.5 13.61 7 .21 6 .8
  55 - 59  45.5  30.9  41.1 56.2 40.0
  60 - 64  39.7  35.2  57.0 44.8 57.3
  65 - 74  45.9  45.4  42.9 59.5 55.0
  75  +  41.2 54.1 41.5 44.9 54.7
  75 - 79  32.5  58.1  46.7 42.9 58.2
  80  +  47.4 49.9 33.9 46.7 51.3
 55  +  43.9 41.9 45.55 3 .65 0 .1
  All  17.5 17.4 19.9 25.0 21.9
2 Below  55  8.2 15.1 12.51 2 .71 9 .2
  55 - 59  45.4  32.2  51.7 46.0 38.1
  60 - 64  52.1  35.6  39.2 62.0 56.9
  65 - 74  42.5  35.6  48.0 44.1 56.0
  75  +  51.5 44.3 66.7 65.9 61.2
  75 - 79  55.2  38.7  66.3 65.3 60.7
  80  +  46.1 53.2 67.3 66.5 62.0
 55  +  47.1 37.6 51.65 4 .15 5 .7
  All  23.8 24.9 29.5 29.2 36.6
10 Below  55  6.9 5.8 7.68 .47 .7
  55 - 59  13.1  18.7  13.5 17.3 14.7
  60 - 64  22.3  27.5  14.9 15.4 7.7
  65 - 74  20.5  31.6  20.3 27.2 22.3
  75  +  41.3 59.3 30.8 49.3 71.1
  75 - 79  19.4  56.1  27.4 8.9 100.0
  80  +  57.8 62.5 32.5 100.0 43.8
 55  +  20.1 27.8 17.12 0 .61 7 .2
  All  8.6 8.5 8.6 9.9 8.9
Total Below  55  8.9 8.6 9.91 0 .91 1 .0
  55 - 59  32.4  29.0  34.3 36.5 32.4
  60 - 64  36.1  32.2  35.6 40.6 38.4
  65 - 74  42.1  38.8  45.8 49.4 52.5
  75  +  49.8 47.7 56.4 55.5 62.3
  75 - 79  48.6  48.2  55.9 57.2 60.7
  80  +  51.4 46.9 57.2 53.4 64.6
 55  +  40.1 37.3 43.54 6 .74 7 .9
  All  17.0 16.3 18.7 20.4 21.0
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Table B12c Marginal groups: distribution of persons in households receiving social income, by age groups and deciles [%] 
 
PERSONS RECEIVING SOCIAL INCOME 
Decile    Age group  1997  1998  1999  2000  2002 2003 2004
1 Below  55  8.5 10.5 9.4 3.6 1.12 .32 .9
  55 - 59  8.5  10.8  10.3  0.4  0.0 0.9 0.0
  60 - 64  0.7  2.1  15.0  0.6  0.0 1.2 0.0
  65 - 74  1.4  3.1  0.0  0.3  0.0 0.0 0.0
  75  +  2.4 0.3 1.7 1.2 1.6 0.0 4.1
  75 - 79  3.6  0.7  3.8  1.6  2.6 0.0 0.0
  80  +  0.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 8.2
 55  +  3.6 4.3 7.6 0.5 0.30 .50 .7
  All  7.4 9.0 9.1 3.0 0.9 1.9 2.5
2 Below  55  15.6 11.9 12.0 5.1 2.62 .24 .1
  55 - 59  10.3  6.2  6.3  0.0  0.0 4.6 1.2
  60 - 64  4.3  3.5  1.8  2.3  0.0 0.0 1.0
  65 - 74  2.0  2.5  0.6  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
  75  +  0.5 1.7 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.1
  75 - 79  0.9  0.8  0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
  80  +  0.0 3.2 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 5.6
 55  +  3.2 3.0 1.6 0.6 0.00 .41 .0
  All  9.9 7.5 8.5 3.3 1.5 1.5 2.6
10 Below  55  4.6 2.4 2.5 4.3 1.93 .43 .3
  55 - 59  3.8  1.9  0.0  0.9  0.0 0.0 0.0
  60 - 64  4.1  1.6  2.8  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
  65 - 74  1.9  5.6  4.1  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
  75  +  4.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  75 - 79  21.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
  80  +  0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 55  +  3.7 2.3 1.8 0.3 0.00 .00 .0
  All  4.5 2.4 2.4 3.7 1.7 3.0 2.9
Total Below  55  7.6 4.9 5.6 4.2 3.43 .43 .2
  55 - 59  5.1  3.3  3.0  1.0  0.5 1.3 0.2
  60 - 64  5.2  2.2  3.1  1.0  0.5 1.0 1.3
  65 - 74  5.8  3.2  2.2  0.8  0.5 0.6 0.2
  75  +  5.8 2.7 2.0 1.1 1.0 0.1 1.2
  75 - 79  5.9  2.2  2.4  0.6  1.7 0.0 0.5
  80  +  5.7 3.3 1.5 1.8 0.0 0.2 2.1
 55  +  5.5 2.9 2.5 1.0 0.60 .70 .7
  All  7.0 4.3 4.7 3.3 2.6 2.7 2.5197 
Table B12d Marginal groups: distribution of non-Estonian persons by age groups and  deciles [%] 
NON-ESTONIANS 
Decile    Age 
group 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 Below  55  32.1 32.0 36.53 5 .34 2 .33 7 .1
  55 - 59  19.5  28.2  23.0 25.8 27.6 44.5
  60 - 64  23.5  35.4  49.1 34.3 29.9 31.7
  65 - 74  18.8  34.5  32.7 21.0 25.7 37.0
  75  +  20.1 29.6 39.9 21.0 40.8 38.5
  75 - 79  31.7  23.3  58.4 23.6 32.3 21.8
  80  +  10.9 34.1 20.5 17.1 48.1 55.1
 55  +  20.5 32.0 36.32 5 .52 9 .73 9 .2
  All  30.0 32.0 36.5 33.4 39.6 37.4
2 Below  55  34.5 33.5 38.13 5 .84 1 .23 3 .9
  55 - 59  32.0  22.8  23.0 23.6 48.1 46.6
  60 - 64  51.4  38.2  47.8 38.4 33.2 28.7
  65 - 74  29.4  34.7  37.7 32.8 42.4 40.1
  75  +  23.1 25.9 22.5 38.7 31.2 38.8
  75 - 79  30.0  33.0  25.0 46.5 44.5 46.3
  80  +  12.9 15.7 18.5 26.0 18.0 26.4
 55  +  32.8 31.6 34.33 5 .03 7 .93 8 .9
  All  34.0 32.7 36.4 35.4 39.9 36.3
10 Below  55  14.5 15.9 16.81 2 .21 3 .81 5 .8
  55 - 59  5.9  7.4  21.2 11.4 11.2 7.8
  60 - 64  7.7  18.2  17.0 12.9 11.5 3.7
  65 - 74  12.3  3.5  11.0 13.2 0.0 14.4
  75  +  12.4 20.9 21.4 4.5 40.0 7.2
  75 - 79  0.0  35.4  35.4 13.5 43.2 14.7
  80  +  22.7 9.8 7.7 0.0 36.0 0.0
 55  +  8.2 11.4 17.81 1 .41 1 .67 .1
  All  13.2 15.3 16.9 12.1 13.5 14.7
Total Below  55  29.8 32.0 32.53 2 .93 3 .93 2 .4
  55 - 59  19.6  27.8  26.1 24.9 27.6 37.2
  60 - 64  31.2  35.0  37.0 36.1 30.9 27.7
  65 - 74  27.8  32.9  29.6 30.5 30.3 31.5
  75  +  19.2 27.4 26.6 30.3 32.0 27.5
  75 - 79  24.3  29.8  32.8 37.5 37.1 32.1
  80  +  12.8 24.4 17.8 20.1 25.9 21.2
 55  +  25.2 31.3 30.03 0 .83 0 .33 1 .0
  All  28.4 31.8 31.8 32.3 33.0 32.0
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Table B13 Marginal groups: poverty headcount at 60 median threshold by marginal groups and age [%] 
  TOTAL Singles Disabled  
Persons 
Social 
 income 
Non- 
Estonians
1996         
Below 55  17.5 24.8 - 31.0 20.0 
55 - 59  15.2  22.0  -  19.5 16.7 
60 - 64  17.9  39.0  -  19.3 24.3 
65 - 74  22.8  42.4  -  17.1 29.1 
75 +  28.7  50.3  -  17.7 25.9 
75 - 79  27.9  47.0  -  10.8 23.3 
80 +  29.4  53.9  -  24.1 28.2 
55 +  20.7 39.9 - 18.2 24.3 
All 18.4  35.3  -  27.1 21.1 
1997         
Below 55  16.9 23.7 - 24.2 17.3 
55 - 59  17.7  29.9  -  33.6 21.0 
60 - 64  19.5  40.4  -  13.2 20.0 
65 - 74  19.3  34.6  -  6.5 20.9 
75 +  23.8  36.0  -  4.7 29.8 
75 - 79  25.6  38.1  -  8.2 40.5 
80 +  21.8  33.9  -  0.9 18.5 
55 +  19.8 35.2 - 13.3 22.0 
All 17.7  31.9  -  21.7 18.5 
1998         
Below 55  16.8 21.4 - 36.4 18.3 
55 - 59  19.3  34.3  -  51.0 26.3 
60 - 64  23.2  48.1  -  28.6 30.6 
65 - 74  27.8  54.0  -  22.8 31.3 
75 +  28.5  48.0  -  13.6 23.9 
75 - 79  29.0  50.7  -  11.3 21.3 
80 +  27.8  45.0  -  15.4 27.9 
55 +  25.0 48.7 - 29.3 29.1 
All 19.2  39.4  -  35.0 21.3 
1999         
Below 55  18.2 24.3 26.5 34.0 20.0 
55 - 59  15.3  22.2  19.7  44.0  15.9 
60 - 64  12.8  20.4  12.5  41.1  13.0 
65 - 74  10.6  18.6  11.6  0.0  9.7 
75 +  14.7  23.0  14.9  4.6  19.4 
75 - 79  14.5  21.9  14.8  6.8  19.3 
80 +  14.9  25.0  15.0  0.0  19.8 
55 +  12.9 20.6 13.3 22.8 13.1 
All 16.6  21.9  14.1  32.3  18.2 
2000         
Below 55  18.1 28.3 21.6 18.8 18.1 
55 - 59  17.0  33.8  22.6  3.2   
60 - 64  14.5  34.7  20.0  27.3   
65 - 74  19.2  40.1  20.9  2.3   
75 +  21.8  37.2  21.3  16.3   
75 - 79  21.1  36.3  20.5  12.5   
80 +  22.7  38.3  22.3  17.9   
55 +  18.1 37.3 21.1 11.9   
All 18.1  34.0  21.3  18.2   199 
 
  TOTAL Singles Disabled 
persons  
Social 
 income 
Non- 
Estonians
2001         
Below 55  18.0 29.1 27.0   18.1 
55 - 59  16.6  32.9  17.8     
60 - 64  20.4  44.4  22.6     
65 - 74  23.3  51.3  22.0     
75 +  27.2  48.2  26.7     
75 - 79  27.7  49.7  25.0     
80 +  26.5  46.0  29.2     
55 +  22.2 46.8 22.8    
All 19.2  40.5  24.4     
2002         
Below 55  17.4 31.9 24.1 9.4 18.5 
55 - 59  18.5  34.8  24.7    18.7 
60 - 64  22.2  52.6  27.5    23.4 
65 - 74  21.1  46.1  20.8    19.8 
75 +  24.9  43.6  27.7  10.2  29.7 
75 - 79  27.2  47.1  32.0  10.2  31.0 
80 +  21.7  38.8  21.8    26.3 
55 +  21.7 45.4 24.5 3.5 22.7 
All 18.5  40.3  24.3  9.0  19.5 
2003         
Below 55  17.9 27.2 25.6 12.9 22.2 
55 - 59  19.9  38.4  27.5  35.6  25.5 
60 - 64  16.5  32.2  22.6  8.0  19.5 
65 - 74  20.6  46.7  22.2    26.5 
75 +  23.3  42.8  27.2  0.0  24.7 
75 - 79  19.5  39.4  22.7    21.4 
80 +  27.7  46.8  33.0    30.4 
55 +  20.3 41.8 24.4 13.8 24.5 
All 18.6  36.6  24.8  13.0  22.8 
2004        
Below 55  18.3 36.3 29.7 18.2 20.1 
55 - 59  19.5  39.2  23.5  60.5  23.6 
60 - 64  15.4  34.7  23.2  9.6  16.7 
65 - 74  23.4  48.0  24.7  0.0  29.5 
75 +  26.9  50.3  25.2  58.9  39.3 
75 - 79  27.4  52.7  25.8    39.4 
80 +  26.3  46.8  24.4  77.3  39.1 
55 +  21.8 45.2 24.4 32.0 27.8 
All 19.2  42.3  26.4  19.2  22.1 
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Table C1 Number of cases in the total sample – weighted 
Age  group 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 2000 2003 2005 
Weighted 
0-55  2793 2793 2799 2736 2708 2709 2634 20841 2763 2771 3053 2607 
55-59  358 354 357 356 368 322 340  347 326 352 383 403 
60-64  355 331 307 280 266 282 329  288 304 304 293 289 
65-74  542 538 534 504 486 446 518  577 518 489 625 473 
75+  314 282 274 276 259 267 412  305 338 352 274 371 
55+  1569 1504 1473 1415 1379 1317 1599  1517 1486 1496 1574 1537 
All  5745 5605 5589 5482 5367 5238 5200  5384 5253 5213 5920 5209 
Unweighted 
0-55  5250 4827 4505 3967 3462 2679 3671  3755 3960 4495 4921 3455 
55-59  442 387 364 307 278 197 344  359 335 363 541 407 
60-64  453 429 366 311 265 227 337  325 321 300 375 366 
65-74  700 670 646 583 525 421 524  655 546 479 493 609 
75+  420 361 339 325 277 254 414  343 355 318 246 447 
55+  2015 1847 1715 1526 1345 1099 1619  1682 1557 1460 1655 1829 
All  7265 6674 6220 5493 4807 3778 5293  5440 5517 5960 6581 5284 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
 
 
 
Table C2 Median income of the elderly by age groups, in constant prices (HUF, year 2005) 
Age 
group  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2005 
0-55  1,007,847  956,489 895,732 856,518 750,307 677,383 678,473 700,494 736,195 837,883 923,181 957,519 
55-59  933,725  900,814 841,390 782,633 744,699 650,256 665,751 711,874 696,050 851,304 920,753 1,027,026 
60-64  790,634  815,682 758,954 760,044 686,910 630,304 632,214 685,444 676,421 698,507 863,057 901,709 
65-74  719,462  743,886 728,220 707,746 668,735 621,884 619,533 635,446 652,325 692,753 786,048 885,101 
75+  683,924  682,613 656,268 648,989 621,721 575,663 553,219 617,945 626,935 652,430 890,460 840,879 
55+  762,344  771,042 747,029 720,981 676,596 620,203 612,643 653,374 658,686 704,324 842,298 896,074 
All  925,539  900,333 852,357 807,589 728,185 663,403 650,389 685,235 708,424 789,210 897,120 940,154 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
 
 
Table C3 Median income of the elderly by age groups as percentage of average earnings (%) 
Age  group 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2005 
0-55  109  105  103 93 93 88 83 83 87 97 81 80 
55-59  101 99 96 85 92 84 82 85 82 99 81 86 
60-64  85 90 87 83 85 82 78 81 80 81 76 75 
65-74  78 82 83 77 83 81 76 76 77 80 69 74 
75+  74 75 75 71 77 75 68 73 74 76 78 70 
55+  82 85 86 78 84 81 75 78 78 82 74 75 
All  100 99 98 88 90 86 80 81 84 92 79 79 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 203 
 
Table C4 Relative share of income components, 1991-2005 (%) 
Income 0-55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  All 
  1991 
Earnings  58.2 39.5 17.6 11.3 15.5 20.0 47.7 
Self-empl. inc.  5.7 3.2 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.9 4.6 
Pensions  4.2 27.9 56.7 64.9 54.8 52.6 17.5 
Social transfers  25.4 19.9 15.0 13.1 19.6 16.4 22.9 
Others  6.5 9.5 9.1 9.2 8.8 9.1 7.3 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 1992 
Earnings  52.2 34.1 15.3  8.7 11.0 16.6 42.7 
Self-empl. inc.  7.6 5.4 3.7 3.3 1.6 3.6 6.5 
Pensions  4.4 31.9 56.3 66.2 62.5 55.2 18.0 
Social transfers  29.1 20.3 15.4 12.6 16.8 15.8 25.5 
Others   6.7 8.3 9.3 9.2 8.1 8.8 7.3 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 1993 
Earnings  53.1 32.6 16.4  9.0 10.5 16.6 43.5 
Self-empl. inc.  7.8 5.1 2.8 2.3 2.0 3.0 6.6 
Pensions  4.9 32.3 57.1 67.1 56.7 54.6 18.0 
Social transfers  28.9 22.9 13.5 13.3 22.7 17.4 25.9 
Others   5.3 7.1  10.2 8.3 8.1 8.4 6.0 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 1994 
Earnings  52.4 29.3 14.9  9.2 10.7 15.7 43.0 
Self-empl. inc.  8.7 5.9 2.8 2.2 3.0 3.4 7.3 
Pensions  5.1 34.8 60.2 67.0 60.3 56.3 18.3 
Social transfers  28.6 22.2 12.9 14.5 20.1 17.2 25.7 
Others   5.2 7.8 9.2 7.1 5.9 7.4 5.7 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  1995 
Earnings  52.4 27.6 14.9  9.5 10.6 15.6 43.0 
Self-empl. inc.  10.0 6.8 4.7 3.1 2.4 4.3 8.6 
Pensions  5.4 35.6 59.3 66.7 65.0 56.7 18.5 
Social transfers  28.2 21.9 15.2 14.2 17.0 17.0 25.3 
Others   4.0 8.1 5.9 6.5 5.0 6.4 4.6 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 1996 
Earnings  52.7 26.4 14.1  9.3  9.7 14.6 43.1 
Self-empl. inc.  8.7 5.3 4.9 3.2 2.5 3.9 7.5 
Pensions  5.7 38.9 64.2 67.5 69.3 60.2 19.4 
Social transfers  27.8 22.4 11.1 14.0 14.8 15.6 24.8 
Others   5.1 7.0 5.7 6.0 3.7 5.7 5.2 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 1997 
Earnings  52.8 26.6 13.1  7.9  8.1 13.0 40.5 
Self-empl. inc.  6.6 5.0 2.5 1.7 1.3 2.5 5.3 
Pensions  6.8 37.1 63.4 67.3 62.8 58.9 22.9 
Social transfers  28.6 25.4 15.6 17.5 23.5 20.3 26.1 
Others  5.2 5.9 5.4 5.6 4.3 8.4 8.3 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 1998 
Earnings  49.1 24.7  9.5  6.7  8.0 11.6 38.6 
Self-empl. inc.  8.4 5.9 3.8 2.1 1.1 3.1 6.9 
Pensions  5.7 34.4 63.4 68.4 65.1 59.0 20.7 
Social transfers  28.4 25.1 14.0 15.2 18.5 17.9 25.5 
Others   8.4 9.9 9.3 7.6 7.3 8.4 8.3 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
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Table C4 (countinued) Relative share of income components, 1991-2005 (%) 
Income 0-55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  All 
 1999 
Earnings  53.5 27.5 13.6  7.8  9.6 13.7 42.2 
Self-empl. inc.  10.2 7.2 3.2 1.5 1.4 3.1 8.2 
Pensions  4.9 28.2 56.0 67.0 64.4 55.7 19.2 
Social transfers  26.4 29.8 20.7 15.6 17.8 20.3 24.7 
Others  5.0 7.3 6.5 8.1 6.8 7.2 5.7 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 2000 
Earnings  57.1 33.2 16.4 10.3  9.9 16.9 45.6 
Self-empl. inc.  7.8 6.0 3.8 2.0 2.1 3.3 6.6 
Pensions  4.4 25.6 55.8 70.8 62.7 55.1 18.9 
Social transfers  25.7 26.5 19.6 11.6 21.2 19.0 23.8 
Others  5.0 8.7 4.4 5.3 4.1 5.7 5.1 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
 
 
Table C5: Distribution of population by age groups and deciles, 1991-2005 (%) 
Decile    0-55 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+  All 
 1991 
1  7.9 9.9  11.4  16.8  24.4  15.5  10.0 
2  7.6 8.5  15.5  20.0  19.8  16.4  10.0 
10  11.8 9.6 5.2 3.8  3.2  5.3  10.0 
 1992 
1  8.9 8.4  10.3  13.9  19.4  12.9  10.0 
2  8.5 9.6  11.0  14.5  21.9  14.0  10.0 
10  11.4 9.3 6.3 5.3  4.7  6.4  10.0 
 1993 
1  9.5 8.7 7.4 9.2  22.9  11.2  10.0 
2  8.8 7.8  13.0  16.2  15.9  13.4  10.0 
10  11.3 9.3 7.0 4.4  5.4  6.2  10.0 
 1994 
1  10.1  11.1 5.9 8.8  13.8  9.8  10.0 
2  8.0 11.7 12.1 16.4  20.5  15.3  10.0 
10  11.7 9.9 4.8 3.1  4.9  5.4  10.0 
 1995 
1  11.1 7.6 3.6 7.1  9.6  7.1  10.0 
2  9.8 7.4  10.3  11.0  14.4  10.6  10.0 
10  11.7 8.8 5.2 4.5  2.0  5.4  10.0 
 1996 
1  11.6 9.9 2.6 4.2  4.7  5.3  10.0 
2  9.6 11.2  7.5 10.8  16.0  11.3  10.0 
10  11.5 8.6 5.2 5.2  3.1  5.5  10.0 
 1997 
1  11.3 9.3 5.7 4.2  9.8  7.0  10.0 
2  9.1 9.3  11.3  12.9  14.0  12.1  10.0 
10  11.8  10.4 6.9 5.2  2.5  6.0  10.0 
 1998 
1  11.7 9.8 5.2 3.1  6.6  5.7  10.0 
2  9.1 12.4  9.4 14.2  12.1  12.4  10.0 
10  11.1 12.4 10.4  4.7 2.3 7.0  10.0 
 1999 
1  11.2 7.7 9.5 4.8  7.1  7.0  10.0 
2  9.7 10.8 10.2 11.6  10.3  10.8  10.0 
10  11.7  11.7 6.9 2.7  3.5  5.8  10.0 
 2000 
1  10.9  11.4 6.9 6.3  6.5  7.7  10.0 
2  8.5 10.3 12.2 12.7  20.4  13.8  10.0 
10  11.8  13.4 3.9 3.1  3.4  5.7  10.0 
 2003 
1  11.0 8.4 6.1 7.5  4.4  6.9  10.0 
2  9.6 9.4 9.6  11.9  13.1  11.1  10.0 
10  10.9  15.1 8.5 4.0  4.0  7.6  10.0 
 2005 
1  11.0 9.7 9.0 5.7  6.4  7.6  10.0 
2  10.2 7.4 9.7 9.1  11.5  9.4  10.0 
10  10.8  17.1 9.0 4.2  2.9  8.3  10.0 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
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Table C6 Median income of the elderly as percentage of median income of non-elderly, 1991-2005 (%) 
Age  group 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2005 
0-55  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
55-59  92.6 94.2 93.9 91.4 99.3 96.0 98.1  101.6 94.5  101.6 99.7  107.3 
60-64  78.4 85.3 84.7 88.7 91.6 93.0 93.2 97.9 91.9 83.4 93.5 94.2 
65-74  71.4 77.8 81.3 82.6 89.1 91.8 91.3 90.7 88.6 82.7 85.1 92.4 
75+  67.9 71.4 73.3 75.8 82.9 85.0 81.5 88.2 85.2 77.9 96.5 87.8 
55+  75.6 80.6 83.4 84.2 90.2 91.6 90.3 93.3 89.5 84.1 91.2 93.6 
All  91.8 94.1 95.2 94.3 97.1 97.9 95.9 97.8 96.2 94.2 97.2 98.2 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
 
 
Table C7 Inequality of disposable income, 1991-2005 
Inequality measure  0-55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  All 
 1991 
Gini  0.261 0.262 0.252 0.227 0.232 0.252 0.266 
Theil  0.126 0.124 0.134 0.098 0.093 0.119 0.129 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.059 0.058 0.058 0.045 0.044 0.054 0.060 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.113 0.111 0.105 0.083 0.083 0.100 0.114 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.167 0.162 0.146 0.118 0.119 0.142 0.167 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.226 0.216 0.184 0.152 0.152 0.182 0.221 
 1992 
Gini  0.277 0.259 0.237 0.245 0.257 0.255 0.276 
Theil  0.142 0.120 0.110 0.120 0.132 0.123 0.141 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.066 0.056 0.049 0.053 0.058 0.055 0.065 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.125 0.105 0.091 0.096 0.106 0.102 0.121 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.182 0.149 0.127 0.131 0.150 0.142 0.175 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.245 0.190 0.160 0.162 0.198 0.181 0.232 
 1993 
Gini  0.301 0.272 0.252 0.237 0.302 0.265 0.297 
Theil  0.173 0.136 0.115 0.108 0.181 0.132 0.167 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.078 0.062 0.053 0.049 0.080 0.060 0.075 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.144 0.115 0.098 0.089 0.147 0.110 0.138 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.204 0.162 0.136 0.123 0.210 0.156 0.195 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.263 0.204 0.169 0.154 0.282 0.201 0.251 
 1994 
Gini  0.307 0.279 0.246 0.234 0.266 0.258 0.300 
Theil  0.172 0.134 0.114 0.109 0.137 0.124 0.165 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.079 0.064 0.052 0.049 0.061 0.057 0.075 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.147 0.124 0.095 0.089 0.110 0.105 0.140 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.211 0.191 0.132 0.122 0.149 0.149 0.199 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.272 0.287 0.165 0.152 0.183 0.198 0.257 
 1995 
Gini  0.306 0.263 0.218 0.225 0.208 0.236 0.292 
Theil  0.174 0.116 0.083 0.093 0.077 0.098 0.158 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.079 0.056 0.039 0.043 0.036 0.046 0.072 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.146 0.107 0.074 0.081 0.069 0.087 0.133 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.207 0.156 0.106 0.115 0.100 0.125 0.188 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.264 0.201 0.136 0.148 0.128 0.160 0.239 
 1996 
Gini  0.308 0.273 0.219 0.215 0.214 0.232 0.292 
Theil  0.196 0.130 0.094 0.084 0.086 0.099 0.175 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.082 0.061 0.042 0.039 0.039 0.046 0.074 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.149 0.115 0.077 0.073 0.073 0.085 0.135 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.210 0.163 0.107 0.103 0.103 0.120 0.189 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.271 0.206 0.133 0.130 0.130 0.151 0.243 
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Table C7 (continued) Inequality of disposable income, 1991-2005 
Inequality measure  0-55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  All 
 1997 
Gini  0.289 0.291 0.226 0.204 0.216 0.237 0.276 
Theil  0.155 0.164 0.087 0.070 0.102 0.107 0.143 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.072 0.074 0.042 0.034 0.044 0.049 0.066 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.139 0.139 0.082 0.065 0.081 0.092 0.126 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.207 0.201 0.121 0.093 0.114 0.132 0.186 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.293 0.272 0.160 0.120 0.145 0.173 0.260 
 1998 
Gini  0.299 0.286 0.240 0.207 0.217 0.239 0.285 
Theil  0.160 0.135 0.103 0.076 0.095 0.102 0.146 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.075 0.065 0.048 0.036 0.043 0.048 0.068 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.142 0.125 0.090 0.067 0.081 0.090 0.129 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.209 0.180 0.128 0.096 0.117 0.129 0.188 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.302 0.231 0.163 0.123 0.154 0.165 0.267 
 1999 
Gini  0.306 0.295 0.254 0.215 0.230 0.248 0.294 
Theil  0.168 0.161 0.112 0.085 0.110 0.116 0.156 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.079 0.073 0.053 0.039 0.048 0.053 0.073 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.151 0.137 0.100 0.074 0.087 0.098 0.138 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.228 0.199 0.143 0.105 0.120 0.139 0.205 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.332 0.270 0.182 0.135 0.148 0.181 0.294 
 2000 
Gini  0.296 0.319 0.240 0.210 0.233 0.260 0.290 
Theil  0.150 0.178 0.114 0.084 0.111 0.129 0.146 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.072 0.083 0.051 0.040 0.049 0.059 0.069 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.141 0.155 0.093 0.080 0.087 0.108 0.134 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.215 0.219 0.130 0.126 0.119 0.155 0.200 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.315 0.277 0.164 0.189 0.146 0.203 0.286 
 2003 
Gini  0.311 0.297 0.253 0.222 0.201 0.251 0.297 
Theil  0.185 0.147 0.114 0.098 0.070 0.114 0.169 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.083 0.070 0.053 0.045 0.033 0.053 0.076 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.152 0.134 0.098 0.083 0.064 0.099 0.139 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.215 0.191 0.138 0.118 0.094 0.140 0.196 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.274 0.245 0.174 0.151 0.121 0.179 0.250 
 2005 
Gini  0.293 0.362 0.278 0.220 0.195 0.278 0.290 
Theil  0.153 0.309 0.150 0.096 0.069 0.179 0.161 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.071 0.122 0.067 0.043 0.032 0.073 0.072 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.135 0.205 0.122 0.080 0.061 0.127 0.133 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.194 0.273 0.170 0.111 0.087 0.171 0.188 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.251 0.334 0.217 0.140 0.111 0.212 0.240 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
 
 
Table C8 Replacement rate after retirement, 1991-1997 (%) 
Year   Average old-age pension as % of average net earnings 
1991  70.8 
1992  72.1 
1993  69.8 
1994  78.0 
1995  73.9 
1996  68.7 
1997  67.4 
Source: calculations of Tamás Keller (TÁRKI) based on HHP. 207 
Table C9 Poverty incidence by age groups with different thresholds, 1991-2005 (%) 
Poverty threshold (% of national median income)  Age group 
40% 50% 60% 70% 
 1991 
0-55  2.2 4.5 9.0  16.0 
55-59  1.7  5.2 11.9 18.4 
60-64  1.2  6.4 15.1 27.8 
65-74  1.7  8.5 19.4 38.3 
75+  2.3 11.3 29.1 45.3 
55+  1.7  7.8 18.7 32.9 
All  2.0  5.4 11.6 20.7 
 1992 
0-55  3.4 6.4  11.1 7.9 
55-59  2.3  5.2 10.2 18.6 
60-64  1.6  5.6 11.6 21.3 
65-74  1.3  7.4 15.4 28.9 
75+  2.2 10.1 24.9 41.5 
55+  1.8  6.0 15.2 27.2 
All  3.0  6.3 12.2 20.4 
 1993 
0-55  3.3  6.1 11.7 20.2 
55-59  1.5  5.1 10.8 20.7 
60-64  1.1  3.2 10.2 23.2 
65-74  0.8  4.6 13.5 28.2 
75+  3.5 12.7 27.1 41.7 
55+  1.5  5.9 14.8 27.9 
All  2.9  6.1 12.5 22.3 
 1994 
0-55  3.2  7.3 12.2 19.1 
55-59  1.5  6.3 13.6 23.9 
60-64  0.7 4.4 8.8  18.4 
65-74  1.4  4.9 13.3 26.5 
75+  1.1  5.6 21.2 35.7 
55+  1.3  5.2 14.0 26.0 
All  2.7  6.8 12.7 20.9 
 1995 
0-55  4.0  7.0 14.9 23.3 
55-59  2.6  4.7 11.4 19.1 
60-64  0.4 2.4 5.5  19.4 
65-74  1.3 4.1 9.5  23.8 
75+  1.2  6.0 16.8 27.6 
55+  1.5  4.3 10.6 22.4 
All  3.3  6.3 13.8 23.1 
 1996 
0-55  3.7  8.9 15.9 23.0 
55-59  3.0  7.6 13.5 23.7 
60-64  0.4 1.1 4.5  12.3 
65-74  0.2 1.6 8.2  15.9 
75+  1.2 2.7 8.9  23.0 
55+  1.2 3.1 8.8  18.4 
All  3.0  7.4 14.1 21.8 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
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Table C9 (continued) Poverty incidence by age groups with different thresholds, 1991-2005 (%) 
Age  group 40% 50% 60% 70% 
 1997 
0-55  4.8  8.1 13.7 19.9 
55-59  2.4  5.7 11.7 17.9 
60-64  2.2 2.8 8.8  16.7 
65-74  3.2  6.2 13.5 15.9 
75+  3.2  6.2 13.5 23.8 
55+  2.0  4.1 10.0 18.5 
All  3.9  6.9 12.6 23.8 
 1998 
0-55  4.8  9.0 15.0 21.2 
55-59  2.3  7.5 12.1 22.3 
60-64  1.0 3.8 7.6  14.2 
65-74  0.5 1.9 8.1  17.5 
75+  1.6  4.3 11.8 18.7 
55+  1.2 4.1 9.7  18.2 
All  3.8  7.6 13.5 20.3 
 1999 
0-55  3.7  8.1 14.4 22.6 
55-59  1.8  5.2 12.0 18.7 
60-64  1.0  7.6 12.5 21.4 
65-74  1.0 2.7 7.3  19.5 
75+  1.2  3.6 11.5 19.6 
55+  1.2  4.4 10.4 19.8 
All  3.0  7.1 13.2 21.8 
 2000 
0-55  4.8  8.9 13.6 20.8 
55-59  4.3  6.3 13.5 22.6 
60-64  2.0  5.9 10.2 22.0 
65-74  1.6  4.3 11.7 20.5 
75+  0.6  2.8 12.8 28.7 
55+  2.1  4.8 12.1 23.2 
All  4.0  7.7 13.1 21.5 
 2003 
0-55  4.5  8.8 14.0 22.2 
55-59  2.9  6.0 10.7 19.3 
60-64  1.0 4.1 7.8  17.4 
65-74  2.1  4.8 10.7 21.4 
75+  0.4  2.2 10.9 19.7 
55+  1.7  4.5 10.2 19.8 
All  3.8  7.6 13.0 21.6 
 2005 
0-55  4.0  7.5 12.6 21.8 
55-59  4.0  5.5 10.4 17.1 
60-64  1.4  3.5 10.3 19.0 
65-74  1.1 2.5 7.4  14.8 
75+  0.8 3.0 8.6  18.9 
55+  1.8 3.6 9.0  17.1 
All  3.4  6.3 11.6 20.4 
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Table C10 Poverty gap by age groups with different thresholds, 1991-2005 (%) 
Age  group 40% 50% 60% 70% 
 1991 
0-55  27.6 19.5 17.5 16.9 
55-59  31.1 18.2 15.9 19.1 
60-64  37.0 13.5 11.4 14.6 
65-74  8.6  8.3 14.0 14.8 
75+  10.6  9.6 13.1 19.1 
55+  2.0 4.0 8.2  14.5 
All  27.6 17.6 15.6 17.0 
 1992 
0-55  22.7 21.5 20.6 18.3 
55-59  7.4 19.8 19.1 17.1 
60-64  2.3 13.0 13.6 17.1 
65-74  5.0  8.4 12.9 17.4 
75+  8.4  9.0 12.1 17.9 
55+  3.1  6.0 10.3 17.1 
All  18.8 18.3 18.2 17.5 
 1993 
0-55  23.1 21.8 17.6 17.0 
55-59  19.6 17.0 15.8 15.4 
60-64  1.9 15.8 10.4 11.4 
65-74  17.7  8.8 12.8 12.9 
75+  30.2 10.5 16.3 20.2 
55+  2.9  5.3 10.4 18.3 
All  22.7 17.6 15.8 16.3 
 1994 
0-55  25.2 17.3 20.1 21.1 
55-59  5.6  7.5 14.7 19.0 
60-64  4.4 14.8 13.9 14.0 
65-74  9.0 11.7 11.6 14.4 
75+  8.9  8.0 11.1 17.0 
55+  3.1  6.6 11.2 18.0 
All  23.1 15.6 18.4 18.6 
 1995 
0-55  18.1 22.2 14.7 20.7 
55-59  24.5 26.9 14.1 19.5 
60-64  28.2 15.0 16.6  7.1 
65-74  17.1 10.1 11.7  9.2 
75+  24.5 10.1 10.5 17.8 
55+  3.6  6.2 13.3 21.1 
All  18.1 21.9 14.6 19.0 
 1996 
0-55  15.2 15.3 18.1 24.1 
55-59  7.8 16.4 21.2 18.2 
60-64  5.0 17.7 11.4  8.4 
65-74  8.8  9.3 12.6 14.4 
75+  13.4 17.5 10.6 11.3 
55+  3.1  7.2 13.4 19.7 
All  12.6 15.3 17.2 21.0 
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Table C10 (continued) Poverty gap by age groups with different thresholds, 1991-2005 (%) 
Age  group 40% 50% 60% 70% 
 1997 
0-55  26.2 25.0 22.0 24.2 
55-59  34.3 14.1 15.6 20.6 
60-64  32.5 43.7 12.5 15.7 
65-74  3.6 8.3 8.7  13.2 
75+  14.8 21.6 13.2 17.3 
55+  4.0  7.2 12.5 18.2 
All  23.7 24.8 19.1 20.9 
 1998 
0-55  14.8 23.0 19.3 25.4 
55-59  14.1 14.2 20.8 17.6 
60-64  17.4  6.8 16.6 17.7 
65-74  18.4 9.0 8.1  12.3 
75+  20.8 18.4 10.6 18.4 
55+  4.6  8.5 14.3 19.7 
All  14.8 19.9 19.1 22.3 
 1999 
0-55  25.1 15.1 19.9 21.0 
55-59  19.3 12.4 11.9 18.3 
60-64  30.3  6.8 17.8 17.5 
65-74  17.0 12.0 12.7 11.2 
75+  7.0 12.8 11.0 17.6 
55+  3.5  7.5 13.4 21.7 
All  25.0 14.1 18.8 18.4 
 2000 
0-55  21.9 20.4 23.2 22.6 
55-59  7.7 24.2  9.4 22.3 
60-64  11.2 12.5 17.4 13.4 
65-74  67.3 12.4 10.9 16.4 
75+  6.0 11.9  8.8 12.9 
55+  4.1  7.7 11.9 18.9 
All  19.8 20.1 19.9 19.4 
 2003 
0-55  23.1 22.3 20.7 21.5 
55-59  27.5 16.2 18.2 20.4 
60-64  4.2  7.0 18.1 12.8 
65-74  18.2 14.3 14.3 14.3 
75+  18.1 11.9  5.4 15.3 
55+  3.9  7.9 12.5 19.9 
All  23.1 21.0 20.0 19.6 
 2005 
0-55  13.6 23.4 23.3 18.5 
55-59  32.0 34.9 24.6 20.7 
60-64  18.0 16.2 13.9 16.4 
65-74  13.4 15.6 13.7 14.5 
75+  2.7  8.6 11.5 12.0 
55+  3.9  7.1 12.2 20.5 
All  14.0 22.3 19.4 17.9 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
 
Table C11 Trends in poverty according to national criteria (minimum old-age pension), 1991-2005 (%) 
Age  group 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2005 
Poverty incidence  
0-55  2.2 2.2 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.4 4.8 4.3 3.5 2.5 2.3 1.6 
55-59  1.7 0.9 1.5 1.2 2.6 1.6 2.4 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.6 2.2 
60-64  1.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.2 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.7 
65-74  1.7 0.6 0.6 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.3 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.2 
75+  2.3 0.7 2.7 1.1 1.2 1.2 3.2 1.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
55+  1.7 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.3 0.8 2.0 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
All  2.0 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.9 3.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.3 
Poverty gap 
0-55  27.9 24.1 23.4 23.1 13.5 11.4 25.2 11.1 24.1 19.4 12.4 17.3 
55-59  31.3 12.3 14.3 24.5 18.8 16.4 33.4 10.5 35.3 10.0 16.5 20.8 
60-64  37.3 29.4  9.0  1.7 22.9  0.7 31.6 13.9 25.5 15.1  4.2 36.4 
65-74  8.9 5.7  14.2 4.5  23.2 4.7 2.3  22.1  11.4  73.4  39.8 4.3 
75+  10.9 38.3 48.2  4.5 18.8  9.7 13.7 17.4 10.8  -  -  - 
55+  18.6 12.1 16.9  4.3 18.8 10.7 22.3 13.2 18.5 26.9 16.4 17.0 
All  27.9 22.3 22.4 21.5 14.3 11.4 22.7 11.1 35.3 19.4 12.5 17.4 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 211 
 
 
Table C12 Average square meters per household member, by age groups 
Year of the survey 
1991 1997 2000 2005  Age groups 
All persons 
0-54  22.6 23.0 24.6 25.1 
55-59  32.9 34.5 35.7 36.4 
60-64  34.9 36.3 36.0 40.0 
65-74  38.2 40.7 40.2 44.0 
75+  37.6 40.5 42.2 44.9 
55+  36.1 38.4 38.7 41.5 
All  26.3 27.7 28.7 29.9 
  Persons with income <60% of median income
0-54  19.3 20.4 22.6 24.2 
55-59  39.6 31.7 39.8 40.4 
60-64  41.6 35.8 34.7 43.8 
65-74  49.1 47.9 41.2 57.5 
75+  49.9 45.5 48.5 51.8 
55+  46.6 40.9 41.5 48.0 
All  31.3 25.3 27.6 29.7 
Source: 1991 – HHP, 1997, 2000, 2005 – TARKI Household Monitor survey. 
 
 
Table C13 Average number of rooms per household member, by age groups 
Year of the survey 
1991 1997 2000 2005  Age groups 
All persons 
0-54  0.77 0.81 0.84 0.88 
55-59  1.08 1.14 1.22 1.28 
60-64  1.14 1.21 1.19 1.36 
65-74  1.24 1.38 1.35 1.41 
75+  1.17 1.38 1.35 1.55 
55+  1.17 1.30 1.29 1.41 
All  0.88 0.96 0.96 1.03 
  Persons with income < 60% of median income
0-54  0.63 0.71 0.74 0.79 
55-59  1.22 1.08 1.25 1.33 
60-64  1.28 1.30 1.06 1.34 
65-74  1.53 1.50 1.34 1.46 
75+  1.39 1.44 1.62 1.84 
55+  1.40 1.34 1.34 1.48 
All  0.97 0.86 0.89 0.91 
Source: 1991 – HHP, 1997, 2000 – TARKI Household Monitor survey, 2005 – EU SILC 
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Table C14 Share of persons living in owned housing unit, by age groups (%) 
Year of the survey 
1991 1997  2000 2005  Age groups 
All persons 
0-54  79.2 88.7  86.9 87.0 
55-59  83.2 90.6  89.1 91.2 
60-64  81.6 87.2  94.1 92.1 
65-74  74.0 88.6  90.0 92.6 
75+  74.2 78.2  85.5 87.4 
55+  77.8 86.1  89.5 90.9 
All  78.8 87.9  87.7 88.1 
  Persons < 60% of median income 
0-54  73.5 82.7  78.1 82.3 
55-59  85.4 74.4  75.0 87.8 
60-64  90.4 85.2  80.6 90.1 
65-74  78.8 83.3  83.9 91.8 
75+  78.9 81.5  80.0 91.2 
55+  81.8 80.5  79.9 89.9 
All  77.2 82.2  78.6 83.5 
Source: 1991 – HHP, 1997, 2000 – TARKI Household Monitor survey, 2005 – EU SILC 
 
 
Table C15 Share of people living in housing units without a flushing toilet, by age groups 
Year of the survey 
1991 1997 2000 2005  Age groups 
All persons 
0-54  15.1  5.4 4.5 7.2 
55-59  20.9  7.6 3.6 7.2 
60-64  25.6  8.9 7.3 6.3 
65-74  29.7  8.9 6.1 6.4 
75+  32.1 12.4  6.8  11.6 
55+  27.2  9.4 5.9 7.9 
All  18.4  6.6 4.9 7.4 
  Persons< 60% of median income 
0-54  37.9 13.5 11.2 24.6 
55-59  70.7 21.4 12.2 23.8 
60-64  46.2 17.6 18.2 23.3 
65-74  50.0 10.5 10.6 25.7 
75+  54.4 41.2 31.4 28.1 
55+  53.7 25.5 17.1 25.2 
All  44.9 16.1 12.8 24.8 
Source: 1991 – HHP, 1997, 2000, 2005 – TARKI Household Monitor survey. 
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Table C16 Share of people who make ends meet with (great or some) difficulty, by age groups, 2005 (%) 
 
With great 
difficulty With difficulty With some 
difficulty 
Total –  
with difficulty
0-54  15.1 21.3 44.5 80.8 
55-59  11.2 22.9 45.5 79.6 
60-64  11.3 20.6 45.4 77.4 
65-74  10.2 22.7 49.2 82.1 
75+  10.4 22.5 48.7 81.6 
55+  10.7 22.3 47.5 80.5 
All  13.8 21.6 45.3 80.7 
Source: EU-SILC. 
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Table C17 Share of people running out of money by the end of the month in the last 12 month, 1991-2005 (%) 
Age  group 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2005 
At all  
0-55  29.3 31.5 33.5 32.8 22.7 28.1 23.7 21.1 27.7 29.8 31.4 40.9 
55-59  44.3 42.8 47.5 41.6 37.6 42.2 32.2 32.8 34.2 30.1 36.0 53.9 
60-64  44.2 45.8 48.0 50.0 38.7 42.3 32.3 31.6 38.8 35.5 38.0 50.5 
65-74  54.4 51.1 55.5 57.9 43.5 44.5 40.0 43.2 44.1 45.5 46.4 60.4 
75+  53.3 54.3 56.8 56.7 47.1 51.3 41.8 49.8 49.7 49.6 54.2 68.1 
55+  49.6 48.6 52.2 51.9 41.6 44.9 37.2 40.0 42.1 40.8 43.6 58.7 
All  34.8 36.1 38.4 37.8 27.5 32.3 27.8 26.4 31.8 33.0 34.7 46.2 
Once in 6 months 
0-55  15.0 14.2 13.7 13.7 18.2 13.0 13.5 18.0 17.5 17.0 17.6 15.6 
55-59  12.6 12.2  9.6 11.8 13.1 10.9 11.8 17.4 13.5 18.8 15.0 13.7 
60-64  13.2 10.2  9.5 13.6 15.0 11.4 14.8 16.7 15.5 18.4 17.8 11.1 
65-74  10.5  9.3 13.0 12.8 17.6 11.3 12.4 17.2 15.5 15.7 14.9 12.7 
75+  12.7  9.3  9.9 14.2 14.5  8.2 13.0 13.4 13.6 12.5 10.7 10.3 
55+  12.1 10.2 10.9 13.0 15.3 10.7 12.9 16.3 14.7 16.2 14.7 12.1 
All  14.2 13.1 13.0 13.5 17.4 12.4 13.3 17.6 16.7 16.8 16.8 14.5 
Every 2-3 months 
0-55  23.3 23.4 21.7 23.4 25.5 24.1 25.8 23.9 20.6 23.2 22.2 20.1 
55-59  23.5 17.8 18.1 21.6 25.9 19.6 24.9 20.9 20.6 20.2 22.6 16.0 
60-64  19.2 23.5 23.4 17.9 24.8 22.1 23.4 24.3 18.8 22.0 22.9 19.0 
65-74  16.8 21.6 17.5 13.6 18.8 19.2 21.5 18.8 17.8 19.5 19.5 13.6 
75+  16.5 19.6 14.7 13.5 17.6 19.5 22.7 14.4 16.9 21.1 15.9 13.2 
55+  18.8 20.7 18.3 16.5 21.7 19.9 22.9 19.5 18.3 20.5 20.3 15.1 
All  22.1 22.7 20.8 21.6 24.5 23.1 24.9 22.6 20.0 22.4 21.7 18.6 
Every months 
0-55  32.4 30.9 31.1 30.1 33.7 34.8 37.0 36.9 34.2 30.0 28.8 23.4 
55-59  19.6 27.2 24.9 25.0 23.4 27.3 31.1 29.0 31.7 31.0 26.5 16.5 
60-64  23.4 20.5 19.1 18.6 21.4 24.2 29.5 27.4 27.0 24.0 21.2 19.4 
65-74  18.3 18.0 14.1 15.8 20.1 25.1 26.1 20.8 22.6 19.3 19.2 13.3 
75+  17.5 16.8 18.7 15.6 20.8 21.0 22.5 22.3 19.8 16.8 19.2  8.4 
55+  19.6 20.5 18.6 18.6 21.4 24.5 27.0 24.2 24.9 22.4 21.4 14.1 
All  28.9 28.1 27.8 27.1 30.5 32.3 33.9 33.4 31.6 27.8 26.8 20.7 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
 
Table C18 Poverty rate by poverty thresholds and age groups; persons in households with pensioner member and the unemployed, 2005 (%) 
Poverty threshold (% of national median income) 
40%  50%  60%  70%  Number of all persons  Age group (years) 
Persons in pensioner households 
below 55  3.1  6.8 14.9 24.6  1129 
55-59  4.9  6.4 13.2 21.6  265 
60-64  1.4  3.6 10.5 19.2  276 
65-74  1.1 2.6 7.5  15.1  464 
75+  0.8 3.0 8.7  19.1  367 
55+  1.7 3.7 9.5  18.2  1372 
All  2.4  5.1 12.0 21.1  2501 
 The  unemployed 
below 55  13.8 22.4 37.0 54.5  246 
55-59  16.7 16.7 30.8 30.8  12 
60-64  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  1 
65-74  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  3 
75+  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  1 
55+  13.1 13.1 20.4 20.4  17 
All  13.7 21.8 36.0 52.3  263 
Source: TARKI Household Monitor survey, 2005 
 
 
Table C19 Women by age groups and selected income deciles, 2005 (% of all persons) 
Age group (years) 
below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All  Income decile 
All women 
1  47.2 71.8 42.3 63.0  87.5  66.4  51.4 
2  51.7 76.7 72.4 72.1  79.1  75.2  58.3 
10  48.1 63.8 38.5 50.0  45.5  55.1  49.7 
All  50.1 62.1 54.0 57.0  60.5  58.6  52.6 
  Women in single households 
1  22.2 69.2 58.3 76.5  100.0  78.0  60.0 
2  78.9 100.0  93.8  87.5  84.8  89.7 86.7 
10  20.0 100.0  50.0 100.0  0.0  85.7 35.7 
All  47.5 79.6 83.0 84.3  82.7  83.4  73.5 
Source: TARKI Household Monitor survey, 2005 
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Table C20 Poverty rate by poverty thresholds and age groups; (single) women, 2005 (%) 
Poverty threshold (% of national median income)  Age group (years) 
40% 50% 60% 70% 
Number of all persons 
 All  women 
below 55  3.4  6.6 12.0 21.8  1839 
55-59  4.4  6.0 11.6 20.4  249 
60-64  0.6 1.3 9.0  20.4  156 
65-74  1.5 3.3 8.5  17.8  270 
75 and over  1.3  4.5 12.5 25.4  224 
55 and over  2.0  4.0 10.5 20.8  899 
All  3.0  5.8 11.5 21.5  2738 
  Women in single households 
below 55  3.0 6.1 9.0  31.3  67 
55-59  12.5 17.5 25.6 38.5  39 
60-64  2.3  4.5 24.4 50.0  44 
65-74  3.5  7.9 14.9 30.1  114 
75 and over  1.6  7.8 16.4 35.7  129 
55 and over  3.5  8.3 18.1 36.1  326 
All  3.6  8.1 16.5 35.2  392 
Source: TARKI Household Monitor survey, 2005 
 
Table C21 Share of single elderly women in different income deciles, 1991-2005 (%) 
Income  decile 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2005 
1  46.9 41.0 35.3 27.7 18.7  9.9 12.9  9.4 11.5 14.9 14.2 14.1 
2  33.8 32.9 33.5 34.2 20.4 21.1 22.4 27.1 20.6 23.3 22.6 21.5 
10  1.3 0.9 1.3 1.3 0.4 2.6 1.2 2.8 2.4 2.9 2.1 1.6 
All              
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
 
Table C22 Poverty incidence among single elderly women with different thresholds, 1991-2005 (%) 
Poverty  threshold 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2005 
40%  3.1 3.6 5.4 3.0 2.7 2.6 3.2 2.4 3.5 5.1 3.8 3.4 
50%  24.9  19.8  19.6  14.7  11.6 6.0 6.8 6.6 8.7 8.3 7.6 8.3 
60%  53.3 47.7 43.5 37.1 27.7 17.7 19.8 20.6 16.7 20.7 21.2 18.1 
70%  80.8 64.3 74.9 65.4 54.9 31.9 33.5 36.2 35.1 41.1 41.7 36.0 
Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1991-1996; TARKI Household Monitor survey, 1997-2005 
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Table D1 Number of cases (household members) in the total sample by age groups 
Age  group  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
  Actual number (unweighted) 
Below 55  83,478 82,863 81,234 82,666 81,343 80,658 91,891 78,485 79,269 80,594  70,576 
55  -  59  5399 5384 5219 4732 4690 4415 5032 4426 4908 5301  5570 
60  -  64  5276 5088 5113 4757 4656 4651 5330 4470 4310 4050  3771 
65  -  74  7199 7437 7434 7286 7213 7072 8372 7376 7531 7313  7229 
75  +  2791 2758 2801 2876 3007 3228 3752 3456 3786 3887  4029 
75  -  79  1214 1328 1384 1508 1700 1745 2208 1997 2256 2204  2284 
80  +  1577 1430 1417 1368 1307 1483 1544 1459 1529 1683  1745 
55 +  20,665 20,667 20,567 19,651 19,566 19,366 22,486 19,729 20,535 20,552  20,598 
All  104,143 103,530 101,801 102,317 100,909 100,024 114,377 98,213 99,804 101,145 91,174 
  In percent (unweighted)  
Below 55  80.2 80.0 79.8 80.8 80.6 80.6 80.3 79.9 79.4 79.7  77.4 
55  -  59  5.2 5.2 5.1 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.9 5.2  6.1 
60  -  64  5.1 4.9 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.3 4.0  4.1 
65  -  74  6.9 7.2 7.3 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.5 7.2  7.9 
75  +  2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.8  4.4 
75  -  79  1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.2  2.5 
80  +  1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7  1.9 
55 +  19.8 20.0 20.2 19.2 19.4 19.4 19.7 20.1 20.6 20.3  22.6 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
  In percent (weighted) 
Below 55  77.8 77.7 79.1 79.5 79.1 79.7 79.8 79.9 79.4 79.7  77.4 
55  -  59  5.7 5.7 5.3 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.9 5.2  6.1 
60  -  64  5.7 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.0  4.1 
65  -  74  7.8 8.1 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.2  7.9 
75  +  3.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.8  4.4 
75  -  79  1.3 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.2  2.5 
80  +  1.7 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7  1.9 
55 +  22.2 22.3 20.9 20.5 20.9 20.3 20.2 20.1 20.6 20.3  22.6 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Source: Polish HBS 219 
Table D2 Median income by age group 
Age group 1994  1995  1996  1997 
old 
1997 
new  1998 1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 
PLN/month (current prices) 
Below 55  315.81 416.15 529.28  640.38  611.84  721.56 762.699 820.04 852.39 858.38 870.09 906.52
55 - 59  340.00  455.08  567.57  705.24  685.41  787.82 852.264 887.84 964.14 989.95  1,004.80  1,047.34
60 - 64  335.83  456.58  574.09  710.62  693.55  796.95 844.359 883.04 964.54 1010.43  1,036.01  1,067.18
65 - 74  315.92  429.36  537.39  659.77  647.47  743.06 810.138 871.59 941.98 993.13  1,017.24  1,049.76
75  +  315.21 433.52 539.77  668.13  656.64  748.04 822.147 869.31 948.17 986.83  996.52 1,035.22
75 - 79  311.30  420.85  531.81  667.22  661.25  757.66 825.932 876.00 955.13 993.33  1,001.00  1,051.95
80  +  320.13 449.97 550.00  669.50  652.03  735.49 813.636 860.10 934.65 973.87  983.23 1,004.12
55  +  326.66 443.35 555.70  683.40  670.28  765.97 828.926 877.57 951.47 995.33 1,013.33 1,050.00
All  318.23  422.76  534.88 650.39  625.41  732.67 778.11 833.33 876.07 889.33 901.22 943.33
PLN/month (2004prices) 
Below 55  823.67 849.28 900.86  948.62  958.92 956.07 941.82 919.73 906.18 895.54 900.54 906.52
55  -  59  886.76 928.71 966.05 1,044.70 1,013.84 1,043.86 1,052.42 995.78 1,024.98 1,032.80 1,039.97 1,047.34
60  -  64  875.88 931.78 977.14 1,052.67 1,004.92 1,055.95 1,042.66 990.39 1,025.40 1,054.17 1,072.27 1,067.18
65 - 74  823.95  876.23  914.67  977.35  920.73 984.55 1,000.40 977.55 1,001.42 1,036.11  1,052.84  1,049.76
75  +  822.11 884.71 918.72  989.73  931.22 991.15 1,015.23 974.99 1,008.00 1,029.54 1,031.40 1,035.22
75 - 79  811.89  858.85  905.18  988.39  924.42 1,003.89 1,019.90 982.50 1,015.40 1,036.32  1,036.04  1,051.95
80  +  834.94 918.29 936.14  991.75  941.20 974.52 1,004.72 964.67 993.63 1,016.02 1,017.65 1,004.12
55  +  851.97 904.79 945.84 1,012.36  966.14 1,014.90 1,023.60 984.26 1,011.51 1,038.41 1,048.80 1,050.00
All  829.99  862.76  910.40 963.45 960.74 970.78 960.85 934.64 931.35 927.82 932.76 943.33
Base year = 100 (in 2004 prices) 
Below 55  100  103  109  115  100 100 98 96 94 93  94  95
55 - 59  100  105  109  118  100 103 104 98 101 102  103  103
60 - 64  100  106  112  120 100 105 104 99 102 105 107 106
65 - 74  100  106  111  119  100 107 109 106 109 113  114  114
75 +  100  108  112  120 100 106 109 105 108 111 111 111
75 - 79  100  106  111  122 100 109 110 106 110 112 112 114
80  +  100  110  112 119 100 104 107 102 106 108 108 107
55  +  100  106  111 119 100 105 106 102 105 107 109 109
All 100  104  110  116  100 101 100 97 97 97  97  98
Yoy real change 
Below  55    3.1  6.1 5.3  -0.3 -1.5 -2.3 -1.5 -1.2 0.6 0.7
55 - 59    4.7  4.0  8.1  3.0 0.8 -5.4 2.9 0.8  0.7  0.7
60 - 64    6.4  4.9  7.7  5.1 -1.3 -5.0 3.5 2.8  1.7  -0.5
65 - 74    6.3  4.4  6.9  6.9 1.6 -2.3 2.4 3.5  1.6  -0.3
75  +    7.6  3.8 7.7  6.4 2.4 -4.0 3.4 2.1 0.2 0.4
75 - 79    5.8  5.4  9.2  8.6 1.6 -3.7 3.3 2.1  0.0  1.5
80 +    10.0  1.9  5.9  3.5 3.1 -4.0 3.0 2.3  0.2  -1.3
55  +    6.2  4.5 7.0  5.0 0.9 -3.8 2.8 2.7 1.0 0.1
All    3.9  5.5 5.8  1.0 -1.0 -2.7 -0.4 -0.4 0.5 1.1
Source: Polish HBS 
 
Table D3 Median income as percent of the average wage by age group 
Age  group  1994 1995 1996 1997old 1997new 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Below 55  59.3 59.2 60.6 60.3  57.6 58.2 55.4 52.9 51.3 49.9 49.0 49.1
55 – 59  63.8  64.8  65.0 66.4  64.5 63.6 61.9 57.2 58.0 57.6 56.6 56.7
60 - 64  63.0  65.0  65.8 66.9  65.3 64.3 61.4 56.9 58.0 58.8 58.4 57.8
65 - 74  59.3  61.1  61.6 62.1  61.0 59.9 58.9 56.2 56.7 57.8 57.3 56.9
75  +  59.2 61.7 61.8 62.9  61.8 60.4 59.8 56.1 57.0 57.4 56.2 56.1
75 - 79  58.4  59.9  60.9 62.8  62.3 61.1 60.0 56.5 57.5 57.8 56.4 57.0
80  +  60.1 64.0 63.0 63.0  61.4 59.3 59.1 55.5 56.2 56.6 55.4 54.4
55  +  61.3 63.1 63.7 64.4  63.1 61.8 60.2 56.6 57.2 57.9 57.1 56.9
All  59.7 60.2 61.3 61.2  58.9 59.1 56.6 53.7 52.7 51.7 50.8 51.1
  PLN/month 
Av. net wage 533 703 873 1062  1062 1239 1376 1551 1662 1720 1775 1846
Source: Polish HBS, GUS (Polish Statistical Office) 220 
Table D4 Income components (mean per capita, per month, PLN per month) 
  Below 55 55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74 75 +  75 - 79 80 +  55 +  All 
1994    
Wages  50.7  27.6  13.9 8.9 9.4 7.8  10.6  15.1  41.3 
Self-empl non-farm.  10.0  5.0 2.9 1.0 1.7 0.8  2.4 2.6  8.1 
Farming income  10.9  8.4 8.1 8.7 8.9 7.9  9.6 8.5  10.3 
Property  0.8  0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2  0.4 0.5  0.7 
Social transfers  22.1  55.4 71.3 77.4 76.4 80.3  73.4 70.0  34.7 
Other  5.5  3.0 3.2 3.5 3.3 2.9  3.6 3.3  4.9 
1995             
Wages  51.1  28.6  14.1 8.3 9.5 8.3  10.4  15.1  41.4 
Self-empl non-farm.  10.0  3.7 2.8 1.0 1.9 1.4  2.4 2.3  7.9 
Farming income  12.1  10.1 8.2 8.1 8.7 7.5  9.7 8.7  11.2 
Property  0.7  0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2  0.7 0.4  0.6 
Social transfers  21.5  54.8 72.0 79.0 76.8 79.9  74.1 70.7  34.7 
Other  4.6  2.3 2.5 3.1 2.6 2.7  2.6 2.7  4.1 
1996             
Wages  55.2  30.1 15.7  9.5 11.0 10.4  11.6 16.6  45.5 
Self-empl non-farm.  8.7  2.4 1.4 0.9 1.6 0.9  2.3 1.5  6.9 
Farming income  10.7  9.9 8.0 7.4 9.2 8.1  10.3 8.4  10.1 
Property  0.9  1.2 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.5  0.3 0.9  0.9 
Social transfers  19.7  53.8 71.3 78.7 75.1 77.2  73.1 69.9  32.3 
Other  4.8  2.7 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.8  2.4 2.7  4.3 
1997 old              
Wages  56.4  32.3 15.9  9.1 12.0 10.2  14.0 16.8  46.6 
Self-empl non-farm.  10.3  3.8 1.9 1.1 1.4 1.0  1.8 2.0  8.2 
Farming income  9.3  7.3 5.8 6.2 6.0 5.5  6.6 6.3  8.6 
Property  0.8  1.0 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2  0.4 0.7  0.8 
Social transfers  18.4  53.2 73.0 80.3 77.6 80.3  74.4 71.5  31.6 
Other  4.9  2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8  2.8 2.6  4.3 
 
    Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All 
1997 new    
Wages  58.3  33.5 16.4  9.4 12.0 10.1 14.2 17.3 47.8
Self-empl non-farm.  10.3  3.8 1.8 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.9 8.1
Farming income  8.4  6.0 5.0 5.3 5.1 4.3 6.0 5.4 7.6
Property  0.3  0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3
Social transfers  19.0  54.0 74.0 81.6 79.2 82.3 75.7 72.7 32.8
Other  3.8  2.4 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.3 3.4
1998     
Wages  60.2  32.3 16.3  8.8 11.5 10.1 13.4 16.6 49.2
Self-empl non-farm.  10.3  4.2 2.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.4 2.1 8.2
Farming income  7.9  5.5 4.6 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.2 5.0 7.2
Property  0.3  0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Social transfers  17.7  55.9 74.6 82.7 79.6 81.7 76.7 73.9 31.9
Other  3.6  1.8 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.9 2.0 3.2
1999     
Wages  60.0  32.2 15.8  9.5 11.4 10.0 13.5 16.5 49.2
Self-empl non-farm.  10.4  4.5 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.7 2.1 8.4
Farming income  6.9  4.2 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.7 4.1 3.8 6.1
Property  0.2  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2
Social transfers  19.0  56.5 76.7 83.0 81.0 82.8 78.4 75.2 33.0
Other  3.4  2.2 1.9 2.5 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.2 3.1
2000     
Wages  58.5  32.8 16.9 10.3 11.9 10.1 14.5 17.2 48.6
Self-empl non-farm.  10.8  4.8 2.4 1.1 1.6 1.4 2.0 2.3 8.8
Farming income  6.4  5.0 3.5 3.6 4.3 4.1 4.6 4.0 5.5
Property  0.2  0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Social transfers  19.2  54.5 74.8 82.1 79.7 82.2 76.1 73.7 32.6
Other  4.2  2.2 2.0 2.4 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.2 3.8221 
 
     Below 55 55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All 
2001    
Wages  58.3  33.2 16.1  9.8 10.7 9.2 12.9 16.6 47.8
Self-empl non-farm.  10.9  4.9 2.1 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.9 2.2 8.7
Farming income  5.8  4.7 3.6 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.4 3.2 5.1
Property  0.3  0.4 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3
Social transfers  20.0  54.2 75.1 83.6 82.9 84.9 79.9 75.0 33.8
Other  4.3  2.4 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.2 3.8
2002     
Wages  57.4  33.4 17.1  9.6 10.9 9.6 12.9 17.1 46.8
Self-empl non-farm.  10.4  5.8 2.5 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.7 2.7 8.4
Farming income  5.9  3.9 4.3 2.6 2.7 2.4 3.1 3.3 5.2
Property  0.3  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3
Social transfers  20.9  53.0 72.8 83.9 82.4 84.4 79.3 74.0 34.8
Other  4.8  3.0 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.4 4.2
2003     
Wages  58.7  33.5 17.7  9.2 10.2 8.7 12.3 17.4 48.0
Self-empl non-farm.  10.1  6.0 2.8 1.1 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.8 8.2
Farming income  4.8  3.9 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.7 4.3
Property  0.3  0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3
Social transfers  20.5  53.6 74.5 84.8 82.1 84.2 79.1 74.2 34.4
Other  5.2  2.4 1.9 2.1 2.8 2.5 3.4 2.3 4.4
2004     
Wages  58.7  32.8 15.1  7.8 8.1 6.9 9.8 15.9 46.6
Self-empl non-farm.  10.4  5.2 2.7 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.5 2.4 8.2
Farming income  5.0  2.5 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.3 4.2
Property  0.4  0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3
Social transfers  19.4  55.4 76.8 85.9 85.7 87.4 83.3 76.1 35.4
Other  5.4  3.0 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.6 4.6
 
Source: Polish HBS 222 
Table D5 Distribution of the population by age groups and income deciles (in %) 
Decile Age group 1994  1995 1996  1997 
old 
1997
new 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 Below  55 85.5 87.4 87.4 88.4 88.8 88.7 90.0 90.0 91.5 91.6 91.5 91.6 
  55  -  59  4.1 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.9 3.3 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.9 
  60  -  64  3.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 
  65  -  74  5.3 5.1 4.6 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.0 
  75  +  1.7 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 
  75  -  79  0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
  80  +  1.0 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 
  55  +  14.5 12.6 12.6 11.6 11.2 11.3 10.0 10.0 8.5 8.4 8.5 8.4 
  All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2 Below  55 79.6 81.9 82.3 83.3 85.3 83.1 85.3 84.4 86.2 87.3 87.7 85.2 
  55  -  59  4.3 4.2 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.6 
  60  -  64  5.0 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.8 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.7 
  65  -  74  8.3 7.4 7.2 7.0 6.0 6.6 5.8 5.8 5.2 4.4 4.2 5.3 
  75  +  2.7 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.6 3.1 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.2 
  75  -  79  1.2 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
  80  +  1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.1 
  55  +  20.4 18.1 17.7 16.7 14.7 16.9 14.7 15.6 13.8 12.7 12.3 14.8 
  All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
10 Below  55 81.1 80.2 81.3 81.6 80.2 82.2 81.8 82.7 80.9 79.5 79.2 78.3 
  55  -  59  6.1 6.4 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.2 6.2 7.0 7.7 
  60  -  64  4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.7 5.0 4.1 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.2 
  65  -  74  5.7 6.0 5.6 5.7 6.3 5.2 5.5 5.5 6.3 6.5 6.2 6.4 
  75  +  2.2 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.3 
  75  -  79  0.8 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.0 
  80  +  1.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 
  55  +  18.9 19.8 18.7 18.4 19.8 17.8 18.2 17.3 19.1 20.5 20.8 21.7 
  All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total  Below  55 77.8 77.7 79.1 79.5 79.5 79.1 79.7 79.8 79.9 79.4 79.7 77.4 
  55  -  59  5.7 5.7 5.3 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.9 5.2 6.1 
  60  -  64  5.7 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.0 4.1 
  65  -  74  7.8 8.1 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.2 7.9 
  75  +  3.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.8 4.4 
  75  -  79  1.3 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.5 
  80  +  1.7 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 
  55  +  22.2 22.3 20.9 20.5 20.5 20.9 20.3 20.2 20.1 20.6 20.3 22.6 
  All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Polish HBS 
 
Table D6 Median income by age group as percent of the median income of the non-elderly [0-54] 
Age group  1994  1995  1996  1997 
old 
1997 
new  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Below  55  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
55 - 59  107.7  109.4  107.2 110.1  112.0  109.2 111.7 108.3 113.1 115.3 115.5 115.5
60 - 64  106.3  109.7  108.5 111.0  113.4  110.4 110.7 107.7 113.2 117.7 119.1 117.7
65 - 74  100.0  103.2  101.5 103.0  105.8  103.0 106.2 106.3 110.5 115.7 116.9 115.8
75  +  99.8 104.2 102.0 104.3 107.3 103.7 107.8 106.0 111.2 115.0 114.5 114.2
75 - 79  98.6  101.1  100.5 104.2  108.1  105.0 108.3 106.8 112.1 115.7 115.0 116.0
80  +  101.4 108.1 103.9 104.5 106.6 101.9 106.7 104.9 109.7 113.5 113.0 110.8
55  +  103.4 106.5 105.0 106.7 109.6 106.2 108.7 107.0 111.6 116.0 116.5 115.8
All  100.8 101.6 101.1 101.6 102.2 101.5 102.0 101.6 102.8 103.6 103.6 104.1
Source: Polish HBS 223 
Table D7 Inequality of equivalised disposable income per head 
     Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64 65 - 74 75 +  75 - 79 80 +  55 +  All 
1994                
Gini coefficient  0.307  0.275 0.251 0.259  0.255 0.231  0.271 0.261 0.297
Theil entropy measure  0.185  0.144 0.115 0.135  0.133 0.100  0.155 0.132 0.173
Theil mean log deviation  0.160  0.130 0.107 0.114  0.112 0.090  0.128 0.117 0.151
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.082  0.065 0.054 0.059  0.058 0.046  0.067 0.060 0.077
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.207  0.175 0.148 0.151  0.149 0.123  0.167 0.156 0.196
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.264  0.226 0.194 0.192  0.189 0.158  0.211 0.201 0.251
1995               
Gini coefficient  0.307  0.267 0.252 0.246  0.241 0.224  0.255 0.253 0.295
Theil entropy measure  0.192  0.136 0.136 0.126  0.119 0.095  0.138 0.131 0.178
Theil mean log deviation  0.159  0.121 0.110 0.105  0.101 0.086  0.113 0.110 0.148
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.085  0.063 0.059 0.055  0.053 0.044  0.059 0.058 0.079
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.209  0.166 0.147 0.141  0.136 0.120  0.149 0.149 0.197
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.299  0.244 0.197 0.188  0.178 0.163  0.189 0.204 0.280
1996               
Gini coefficient  0.310  0.288 0.254 0.245  0.264 0.255  0.272 0.262 0.300
Theil entropy measure  0.199  0.174 0.128 0.121  0.144 0.138  0.150 0.140 0.186
Theil mean log deviation  0.166  0.141 0.111 0.104  0.119 0.112  0.126 0.118 0.156
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.087  0.077 0.058 0.054  0.063 0.059  0.066 0.062 0.082
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.217  0.186 0.150 0.144  0.156 0.147  0.164 0.159 0.206
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.304  0.264 0.208 0.209  0.196 0.186  0.205 0.222 0.289
1997 OLD                
Gini coefficient  0.323  0.297 0.264 0.255  0.247 0.235  0.259 0.268 0.312
Theil entropy measure  0.221  0.176 0.136 0.135  0.115 0.104  0.126 0.144 0.205
Theil mean log deviation  0.178  0.149 0.120 0.110  0.103 0.093  0.114 0.121 0.166
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.095  0.079 0.061 0.059  0.053 0.048  0.058 0.064 0.089
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.231  0.196 0.161 0.145  0.140 0.129  0.153 0.161 0.218
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.351  0.284 0.217 0.184  0.188 0.180  0.198 0.218 0.328
 
  Below 55  55 – 59  60 - 64 65 - 74 75 +  75 - 79 80 +  55 +  All 
1997 NEW                
Gini coefficient  0.308  0.287  0.251  0.249 0.245 0.234 0.257 0.259 0.299 
Theil entropy measure  0.186  0.165  0.121  0.120 0.108 0.099 0.119 0.131 0.174 
Theil mean log deviation  0.145  0.129  0.102  0.098 0.090 0.082 0.098 0.106 0.137 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.089  0.080  0.059  0.059 0.055 0.051 0.060 0.064 0.084 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.189  0.175  0.139  0.135 0.119 0.112 0.128 0.144 0.181 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.297  0.301  0.206  0.232 0.181 0.177 0.185 0.237 0.286 
1998               
Gini coefficient  0.304  0.274  0.251  0.231 0.241 0.234 0.250 0.249 0.293 
Theil entropy measure  0.175  0.141  0.123  0.095 0.102 0.095 0.111 0.115 0.163 
Theil mean log deviation  0.145  0.120  0.104  0.084 0.092 0.081 0.106 0.099 0.136 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.084  0.068  0.059  0.047 0.052 0.049 0.056 0.056 0.079 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.191  0.159  0.144  0.117 0.133 0.108 0.164 0.137 0.181 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.290  0.225  0.225  0.178 0.235 0.155 0.320 0.211 0.275 
1999               
Gini coefficient  0.310  0.270  0.245  0.239 0.233 0.229 0.238 0.247 0.298 
Theil entropy measure  0.190  0.134  0.107  0.109 0.094 0.093 0.097 0.113 0.174 
Theil mean log deviation  0.155  0.120  0.095  0.091 0.087 0.085 0.090 0.098 0.143 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.088  0.066  0.055  0.053 0.048 0.047 0.049 0.056 0.082 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.205  0.171  0.138  0.124 0.125 0.126 0.125 0.139 0.192 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.310  0.324  0.282  0.183 0.207 0.227 0.176 0.246 0.298 
2000              
Gini coefficient  0.327  0.303  0.263  0.244 0.251 0.246 0.257 0.264 0.314 
Theil entropy measure  0.207  0.183  0.130  0.107 0.114 0.105 0.127 0.132 0.192 
Theil mean log deviation  0.173  0.149  0.109  0.095 0.097 0.094 0.101 0.111 0.160 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.097  0.085  0.064  0.053 0.057 0.053 0.061 0.063 0.090 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.231  0.204  0.160  0.135 0.130 0.131 0.130 0.156 0.217 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.406  0.433  0.409  0.289 0.192 0.196 0.185 0.342 0.394 
2001               224 
Gini coefficient  0.321  0.291  0.262  0.247 0.244 0.237 0.253 0.260 0.310 
Theil entropy measure  0.188  0.162  0.135  0.111 0.106 0.099 0.114 0.128 0.176 
Theil mean log deviation 
measure  0.168  0.136  0.111  0.098 0.093 0.091 0.096 0.109 0.156 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.091  0.077  0.063  0.055 0.055 0.051 0.061 0.062 0.085 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.226  0.183  0.152  0.138 0.147 0.154 0.136 0.153 0.213 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.364  0.280  0.246  0.220 0.374 0.439 0.261 0.271 0.348 
2002              
Gini coefficient  0.329  0.308  0.288  0.246 0.249 0.241 0.260 0.271 0.318 
Theil entropy measure  0.203  0.187  0.221  0.108 0.111 0.100 0.127 0.153 0.192 
Theil mean log deviation 
measure  0.175  0.153  0.143  0.095 0.102 0.097 0.110 0.121 0.165 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.095  0.086  0.085  0.053 0.055 0.050 0.062 0.069 0.090 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.230  0.205  0.178  0.129 0.152 0.150 0.154 0.163 0.219 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.344  0.326  0.236  0.182 0.296 0.326 0.246 0.253 0.329 
2003              
Gini coefficient  0.334  0.316  0.272  0.246 0.256 0.253 0.259 0.272 0.323 
Theil entropy measure  0.203  0.188  0.138  0.106 0.125 0.123 0.128 0.138 0.190 
Theil mean log deviation 
measure  0.180  0.165  0.122  0.100 0.102 0.095 0.112 0.122 0.169 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.097  0.089  0.066  0.053 0.061 0.060 0.062 0.067 0.091 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.236  0.220  0.168  0.145 0.141 0.120 0.168 0.169 0.225 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.345  0.322  0.264  0.236 0.244 0.171 0.320 0.267 0.333 
2004              
Gini coefficient  0.346  0.307  0.265  0.248 0.241 0.238 0.245 0.267 0.329 
Theil entropy measure  0.223  0.169  0.123  0.113 0.103 0.101 0.106 0.129 0.201 
Theil mean log deviation 
measure  0.196  0.152  0.111  0.096 0.091 0.088 0.094 0.113 0.178 
Atkinson (ε =0.5)  0.104  0.083  0.061  0.054 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.063 0.095 
Atkinson (ε =1.5)  0.252  0.206  0.150  0.129 0.123 0.120 0.127 0.153 0.232 
Atkinson (ε =2.0)  0.352  0.310  0.206  0.177 0.174 0.177 0.171 0.221 0.329 
 
Source: Polish HBS 
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Table D8 Poverty incidence (headcount) [percent of persons with equivalised income below 40%, 50%, 60% and 70% of the overall median 
equivalised income] 
  Below 55  55 - 59 60 - 64  65 - 74  75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All 
1994                 
40% Median  4.2  2.7 1.9 1.8  1.8 1.6 2.0 2.1 3.7
50% Median  8.6  5.6 4.4 4.7  4.1 3.5 4.5 4.8 7.8
60% Median  15.1  10.1 9.1 10.7  8.1 8.2 8.1 9.8 14.0
70% Median  22.8  16.3 16.4 19.1  16.7 17.2 16.4 17.4 21.6
1995                
40% Median  4.2  2.7 1.5 1.3  1.3 1.4 1.1 1.7 3.6
50% Median  8.6  5.1 3.4 3.8  2.7 3.1 2.3 3.9 7.6
60% Median  14.9  9.3 7.5 9.0  5.9 5.7 6.0 8.3 13.4
70% Median  23.1  14.9 13.8 16.6  13.2 13.8 12.7 15.0 21.3
1996              
40% Median  3.9  2.8 1.7 1.8  1.2 0.9 1.4 1.9 3.5
50% Median  8.1  5.1 3.9 4.1  3.8 3.7 3.9 4.3 7.3
60% Median  14.5  9.2 7.5 8.8  8.6 9.2 8.1 8.5 13.2
70% Median  22.7  15.9 13.5 16.8  16.4 16.6 16.2 15.7 21.3
1997 OLD               
40% Median  4.5  3.0 1.8 1.6  1.6 1.2 2.0 2.0 4.0
50% Median  9.2  5.5 4.1 4.2  3.5 2.9 4.1 4.4 8.2
60% Median  15.7  9.7 8.7 9.1  8.5 7.4 9.7 9.0 14.4
70% Median  24.2  15.8 15.1 17.1  17.2 16.3 18.2 16.3 22.6
1997 NEW                 
40% Median  5.7  4.2 2.7 2.6  2.5 2.4 2.6 3.0 5.1
50% Median  10.2  6.3 4.7 4.7  4.0 4.1 3.8 5.0 9.2
60% Median  17.1  10.1 8.2 9.0  7.8 6.9 8.9 8.9 15.4
70% Median  24.8  15.1 13.7 15.7  16.2 15.3 17.1 15.2 22.8
1998                
40% Median  5.4  3.0 2.4 2.0  2.3 1.9 2.8 2.4 4.8
50% Median  10.2  5.9 4.5 4.6  3.9 3.2 4.8 4.8 9.1
60% Median  16.9  10.5 8.6 9.4  8.1 7.0 9.5 9.3 15.3
70% Median  24.8  16.9 14.4 16.9  17.6 16.7 18.8 16.4 23.0
1999              
40% Median  5.9  3.6 2.5 2.3  1.8 1.7 2.0 2.6 5.3
50% Median  11.1  6.3 4.5 4.5  4.0 3.8 4.3 4.8 9.8
60% Median  17.8  10.5 8.6 9.1  7.5 7.2 7.8 9.0 16.0
70% Median  25.4  16.1 13.6 15.7  15.7 14.9 16.8 15.3 23.3
2000     
40% Median  6.8  4.5 2.8 2.2  2.4 2.5 2.2 2.9 6.0
50% Median  12.1  8.1 5.1 4.4  4.6 4.6 4.6 5.4 10.7
60% Median  18.7  12.9 9.9 9.2  8.4 8.1 9.0 10.0 17.0
70% Median  26.6  18.9 16.0 15.6  16.3 15.2 17.9 16.5 24.5
2001     
40% Median  7.2  3.8 2.1 2.0  2.6 1.9 3.6 2.6 6.3
50% Median  12.5  6.7 4.0 4.3  4.3 3.3 5.7 4.8 11.0
60% Median  19.3  11.1 8.4 8.6  7.0 6.0 8.4 8.8 17.2
70% Median  26.9  17.2 14.0 14.0  14.4 12.6 17.0 14.8 24.5
2002     
40% Median  7.6  3.9 2.5 1.9  2.1 1.6 2.8 2.5 6.5
50% Median  13.3  7.4 4.6 3.6  3.8 3.2 4.7 4.8 11.5
60% Median  20.3  11.9 8.4 7.2  7.5 6.7 8.6 8.6 17.9
70% Median  27.9  17.6 13.2 12.8  13.6 12.2 15.7 14.2 25.1
2003     
40% Median  7.6  4.3 2.4 2.1  2.1 1.7 2.6 2.7 6.6
50% Median  13.3  7.8 4.4 3.9  4.0 3.4 4.9 5.0 11.6
60% Median  20.1  12.2 8.5 7.6  6.6 6.3 6.9 8.8 17.8
70% Median  28.3  18.4 13.0 12.7  11.9 11.5 12.4 14.0 25.4
2004     
40% Median  8.2  4.5 2.2 1.5  1.8 1.9 1.6 2.5 6.9
50% Median  14.1  7.8 4.2 3.1  3.3 3.5 3.1 4.6 11.9
60% Median  21.0  12.4 8.5 7.7  6.6 6.4 6.9 8.9 18.3
70% Median  28.8  18.5 14.7 13.2  12.9 12.0 14.1 14.8 25.7
 
Source: Polish HBS 226 
Table D9 Poverty gap ratio (in %) [thresholds 40%, 50%, 60% and 70% of the overall median equivalized income] 
     Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74  75 +  75 - 79  80 +  55 +  All 
1994       
40%  Median 22.8 22.5 22.8 21.6 23.5 19.3 26.0 22.4 22.7 
50%  Median 23.2 23.0 22.5 19.3 22.0 20.7 22.7 21.5 23.0 
60%  Median 24.0 23.3 21.2 18.9 21.3 18.7 23.4 20.9 23.5 
70%  Median 25.5 23.8 21.1 20.1 19.1 17.8 20.2 21.1 24.7 
1995           
40%  Median 31.8 31.7 28.4 21.7 25.3 19.4 32.2 27.5 31.3 
50%  Median 26.7 28.9 23.4 18.9 24.5 21.4 28.5 23.7 26.4 
60%  Median 25.9 25.4 20.7 18.4 21.1 22.9 19.5 21.2 25.3 
70%  Median 26.1 25.1 20.4 19.4 18.0 17.6 18.4 20.9 25.3 
1996           
40%  Median 31.0 37.6 30.2 28.7 23.5 25.4 22.3 31.8 31.1 
50%  Median 26.5 31.5 24.4 23.3 18.0 16.1 19.6 25.4 26.3 
60%  Median 25.3 27.4 22.8 21.0 18.0 16.4 19.8 22.8 24.9 
70%  Median 25.4 24.6 21.8 19.9 18.9 18.8 18.9 21.4 24.8 
1997 OLD           
40%  Median 33.9 32.9 22.0 21.4 23.2 26.4 20.8 25.5 32.8 
50%  Median 30.1 30.4 21.1 19.4 19.0 19.0 19.0 22.3 28.8 
60%  Median 28.6 28.2 22.4 20.8 19.7 19.1 20.3 22.5 27.5 
70%  Median 27.9 26.6 22.9 22.2 21.8 20.9 22.8 23.2 26.9 
1997 NEW           
40%  Median 44.8 48.3 40.4 41.9 48.9 50.6 47.1 44.4 44.7 
50%  Median 37.1 41.4 29.2 29.3 29.0 28.7 29.3 32.2 36.4 
60%  Median 33.0 35.8 27.4 25.9 23.2 24.5 22.0 27.9 32.1 
70%  Median 31.9 31.5 26.4 25.4 24.9 25.0 24.8 26.8 30.9 
1998                 
40%  Median 39.3 42.9 48.5 42.9 49.3 49.8 48.8 45.2 39.9 
50%  Median 31.6 32.2 35.5 28.6 38.1 38.1 38.0 32.4 31.7 
60%  Median 29.3 27.6 27.9 23.9 26.8 26.1 27.5 26.1 28.9 
70%  Median 29.0 26.2 25.6 22.2 21.1 19.6 22.9 23.7 28.2 
1999           
40%  Median 38.0 40.6 49.3 45.5 51.0 55.5 45.3 45.5 38.7 
50%  Median 31.5 34.2 36.8 32.7 33.2 34.8 31.2 34.1 31.8 
60%  Median 29.8 30.1 28.5 25.9 27.4 27.7 26.9 27.8 29.6 
70%  Median 30.0 28.4 26.8 23.9 21.5 21.9 21.0 25.2 29.4 
2000           
40%  Median 37.7 38.1 45.3 38.3 45.5 43.5 48.5 40.9 38.0 
50%  Median 32.6 32.2 33.7 29.8 33.7 34.2 33.1 32.0 32.5 
60%  Median 31.1 30.1 26.9 23.9 27.6 28.5 26.4 26.9 30.6 
70%  Median 30.9 29.5 25.7 23.3 22.8 23.6 21.8 25.3 30.2 
2001           
40%  Median 34.5 42.4 47.5 46.9 56.9 57.7 56.4 47.3 35.6 
50%  Median 31.5 34.9 35.4 32.2 43.3 41.6 44.7 35.4 31.9 
60%  Median 30.7 30.8 25.8 25.2 35.8 32.2 39.2 28.4 30.4 
70%  Median 31.0 28.8 24.3 24.7 25.2 23.5 27.1 25.8 30.4 
2002           
40%  Median 33.6 41.1 35.7 42.6 46.5 50.4 43.2 41.2 34.2 
50%  Median 30.9 32.5 31.0 32.1 35.2 34.2 36.3 32.5 31.0 
60%  Median 30.6 30.2 27.2 25.9 27.2 25.7 29.0 27.8 30.3 
70%  Median 31.3 29.5 26.3 23.4 23.4 22.6 24.2 25.8 30.7 
2003           
40%  Median 34.7 40.6 40.2 42.7 56.0 63.1 50.2 43.3 35.4 
50%  Median 31.4 33.3 31.9 33.1 38.2 39.5 37.0 33.7 31.6 
60%  Median 31.0 31.3 25.8 26.2 32.7 29.8 36.3 28.9 30.8 
70%  Median 31.1 29.6 26.1 24.8 26.4 24.9 28.1 26.9 30.6 
2004           
40%  Median 33.1 38.6 42.0 48.1 47.0 52.3 38.9 42.3 33.8 
50%  Median 31.1 33.5 32.4 32.5 35.2 38.3 30.5 33.3 31.3 
60%  Median 31.2 30.7 25.3 22.0 26.7 29.0 23.9 26.5 30.7 
70%  Median 31.8 29.6 23.6 22.4 21.8 23.5 19.8 24.9 30.9 
 
Source: Polish HBS 227 
Table D10 Poverty incidence (headcount) according to national criteria [percent of persons with equivalized income below local thresholds] 
  Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74  75 +  75 - 79  80 +  55 +  All   
Poverty 
threshold 
(in PLN) 
1994                  
Subsistence minimum  6.9  4.4 3.6 3.5  3.2 2.8  3.5 3.7  6.2   148.8
Social minimum  21.9  15.4 15.2 17.9  15.3 15.4  15.2 16.2  20.6   218.7
Legal threshold  12.1  7.9 6.8 7.8  6.0 5.5  6.4 7.3  11.0   176.8
1995              
Subsistence minimum  5.0  3.3 1.7 1.7  1.6 1.7  1.5 2.1  4.3   177.4
Social minimum  24.2  15.7 14.8 17.8  14.3 14.6  14.0 16.0  22.4   301.0
Legal threshold  10.7  6.2 4.7 5.7  3.5 4.1  2.9 5.3  9.5   225.9
1996              
Subsistence minimum  3.6  2.6 1.5 1.6  1.0 0.8  1.3 1.7  3.2   207.7
Social minimum  19.7  13.1 11.2 13.6  13.6 14.1  13.1 12.9  18.3   356.0
Legal threshold  8.6  5.3 4.2 4.5  3.9 3.7  4.0 4.5  7.7   270.8
1997OLD              
Subsistence minimum  3.4  2.4 1.4 1.0  0.9 0.8  1.0 1.4  3.0   236.7
Social minimum  23.0  14.7 14.0 15.7  15.6 14.6  16.8 15.0  21.3   445.3
Legal threshold  7.9  4.9 3.4 3.3  3.0 2.5  3.6 3.7  7.1   311.2
1997NEW              
Subsistence minimum  5.1  3.7 2.3 2.3  2.2 2.2  2.2 2.6  4.6   236.7
Social minimum  25.8  16.1 14.6 16.8  17.7 16.3  19.2 16.2  23.9   445.3
Legal threshold  10.1  6.3 4.6 4.6  3.9 4.0  3.8 4.9  9.0   311.2
1998              
Subsistence minimum  4.0  2.4 2.1 1.6  1.7 1.4  2.1 1.9  3.6   258.5
Social minimum  25.5  17.3 14.9 17.7  18.5 17.7  19.4 17.0  23.7   518.7
Legal threshold  8.9  4.9 3.9 3.7  3.4 2.7  4.4 4.0  7.9   347.9
1999              
Subsistence minimum  5.2  3.1 2.4 2.1  1.7 1.5  1.9 2.3  4.6   293.0
Social minimum  28.3  18.3 15.8 18.7  19.0 18.4  19.7 17.9  26.2   571.1
Legal threshold  10.0  5.6 3.8 3.8  3.6 3.3  4.0 4.2  8.8   373.3
2000              
Subsistence minimum  6.3  4.1 2.5 1.9  2.2 2.3  2.0 2.6  5.6   322.1
Social minimum  32.3  24.4 22.2 21.5  22.4 21.1  24.3 22.4  30.3   641.2
Legal threshold  11.6  7.7 4.7 4.2  4.3 4.3  4.4 5.1  10.3   411.0
2001              
Subsistence minimum  6.3  3.3 1.9 1.8  2.3 1.6  3.3 2.3  5.5   330.9
Social minimum  34.9  24.3 21.0 21.6  22.9 20.9  25.5 22.3  32.3   695.5
Legal threshold  12.3  6.5 4.0 4.2  4.2 3.2  5.4 4.7  10.8   433.6
2002              
Subsistence minimum  7.1  3.7 2.4 1.7  2.0 1.6  2.6 2.4  6.1   347.0
Social minimum  37.4  25.6 21.2 21.9  22.9 21.4  25.1 22.8  34.4   722.9
Legal threshold  13.1  7.3 4.6 3.5  3.8 3.2  4.6 4.7  11.4   441.9
2003              
Subsistence minimum  7.2  4.0 2.1 2.0  2.0 1.6  2.5 2.5  6.3   351.2
Social minimum  37.3  25.4 20.7 20.5  21.8 21.0  22.9 22.0  34.2   729.4
Legal threshold  13.0  7.6 4.3 3.7  3.8 3.2  4.6 4.8  11.3   445.4
2004              
Subsistence minimum  7.7  4.2 2.1 1.4  1.7 1.9  1.5 2.3  6.5   367.7
Social minimum  37.6  25.6 22.5 21.6  21.3 20.3  22.4 22.8  34.2   757.1
Legal threshold  13.4  7.4 3.8 3.0  3.1 3.3  2.8 4.3  11.3   461.0
 
Source: Polish HBS 228 
Table D11a Subjective poverty: the percent of persons who can make ends meet with difficulty or great difficulty 
  Below 55  55 - 59 60 - 64 65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All 
2000    
With difficulty or great difficulty 46.8  42.6 41.1 40.0  37.8 38.6  36.7 40.5 45.5 
with great difficulty  23.6  20.0  17.3  16.7  14.6 15.4  13.4 17.2 22.3 
with  difficulty  23.2  22.5 23.8 23.4  23.2 23.2  23.3 23.3 23.2 
2001                 
With difficulty or great difficulty 47.7  40.7 39.1 37.5  36.1 34.5  45.8 35.4 38.2 
with great difficulty  23.5  18.8  14.5  14.0  12.7 13.3  21.8 13.0 15.0 
with  difficulty  24.2  21.9 24.6 23.5  23.4 21.2  24.0 22.5 23.2 
2002                 
With difficulty or great difficulty 47.9  41.7 36.6 36.0  33.3 33.9  32.4 37.0 45.6 
with great difficulty  23.0  18.4  14.1  13.7  11.9 11.9  11.9 14.6 21.3 
with  difficulty  24.8  23.3 22.5 22.3  21.4 22.0  20.5 22.4 24.3 
2003                 
With difficulty or great difficulty 46.7  39.5 35.1 36.7  32.8 33.5  32.0 36.4 44.6 
with great difficulty  22.3  16.7  13.2  13.2  11.4 11.3  11.5 13.8 20.5 
with  difficulty  24.5  22.8 21.8 23.5  21.5 22.2  20.5 22.6 24.1 
2004                 
With difficulty or great difficulty 45.4  40.1 39.0 36.8  33.4 34.5  31.9 37.4 43.6 
with great difficulty  21.5  18.0  15.0  13.5  11.6 12.3  10.6 14.6 20.0 
with  difficulty  23.9  22.1 24.0 23.3  21.8 22.2  21.4 22.8 23.7 
 
Source: Polish HBS 
 
 
Table D11b Subjective poverty: the percent of persons who consider their material situation as bad or very bad 
  Below 55  55 - 59  60 - 64 65 - 74 75 +  75 - 79 80 +  55 +  All 
2000    
Very bad or insufficient  38.2  34.8  32.9  32.9 30.9  31.0 30.7 33.0 37.1 
very  bad  16.2  14.9 11.7 11.3  9.8 10.6  8.6  11.9  15.3 
Insufficient  22.0  19.9  21.2  21.6 21.1  20.4 22.1 21.0 21.8 
2001               
Very bad or insufficient  38.6  34.0  30.2  30.0 27.5  27.7 27.1 30.5 37.0 
very  bad  16.9  13.4  11.0  9.8 8.2  8.2 8.1  10.6  15.6 
Insufficient  21.7  20.7  19.2  20.2 19.3  19.5 19.0 19.9 21.3 
2002               
Very bad or insufficient  39.0  34.1  29.2  28.8 27.3  28.1 26.1 29.9 37.1 
very  bad  16.7  14.1  10.1  9.6 8.3  8.6 7.8  10.5  15.4 
Insufficient  22.3  20.0  19.1  19.2 19.0  19.5 18.2 19.3 21.7 
2003               
Very bad or insufficient  37.4  31.7  27.8  28.3 25.7  25.0 26.6 28.6 35.6 
very  bad  15.9  12.4  9.9  8.8 7.6  7.4 7.8 9.7  14.6 
Insufficient  21.5  19.3  17.9  19.5 18.1  17.6 18.8 18.9 21.0 
2004               
Very bad or insufficient  36.1  32.7  29.0  27.7 27.6  26.7 34.5 27.2 29.2 
very  bad  15.5  13.6  11.4  9.6 8.3  7.5  14.4 8.0  10.7 
Insufficient  20.6  19.1  17.6  18.1 19.2  19.3 20.1 19.3 18.5 
  
Source: Polish HBS 
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Table D11c Material deprivation – percent of persons living in substandard housing conditions by age groups 
  Below 55 55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74 75 +  75 - 79 80 +  55 +  All 
2000    
[1]  no WC  10.5  11.3  14.0  16.7  22.0  20.6  23.9  15.8  11.5 
[2] space <=7 m
2/head  2.1  0.5  0.9  1.1 1.5  1.5 1.5 1.9 1.0 
[1]  and  [2]  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.3 0.3  0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 
[1]  or   [2]  12.2  11.7  14.6  17.5  23.1  21.8  25.0  13.1  16.5 
2001               
[1]  no WC  9.4  8.0  12.1  14.5 19.1  17.7 21.1 13.3 10.2 
[2] space <=7 m
2/head  5.8  1.6  1.9  2.5 2.8  2.7 2.9 2.2 5.1 
[1] and [2]  1.6  0.5  0.5  0.6 1.2  1.2 1.2 0.7 1.4 
[1]  or   [2]  13.7  9.1  13.5  16.3 20.7  19.2 22.8 14.8 13.9 
2002               
[1]  no WC  9.0  8.1  9.8  13.6 18.6  17.9 19.6 12.4  9.7 
[2] space <=7 m
2/head  6.3  1.8  2.3  2.9 3.8  3.9 3.7 2.7 5.5 
[1] and [2]  1.7  0.5  0.7  0.8 1.5  1.6 1.4 0.8 1.5 
[1]  or   [2]  13.6  9.5  11.4  15.7 20.9  20.2 21.9 14.3 13.7 
2003               
[1]  no WC  8.4  7.8  9.5  11.7 20.3  19.2 21.8 11.9  9.1 
[2] space <=7 m
2/head  6.2  2.2  2.3  3.3 4.7  4.4 5.0 3.1 5.6 
[1] and [2]  1.6  0.7  0.6  0.7 1.7  1.4 2.0 0.9 1.4 
[1]  or   [2]  13.1  9.3  11.2  14.3 23.3  22.1 24.7 14.1 13.3 
 
Source: Polish HBS 
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Table D12a Marginal groups: distribution of persons in farmer households by age groups and  deciles [%] 
FARMERS 
Decile    Age 
group  1994 1995 1996 1997 
old 
1997 
new  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 Below  55  24.8 25.0  26.1 20.2 21.5 22.5 21.0 18.3 14.8 12.7 14.0 11.4
  55  -  59  31.7 34.8  41.2 30.1 36.2 24.6 29.1 21.1 18.5 12.3 20.2 13.3
  60 - 64  34.2 36.8  41.2 28.5 30.1 22.9 34.4 21.6 23.2  12.4  21.2  9.1
  65  -  74  30.0 26.8  33.4 23.5 31.1 22.4 26.7 25.6 20.1 13.0 26.8 11.3
  75  +  42.5 40.6  37.8 38.2 47.7 37.4 39.1 37.9 30.0 28.0 36.6 19.3
  75  -  79  32.8 43.6  41.6 40.1 47.3 30.2 41.3 35.8 25.0 23.2 33.3 17.9
  80  +  49.0 36.5  34.2 36.3 48.3 44.4 36.4 40.9 33.8 34.8 39.4 21.2
 55  +  33.0 32.6  37.9 28.4 34.3 25.0 30.8 25.0 21.7 14.8 24.7 12.6
  All  26.0 26.0  27.6 21.2 22.9 22.8 22.0 19.0 15.4 12.9 14.9 11.5
2 Below  55  11.5 11.0  12.5 8.3 8.1 9.2 7.8 7.7 7.9 6.0 7.7 5.8
  55  -  59  13.7 9.1  12.8 9.4 8.7 10.4 9.2 7.6 6.9 6.9 9.3 5.3
  60  -  64  13.1 10.7  14.2 6.7 9.6 9.5 4.1 8.9 6.4 3.1 4.9 1.2
  65  -  74  9.9 11.2  11.1 8.3 6.3 8.6 6.1 5.8 7.4 2.9 5.8 3.2
  75  +  10.5 13.1  12.9 7.4 9.9 10.2 10.0 9.1 8.9  10.1 8.9 4.5
  75  -  79  6.9 14.2  12.9 7.3 8.5 10.6 13.2 6.9 10.2 8.8 7.4 3.8
  80  +  13.4 12.2  12.9 7.6 11.1 9.8 5.8 11.8 7.4 11.8 11.3  5.5
 55  +  11.6 10.9  12.4 8.0 8.1 9.5 7.0 7.5 7.3 5.0 7.2 3.4
  All  11.6 11.0  12.5 8.3 8.1 9.3 7.7 7.7 7.8 5.8 7.6 5.4
10 Below  55  12.3 12.9  11.8 10.7 11.9 9.4 7.3 7.0 6.1 5.8 5.0 4.7
  55  -  59  8.7 11.7  12.0 9.5 8.3 7.9 5.3 5.3 5.4 7.4 4.1 4.4
  60  -  64  11.9 12.9  12.9 8.1 10.2 6.8 7.5 4.5 5.8 5.8 3.2 2.6
  65  -  74  13.7 13.1  14.0 14.0 13.0 14.4 8.3 7.7 5.2 6.1 4.3 5.8
  75  +  17.0 16.8  20.3 13.6 13.0 11.0 9.8 11.8 6.9 6.2 5.1  10.5
  75  -  79  19.5 14.5  15.9 10.1 10.8 8.7 9.5 10.5 6.7 5.8 4.6 9.9
  80  +  15.6 18.2  24.4 16.9 15.0 13.8 10.1 14.0 7.1 7.0 5.9  11.4
 55  +  12.0 13.1  13.9 11.0 10.9 9.9 7.4 6.9 5.7 6.4 4.1 5.4
  All  12.3 13.0  12.2 10.8 11.7 9.5 7.3 7.0 6.0 5.9 4.9 4.8
Total Below  55  10.4 10.5  10.3 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.4 6.6 5.9 5.0 5.7 4.3
  55  -  59  8.7 9.2  10.5 7.1 7.1 6.2 5.6 5.1 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.6
  60  -  64  8.7 8.0  9.1 6.1 6.1 5.2 5.2 4.4 4.5 3.1 3.5 1.8
  65  -  74  9.0 8.3  8.8 6.5 6.5 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.0 3.1 3.8 2.6
  75  +  11.6 10.4  11.2 8.1 8.1 7.8 7.5 6.6 5.2 5.0 5.2 4.2
  75  -  79  9.2 9.7  10.4 7.9 7.9 7.0 7.6 6.2 4.9 4.4 4.6 3.9
  80  +  13.4 11.1  12.0 8.4 8.4 8.9 7.4 7.1 5.8 5.7 6.1 4.6
 55  +  9.2 8.7  9.6 6.8 6.8 6.2 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 4.3 3.1
  All  10.1 10.1  10.1 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.1 6.3 5.6 4.8 5.4 4.0
 
Source: Polish HBS 231 
Table D12b Marginal groups: distribution of persons in large households (5+ persons) by age groups and deciles [%] 
LARGE HOUSEHOLDS 
Decile    Age group  1994  1995  1996  1997 
old 
1997 
new  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1  Below  55  56.3 55.6 58.4 54.9 54.6 52.1 55.9 55.5 55.1 49.4 52.4 42.7 
  55  -  59  28.3 21.7 22.4 21.2 21.3 20.6 23.4 24.8 23.2 23.2 26.7 23.5 
  60  -  64  20.9 24.5 24.0 28.6 28.1 21.3 23.2 26.6 26.2 20.7 25.3 14.9 
  65  -  74  26.1 25.7 26.9 26.1 26.7 23.3 30.9 36.9 30.8 23.4 39.5 14.4 
  75  +  36.8 33.7 32.9 36.5 44.1 40.6 35.2 48.4 47.7 39.1 49.3 27.3 
  75  -  79  32.6 34.2 30.6 39.4 43.7 40.5 30.6 49.5 44.6 31.6 52.4 29.5 
  80  +  39.7 33.1 35.1 33.6 44.6 40.8 41.1 47.0 50.0 50.0 46.5 24.2 
  55  +  26.8 25.0 25.8 26.6 27.4 24.3 27.6 32.3 30.1 25.0 33.3 19.3 
  All  52.0 51.7 54.3 51.6 51.6 49.0 53.1 53.2 52.9 47.0 50.8 40.4 
2  Below  55  51.7 51.9 50.4 49.1 50.8 48.9 50.6 50.4 50.3 46.1 50.3 38.2 
  55  -  59  20.6 20.1 17.0 16.5 19.4 15.5 22.6 20.1 21.8 21.6 27.5 21.6 
  60  -  64  18.8 17.3 18.3 18.5 21.7 14.0 21.7 19.5 25.6 13.4 20.8  8.7 
  65  -  74  16.0 15.0 17.4 15.1 16.6 15.2 16.9 16.0 19.6 19.1 21.6 14.0 
  75  +  17.1 23.7 23.3 22.0 19.6 15.6 26.2 22.0 27.2 27.6 33.0 25.9 
  75  -  79  12.1 20.8 20.8 20.1 19.1 15.3 24.7 22.0 25.4 24.5 27.8 22.0 
  80  +  21.2 26.0 26.1 24.0 20.1 16.0 28.1 22.0 29.5 31.5 40.8 30.7 
  55  +  17.8 17.9 18.4 17.3 18.8 15.1 20.8 18.7 22.6 19.6 24.9 16.3 
  All  44.8 45.8 44.8 43.8 46.1 43.2 46.2 45.5 46.5 42.0 47.2 34.8 
10  Below  55  20.2 21.5 21.7 20.1 21.1 16.0 16.7 17.9 16.0 12.7 15.6 11.0 
  55  -  59  9.3 8.0 7.7 6.3 6.7 5.3 4.6 7.1 5.4 7.2 4.0 4.9 
  60  -  64  10.6  12.2  10.9 7.8 7.2 6.3 5.9 7.4 5.8 6.3 5.0 5.0 
  65  -  74  15.7 13.4 15.9 14.5 14.1 9.0 9.6 12.9 8.1 8.2  9.9  8.0 
  75  +  22.4 23.7 19.8 19.9 19.2 15.7 13.0 16.4 13.1 13.8 14.8 12.5 
  75  -  79  21.8 16.6 16.0 16.1 16.2 15.5 11.2 13.6 13.5 11.5 12.8  9.9 
  80  +  22.8 27.9 23.2 23.4 22.0 16.0 15.1 21.1 12.5 17.5 17.6 16.7 
  55  +  13.1 12.6 12.6 10.8 10.9 8.1 7.6 10.4 7.6 8.3  7.7  7.1 
  All  18.9 19.7 20.0 18.4 19.1 14.6 15.1 16.6 14.4 12.0 13.9 10.3 
Total Below  55  37.8 38.1 37.5 36.4 36.4 34.7 36.3 36.6 36.5 32.2 36.5 25.9 
  55  -  59  15.5 14.7 13.9 12.4 12.4 11.6 12.1 14.1 13.9 14.3 14.6 13.3 
  60  -  64  13.7 14.7 13.1 12.1 12.1 10.3 11.3 11.8 13.1 10.9 13.9  7.6 
  65  -  74  14.9 14.6 14.1 12.9 12.9 11.7 12.7 13.4 13.1 12.0 13.8  9.3 
  75  +  19.6 19.4 20.8 18.2 18.2 16.2 17.2 17.6 17.4 17.5 18.9 14.3 
  75  -  79  16.1 16.4 18.5 16.7 16.7 15.1 16.3 16.5 15.2 16.2 17.5 12.7 
  80  +  22.3 22.2 23.1 19.9 19.9 17.7 18.6 19.3 20.4 19.4 20.7 16.5 
  55  +  15.4 15.3 14.8 13.4 13.4 12.0 12.9 13.9 14.0 13.2 15.0 10.6 
  All  32.8 33.0 32.7 31.7 31.7 30.0 31.6 32.0 32.0 28.3 32.1 22.8 
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Table D12c Marginal groups: distribution of persons in households receiving social income by age groups and deciles [%] 
BENEFICIARIES OF SOCIAL INCOME 
Decile    Age 
group  1994 1995 1996  1997 
old 
1997 
new  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1  Below  55  21.2 21.1 19.8  20.2 22.0 15.0 18.5 22.2 23.2 22.8 25.9 20.2
  55  –  59  11.8 10.1  8.1  9.3 9.1 7.7 5.8 9.3 13.3 18.4 22.5 30.7
  60  –  64  7.7 4.4 2.7  3.0 3.2 5.4 4.0 4.6 8.5 5.0  13.0 8.7
  65  -  74  5.3 2.9 3.7  2.9 2.2 3.5 3.6 1.7 5.1 3.9 1.8 1.4
  75  +  10.5 6.5 3.4  3.5 4.0 5.2 8.6 5.6 3.8 3.1 0.7 2.5
  75  -  79  4.4 0.0 2.5  0.0 0.0 5.0 7.7 7.4 1.8 3.2 1.6 3.2
  80  +  14.6  15.0 4.2  6.9 9.0 5.4 9.6 3.0 5.4 3.0 0.0 1.5
  55  +  8.3 5.6 4.7  4.8 4.7 5.3 5.0 5.4 8.2 8.8  12.0  12.8
  All  19.3 19.2 17.9  18.5 20.1 13.9 17.1 20.5 21.9 21.4 24.7 19.5
2  Below  55  11.0 11.6  8.7  9.5 9.0 6.7 8.9 10.1 10.7 12.0 12.0 10.2
  55 - 59  1.2  0.4  4.2  3.6 4.0 4.5 5.6 8.1 12.1 12.4  13.4  19.3
  60  -  64  2.7 3.4 1.2  0.3 0.3 1.1 3.1 2.3 4.7 2.6 4.9 4.7
  65  -  74  0.9 0.9 0.4  0.6 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.5 1.9 0.8
  75  +  1.1 3.4 0.7  0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 2.3 2.8 1.7 1.7
  75  -  79  2.5 0.0 1.4  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.3 1.7 2.5 0.9 1.9
  80  +  0.0 6.1 0.0  1.2 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.0 3.2 3.1 2.8 1.6
  55  +  1.5 1.7 1.5  1.1 1.3 1.5 2.3 2.6 4.6 4.0 6.0 6.0
  All  9.1 9.8 7.4  8.1 7.9 5.8 7.9 8.9 9.8 10.8  11.3 9.5
10  Below  55  1.3 0.8 0.7  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8
  55  -  59  0.2 0.1 0.2  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.5 1.6 0.5
  60  -  64  1.0 0.0 0.0  0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.7
  65  -  74  0.7 0.1 0.2  0.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
  75  +  0.5 0.9 0.4  1.4 1.7 0.0 1.5 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.0
  75  -  79  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.2 0.0 2.2 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.0
  80  +  0.8 1.4 0.7  2.6 2.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.0
  55  +  0.6 0.2 0.2  0.4 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.6
  All  1.2 0.7 0.6  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8
Total Below  55  5.5 5.5 4.8  4.5 4.5 3.3 4.3 5.4 5.8 6.2 7.0 5.8
  55  -  59  1.5 1.2 1.5  1.3 1.3 1.3 1.7 4.0 5.5 7.3 7.4  10.5
  60  -  64  0.9 0.6 0.5  0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.7 1.4 2.7 2.0
  65  -  74  0.5 0.6 0.4  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3
  75  +  0.9 1.0 0.8  0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.8
  75  -  79  0.7 0.3 0.7  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.6
  80  +  1.1 1.7 0.9  0.9 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0
  55  +  0.9 0.8 0.8  0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.2 2.7 3.0
  All  4.5 4.5 4.0  3.7 3.7 2.8 3.6 4.6 5.0 5.4 6.1 5.2
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Table D13 Marginal groups: poverty headcount at 60% median threshold by marginal groups and age [%] 
  TOTAL FARMERS  LARGE 
HOUSEHOLDS 
BENEFICIARIES 
SOCIAL INCOME SINGLE WOMEN
1994          
Below 55  15.1 31.0  22.2 52.1 14.8
55 - 59  10.1 30.4  17.1 60.2 11.2
60 - 64  9.1 28.0  13.7 65.7 14.5
65 - 74  10.7 27.5  15.6 79.7 20.5
75 +  8.1 23.8  13.4 63.1 9.3
75 - 79  8.2 20.2  13.2 34.2 7.8
80 +  8.1 25.7  13.4 76.1 10.9
55 +  9.8 27.7  15.2 66.0 15.6
All  14.0 30.3  21.5 52.7 15.4
1995          
Below 55  14.9 30.2  21.1 52.6 12.2
55 - 59  9.3 26.7  14.0 55.3 11.3
60 - 64  7.5 25.7  11.0 49.2 11.2
65 - 74  9.0 24.7  13.8 37.1 14.8
75 +  5.9 18.5  9.3 41.6 5.8
75 - 79  5.7 24.6  11.9 0.0 3.5
80 +  6.0 13.6  7.5 48.9 8.3
55 +  8.3 24.5  12.4 47.0 11.7
All  13.4 29.1  20.2 52.4 11.9
1996        
Below 55  14.5 32.9  22.3 52.4 10.3
55 - 59  9.2 30.2  13.3 44.5 10.1
60 - 64  7.5 26.9  12.5 31.6 9.9
65 - 74  8.8 27.5  14.8 55.3 13.5
75 +  8.6 25.0  14.3 33.2 8.7
75 - 79  9.2 29.9  16.2 38.6 9.2
80 +  8.1 20.9  12.9 28.8 8.1
55 +  8.5 27.7  13.9 42.8 11.4
All  13.2 31.9  21.5 52.0 11.2
1997 old       0.0
Below 55  15.7 33.6  23.3 60.9 11.8
55 - 59  9.7 34.1  15.9 57.7 12.6
60 - 64  8.7 29.5  18.9 34.0 14.1
65 - 74  9.1 25.6  15.9 49.6 14.6
75 +  8.5 25.5  15.6 34.0 10.0
75 - 79  7.4 24.0  16.4 - 8.3
80 +  9.7 27.1  14.8 40.7 12.3
55 +  9.0 28.5  16.5 48.9 13.2
All  14.4 32.7  22.7 60.5 12.9
1997 new         
Below 55  17.1 37.3  25.3 69.1 12.6
55 - 59  10.1 39.0  17.0 58.9 12.9
60 - 64  8.2 31.4  17.5 34.0 11.3
65 - 74  9.0 30.2  15.7 46.5 13.3
75 +  7.8 31.2  14.9 45.0 7.6
75 - 79  6.9 30.4  15.3 - 5.6
80 +  8.9 32.1  14.5 53.9 10.2
55 +  8.9 32.8  16.2 50.0 11.6
All  15.4 36.5  24.5 68.5 11.8
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 TOTAL  FARMERS  LARGE
HOUSEHOLD
BENEFICIARIES 
SOCIAL INCOME 
SINGLE WOMEN 
1998      
Below 55  16.9  38.2  24.9 63.9 13.9 
55 - 59  10.5  32.8  16.8 53.5 13.9 
60 - 64  8.6  28.6  14.7 58.6 13.6 
65 - 74  9.4  24.0  15.4 50.2 16.5 
75 +  8.1  25.7  15.2 57.4 7.2 
75 - 79  7.0  20.4  14.0 54.5 6.3 
80 +  9.5  31.1  16.7 59.7 8.8 
55 +  9.3  27.3  15.5 54.2 13.5 
All 15.3  36.3  24.1 63.4 13.6 
1999       
Below 55  17.8  39.2  26.6 64.6 12.4 
55 - 59  10.5  39.8  19.7 37.3 14.1 
60 - 64  8.6  33.9  17.9 41.7 12.8 
65 - 74  9.1  29.0  18.1 48.9 12.5 
75 +  7.5  27.3  15.3 50.9 4.3 
75 - 79  7.2  29.0  14.8 49.3 4.9 
80 +  7.8  24.8  15.9 52.9 3.2 
55 +  9.0  32.1  17.8 42.4 10.9 
All 16.0  38.1  25.9 63.6 11.2 
2000        
Below 55  18.7  40.4  27.4 61.0 14.9 
55 - 59  12.9  39.0  20.0 29.7 14.8 
60 - 64  9.9  35.0  18.6 35.1 11.5 
65 - 74  9.2  29.5  17.6 40.8 11.8 
75 +  8.4  31.7  17.8 35.0 6.5 
75 - 79  8.1  29.4  18.5 50.0 5.7 
80 +  9.0  34.6  16.9 14.7 7.6 
55 +  10.0  33.2  18.4 31.9 10.7 
All 17.0  39.2  26.6 59.3 11.5 
2001       
Below 55  19.3  39.4  28.4 59.4 12.8 
55 - 59  11.1  30.6  18.2 23.8 14.6 
60 - 64  8.4  27.0  17.8 23.4 9.3 
65 - 74  8.6  27.9  16.2 38.7 13.0 
75 +  7.0  29.7  17.7 36.8 2.7 
75 - 79  6.0  24.1  15.7 31.6 2.8 
80 +  8.4  36.2  19.7 40.2 2.6 
55 +  8.8  28.7  17.3 26.2 9.7 
All 17.2  37.7  27.4 56.8 10.4 
2002       
Below 55  20.3  38.9  29.5 57.7 15.7 
55 - 59  11.9  29.2  20.6 27.9 12.2 
60 - 64  8.4  24.7  16.5 23.7 8.6 
65 - 74  7.2  21.7  17.0 54.9 9.1 
75 +  7.5  33.3  17.5 31.4 3.0 
75 - 79  6.7  30.7  16.3 24.3 3.4 
80 +  8.6  36.3  18.9 40.3 2.5 
55 +  8.6  27.0  17.8 29.0 7.7 
All 17.9  37.0  28.4 55.3 9.5 
2003       
Below 55  20.1  41.2  28.4 57.7 13.4 
55 - 59  12.2  40.3  22.3 29.7 10.3 
60 - 64  8.5  30.1  13.9 26.4 10.0 
65 - 74  7.6  30.1  15.6 44.9 8.6 
75 +  6.6  30.5  14.7 14.7 1.5 
75 - 79  6.3  28.3  14.5 33.5 1.3 
80 +  6.9  32.7  14.8 7.6 2.0 
55 +  8.8  33.1  16.8 29.2 7.0 
All 17.8  39.9  27.3 55.1 8.5 
2004       
Below 55  21.0  41.5  31.8 55.3 13.4 
55 - 59  12.4  30.0  23.4 33.5 10.4 
60 - 64  8.5  25.7  17.0 34.6 8.0 
65 - 74  7.7  24.0  16.3 38.0 9.4 
75 +  6.6  25.2  19.2 26.3 1.4 
75 - 79  6.4  25.6  19.8 32.7 1.7 
80 +  6.9  24.7  18.6 20.1 1.0 
55 +  8.9  26.4  19.1 33.6 7.0 
All 18.3  39.1  30.6 52.8 8.7 
 
Source: Polish HBS 235 
Table D14 Poverty incidence (headcount) [percent of persons with equivalised expenditures below 40%, 50%, 60% and 70% of the overall 
median equivalised expenditures and national poverty thresholds] 
  Below 55 55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 74 75 + 75 - 79 80 + 55 + All 
2004    
40% Median  4.5  2.8 1.9 1.2  2.2 1.8  2.6 2.0 3.9
50% Median  10.5  6.8 4.8 4.4  5.2 4.6  6.1 5.3 9.4
60% Median  18.0  11.4 9.8 9.6  11.5 10.7  12.6 10.5 16.3
70% Median  26.8  18.2 16.0 16.1  18.2 17.4  19.2 17.0 24.6
         
Subsistence minimum  5.3  3.3 2.2 1.4  2.8 2.3  3.6 2.3 4.6
Social minimum  40.7  31.1 27.7 28.7  31.0 29.2  33.2 29.6 38.2
Legal threshold  12.0  7.8 5.5 5.1  6.6 6.0  7.3 6.2 10.7
 
Source: Polish HBS 
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Table E1 Population, age structure, age dependency between and spatial distribution, 1990-2007 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Population (million)  23.2 23.2 22.8 22.8 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.6 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.4 21.8 21.8 21.7 21.7 21.6 21.6 
Age groups (as % of population) 
0-14 years  23.7 23.3 22.7 22.1 21.4 20.8 20.2 19.6 19.2 19.0 18.5 18.0 17.7 17.0 16.4 15.9 15.5 15.4 
15-54 years  54.9 55.1 54.9 55.2 55.6 55.9 56.4 56.9 57.2 57.6 57.9 58.4 58.3 58.8 59.2 59.3 59.3 59.1 
55 years and older  21.4 21.6 22.4 22.7 23.0 23.3 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.6 23.5 24.0 24.1 24.3 24.8 25.2 25.5 
Old-age dependency (%)  38.9 39.3 40.8 41.1 41.4 41.6 41.6 41.4 41.1 40.8 40.7 40.3 41.2 41.0 41.1 41.8 42.5 43.2 
Total age dependency (%)  82.1 81.5 82.1 81.1 80.0 78.9 77.5 75.9 74.8 73.7 72.7 71.2 71.5 70.0 68.8 68.5 68.8 69.3 
Spatial distribution (as % of population) 
             Urban  53.2 53.9 54.3 54.4 54.6 54.9 54.9 55.0 55.0 54.9 54.8 54.6 53.3 53.4 53.6 54.9 55.2 55.2 
Rural  46.8 46.1 45.7 45.6 45.4 45.1 45.1 45.0 45.0 45.1 45.2 45.4 46.7 46.6 46.4 45.1 44.8 44.8 
Source: Eurostat, NIS 
 
 
 
Table E2 Projected population 
   2008 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 
Population (million)  21.4 21.3 21.1 20.8 20.5 20.1 19.6 19.2 18.7 18.2 17.6 16.9 
Age group (as % of population) 
0-14  15.2 15.1 14.9 14.7 13.9 13.0 12.2 11.9 11.8 11.8 11.7 11.5 
15-54  58.8 58.1 56.3 55.9 53.9 51.9 49.2 46.8 43.5 42.2 41.8 41.5 
55+  26.0 26.8 28.8 29.4 32.2 35.2 38.6 41.4 44.7 46.0 46.5 47.0 
Old-age dependency (%)  44.2 46.1 51.0 52.6 59.8 67.8 78.5 88.4  102.9  108.9  111.4  113.1 
Total age dependency 
(%) 
70.1  72.0  77.6  78.9  85.7  92.7 103.2 113.7 130.1 136.9 139.3 140.8 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table E3 Number of cases in the sample 
 
Weighted number of cases (thousands) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
0-17  5808 5727 5570 5412 5351 5249 5057 5076 4779 4713 4558 
18-54  11539 11596 11680 11847 11853 11927 12056 12011 11697 11674 11695 
55-59  1330 1284 1256 1103 1088 1043 1072 1063 1048 1138 1223 
60-64  1235 1235 1209 1256 1257 1233 1169 1158 1102 1026  982 
65-74  1902 1924 1950 1967 1963 2003 2004 2012 1994 1996 1998 
75+  843  841  881  919  947  981 1050 1071 1114 1145 1185 
Elderly  5310 5284 5296 5245 5254 5259 5295 5305 5258 5305 5388 
Total  22656 22607 22546 22503 22458 22435 22408 22392 21734 21692 21641 
Non-weighted number of cases 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
0-17  23578 22345 21644 20156 18402 16877 16632 15893 14347 17481 15970 
18-54  46036 45954 46105 45241 43008 41454 42221 41773 39739 44852 43100 
55-59  5846 5699 5651 5186 5103 4797 5067 4910 5028 5333 5691 
60-64  5562 5768 5671 5703 5794 5722 5903 5765 5561 5064 4886 
65-74  8521 8845 9224 9268 9382 9592  10255  10379  10512  10003  10051 
75+  3662 3880 4039 4322 4408 4624 4965 5204 5440 5521 5596 
Elderly  23591 24192 24585 24479 24687 24735 26190 26258 26541 25921 26224 
Total  93205 92491 92334 89876 86097 83066 85043 83924 80627 88254 85294 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
 
Table E4 Median income and income growth, without self-consumption, 1995-2005 
  1995  1996  1997 1998  1999 2000 2001  2002 2003  2004  2005 
Median income without self-consumption in constant prices, ROL 2002 (million) 
Non-elderly 2.58  2.67  2.12 2.18  1.99 1.99 2.11  2.22 2.44  2.79  3.04 
Median income without self-consumption of the elderly as % of non-elderly (age groups) 
55-59 98.35 100.88  99.68 95.24 101.75 93.50 99.61 102.15 99.39 102.56 102.99 
60-64 90.22  91.50  95.89 87.96  92.84 88.23 94.67  96.20 90.60  95.48  94.96 
65-74 75.10  76.93  81.40 76.94  79.53 77.90 80.92  81.95 78.44  87.82  86.89 
75+ 65.53  66.02  69.48 67.62  70.06 66.72 70.90  70.46 66.94  76.70  77.65 
total 82.13  83.70  86.09 81.68  84.80 81.14 85.28  85.80 81.85  89.40  89.67 
 
 
Median income growth without self-consumption  Correlation with 
 median income 
growth non-elderly
a 
Non-elderly  -  3.30  -20.57 2.89 -8.93 0.19 6.07  5.27 9.59 14.51  9.11  1.00** 
Median income growth without self-consumption of the elderly (age groups)   
55-59  -  5.96 -21.52 -1.69  -2.71 -7.93 13.00  7.96  6.62  18.17  9.57  0.91** 
60-64  -  4.77 -16.76 -5.62  -3.89 -4.79 13.81  6.98  3.20  20.68  8.50  0.86** 
65-74  -  5.82 -15.96 -2.74  -5.88 -1.86 10.18  6.61  4.89  28.21  7.95  0.88** 
75+  -  4.08  -16.41 0.14 -5.65  -4.58  12.70  4.62 4.12 31.19 10.46  0.86** 
total  -  5.27 -18.30 -2.38  -5.46 -4.14 11.49  5.91  4.54  25.08  9.43  0.90** 
a Pearson correlation coefficients, all of the correlations are significant at a p=0.05 level. 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 240 
Table E5 Median income and income growth, including self-consumption, 1995-2005 
  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Median income with self-consumption in constant prices, ROL 2002 (million) 
Non-elderly 3.27 3.42 2.78  2.84 2.64 2.61 2.71 2.83 3.04 3.44 3.68 
Median income with self-consumption of the elderly as % of non-elderly (age groups) 
55-59 101.73 104.46 103.46 99.89 106.08 100.57 103.69 105.30 101.72 103.32 103.65 
60-64 96.38 99.14  101.05  96.61  100.05 97.67  101.43  102.17 96.47 99.88 98.34 
65-74 87.16 89.22 92.02  88.34 91.26 90.18 92.35 92.16 89.18 93.48 93.65 
75+ 74.73 76.59 79.74  78.06 81.35 78.97 81.79 80.48 78.36 83.71 84.11 
total 90.54 92.81 94.77  90.77 94.24 91.58 94.40 94.42 90.53 94.44 94.50 
 
Median income growth with self-consumption  Correlation with 
 median income 
growth non-elderly
a 
Non-elderly  -  4.64  -18.77 1.94 -7.06 -0.87  3.74  4.28  7.51 13.19  6.85  1.00** 
Median income growth with self-consumption of the elderly (age groups)   
55-59  -  7.45  -19.55  -1.58 -1.30 -6.02  6.97  5.90  3.85 14.96  7.19  0.93** 
60-64  -  7.64  -17.21  -2.54 -3.75 -3.22  7.74  5.04  1.51 17.18  5.20  0.92** 
65-74  -  7.11  -16.22  -2.13 -3.99 -2.04  6.24  4.06  4.05 18.63  7.04  0.94** 
75+  -  7.25  -15.42  -0.20 -3.15 -3.77  7.45  2.61  4.67 20.92  7.35  0.93** 
total  -  7.26  -17.06  -2.35 -3.51 -3.67  6.94  4.30  3.08 18.07  6.91  0.93** 
a Pearson correlation coefficients, all of the correlations are significant at a p=0.05 level. 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
 
Table E6 Median income related to wage without self-consumption, 1995-2005 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Δ(2005-1995) 
non-elderly 57.2 53.8 56.9 52.3 48.9 51.5 51.5 53.1 53.9 56.8 54.2  -3.0 
55-59  56.4 54.2 55.8 49.8 49.7 48.1 51.4 54.2 53.5 58.2 55.8  -0.5 
60-64  51.0 49.4 53.7 46.0 45.4 45.5 49.0 51.2 48.7 54.5 51.5  0.4 
64-75  43.2 42.3 46.8 40.4 39.1 40.1 42.1 43.8 42.4 50.0 47.0  3.8 
75+  37.4 36.5 40.0 35.5 33.8 34.8 36.9 37.4 36.2 43.4 41.9  4.5 
elderly  47.1 45.5 49.3 42.5 41.4 41.8 44.3 45.7 44.1 50.9 48.5  1.3 
total  
population  54.7 51.8 54.9 49.6 46.8 48.6 49.5 51.1 51.0 55.0 52.5  -2.2 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
 
Table E7 Median income related to wage with self-consumption, 1995-2005 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Δ(2005-1995) 
non-elderly 72.3 69.4 75.0 68.0 64.8 67.7 66.6 67.4 67.0 70.0 65.5  -6.8 
55-59  73.5 72.3 77.2 67.7 68.5 67.3 69.3 71.3 68.5 72.5 67.7  -5.8 
60-64  69.5 68.2 76.1 65.5 64.9 66.2 67.4 69.1 64.6 69.9 64.0  -5.5 
64-75  63.2 62.6 69.3 60.0 59.3 61.3 61.5 62.3 59.9 65.7 61.2  -2.0 
75+  54.1 53.3 60.3 53.1 51.9 53.8 54.5 54.7 52.7 58.3 55.2  1.0 
elderly  65.6 64.6 71.1 61.5 61.0 62.1 62.9 63.9 60.9 66.2 61.7  -3.8 
total  
population  70.3 68.1 73.9 66.2 63.9 66.2 65.5 66.4 65.2 68.9 64.4  -6.0 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
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Table E8 Relative share of income components, 1995-2005 
1995 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages  55.4 29.0  13.8  9.2  11.5  16.2  47.1 
Self-employment  6.9 4.2  3.0  2.0 2.0  2.8  6.0 
Old-age pensions  5.9 33.9 45.9 47.4  44.0  42.8  13.7 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers) 
13.3 11.5  13.3  14.8 15.3  13.6  13.3 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  18.5 21.4  24.1  26.6 27.2  24.6  19.8 
Total  100 100  100  100 100  100  100 
1996 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages 55.2  28.9  13.6  9.1  10.7  15.8  46.7 
Self-employment 6.1  3.4  3.0  1.9  1.5  2.5  5.3 
Old-age pensions  6.2  33.9  46.3  47.7  43.3  43.0  14.1 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers)  12.8  11.4  12.0  13.5  15.9  12.9  12.9 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  19.7  22.4  25.1  27.9  28.5  25.8  21.0 
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1997 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages 50.3  24.4  12.2  7.0  9.4  13.1  42.1 
Self-employment 6.1  3.0  2.1  1.4  1.0  1.9  5.2 
Old-age pensions  6.1  33.9  46.7  48.1  43.0  43.3  14.3 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers)  16.2  14.1  12.7  14.2  16.7  14.2  15.8 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  21.3  24.5  26.4  29.3  29.9  27.4  22.6 
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1998 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages 51.7  26.4  13.5  7.6  9.4  13.7  43.6 
Self-employment 5.7  2.7  2.1  1.3  1.2  1.8  4.9 
Old-age pensions  6.3  34.5  45.8  47.1  42.5  43.2  14.2 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers)  15.7  12.4  12.4  14.5  16.8  13.8  15.3 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  20.5  24.0  26.2  29.4  30.1  27.4  22.0 
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1999 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages 50.5  24.5  11.0  7.3  8.5  12.5  42.1 
Self-employment 6.6  3.6  2.8  1.5  1.1  2.2  5.6 
Old-age pensions  7.2  36.8  48.7  48.4  44.7  45.2  15.6 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers)  14.1  10.6  10.3  12.2  15.1  11.8  13.6 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  21.6  24.5  27.1  30.5  30.5  28.3  23.1 
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
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Table E8 (continued) Relative share of income components, 1995-2005 
2000 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages  52.2 23.2  12.5  7.7  8.1 12.4  43.5 
Self-employment  5.7 3.2  1.9  1.5 1.1  1.9  4.9 
Old-age pensions  7.3 37.2 45.8 46.6  43.2  43.8  15.3 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers) 
13.5 11.5  12.0  13.4 16.1  13.1  13.4 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  21.3 24.9  27.7  30.8 31.6  28.9  22.9 
Total  100 100  100  100 100  100  100 
2001 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages  51.9 21.8  12.3  8.7  8.7 12.5  43.2 
Self-employment  5.0 2.9  1.7  1.5 1.1  1.8  4.3 
Old-age pensions  9.0 40.8 50.4 49.7  46.5  47.3  17.5 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers) 
14.1 12.1  11.4  12.3 15.4  12.6  13.8 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  20.0 22.4  24.2  27.7 28.2  25.8  21.2 
Total  100 100  100  100 100  100  100 
2002 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages  52.4 25.5  13.4  8.5  9.3 13.6  43.8 
Self-employment  5.1 2.9  2.3  1.3 0.9  1.8  4.4 
Old-age pensions  8.8 39.4 50.6 51.6  47.3  47.9  17.4 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers) 
14.6 10.9  10.4  12.0 14.8  11.9  14.0 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  19.2 21.2  23.4  26.6 27.7  24.8  20.4 
Total  100 100  100  100 100  100  100 
2003 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages  52.5 28.1  14.2  9.0  7.8 14.3  44.1 
Self-employment  5.5 3.2  2.1  1.2 1.2  1.8  4.7 
Old-age pensions  8.0 37.4 50.5 52.0  48.7  47.7  16.7 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers) 
16.2 11.3  10.4  11.7 15.8  12.1  15.3 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  17.8 20.1  22.7  26.1 26.5  24.0  19.2 
Total  100 100  100  100 100  100  100 
2004 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
Wages  51.9 31.1  16.4  10.9 11.8  17.0  43.8 
Self-employment  6.4 3.8  2.5  1.9 1.3  2.4  5.5 
Old-age pensions  8.3 34.4 48.4 51.2  47.6  45.9  17.0 
Other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers) 
17.4 13.9  13.4  14.8 17.9  14.9  16.8 
Other agriculture (self-consumption)  16.0 16.8  19.3  21.3 21.4  19.8  16.9 
Total  100 100  100  100 100  100  100 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
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Table E8 (continued) Relative share of the income components, 1995-2005 
2005 
  0-54 55-59 60-64 65-74 75+ 55+ Total  population 
wages  54.3 34.8  17.8  11.6 11.0  18.6  46.0 
self-employment  6.2 3.6  2.7  2.0 1.7  2.5  5.4 
old-age pensions  8.0 32.5 48.3 53.6  50.6  46.6  17.0 
other non-agriculture (e.g. capital income, other social transfers) 
16.8 13.5  13.4  13.2 16.4  13.9  16.2 
other agriculture (self-consumption)  14.6 15.6  17.7  19.7 20.4  18.4  15.5 
Total  100 100  100  100 100  100  100 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
 
Table E9 Correlation between the difference of the Ginis with and without self-consumption and the share of self-consumption in the 
incomes 
  0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+  Total 
r
a  0.87** 0.97** 0.93** 0.90** 0.91** 0.95** 0.90** 
t-value  5.20  12.03  7.78 6.28 6.40 9.28 6.38 
a Pearson correlation coefficients, all of the correlations are significant at a p=0.05 level. 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
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Table E10 Gini-coefficients with and without self-consumption and the share of self-consumption in the incomes, 1995-2005 
1995 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.307  0.274  0.263  0.260  0.278  0.273  0.301 
Gini without self-consumption  0.372 0.348 0.341 0.352 0.380 0.359  0.372 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  18.5  21.4  24.1  26.6  27.2  24.6  19.8 
1996 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.297  0.261  0.256  0.250  0.273  0.264  0.291 
Gini without self-consumption  0.369 0.338 0.341 0.343 0.378 0.353  0.368 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  19.7  22.4  25.1  27.9  28.5  25.8  21.0 
1997 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.292  0.266  0.237  0.234  0.258  0.251  0.284 
Gini without self-consumption  0.363 0.346 0.316 0.318 0.355 0.336  0.359 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  21.3  24.5  26.4  29.3  29.9  27.4  22.6 
1998 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.290  0.257  0.252  0.244  0.262  0.256  0.284 
Gini without self-consumption  0.362 0.339 0.337 0.330 0.357 0.344  0.361 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  20.5  24.0  26.2  29.4  30.1  27.4  22.0 
1999 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.291  0.261  0.240  0.242  0.263  0.254  0.283 
Gini without self-consumption  0.368 0.346 0.320 0.332 0.359 0.344  0.365 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  21.6  24.5  27.1  30.5  30.5  28.3  23.1 
2000 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.296  0.276  0.254  0.241  0.262  0.259  0.289 
Gini without self-consumption  0.381 0.366 0.343 0.338 0.371 0.357  0.379 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  21.3  24.9  27.7  30.8  31.6  28.9  22.9 
2001 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.297  0.264  0.241  0.242  0.260  0.254  0.288 
Gini without self-consumption  0.376 0.340 0.321 0.330 0.356 0.340  0.371 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  20.0  22.4  24.2  27.7  28.2  25.8  21.2 
2002 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.299  0.265  0.241  0.239  0.255  0.253  0.290 
Gini without self-consumption  0.372 0.339 0.318 0.325 0.349 0.337  0.367 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  19.2  21.2  23.4  26.6  27.7  24.8  20.4 
2003 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.294  0.273  0.240  0.235  0.256  0.254  0.286 
Gini without self-consumption  0.364 0.344 0.310 0.316 0.347 0.334  0.361 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  17.8  20.1  22.7  26.1  26.5  24.0  19.2 
2004 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.308  0.290  0.262  0.247  0.271  0.269  0.300 
Gini without self-consumption  0.367 0.351 0.324 0.310 0.341 0.333  0.361 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  16.0  16.8  19.3  21.3  21.4  19.8  16.9 
2005 
 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+  Total  population 
Gini with self-consumption  0.311  0.295  0.268  0.245  0.265  0.270  0.302 
Gini without self-consumption  0.368 0.353 0.327 0.309 0.331 0.333  0.361 
Share of self-consumption in the incomes (%)  14.6  15.6  17.7  19.7  20.4  18.4  15.5 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 245 
 
Table E11 Distribution of population by age groups and deciles, 1995-2005 (%) 
1995 
Decile 0-54  55-59  60-64  65-74  75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  9.8  9.2  7.6  8.7  7.7  9.2  10.6 13.7 20.4 21.2 10.7 12.6 
2  9.7  9.5  7.9  9.0  9.1 10.8 12.4 12.3 15.5 16.0 11.0 11.7 
10  11.1  11.2  10.1  9.7  7.1  6.6 4.8 4.5 3.4 3.2 6.4 6.1 
1996 
 0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  10.0 9.4  6.9  8.2 7.1 9.1  9.6 12.6  19.3  21.0 9.9 12.1 
2  9.7  9.6  7.7  8.2  8.6  9.9  12.0 12.0 16.2 15.5 10.8 11.2 
10  11.1  11.2  10.1  9.5  7.0  6.4 5.1 4.6 3.2 2.9 6.5 5.9 
1997 
 0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  10.4 9.6  6.9  9.2 6.2 8.9  7.7 11.0  16.6  18.6 8.7 11.3 
2  9.6  9.7  9.1  8.5  8.5  8.6  11.9 11.9 17.3 16.3 11.3 11.1 
10  11.0  11.2  10.1  9.3  7.7  6.7 5.6 4.6 3.7 3.2 6.8 6.0 
1998 
 0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  10.1 9.6  6.7  8.3 6.9 9.1  9.4 11.8  16.7  17.9 9.5 11.5 
2  9.5  9.5  8.7  9.0  9.4  9.6  12.5 12.8 16.4 15.9 11.7 11.8 
10  11.2  11.4  10.1  9.3  6.7  5.9 4.8 3.9 3.8 3.5 6.2 5.5 
1999 
 0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  10.4  10.0 6.3  7.7 5.7 7.2  8.1 10.5  16.4  16.2 8.6 10.1 
2  9.9  9.6  7.4  8.4  8.1  9.0  11.1 12.4 14.2 15.4 10.2 11.3 
10  10.9  11.1  11.6  11.3  7.8  7.2 5.2 4.3 4.0 4.2 7.0 6.4 
2000 
 0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  10.7  10.1 6.5  7.7 5.1 6.6  7.0  9.5 14.1  15.6 7.7  9.6 
2  9.7  9.6  9.2  9.0  8.7  9.6  11.4 11.9 15.4 15.5 11.1 11.5 
10  11.1  11.4  10.5  9.8  7.1  6.2 4.6 3.6 4.1 3.7 6.3 5.5 
2001 
 0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  10.6  10.3 6.0  6.2 5.7 6.2  7.6  9.0 13.7  14.5 8.1  8.9 
2  9.7  9.7  8.2  8.4  8.5  9.4  11.6 11.8 15.9 14.2 11.1 11.1 
10  11.2  11.3  10.1  9.4  6.6  6.3 4.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 6.1 5.7 
2002 
 0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  10.7  10.2 6.7  7.1 5.2 6.1  7.1  9.2 13.5  14.8 7.9  9.2 
2  9.9  9.7  7.9  8.6  7.9  8.9  10.9 11.3 14.0 14.4 10.2 10.9 
10  11.2  11.3  9.9 9.6  6.9  6.3 4.8 4.5 3.4 3.6 6.0 5.7 
2003 
 0-54 55-59  60-64  65-74 75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1  10.2 9.9  6.7  6.8 6.5 7.5  9.2 10.8  15.3  15.8 9.4 10.4 
2  9.6  9.4  7.9  9.1  9.3  8.8  11.5 12.6 15.8 16.9 11.2 12.0 
10  11.3  11.5  11.0  10.4  6.6  6.1 4.0 3.5 3.3 3.1 5.8 5.3 
* SC stands for with self-consumption, -SC stands for without self-consumption 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 246 
Table E11 (continued) Distribution of population by age groups and deciles, 1995-2005 (%) 
2004 
 0-54  55-59 60-64 65-74  75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1 10.7  10.5 7.4  7.4 5.9 6.8 6.7  8.0 11.4  11.6 7.7  8.4 
2  10.0  9.7  7.9  8.9  7.9 8.3 10.0 10.9 14.7 15.8 10.2 11.0 
10 11.1 11.2 10.7 10.6 7.3 6.8  5.0  4.4  4.3  4.3  6.5  6.2 
2005 
 0-54  55-59 60-64 65-74  75+  55+ 
  SC -SC SC -SC  SC  -SC SC -SC SC -SC SC -SC 
1 10.7  10.4 6.8  7.7 6.9 7.7 7.2  8.0 11.7  11.7 8.0  8.7 
2  10.0  9.6 8.5 8.4  7.4  8.3 9.9  11.6  13.8  15.5  10.0  11.1 
10 11.1 11.1 11.8 11.1 7.1 6.4  5.0  5.0  4.5  4.6  6.8  6.6 
* SC stands for with self-consumption, -SC stands for without self-consumption 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
Table E12 Poverty incidence by age groups with different thresholds and self-consumption, 1995-2005 (%) 
Age group    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
0-54  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption 
 40%  4.8 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.9 5.0 5.6 5.9 5.1 5.8 5.5 
 50%  9.5 9.1 9.1 8.9 9.5  10.6  10.5  11.1  10.0  11.3  10.9 
 60%  15.9 15.5 15.1 15.2 16.0 17.1 16.8 17.7 16.6 18.0 18.0 
 70%  23.4 23.2 22.9 22.7 23.8 24.4 24.5 24.8 24.2 25.3 25.1 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption 
 40%  10.9 11.1 10.7 11.4 12.6 14.4 14.1 13.6 12.3 11.8 11.3 
 50%  16.4 16.3 16.1 16.4 17.8 19.8 19.6 19.5 17.8 17.8 17.6 
 60%  22.3 22.5 22.1 22.2 23.3 25.4 24.5 25.4 24.1 23.8 23.6 
 70%  28.8 28.8 28.5 27.9 29.5 30.8 30.3 30.8 30.3 29.7 29.8 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
55-59  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption 
 40%  3.8 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.5 3.1 2.3 3.2 2.7 3.0 3.7 
 50%  7.5 6.2 5.9 5.4 5.7 6.4 5.9 7.0 6.6 7.8 6.9 
 60%  12.5 10.9 11.0 11.2 10.5 12.8 11.3 12.3 11.5 12.9 12.4 
 70%  19.1 17.7 18.5 18.9 16.7 19.7 18.5 18.8 18.9 19.7 19.3 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption 
 40%  10.1 9.5 10.2  10.0 9.8 10.9 9.1 10.2 9.0  8.5  8.6 
 50%  15.5 14.0 14.8 14.4 14.5 16.9 14.1 15.3 14.4 13.8 13.3 
 60%  21.0 19.5 20.3 21.2 19.9 23.8 19.8 21.1 20.9 20.1 19.6 
 70%  27.8 26.7 27.4 28.8 26.6 30.7 26.6 27.1 27.4 25.9 25.5 
60-64    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption 
 40%  3.6 2.9 2.0 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.8 2.7 
 50%  7.4 6.4 5.0 5.9 4.9 5.0 5.6 5.6 6.3 6.4 7.0 
 60%  12.8 11.5 10.4 11.9 10.3 10.2 10.3 10.8 12.4 11.4 11.9 
 70%  21.4 19.3 17.2 19.7 17.5 18.5 18.3 17.8 20.6 18.6 18.4 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption 
 40%  10.8  10.9  9.9  10.8  9.2  10.4  9.5 9.0 9.2 7.6 8.6 
 50%  16.9 16.0 14.3 15.8 14.0 16.4 15.0 14.5 14.7 12.9 13.7 
 60%  24.0 22.4 20.1 22.7 21.1 23.8 21.4 21.7 22.2 19.3 19.8 
 70%  32.8 30.6 27.6 31.6 28.8 31.6 28.4 28.9 30.2 26.7 27.0 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
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Table E12 (continued) Poverty incidence by age groups with different thresholds and self-consumption, 1995-2005 (%) 
65-74    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption 
 40%  4.5 3.4 2.4 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.7 2.8 2.7 
 50%  10.3  8.5 6.1 7.7 7.0 6.9 7.6 7.5 8.9 7.2 7.4 
 60%  18.1 16.4 13.5 15.8 14.4 13.9 15.0 14.8 16.4 14.1 14.0 
 70%  28.8 25.6 23.6 26.2 23.9 23.8 24.7 23.8 26.0 22.1 22.5 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption 
 40%  15.5 14.4 12.2 14.2 13.4 14.1 13.3 12.8 13.5  9.1  9.1 
 50%  22.7 20.7 18.8 20.6 20.4 21.6 20.0 20.0 21.4 15.8 16.3 
 60%  31.6 29.6 26.8 30.1 29.5 31.4 28.9 28.8 30.5 23.6 24.0 
 70%  42.4 40.3 37.0 40.3 38.7 39.7 38.4 37.5 39.1 31.4 32.5 
75+    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption 
 40%  10.5  9.2 6.4 6.7 6.5 5.8 5.6 6.9 6.8 5.4 4.8 
 50%  20.1 17.8 14.6 14.6 15.1 13.7 13.6 14.0 15.0 12.2 12.2 
 60%  30.3 28.6 25.4 25.4 25.3 23.8 24.3 23.3 26.2 22.1 21.4 
 70%  42.5 40.3 37.2 37.9 36.1 36.3 35.2 34.5 37.7 33.2 32.1 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption 
 40%  23.2 23.0 20.5 20.8 19.7 21.8 19.9 20.2 19.9 13.8 13.3 
 50%  32.4 31.8 29.3 29.1 28.8 31.5 28.0 28.4 29.9 23.7 23.0 
 60%  42.8 41.7 38.9 39.5 38.8 41.6 38.0 38.6 40.6 32.9 32.4 
 70%  51.8 50.8 48.3 49.0 47.4 49.6 46.8 47.8 49.5 42.6 41.3 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
55+  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption 
 40%  5.1 4.1 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.9 3.4 3.4 
 50%  10.5  8.9 7.2 8.0 7.7 7.6 8.0 8.3 9.2 8.3 8.3 
 60%  17.4 15.9 14.2 15.6 14.6 14.7 15.1 15.1 16.7 15.0 14.9 
 70%  26.8 24.6 23.2 25.2 23.1 24.1 24.1 23.7 25.9 23.3 23.1 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption 
 40%  14.3 13.8 12.6 13.7 12.8 14.0 12.9 12.9 13.1  9.7  9.8 
 50%  21.1 19.8 18.6 19.6 19.2 21.3 19.3 19.6 20.4 16.5 16.7 
 60%  29.0 27.4 25.7 28.1 27.2 30.0 27.2 27.7 29.0 24.0 24.1 
 70%  38.0 36.4 34.5 37.3 35.4 37.8 35.5 35.6 37.1 31.7 31.9 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption 
 40%  4.9 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.4 4.8 5.2 5.0 
 50%  9.7 9.1 8.7 8.7 9.1 9.9 9.9  10.4  9.8  10.6  10.3 
 60%  16.3 15.6 14.9 15.3 15.7 16.5 16.4 17.1 16.6 17.3 17.3 
 70%  24.2 23.5 23.0 23.3 23.7 24.3 24.4 24.5 24.6 24.8 24.6 
  Poverty incidence (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption 
 40%  11.7 11.7 11.2 12.0 12.6 14.3 13.8 13.4 12.5 11.2 11.0 
 50%  17.5 17.1 16.7 17.2 18.1 20.2 19.5 19.5 18.5 17.5 17.3 
 60%  23.9 23.6 23.0 23.6 24.2 26.5 25.1 25.9 25.3 23.9 23.7 
 70%  31.0 30.6 29.9 30.1 30.9 32.5 31.5 31.9 32.0 30.2 30.3 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
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Table E13 Poverty gap by age group with different thresholds and self-consumption, 1995-2005 
Age group  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Correlation
a 
0-54  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption   
  40%  1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.4  0.97** 
  50%  2.4 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.9 2.8  0.96** 
  60%  4.1 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.3 4.9 4.7  0.98** 
  70%  6.3 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.4 6.7 6.8 7.2 6.6 7.3 7.1  0.98** 
  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption   
  40%  4.3 4.6 4.2 4.6 4.9 5.8 5.6 5.1 4.5 4.1 3.9  0.91** 
  50%  6.2 6.4 6.1 6.4 6.9 8.1 7.9 7.4 6.6 6.2 6.0  0.88** 
  60%  8.4 8.6 8.2 8.6 9.2  10.5  10.2  9.9 9.0 8.7 8.4  0.87** 
  70% 10.8 11.0 10.6 10.9 11.7 13.0 12.7 12.5 11.6 11.2 11.1  0.85** 
   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005   
55-59  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption   
  40%  1.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.9  0.95** 
  50%  1.9 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7  0.89** 
  60%  3.2 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.4 2.9 2.6 3.1 3.1  0.86** 
  70%  5.0 4.3 4.3 4.2 3.9 4.6 4.1 4.7 4.4 5.0 4.9  0.77** 
  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption   
  40%  4.4 4.2 4.3 4.1 3.8 4.4 3.4 3.5 3.2 2.6 2.8  0.87** 
  50%  6.1 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.4 6.3 5.0 5.3 4.9 4.3 4.4  0.76** 
  60%  8.1 7.5 7.8 7.7 7.4 8.5 7.0 7.4 7.0 6.4 6.5  0.70** 
  70%  10.4 9.7 10.1  10.2 9.7 11.2 9.3  9.8  9.5  8.8  8.8  0.92** 
   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005   
60-64  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption   
  40%  0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6  0.88** 
  50%  1.7 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4  0.92** 
  60%  3.0 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.8  0.90** 
  70%  5.0 4.4 3.8 4.4 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.4 4.3 4.5  0.84** 
  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption   
  40%  4.4 4.3 3.7 4.0 3.1 3.4 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.1 2.4  0.96** 
  50%  6.2 6.1 5.3 5.8 4.7 5.4 4.8 4.5 4.7 3.7 4.1  0.90** 
  60%  8.6 8.3 7.3 8.0 6.8 7.8 7.0 6.8 7.0 5.7 6.2  0.85** 
  70%  11.4  10.9 9.7 10.8 9.5 10.7 9.6  9.4  9.7  8.2  8.6  0.94** 
   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005   
65-74  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption   
  40%  1.0 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5  0.99** 
  50%  2.2 1.7 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.3  0.99** 
  60%  4.2 3.5 2.5 3.2 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.5 2.9 2.9  0.98** 
  70%  6.9 6.0 4.7 5.7 5.2 5.1 5.4 5.3 6.1 5.0 5.1  0.93** 
  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption   
  40%  6.3 5.7 4.0 4.8 4.3 4.8 4.1 3.9 4.3 2.4 2.2  0.95** 
  50%  8.8 8.0 6.3 7.3 6.8 7.4 6.6 6.3 6.8 4.4 4.3  0.94** 
  60%  11.9  10.9 9.0 10.2 9.8 10.6 9.5  9.3 10.1 6.9  7.0  0.95** 
  70% 15.4 14.3 12.3 13.8 13.2 14.2 13.0 12.7 13.6  9.9  10.0  0.99** 
   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005   
75+  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption   
  40%  2.5 2.0 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.8  0.99** 
  50%  5.0 4.2 3.0 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.3  0.99** 
  60%  8.3 7.4 5.8 5.9 6.0 5.4 5.4 5.7 6.0 5.0 4.7  0.97** 
  70%  12.3  11.3  9.5 9.6 9.4 8.9 8.9 9.0 9.7 8.2 7.8  0.97** 
  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption   
  40%  11.2  10.7  7.9 8.1 7.3 8.3 7.0 6.9 6.6 3.5 3.4  0.96** 
  50% 14.5 13.9 11.2 11.5 10.7 11.9 10.4 10.4 10.3  6.5  6.3  0.96** 
  60% 18.3 17.7 15.1 15.2 14.5 16.0 14.1 14.2 14.5 10.2  9.9  0.97** 
  70% 22.4 21.8 19.2 19.4 18.6 20.2 18.2 18.4 18.8 14.2 13.8  0.98** 
a Pearson correlation indicates the correlation between poverty gap and poverty incidence. all of the correlations are significant at p=0.05 
level. 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
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Table E13 (continued) Poverty gap by age group with different thresholds and self-consumption, 1995-2005 
   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Correlation
a 
55+  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption   
  40%  1.2 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6  0.98** 
  50%  2.4 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7  0.97** 
  60%  4.3 3.7 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.3  0.95** 
  70%  6.8 6.0 5.2 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.6 6.2 5.6 5.5  0.90** 
  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption   
  40%  6.2 5.8 4.7 5.0 4.5 5.0 4.3 4.2 4.3 2.6 2.6  0.94** 
  50%  8.4 7.9 6.8 7.3 6.7 7.5 6.6 6.5 6.7 4.7 4.7  0.90** 
  60%  11.2  10.5 9.4 10.1 9.4 10.5 9.4  9.4  9.7  7.3  7.4  0.88** 
  70% 14.4 13.6 12.3 13.3 12.6 13.9 12.5 12.6 13.1 10.2 10.3  0.98** 
   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005   
Total  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) with self-consumption   
  40%  1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.2  0.96** 
  50%  2.4 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.5  0.96** 
  60%  4.1 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.5 4.1 4.5 4.4  0.98** 
  70%  6.4 6.0 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.8 6.7  0.96** 
  Poverty gap (threshold as % of the median income) without self-consumption   
  40%  4.8 4.9 4.3 4.7 4.8 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.5 3.7 3.6  0.86** 
  50%  6.7 6.8 6.2 6.6 6.9 7.9 7.6 7.2 6.7 5.8 5.7  0.82** 
  60%  9.0 9.0 8.5 8.9 9.3  10.5  10.0  9.8 9.2 8.3 8.2  0.86** 
  70% 11.6 11.6 11.0 11.5 11.9 13.2 12.6 12.5 12.0 11.0 10.9  0.90** 
a Pearson correlation indicates the correlation between poverty gap and poverty incidence, all correlations are significant at p=0.05 level. 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
Table E14 Poverty incidence according to national criteria (minimum old-age pensions), 1995-2005 (%) 
Age  group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
0-54  25.0 20.3 30.1 30.8 33.7 36.8 31.1 29.6 25.9 19.8 16.1 
55-59  22.5 16.5 26.9 26.4 26.9 29.8 24.6 23.7 19.0 14.4 10.7 
60-64  23.6 17.2 26.7 27.5 27.4 29.7 24.4 22.5 19.4 13.2 10.7 
65-74  27.8 19.0 31.4 31.6 32.0 32.9 29.4 27.0 22.3 15.0 11.6 
75+  37.4 28.1 40.1 39.0 40.6 40.1 36.9 33.8 29.5 19.7 15.9 
55+  27.0 19.4 30.7 30.8 31.4 32.9 28.8 26.7 22.6 15.5 12.2 
Total  25.4 20.1 30.3 30.8 33.2 35.9 30.6 28.9 25.1 18.8 15.1 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 250 
Table E15 Share of households that saved money in the last 12 months, by occupational status of the head of the households, 2000-2005 
Occupation status of household head  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Total  7.6 8.2 8.2 9.0 9.8  10.6 
Employee  10.3 11.2 11.1 12.0 13.4 13.5 
Employer  25.0 34.5 35.3 31.9 46.0 38.2 
Self employed in non-agricultural activities  9.0  11.9 10.1 10.8 17.4 14.8 
Unemployed  3.4 1.6 0.8 3.1 2.5 2.1 
Farmers  7.0 7.3 7.4 8.3 8.2  11.3 
Pensioner  5.1 5.6 5.5 6.4 6.4 7.4 
Source: NIS 
 
 
Table E16 Poverty gap according to national criteria (minimum old-age pension), 1995-2005 (%) 
Age  groups 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
0-54  6.7 4.9 8.2 8.2 9.2  10.2  8.3 8.0 6.5 4.8 3.8 
55-59  5.6 3.7 6.5 6.2 6.5 7.3 5.7 5.7 4.1 3.2 2.3 
60-64  5.5 3.5 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.5 5.4 5.0 4.1 2.8 2.4 
65-74  6.6 4.2 6.9 7.2 7.3 7.3 6.6 5.9 4.7 3.1 2.4 
75+  10.4 6.9 10.3 9.6 10.2 9.6  8.6  8.3  6.6  4.4  3.2 
55+  6.7 4.4 7.2 7.2 7.4 7.6 6.6 6.1 4.9 3.4 2.5 
Total  6.7 4.8 7.9 8.0 8.8 9.6 7.9 7.6 6.1 4.5 3.5 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
 
Table E17 Absolute and relative poverty with different thresholds in urban and rural areas, with self-consumption. 1995-2005 (%) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
URBAN 
Relative poverty incidence 
threshold: 40% of median income  2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.1 3.3 2.5 3.7 2.8 
threshold: 50% of median income  5.3 5.5 5.9 5.6 5.9 6.6 5.7 6.1 4.8 6.6 5.7 
threshold: 60% of median income  10.1 10.1 10.1  9.7  10.2 11.4  9.8  9.9  8.7  10.7 10.1 
threshold: 70% of median income  16.1 16.2 16.6 15.9 16.6 17.4 15.6 15.2 14.0 16.2 14.8 
Absolute poverty incidence  15.2 12.5 20.2 20.6 22.2 25.9 18.8 17.6 13.8 11.6  8.1 
RURAL 
Relative poverty incidence 
threshold: 40% of median income  7.7 6.4 5.7 6.0 6.6 6.0 7.4 7.8 7.5 7.1 7.6 
threshold: 50% of median income  14.9 13.3 12.1 12.4 12.9 13.7 15.0 15.6 15.4 15.3 15.8 
threshold: 60% of median income  23.6 22.2 20.6 22.0 22.2 22.7 24.2 25.6 25.5 25.0 25.9 
threshold: 70% of median income  33.8 32.2 30.6 32.2 32.1 32.6 35.0 35.7 36.6 35.0 36.4 
Absolute poverty incidence  37.6 29.2 42.3 43.0 46.3 47.8 44.7 42.4 38.0 27.3 23.6 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 251 
Table E18 Relative poverty incidence with different thresholds, without self-consumption. 1995-2005 (%) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
URBAN 
Relative poverty incidence 
threshold: 40% of median income   3.5 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.6 4.4 3.7 4.0 3.1 4.2 3.7 
threshold: 50% of median income   6.1 6.2 5.9 5.5 6.3 7.3 6.2 6.7 5.3 6.9 6.1 
threshold: 60% of median income   10.1 9.9  9.6  9.0  9.8 10.9 9.3  9.9  8.5 10.7 9.7 
threshold: 70% of median income   15.1 14.9 14.5 13.5 14.4 15.1 13.5 13.7 12.8 14.9 14.4 
RURAL 
Relative poverty incidence 
threshold: 40% of median income   21.4 21.6 20.8 22.4 23.4 26.2 26.0 24.7 23.1 19.5 19.8 
threshold: 50% of median income   31.1 30.2 29.6 31.2 32.1 35.5 35.4 34.8 33.4 30.0 30.9 
threshold: 60% of median income   40.3 40.0 39.0 41.1 41.5 44.9 44.0 45.1 44.3 39.4 40.7 
threshold: 70% of median income   49.9 49.3 48.4 49.9 50.6 53.2 53.0 53.8 53.7 48.2 49.7 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
Table E19 Number of elderly and female as % of elderly. 1990-2007 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total (million)  23.2  23.2  22.8 22.8 22.8 22.7 22.7 22.6 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.4 21.8 21.8 21.7 21.7 21.6 21.6 
Female  (%)  50.7 50.7 50.8 50.9 50.9 50.9 51.0 51.0 51.1 51.1 51.1 51.1 51.2 51.2 51.2 51.2 51.3 51.3 
55-59  (million) 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 
Female  (%)  51.7 51.7 52.0 52.1 52.3 52.5 52.7 52.8 52.9 52.8 52.7 52.7 52.7 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6 
60-64  (million) 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Female  (%)  52.9 52.9 52.9 53.0 53.1 53.3 53.4 53.7 53.9 54.1 54.3 54.4 54.4 54.4 54.4 54.3 54.3 54.2 
65-74  (million) 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Female  (%)  57.6 57.2 57.0 56.8 56.7 56.5 56.3 56.2 56.1 56.1 56.2 56.3 56.4 56.6 56.8 57.0 57.1 57.3 
75+  (million)  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
Female  (%)  59.9 60.2 61.3 61.6 62.1 62.4 62.7 62.9 63.0 62.9 62.6 62.4 62.5 62.3 62.2 62.1 62.0 62.0 
55+  (million)  5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 
Female  (%)  55.3 55.3 55.4 55.5 55.6 55.7 55.8 55.9 56.0 56.1 56.2 56.3 56.5 56.5 56.6 56.6 56.7 56.7 
Source: NIS252 
Table E20 Paired samples test for the contribution of self-consumption to the income position of elderly 75 years old or over 
Paired Samples Test a
-,89091 ,71757 ,21636 -4,118 10 ,002
-,20000 1,06583 ,32136 -,622 10 ,548
,15455 ,24234 ,07307 2,115 10 ,061
Share of persons in the
lowest decile with
self-consumption - Share
of persons in the lowest
decile without
self-consumption
Pair
1
Share of persons in the
second income decile
with self-consumption -
Share of persons in the
second income decile
without self-consumption
Pair
2
Share of persons in the
top income decile with
self-consumption - Share
of persons in the top
income decile without
self-consumption
Pair
3
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Age group = 75+ a. 
 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
 
Table E21 Paired samples test for the contribution of self-consumption to the income position of single elderly women 
Paired Samples Test
-,30000 1,38130 ,41648 -,720 10 ,488
,07273 1,97438 ,59530 ,122 10 ,905
-,34545 ,22074 ,06656 -5,190 10 ,000
Share of persons in the
lowest income decile
without self-consumption
- Share of persons in the
lowest income decile with
self-consumption
Pair
1
Share of persons in the
second income decile
without self-consumption
- Share of persons in the
second income decile
without self-consumption
Pair
2
Share of persons in the
top income decile without
self-consumption - Share
of persons in the top
income decile without
self-consumption
Pair
3
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
  
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 253 
Table E22 Distribution of single elderly women by income deciles and trends in relative poverty, 1995-2005 
with  self-consumption  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Distribution of single elderly women by income deciles                     
Share of persons in the lowest income decile  24.2  21.6  18.3  21.0  18.6  15.8  17.2  16.3  20.9  18.0  18.3 
Share of persons in the second income decile  18.1  19.4  19.9  19.8  17.5  20.4  18.9  17.6  18.2  18.7  17.8 
Share of persons in the top income decile  2.1  1.9  3.0  2.3  2.4  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.5  2.0  2.3 
Poverty incidence as% of the median income 
threshold:  40%  of  median  income    11.8 9.7 6.7 7.2 7.4 6.7 7.2 7.8 9.4 8.9 8.3 
threshold:  50%  of  median  income   23.8 19.6 15.4 18.0 16.6 15.5 17.1 17.2 20.3 19.2 18.9 
threshold:  60%  of  median  income   36.1 33.2 28.1 32.1 29.3 27.9 29.7 29.5 32.8 31.8 31.1 
threshold:  70%  of  median  income   49.8 46.2 42.5 47.1 42.3 44.1 43.6 42.2 46.4 44.8 43.9 
             
without  self-consumption  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Distribution of single elderly women by income deciles                     
Share of persons in the lowest income decile  22.5  22.2  20.7  20.1  16.3  16.5  16.1  17.0  19.4  17.4  18.7 
Share of persons in the second income decile  20.1  18.2  16.5  18.7  18.2  18.3  18.1  17.6  20.0  21.0  20.4 
Share of persons in the top income decile  1.8  1.5  2.2  1.8  2.0  1.3  1.7  1.6  1.3  1.8  2.2 
Poverty incidence as % of the median income 
threshold:  40%  of  median  income   25.3 24.5 22.0 23.1 20.2 24.0 23.4 23.2 24.4 20.5 21.0 
threshold:  50%  of  median  income   38.0 34.4 31.1 33.2 30.8 35.1 33.3 33.7 36.5 33.8 34.4 
threshold:  60%  of  median  income   48.8 46.3 41.2 45.0 43.0 46.7 44.7 45.2 47.5 44.5 44.2 
threshold:  70%  of  median  income   58.2 57.3 52.4 56.2 53.8 55.9 54.8 53.9 55.0 52.4 51.9 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 254 
Table E23 Distribution of rural elderly by income deciles and trends in relative poverty, 1995-2005 
With  self-consumption  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Income distribution by deciles (%) 
 Share  of  persons  in  the  lowest  income  decile 14.4 13.2 10.7 12.1 11.0  9.9 11.0 11.2 12.8 10.4 11.4 
 Share  of  persons  in  the  second  income  decile 13.1 12.5 12.7 13.4 11.8 12.5 13.9 13.1 14.6 13.4 13.8 
  Share  of  persons  in  the  top  income  decile 5.4 5.1 6.1 5.2 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.4 4.0 4.3 3.7 
Relative poverty as % of the median income (%) 
  threshold:  40%  of  median  income    7.3 5.8 4.0 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.6 5.2 5.6 4.6 4.8 
  threshold:  50%  of  median  income    14.1 12.0  8.9 10.3  9.8  9.7 10.9 11.7 12.5 11.3 11.8 
  threshold:  60%  of  median  income    22 20 17 19 18 18 20 21 22 20 21 
  threshold:  70%  of  median  income    33.4 30.2 27.0 29.9 27.5 28.6 30.7 30.9 34.1 30.5 31.7 
             
Without  self-consumption  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Income distribution by deciles (%) 
 Share  of  persons  in  the  lowest  income  decile 20.1 19.1 18.2 18.9 16.8 15.8 15.1 15.6 17.4 13.6 14.4 
  Share  of  persons  in  the  2.  income  decile 15.9 15.8 15.5 16.8 16.3 17.0 17.0 16.8 18.0 16.8 17.5 
  Share  of  persons  in  the  top  income  decile 4.1 3.3 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 3.1 2.8 
Relative poverty as % of the median income (%) 
  threshold:  40%  of  median  income    22.5 21.6 20.1 22.3 20.7 22.7 21.6 21.5 21.5 15.6 16.3 
  threshold:  50%  of  median  income    31.7 30.1 28.5 30.8 29.8 33.0 31.0 31.6 32.5 26.1 27.1 
  threshold:  60%  of  median  income    42.1 40.5 38.0 42.1 41.0 45.0 42.2 42.9 44.8 36.8 38.1 
  threshold:  70%  of  median  income    53.1 51.6 48.7 53.6 51.7 55.1 53.1 53.9 55.5 47.3 48.5 
Source: Integrated Household Survey (1995-2000) and Family Budget Survey (2001-2005) 
 
 
 
Table E24 Share of people whose household ran out of money to pay for food 
Countries 2003 
  0-29 30-44 45-64 65+ 
Romania 47.9 52.5  61.5 57.9 
EU-25 12.2  10.5 9.7 8.5 
Source: EQLS 
 
 
 
Table E25  Mean value on a scale of 1 'very dissatisfied' to 10 'very satisfied' with the own present standard of living. 
Countries 2003 
  0-29 30-44 45-64 65+ 
RO 6.4  6.2  5.9  5.6 
EU-25 6.9 6.9 6.8  7.1 
Source: EQLS 
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Figure E1 Replacement ratios of average net pensions as % of average net salaries 
 
 
Source: CNPAS 
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Table F1 Development of wages and old pensions in Slovakia 
   1989  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000  2005 
Average monthly wage gross (SKK)  3142  3278 3770 4543 5379 6294 7195 11430 17274 
Index of real gross wage (1989=100)  100  94.3  67.3  73.7  70.9  73.1  76.1  81.4  92.7 
Average  monthly  net  wage  (SKK)  2310  . . . . . 5526 8881  13526 
Index of real net wage (1989=100)  100  .  .  .  .  .  .  92.8  98.7 
Average old pension (SKK)  1544  1673 2025 2199 2532 3049 3320 5382  7713 
Index of real old pension (1989=100)  100  . . . 66.5  70.7  73.0  78.6  83.6 
Ratio (net average pension/net average wage)  0.67                 0.60  0.61  0.57 
Source: Socialna politika Slovenskej republiky v roku 2000, Ministerstvo prace a socialnych veci a rodiny SR, 2001 Statisticky urad SR 
 
 
Table F2 Density of population (per square KM) 
Regions 
Slovakian  
Total   Bratislava Region  Western Slovakia  Central Slovakia Eastern Slovakia
110  294 124 83 69 
Source: Statistical Office, 2007 
 
 
Table F3 GDP Per Capita (constant 2000 prices) 
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Level  (x  1000,  SK)  138 148 158 167 173 173 174 181 188 196 206 219 
Growth  5.8 7.3 6.7 5.6 3.6 0.2 0.6 3.7 4.1 4.1 5.3 6.0 
Source: Own Computation based on data from the Statistical Office, 2007 
 
 
 
Table F4 Sectoral employment structure  
1995 2000 2005 1995  2000  2005 
   persons per  cent 
Total  2145.3 2101.4 2212.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Agriculture  197.2 139.8 105.1 9.2  6.7  4.8 
Industry  and  construction  834.7 782.9 858.9 38.9 37.3 38.8 
Services  1113.4 1178.7 1248.4 51.9  56.1  56.4 
                    
Men  1192.0 1137.0 1231.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Agriculture  136.5 101.3 79.2  11.5 8.9  6.4 
Industry  and  construction  562.0 537.1 611.0 47.1 47.2 49.6 
Services  493.5 498.6 540.8 41.4 43.9 43.9 
                    
Women  953.4 964.2 981.5 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Agriculture  60.8 38.4 25.9 6.4 4.0 2.6 
Industry  and  construction  272.7 245.8 248.0 28.6 25.5 25.3 
Services  619.9 680.0 707.6 65.0 70.5 72.1 
Source: Labour Force Surveys of the Slovak Republic 
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Table F5 Employed persons divided according to education grades 
1995  2000  2005  1995 2000 2005 
   Persons (thousand)  Per cent 
Total  2  146.8 2101.7 2216.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 
basic  239.7  146.1 102.6 11.2 7.0  4.6 
apprentice  712.0  737.5 700.5 33.2 35.1 31.6 
middle  (without  graduation)  156.4  86.9 55.8 7.3 4.1 2.5 
apprentice with graduation  67.3  97.2  115.5  3.1  4.6  5.2 
middle  complete  general  88.7  113.0  97.8 4.1 5.4 4.4 
middle  complete  vocational  610.8  661.9 778.5 28.5 31.5 35.1 
advanced vocational     15.0  21.1    0.7  1.0 
university - 1st level     6.9  12.5    0.3  0.6 
university - 2nd level  269.9  233.1  326.8  12.6  11.1  14.7 
university - 3rd level     4.0  5.2    0.2  0.2 
without education  2.0  0.2     0.1  0.0   
Source: Labour Force Surveys of the Slovak Republic 
 
 
Table F6 Foreign migration  
Year  Total employment  Employment abroad 
   thousand  thousand  per cent of employed
2000  2 101.7   49.3  2.35 
2001  2 123.7   64.1  3.02 
2002  2 127.0   78.4  3.69 
2003  2 164.6    69.3  3.20 
2004 2  170.4  103.6  4.77 
2005 2  216.2  125.4  5.66 
2006 2  312.7  158.1  6.84 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
 
 
Table F7 The ratio of self-employed persons  
 1995  2000  2005 
Employed Total (thousand)  2147.8  2101.7  2216.2 
Employed Men  1193.3  1137.3  1233.0 
Employed Women  953.5  964.4  983.1 
Self-employed Total (thousand)  140.1  167.4  279.3 
Self-employed Men  104.0  123.0  211.2 
Self-employed Women  36.0  44.4  68.1 
Ratio of self-employed Total (%) 6.5  8.0  12.6 
Ratio of self-employed Men  8.7  10.8  17.1 
Ratio of self-employed Women  3.8  4.6  6.9 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
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Table F8 Number of persons in each age cohort in 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2005 
Age  group  1997 2000 2003 2005 
– 54  4374  4515  4444  10609 
55 – 59  193  158  193  969 
60 – 64  125  119  133  732 
65 – 74  166  183  199  1001 
75+  65 94 104  505 
55+  549 554 629 3207 
All 4923  5069  5073  13816 
Source: Household budget surveys (HBS), Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
 
 
 
Table F9 Median equivalised disposable monthly income by age groups, in constant prices (year 1990) in SKK 
Age  group  1997 2000 2003 2005 
 - 54  2 132  2 104  2 585 2 968 
55 – 59  3 518  4 031  5 055 4 880 
60 – 64  3 444  3 476  4 379 5 257 
65 – 74  3 355  3 526  4 277 5 055 
75+  2 888  3 326  4 441 4 650 
55 +  3 431  3 535  4 574 5 017 
All  2 170  2 166  2 669 3 215 
Source: HBS, own calculation 
 
 
 
Table F10 Median equivalised disposable income by age groups as percentage of average net wage, in % 
Age  group 1997 2000 2003 2005 
 - 55  32.7  27.4  25.5  22.3 
55 – 59  53.9  52.5  49.9  36.7 
60 – 64  52.8  45.3  43.2  39.6 
65 – 74  51.4  46.0  42.2  38.1 
75+  44.3 43.3 43.8 35.0 
55+  52.6 46.1 45.1 37.8 
All  33.2 28.2 26.3 24.2 
Source: HBS, own calculation 
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Table F11: Income components across age groups (%) 
Age group (years)   
Income component  below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All 
 1997 
Earnings 78.7  73.8  16.9  3.2  6.5  41.9  73.8 
Self-employment  income  6.7  3.9 1.6 1.6 0.0  2.7  6.1 
Factor  income  1.0  1.6 3.2 5.5 3.1  2.9  1.2 
Social  transfers  7.3  16.3 71.0 84.9 85.5  47.5  12.7 
Others  6.4  4.3 7.3 4.9 5.0  5.0  6.2 
All  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
 2000 
Earnings 77.6  75.8  25.9  3.3  2.8  40.6  72.6 
Self-employment  income  6.6  3.5 3.5 0.0 0.0  2.2  6.0 
Factor  income  1.3  0.8 2.2 2.4 0.4  1.4  1.3 
Social  transfers  8.0  16.8 65.8 92.7 95.5  53.4  14.1 
Others  6.4  3.0 2.7 1.6 1.4  2.4  5.9 
All  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
 2003 
Earnings 79.4  78.9  36.1  2.4  2.8  43.6  74.1 
Self-employment  income  6.3  6.4 7.5 0.6 0.0  4.6  6.0 
Factor  income  0.5  0.3 1.4 1.1 0.3  0.7  0.1 
Social  transfers  6.7  11.4 52.4 94.4 95.9  48.8  13.0 
Others  7.1  3.0 2.5 1.5 1.1  2.3  6.4 
All  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
 2005 
Earnings  69.4  60.4 31.3 12.5 6.6  35.9  59.6 
Self-employment  income  11.3  6.4 2.7 1.8 0.2  3.7  9.1 
Factor  income  0.3  0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3  0.3  0.3 
Social  transfers  13.8  27.9 62.8 83.2 91.6  56.6  26.3 
Others  5.2  4.9 3.0 2.2 1.3  3.4  4.7 
All  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: HBS, own calculation 
 
 
 
Table F12 Structure of net money income of households by social groups 
Income  A B C D 
2001 
Wages 66.9  80.6     
Income from business  4.7    63.8 
Property  income  2.7 2.7 2.5 2.1 
Social  income  18.4 8.1  92.0 7.7 
  of which:  Pensions 
  13.3    91.4 2.6 
           Children’s allowance  2.2  2.5    2.0 
2003 
Wages 69.5  82.1    
Income from business  5.5    63.1 
Property  income  0.6 0.5 1.1 0.4 
Social  income  17.0 8.0  95.2 6.2 
  of which:  Pensions 
  11.9    94.7 2.0 
           Children’s allowance  2.3  2.6    2.1 
2005 
Wages 47.5  78.2    
Income from business  8.7    67.0 
Property  income  0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 
Social  income  38.0 13.8 89.3 10.0 
  of which:  Pensions 
  32.3    88.0 4.5 
           Children’s allowance  3.1 4.2   4.5 
where: 
A - Households total     
B - Households of employees     
C - Households of pensioners without working members     
D - Households of self-employers     
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
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Table F13: Distribution of population by age groups and selected income deciles (%) 
Age group (years)   
Income decile  below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All 
 1997 
1  100.0         100.0 
2  99.8     0.2  0.2  100.0 
10 80.5  10.8  3.3  4.3  1.2  19.5  100.0 
All  88.8  3.9 2.5 3.4 1.3  11.2  100.0 
 2000 
1  100.0         100.0 
2 99.6      0.4    0.4  100.0 
10 78.5  11.7  3.8  4.2  2.0  21.5  100.0 
All  89.1  3.1 2.3 3.6 1.9  10.9  100.0 
 2003 
1  100.0         100.0 
2  99.8     0.2  0.2  100.0 
10 74.4  15.0  5.1  3.0  2.6  25.6  100.0 
All  87.6  3.8 2.6 3.9 2.1  12.4  100.0 
 2005 
1  98.8  0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1  1.2  100.0 
2  95.4  1.2 0.8 1.3 1.2  4.6  100.0 
10 62.1  16.1  10.7  8.5  2.5  37.9  100.0 
All  76.8  7.0 5.3 7.2 3.7  23.2  100.0 
Source: HBS, own calculation 
  
 
 
Table F14 Median income of the elderly as percentage of median income of non-elderly 
Age group  1997  2000  2003  2005 
 - 55  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0 
55 – 59  165.0   191.6   195.5   164.4 
60 – 64  161.6   165.2   169.4   177.1 
65 – 74  157.4   167.6   165.5   170.3 
75+  135.5   158.1   171.8   156.7 
55+  161.0   168.0   176.9   169.0 
All  101.8   103.0   103.2   108.3 
 
Source: HBS, own calculation 
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Table F15 Income inequality by age groups 
Age group (years)   
Inequality measure  below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All 
 1997 
Gini  0.361  0.239 0.224 0.210 0.214  0.230  0.356 
Theil  0.215  0.086 0.083 0.078 0.073  0.085  0.206 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.102  0.045 0.042 0.039 0.038  0.042  0.099 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.192  0.090 0.084 0.078 0.077  0.085  0.190 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.269  0.134 0.125 0.117 0.119  0.127  0.269 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.334  0.176 0.165 0.156 0.160  0.168  0.337 
 2000 
Gini  0.371  0.232 0.250 0.193 0.192  0.226  0.365 
Theil  0.227  0.085 0.102 0.063 0.061  0.083  0.217 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.107  0.044 0.050 0.033 0.032  0.042  0.104 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.200  0.090 0.096 0.069 0.065  0.084  0.197 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.278  0.138 0.139 0.107 0.101  0.127  0.278 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.342  0.185 0.178 0.147 0.139  0.170  0.345 
 2003 
Gini  0.374  0.257 0.254 0.192 0.189  0.236  0.368 
Theil  0.238  0.102 0.106 0.063 0.060  0.089  0.225 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.110  0.052 0.052 0.033 0.031  0.045  0.107 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.204  0.104 0.101 0.068 0.066  0.089  0.201 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.283  0.155 0.146 0.105 0.103  0.133  0.283 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.348  0.203 0.187 0.142 0.142  0.175  0.352 
 2005 
Gini  0.388  0.308 0.277 0.250 0.242  0.278  0.374 
Theil  0.258  0.155 0.128 0.106 0.092  0.129  0.234 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.120  0.075 0.062 0.052 0.047  0.062  0.112 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.224  0.144 0.119 0.104 0.094  0.121  0.214 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.314  0.208 0.174 0.156 0.142  0.177  0.306 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.392  0.266 0.224 0.207 0.188  0.230  0.388 
Source: HBS, own calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F16 Aggregate cross-sectional replacement rates 
   2005  2006 
Replacement rate - total  0.5498  0.5822 
Replacement rate - men  0.5528  0.5614 
Replacement rate - women  0.5693  0.5777 
Source: SILC 2005, 2006, Slovakia, own calculations 264 
Table F17 Poverty incidence as percentage of persons with equivalised disposable income below 40%, 50%, 60% and 70% of median 
income 
 Age group  40%  50%  60%  70% 
1997 
 - 54  1.2  4.3  9.9  19.3 
55 - 59  2.6  4.7  10.4  16.1 
60 - 64  0.8  1.6  1.6  4.0 
65 - 74  0.6  1.2  4.8  7.8 
75 +  -  3.1  7.7  13.8 
55 +  1.3  2.7  6.4  10.6 
All 1.1  4.3  9.0  18.0 
2000 
-  54  1.2  3.8 9.7 18.2 
55 - 59  3.8  5.7  12.0  24.7 
60 - 64  -  0.8  3.4  5.0 
65 - 74  -  1.6  4.9  6.6 
55  +  1.1  2.3 6.3 11.7 
75 +  -  -  3.2  8.5 
55+  1.1  2.3 6.3 11.7 
All  1.2  4.2 9.7 18.0 
2003 
-  54  1.9  4.7 9.7 19.0 
55 - 59  3.1  6.7  14.5  20.2 
60 - 64  -  0.8  0.8  5.3 
65 - 74  2.0  3.0  3.5  5.0 
75+  -  1.0 2.9 9.6 
55+  1.6  3.3 6.2 10.5 
All 1.7  4.6  10.2  18.8 
2005 
-  54  5.5  10.3 17.1 24.7 
55 - 59  8.3  12.8  20.6  27.1 
60 - 64  6.7  10.1  16.1  20.6 
65 - 74  6.0  9.1  13.3  17.9 
75+  6.5  10.7 15.0 22.2 
55+  6.9  10.7 16.4 22.0 
All  5.7  10.9 17.4 24.5 
Source: HBS, own calculation 
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Table F18 Poverty gap by age groups, thresholds are 40%, 50%, 60% and 70% of median income 
Age  group  40%  50% 60% 70% 
1997 
 - 54  6.0  13.4  16.5  14.2
55 - 59  3.9  20.2  13.3  18.6
60 - 64  32.9  27.7  39.8  2.8 
65 - 74  31.1  25.8  9.2  14.6
75+ -  2.8  16.6  26.0
55+  16.0  18.1 16.0 16.5
All  7.7  14.0 16.2 14.4
2000 
 - 54  9.6  14.1  14.7  13.9
55 - 59  2.8  20.6  16.6  14.1
60 - 64  -  16.6  3.3  16.0
65 - 74  -  2.8  11.7  18.9
75+ -  -  0.3  6.7 
55+ 26.2  9.6  12.1  17.3
All  8.4  13.5 14.2 15.8
2003 
 - 54  19.1  15.8  14.3  15.7
55 - 59  12.4  10.6  11.2  19.6
60 - 64  -  11.9  26.6  6.5 
65 - 74  22.4  37.3  47.8  37.4
75+  -  11.2 16.6 7.8 
55+  13.7  20.7 23.6 12.6
All  16.2  16.5 13.4 16.2
2005 
 - 54  20.7  22.3  24.7  33.6
55 - 59  18.0  26.7  28.9  37.9
60 - 64  20.9  28.2  33.6  40.0
65 - 74  25.6  31.1  38.6  41.2
75+  23.0  23.9 35.7 37.9
55+  22.2  27.6 32.0 39.5
All  19.1  21.6 26.9 35.2
Source: HBS, own calculation 
 
 
 
Table F19 Poverty incidence as percentage of persons with equivalised disposable income below subsistence minimum (national criteria) as 
share of all persons (%) 
 Age group  1997  2000  2003  2005 
0 – 54  18.8  34.2  36.9  39.3 
55 – 59  0.4  0.6  0.5  2.5 
60 – 64  0.0  0.2  0.2  1.2 
65 – 74  0.1  0.4  0.5  1.7 
75+  0.1 0.3 0.4 1.2 
55+  0.5 1.5 1.6 6.6 
All 19.3  35.7  38.5  45.9 
Source: HBS, own calculation 
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Table F20 Risk-of-poverty rate by age and gender in 2004 
Age  group  Males Females Total 
Total 13.2  13.5  13.3 
    - 15   19.2  17.6  18.4 
    - 64  14.3  14.0  14.2 
    16 +  11.8  12.7  12.3 
       16 - 64  13.1  13.3  13.2 
       16 - 24  17.1  16.6  16.8 
       25 - 49  13.4  14.7  14.1 
       50 - 64  8.3  8.3  8.3 
    65 +  2.7  9.8  7.1 
SILC 2005, Statistical Office SR 
 
 
 
Table F21 Risk-of-poverty rate by age and gender before all transfers in 2004 
Age  group Males Females Total 
Total 37.0  43.2  40.3 
- 15   35.2  34.1  34.7 
16 +  37.5  44.8  41.4 
16 – 64  30.7  35.0  32.9 
65 +  88.0  93.3  91.2 
SILC 2005, Statistical Office SR 
 
 
 
Table F22 Risk-of-poverty rate by age and gender before social transfers (without old-age benefits and survivor´s benefits) in 2004 
Age group  Males  Females  Total 
Total 21.9  21.9  21.9 
- 15   30.8  28.0  29.4 
16 +  20.0  20.8  20.4 
16 – 64  21.7  21.9  21.8 
65 +  7.9  15.1  12.4 
SILC 2005, Statistical Office SR 
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Table G1: Median disposable income of the elderly by age groups (2004 prices, SIT) 
Age group (years)  Year of the survey 
  1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005 
below 55  1,797,341 1,829,161 1,888,512 1,935,711 
55-59  1,823,001 1,879,457 1,949,513 1,964,480 
60-64  1,700,861 1,788,794 1,849,113 1,855,181 
65-74  1,562,125 1,665,091 1,695,517 1,732,935 
75 and over  1,426,893 1,508,839 1,468,208 1,455,826 
55 and over  1,639,586 1,717,540 1,737,739 1,758,564 
All  1,765,113 1,799,875 1,844,255 1,886,116 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
 
Table G2: Median disposable income of the elderly as percentage of average net earnings, by age groups 
Age group (years)  Year of the survey 
  1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005 
below 55  101.8    99.1    97.2  95.9 
55-59  103.2 101.8 100.4  97.3 
60-64    96.3    96.9    95.2  91.9 
65-74    88.4    90.2    87.3  85.9 
75 and over    80.8    81.7    75.6  72.1 
55 and over    92.8    93.0    89.5  87.1 
All    99.9    97.5    95.0  93.4 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
 
Table G3: Income components across age groups (%) 
Age group (years) 
below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All  Income component 
1997-1999 
Earnings    72.3    40.7    24.4    16.9    18.1    25.0    59.7 
Self-employment income      7.4      4.6      4.1      2.7      2.9      3.6      6.4 
Occasional income      1.8      1.2      1.6      0.3      0.3      0.8      1.5 
Factor income      0.9      0.8      1.2      1.6      0.3      1.1      0.9 
Pensions    10.4    48.0    66.4    76.6    74.2    66.5    25.3 
Social transfers      6.8      4.5      2.1      1.6      2.8      2.7      5.7 
Private transfers      0.4      0.2      0.1      0.2      1.3      0.4      0.4 
All  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
 1999-2001 
Earnings    72.4    41.8    22.1    15.9    15.1    23.4    59.3 
Self-employment income      7.4      5.5      2.6      3.0      2.9      3.5      6.3 
Occasional income      2.1      1.5      1.7      0.5      0.3      1.0      1.8 
Factor income      0.9      0.7      0.6      0.5      0.3      0.5      0.8 
Pensions      9.8    45.3    70.5    77.9    77.8    68.4    25.4 
Social transfers      6.9      4.9      2.2      1.8      2.6      2.8      5.8 
Private transfers      0.6      0.2      0.3      0.3      1.0      0.4      0.5 
All  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
 2001-2003 
Earnings    72.4    44.0    24.4    15.8    14.2    23.7    59.1 
Self-employment income      7.4      6.4      3.1      2.2      1.4      3.2      6.3 
Occasional income      2.3      1.8      1.2      0.6      0.3      0.9      1.9 
Factor income      0.7      0.9      0.8      0.8      1.1      0.9    0.8 
Pensions      9.6    42.1    68.0    78.9    80.2    68.5    25.7 
Social transfers      7.0      4.5      2.0      1.6      2.1      2.4      5.7 
Private transfers      0.6      0.3      0.4      0.3      0.7      0.4      0.5 
All  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
 2003-2005 
Earnings    72.9    46.0    21.4    14.5    10.7    22.6    58.6 
Self-employment income      7.2      6.2      3.2      2.6      1.1      3.3      6.1 
Occasional income      2.6      3.0      1.0      0.8      0.3      1.3      2.2 
Factor income      1.2      1.6      0.7      1.0      0.8      1.0      1.2 
Pensions      8.5    39.4    71.4    79.2    85.1    69.4    25.8 
Social transfers      6.9      3.4      2.1      1.5      1.5      2.1      5.5 
Private transfers      0.8      0.3      0.3      0.3      0.5      0.4      0.6 
All  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
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Table G4: Distribution of population by age groups and selected income deciles 
Age group (years)  Income decile  
below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All 
 1997-1999 
1  67.3  4.4  6.2  13.5    8.6  32.7  100.0 
2  65.1  6.0  6.2  15.1    7.5  34.9  100.0 
10  76.7  9.0  5.9    6.4    2.0  23.3  100.0 
All  75.6  5.8  5.6    8.6    4.5  24.4  100.0 
 1999-2001 
1  62.3 4.6  6.6  16.3  10.2  37.7 100.0 
2  72.0  3.4  5.0  11.5    8.0  28.0  100.0 
10  79.7  6.7  5.9    5.4    2.3  20.3  100.0 
All  75.2  5.5  5.6    8.8    4.8  24.8  100.0 
 2001-2003 
1  61.5 5.5  6.0  16.3  10.7  38.5 100.0 
2  69.5 3.9  4.7  10.2  11.8  30.5 100.0 
10  78.6  6.9  4.6    6.4    3.5  21.4  100.0 
All  74.8  5.5  5.1    9.1    5.5  25.2  100.0 
 2003-2005 
1  59.9 5.6  5.4  14.9  14.3  40.1 100.0 
2  67.8  4.9  5.4    9.5  12.5  32.2  100.0 
10  78.8  7.3  4.9    6.4    2.6  21.2  100.0 
All  73.7  6.0  5.3    9.0    6.0  26.3  100.0 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
 
Table G5: Median disposable income of the elderly as percentage of median disposable income of the non-elderly, by age groups 
Age group (years)  Year of the survey 
  1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005 
below 55  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
55-59  101.4 102.7 103.2 101.5 
60-64    94.6    97.8    97.9    95.8 
65-74    86.9    91.0    89.8    89.5 
75 and over    79.4    82.5    77.7    75.2 
55 and over    91.2    93.9    92.0    90.8 
All    98.2    98.4    97.7    97.4 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note:  The non-elderly are persons below 55 years of age. 
 
Table G6: Inequality of disposable income, by age groups 
Age group (years) 
below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All  Inequality measure 
1997-1999 
Gini  0.238 0.262  0.255  0.270  0.263  0.268  0.246 
Theil  0.096 0.117  0.108  0.122  0.115  0.121  0.102 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.048 0.059  0.053  0.060  0.058  0.060  0.051 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.096 0.114  0.104  0.117  0.118  0.117  0.102 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.148 0.176  0.154  0.174  0.182  0.177  0.156 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.207 0.262  0.204  0.232  0.253  0.244  0.218 
 1999-2001 
Gini  0.239 0.243  0.253  0.261  0.270  0.261  0.245 
Theil  0.097 0.101  0.107  0.113  0.121  0.114  0.101 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.048 0.050  0.054  0.057  0.061  0.057  0.050 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.095 0.102  0.108  0.117  0.124  0.117  0.101 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.146 0.158  0.166  0.183  0.191  0.181  0.156 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.204 0.225  0.229  0.257  0.263  0.253  0.218 
 2001-2003 
Gini  0.228 0.241  0.242  0.253  0.276  0.257  0.236 
Theil  0.087 0.099  0.100  0.105  0.129  0.110  0.093 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.043 0.050  0.051  0.053  0.063  0.055  0.047 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.087 0.104  0.104  0.107  0.123  0.112  0.094 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.137 0.164  0.162  0.165  0.183  0.172  0.147 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.204 0.236  0.227  0.227  0.246  0.238  0.215 
 2003-2005 
Gini  0.232 0.251  0.236  0.247  0.263  0.254  0.239 
Theil  0.091 0.107  0.094  0.101  0.120  0.109  0.096 
Atkinson (ε=0.5)  0.045 0.054  0.046  0.050  0.057  0.053  0.048 
Atkinson (ε=1.0)  0.088 0.112  0.090  0.099  0.111  0.106  0.094 
Atkinson (ε=1.5)  0.137 0.187  0.133  0.149  0.163  0.162  0.145 
Atkinson (ε=2.0)  0.213 0.318  0.175  0.202  0.218  0.233  0.220 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note: Based on disposable income. 
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Table G7: Poverty incidence, by age groups and at different poverty thresholds  
Poverty threshold (% of national median disposable income) 
40% 50% 60% 70%  Age group (years) 
1997-1999 
below 55  3.6    7.4  12.4  18.9 
55-59  3.6    5.7  10.7  18.4 
60-64  4.4    8.4  15.5  23.4 
65-74  5.7 11.8  24.6  34.8 
75 and over  8.9 17.0  25.7  37.6 
55 and over  5.5 10.5  19.4  28.8 
All  4.1    8.2  14.1  21.3 
 1999-2001 
below 55  3.4    6.3  10.8  18.4 
55-59  2.9    6.2  10.3  14.8 
60-64  5.6    8.3  14.7  21.3 
65-74  7.5 13.5  22.4  31.6 
75 and over  9.2 16.5  26.0  38.2 
55 and over  6.4 11.3  18.7  26.8 
All  4.1    7.5  12.8  20.5 
 2001-2003 
below 55  2.8    5.4    9.5  16.4 
55-59  3.7    7.3  11.3  16.3 
60-64  5.5    8.7  13.0  19.7 
65-74  6.5 11.1  21.0  28.0 
75 and over  8.3 15.4  25.3  39.8 
55 and over  6.1 10.7  18.2  26.3 
All  3.6    6.7  11.7  18.9 
 2003-2005 
below 55  2.5    5.0    9.5  16.1 
55-59  3.8    5.5  10.9  16.6 
60-64  3.2    6.8  11.5  20.0 
65-74  4.4    9.2  18.0  25.9 
75 and over  4.8 12.2  29.9  42.4 
55 and over  4.1    8.6  17.8  26.4 
All  3.0    6.0  11.7  18.8 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note: Poverty rates are calculated as percentages of persons with equivalised disposable income below 40%, 50%, 60%, and 70% of the 
national median disposable income. 
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Table G8: Poverty gap, by age groups and at different poverty thresholds  
Poverty threshold (% of national median disposable income) 
40% 50% 60% 70%  Age group (years) 
1997-1999 
below 55  21.9 19.6 22.1 21.1 
55-59  30.8 29.5 23.1 17.9 
60-64  12.2 23.6 19.2 21.0 
65-74  31.4 18.9 15.9 20.2 
75 and over  30.8 22.1 22.8 23.6 
55 and over  26.8 23.2 19.5 20.4 
All  22.5 19.9 21.2 20.9 
 1999-2001 
below 55  17.6 20.9 21.4 18.4 
55-59  21.6 19.8 22.2 26.7 
60-64  19.1 29.9 22.5 23.6 
65-74  32.3 22.5 21.4 25.1 
75 and over  31.0 24.7 27.4 23.5 
55 and over  28.3 23.8 23.1 24.2 
All  22.1 21.7 21.9 20.3 
 2001-2003 
below 55  19.0 21.4 19.5 18.9 
55-59  33.9 20.6 28.4 23.9 
60-64  28.9 25.7 27.7 24.7 
65-74  20.1 27.4 18.3 24.4 
75 and over  27.9 22.1 19.7 18.6 
55 and over  21.8 25.1 21.6 23.3 
All  20.7 22.1 20.0 20.5 
 2003-2005 
below 55  20.5 20.3 17.9 17.6 
55-59  27.0 33.5 18.4 19.5 
60-64  19.1 19.3 20.3 17.6 
65-74  22.4 18.7 17.9 23.5 
75 and over  26.1 16.6 10.9 18.7 
55 and over  22.4 19.1 15.7 20.0 
All  20.8 19.9 17.1 18.7 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note: Poverty gaps are based on poverty rates calculated as percentages of persons with equivalised disposable income below 40%, 50%, 
60%, and 70% of the national median disposable income. 
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Table G9: Persons with income below social minimum, by age groups (% of all persons in the age group) 
Year of the survey  Age group (years) 
1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005 
below 55  1.9 1.2 1.6 1.1 
55-59  1.8 1.2 2.8 2.4 
60-64  1.4 1.9 3.6 1.2 
65-74  2.7 3.0 4.1 2.1 
75 and over  4.0 3.3 5.9 2.8 
55 and over  2.4 2.4 4.1 2.2 
All  2.1 1.5 2.2 1.4 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
 
Table G10: Share of social assistance recipients, by age groups (%) 
Year of the survey  Age group (years) 
1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005 
  % of all persons (in the age group) 
below 55  2.8 2.7 3.3 7.1 
55-59  2.8 2.0 2.2 4.3 
60-64  2.0 2.3 2.7 3.0 
65-74  2.2 1.9 1.6 2.0 
75 and over  5.1 4.7 2.4 0.9 
55 and over  2.8 2.5 2.1 2.5 
All  2.8 2.6 3.0 5.9 
  % of persons (in the age group) with income below 60% of median disposable income  
below 55  60.6 56.4 46.5 39.4 
55-59  46.1 73.7 56.9 40.5 
60-64  73.9 92.3 41.9 24.2 
65-74  51.4 50.6 41.6 45.1 
75 and over  48.0 70.1 59.2 50.7 
55 and over  52.7 70.0 49.4 38.7 
All  58.7 59.6 47.0 39.3 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
 
Table G11: Share of persons living in owned housing unit, by age groups (%) 
Year of the survey 
1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005  Age group (years) 
All persons 
below 55  92.5 92.6 93.2 92.9 
55-59  95.7 96.8 95.8 95.5 
60-64  95.8 95.9 96.9 96.0 
65-74  95.3 95.9 96.1 97.5 
75 and over  93.8 93.3 92.3 95.1 
55 and over  95.2 95.6 95.4 96.2 
All  93.2 93.3 93.8 93.8 
  Persons with income below 60% of median disposable income 
below 55  86.4 91.2 89.4 82.8 
55-59  86.0 94.5 88.6 88.9 
60-64  95.3 92.0 89.3 93.8 
65-74  93.3 95.8 95.7 96.9 
75 and over  91.8 91.8 95.0 94.9 
55 and over  92.3 93.9 93.6 94.6 
All  88.4 92.2 91.0 87.5 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 274 
 
 
Table G12: Average floor area per person, by age groups (m
2) 
Year of the survey 
1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005  Age group (years) 
All persons 
below 55  23.8 24.7 24.7 26.1 
55-59  33.4 34.8 34.0 34.6 
60-64  33.4 35.3 36.9 39.4 
65-74  36.6 37.3 38.9 41.8 
75 and over  39.1 40.4 42.1 45.5 
55 and over  35.6 36.9 38.1 40.6 
All  26.7 27.7 28.1 29.9 
  Persons with income below 60% of median disposable income 
below 55  21.8 23.0 21.6 23.3 
55-59  27.8 35.6 39.7 38.3 
60-64  34.9 34.8 39.3 41.2 
65-74  38.1 39.0 42.1 49.1 
75 and over  43.4 44.0 42.3 48.8 
55 and over  37.4 39.2 41.4 46.5 
All  27.0 28.9 29.4 32.6 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Table G13: Average number of rooms per household member, by age groups 
Year of the survey 
1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005  Age group (years) 
All persons 
below 55  0.85 0.82 0.87 0.93 
55-59  1.18 1.05 1.17 1.19 
60-64  1.16 1.11 1.26 1.34 
65-74  1.28 1.27 1.34 1.43 
75 and over  1.26 1.62 1.42 1.57 
55 and over  1.22 1.31 1.31 1.39 
All  0.94 1.00 0.98 1.05 
  Persons with income below 60% of median disposable income 
below 55  0.74 0.87 0.75 0.82 
55-59  0.96 1.21 1.20 1.34 
60-64  1.11 1.23 1.24 1.35 
65-74  1.22 1.28 1.34 1.54 
75 and over  1.24 1.42 1.40 1.61 
55 and over  1.17 1.28 1.32 1.51 
All  0.88 0.97 0.98 1.10 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
 
Table G14: Share of persons living in a dwelling without bathroom, by age groups (%) 
Year of the survey 
1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005  Age group (years) 
All persons 
below 55    5.4    3.2  1.8  1.7 
55-59    5.5    3.0  3.0  2.9 
60-64    7.6    5.4  2.9  2.8 
65-74    9.5    6.8  4.4  3.6 
75 and over    9.4  10.0  9.2  6.4 
55 and over    8.1    6.3  4.8  3.9 
All    6.0    4.0  2.5  2.3 
  Persons with income below 60% of median disposable income 
below 55  16.3    9.4    8.7    9.4 
55-59  27.3 14.6 16.9 20.1 
60-64  17.7  19.7  15.4    8.9 
65-74  23.1 20.4 14.1 12.7 
75 and over  21.5 30.6 24.7 11.5 
55 and over  22.3 22.3 17.9 12.8 
All  18.3 14.1 12.3 10.7 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
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Table G15: Share of persons living in a dwelling without central heating, by age groups (%) 
Year of the survey 
1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005  Age group (years) 
All persons 
below 55  14.5  12.1  10.6    8.8 
55-59  16.0  12.1 8.6     9.2 
60-64  24.5 17.2 10.5 11.6 
65-74  25.5 23.5 15.8 12.5 
75 and over  32.0 30.2 27.6 20.1 
55 and over  24.2 20.8 15.7 13.3 
All  16.9 14.3 11.9 10.0 
  Persons with income below 60% of median disposable income 
below 55  34.9 29.5 27.2 27.8 
55-59  42.6 33.8 19.5 33.3 
60-64  50.4 34.4 23.9 27.6 
65-74  47.2 45.1 32.1 26.1 
75 and over  55.4 60.9 54.9 37.6 
55 and over  49.2 46.1 36.0 31.7 
All  39.7 35.5 30.7 29.4 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
Table G16: Share of the poor who make ends meet with (great) difficulty, by age groups (%) 
Year of the survey 
1997-1999 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005  Age group (years) 
With great difficulty 
below 55  37.4 37.8 41.7 44.9 
55-59  43.7 32.2 38.0 34.3 
60-64  21.1 27.8 33.5 18.0 
65-74  19.3 25.7 23.2 17.1 
75 and over  28.7 26.0 23.9 18.8 
55 and over  25.1 27.0 26.9 20.2 
All  33.3 33.8 35.9 35.0 
 With  difficulty 
below 55  38.2 33.9 33.8 30.6 
55-59  27.5 34.7 41.6 33.6 
60-64  39.3 34.7 32.8 43.8 
65-74  45.4 42.7 49.8 48.4 
75 and over  42.8 48.6 41.1 40.4 
55 and over  41.3 41.9 43.6 42.7 
All  39.2 36.8 37.7 35.4 
  With (great) difficulty  
below 55  75.6 71.7 75.5 75.4 
55-59  71.2 66.9 79.6 67.9 
60-64  60.5 62.5 66.3 61.9 
65-74  64.7 68.5 73.0 65.4 
75 and over  71.5 74.6 65.1 59.2 
55 and over  66.4 68.9 70.5 62.9 
All  72.5 70.7 73.5 70.4 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note: Poverty threshold is set at 60% of the median equivalent disposable income. 276 
Table G17: Persons in pensioner households and the unemployed, by age groups and selected income deciles, 2003-2005 (% of all persons)  
Age group (years) 
below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All  Income decile  
Persons in pensioner households 
1    6.1  38.5  67.6  76.4  92.8  75.8  34.1 
2    3.8  17.2  56.6  70.5  81.5  64.4  23.3 
10    0.2    5.1  33.2  56.2  71.9  35.3    7.6 
All    2.0  24.1  55.1  65.1  76.5  56.4  16.3 
 Unemployed 
1  30.6  21.4    6.0    0.5    0.0    4.0  19.9 
2  16.8  13.5    4.3    0.6    0.0    2.9  12.3 
10    1.6    1.0    1.4    0.0    0.0    0.7    1.4 
All    7.8    6.6    1.8    0.2    0.0    1.9    6.3 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
Table G18: Poverty incidence, by age groups and at different poverty thresholds; persons in pensioner households and the unemployed (%), 
2003-2005 
  Poverty threshold (% of national median disposable income) 
40%  50%  60%  70%  Number of all persons  Age group (years) 
Persons in pensioner households 
below 55    5.1  15.4  28.5  38.8     151.9 
55-59    5.7    6.8  17.0  20.4     146.0 
60-64    3.6    8.6  14.1  22.7     294.5 
65-74    4.8    1.6  20.3  29.3     597.4 
75 and over    5.9  15.1  35.3  48.9     467.5 
55 and over    5.0  11.2  23.4  33.2     1505.4 
All    5.0  11.6  23.9  33.7  1.657.2 
 The  unemployed 
below 55  14.3  22.8  36.5  49.8     585.7 
55-59  19.0  26.7  32.4  41.8       39.7 
60-64  26.2  26.2  33.3  57.5         9.8 
65-74  -  43.5  43.5  43.5         1.9 
75 and over  -  -  -  -         0.0 
55 and over  19.7  27.3  33.0  44.9       51.4 
All  14.7  23.1  36.2  49.4     637.1 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note: Poverty rates are calculated as percentages of persons with equivalised disposable income below 40%, 50%, 60%, and 70% of the 
national median disposable income. 
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Table G19: Share of women in all persons, by age groups and selected income deciles; all women and women in single households, 2003-
2005 (%) 
Age group (years) 
below 55  55-59  60-64  65-74  75 and over  55 and over  All  Income decile  
All women 
1  48.8 52.0  43.7  75.0  79.9  69.4  57.1 
2  48.6 47.0  66.5  65.6  75.7  66.9  54.5 
10  49.5 47.1  47.6  49.1  60.1  49.4  49.5 
All  48.8 48.7  51.0  57.6  70.6  57.2  51.0 
  Women in single households 
1    4.3  13.2  19.6  48.7  60.8  44.2  20.3 
2    1.6    6.3  25.3  34.2  45.8  33.0  11.7 
10    1.4    0.0    0.0    6.3  20.2    4.4    2.1 
All    1.3    3.3    8.8  18.5  37.0  17.4    5.5 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
 
Table G20: Poverty  incidence among women, by age groups and at different poverty thresholds; all women and women in single 
households, 2003-2005 (%)  
Poverty threshold (% of national median disposable income)  Number of all persons  Age group (years) 
40% 50% 60% 70%   
 All  women 
below 55    2.3    5.1    9.5  16.2  3,652.7 
55-59    3.4    5.7  11.3  17.4     294.7 
60-64    1.9    4.5  11.4  21.1     272.9 
65-74    5.5  12.4  23.2  32.3     527.8 
75 and over    4.8  13.8  34.4  46.9     431.4 
55 and over    4.3  10.1  21.9  31.5  1,526.8 
All    2.9    6.5  13.1  20.8  5,179.6 
  Women in single households 
below 55  15.4  22.3  34.1  39.0       95.1 
55-59  -    7.7  48.8  52.6       20.2 
60-64    6.8    6.8  27.7  52.6       46.9 
65-74    9.6  26.5  44.7  61.0     170.0 
75 and over    6.0  19.7  49.0  64.1     226.0 
55 and over    7.2  20.4  45.2  61.3     463.2 
All    8.6  20.7  43.3  57.5     558.2 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note: Poverty rates are calculated as percentages of persons with equivalised disposable income below 40%, 50%, 60%, and 70% of the 
national median disposable income. 
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Table G21: Poverty incidence among male and (single) female pensioners, by age groups and at different poverty thresholds, 2003-2005 (%) 
  Poverty threshold (% of national median disposable income)  Number of all persons 
40% 50% 60% 70%   Age group (years) 
Male pensioners 
below 55  5.7  11.8  19.7  25.3    90.9 
55-59  5.4    5.8  11.2  16.6  107.1 
60-64  3.7    8.0    9.8  16.5  217.8 
65-74  2.9    4.8  10.8  17.0  381.9 
75 and over  4.7    8.4  19.4  32.0  178.3 
55 and over  3.7    6.5  12.3  19.8  885.2 
All  3.9    7.0  13.0  20.3  976.1 
 Female  pensioners   
below 55  2.9    6.5  16.1  21.9     129.0 
55-59  0.4    0.9    6.5  11.4     225.2 
60-64  1.1    2.0    8.2  17.3     250.8 
65-74  4.8  11.5  20.6  29.3     494.4 
75 and over  4.7  13.7  34.4  46.6     416.4 
55 and over  3.4    8.7  20.2  29.4  1,386.7 
All  3.3    8.5  19.9  28.8  1,515.7 
  Female pensioners in single households 
below 55  13.5  13.5  74.0  74.0     7.6 
55-59  0.0    0.0  45.2  49.4    18.3 
60-64  4.7    4.7  26.0  51.4    45.8 
65-74  9.6 26.5  44.7  61.0  170.0 
75 and over  6.0 19.7  49.0  64.1  226.0 
55 and over  7.0 19.9  45.0  61.1  460.3 
All  7.1 19.8  45.4  61.3  467.9 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note: Poverty rates are calculated as percentages of persons with equivalised disposable income below 40%, 50%, 60%, and 70% of the 
national median disposable income. 
 
 
 
Table G22: Number of cases in the total sample (weighted), by age groups 
  Year of the survey 
Age group (years)  1997-1999  1999-2001  2001-2003  2003-2005 
below 55    8,839.8    8,541.2    7,891.7    7,478.2 
55-59       675.8       625.9       581.2       605.4 
60-64       649.0       636.0       542.6       534.7 
65-74    1,005.8    1,003.9       964.0       916.9 
75 and over       521.6       543.9       576.2       611.2 
55 and over    2,852.2    2,809.6    2,664.0    2,668.2 
All  11,693.0 11,350.8 10,555.7 10,146.4 
Source: SORS, Household Budget Surveys (1997-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005); own calculations. 
Note: See Section 8.3 for explanation of the equivalence scale used. 279 
 
  
 
Figure G1: Income components of the elderly, 1997-1999, Slovenia
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Figure G2: Income components of the elderly, 1999-2001; Slovenia
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Figure G3: Income components of the elderly, 2001-2003; Slovenia
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Figure G4: Income components of the elderly, 2003-2005; Slovenia
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Figure G5: 
Share of persons with income below the social minimum; Slovenia
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